Vietnam challenges Chinese dominance with new fortified Spratly island bases in South China Sea.

According to information published by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), on August 22, 2025, Vietnam has completed land reclamation on all of its occupied outposts in the Spratly Islands. New satellite imagery confirms that dredging and landfill operations have expanded to at least eight previously undeveloped reefs since early 2025, including Alison Reef, Collins Reef, East Reef, Landsdowne Reef, and Petley Reef. This development transforms Vietnam’s presence from austere pillbox positions into a fully fortified island chain, marking its most sweeping escalation in the South China Sea to date.
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Vietnam has completed new land reclamation and fortifications across all its Spratly outposts, turning reefs into militarized bases equipped with hardened depots and ready for missile deployment, directly challenging China’s dominance in the South China Sea (Picture source: CSIS/ AMTI/ MAXAR).

The pace and scale of this effort have altered the balance of power in contested waters. By March 2025, Vietnam’s reclaimed land in the Spratlys reached 1.343 hectares, closing much of the gap with China’s 1,882 hectares built over the past decade. Vietnam added a record 259 hectares in 2024 alone, a surge that positions Hanoi as the only regional actor significantly narrowing Beijing’s lead in the island-building race. The acceleration is more than symbolic; it reflects Vietnam’s boldest attempt yet to reshape the regional security architecture.

Military infrastructure now dominates the reclaimed reefs. At least seven positions, including Barque Canada Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Ladd Reef, Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, Sand Cay, and Tennent Reef, are equipped with hardened ammunition depots enclosed by blast walls. Barque Canada Reef alone contains three distinct storage sites, underscoring its role as a priority logistics hub. These fortifications allow the reefs to sustain combat operations and resist long-range strikes, turning once-vulnerable positions into viable forward bases.

The next phase of militarization is defined by armament. Vietnam has steadily expanded its arsenal with both imported and domestically produced systems, many of which could be deployed on these reclaimed outposts. Foremost is the VCS-01 Trường Sơn coastal defense missile system, fielded by Viettel. Using VCM-01 cruise missiles with a range of up to 300 km, these batteries can deny access to wide swathes of the South China Sea. Their mobility and relatively small footprint make them well suited for deployment on reclaimed reefs reinforced with hardened pads. Vietnam has also positioned Israeli-made EXTRA artillery rocket systems in the Spratlys, providing rapid saturation strike options from small platforms. Combined with air-search radars, short-range air defense systems, and UAV reconnaissance, these capabilities create a credible anti-access envelope against both regional navies and larger powers.

Infrastructure developments reinforce this posture. New harbors, strengthened coastal perimeters, and expanded logistics shelters are transforming reefs into hubs for resupply and naval staging. Unlike China’s approach of building massive artificial islands like Fiery Cross or Subi Reef, Vietnam has pursued a dispersed strategy, smaller but coordinated fortifications that form a mutually supporting network across the southern South China Sea. This creates a lattice of forward operating bases able to complicate hostile maneuvering while ensuring year-round operational readiness.

Vietnam’s determination to militarize the Spratlys stems from its strategic reality. Hanoi has faced repeated confrontations with Chinese vessels over oil exploration, fishing rights, and survey activities. Diplomatic protests alone have failed to prevent encroachment. The fortified reefs therefore represent the military dimension of Vietnam’s “active defense” doctrine, aimed at deterring aggression by raising the cost of coercion. By integrating domestically produced systems such as the VCS-01 and showcasing them in real operational conditions, Vietnam also strengthens its defense industry ambitions and signals a long-term commitment to self-reliance.

What is at stake extends far beyond sovereignty markers. The South China Sea is one of the world’s busiest maritime arteries, carrying an estimated one-third of global trade. Control over the Spratly Islands strengthens claims to vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) rich in hydrocarbons, fisheries, and seabed minerals. Fortified islands with anti-ship and air defense systems grant Vietnam both resource access and a stronger role in securing maritime trade routes. At the same time, they complicate freedom of navigation operations by the United States and allied navies, creating new points of tension in the great power competition unfolding in Asia. Vietnam’s fortified Spratly chain is therefore more than a defensive line. It represents a deliberate strategic shift: a hardened, distributed network of bases capable of denying adversaries, anchoring national sovereignty, and reshaping the strategic geometry of the South China Sea. With every outpost now militarized, Hanoi has entrenched itself as a far more credible actor in one of the world’s most volatile maritime flashpoints. The Spratly Islands are no longer just scattered reefs, they are a fortified tripwire whose activation could reverberate across the entire Indo-Pacific.