US Warfighters Hone Arctic Domain Awareness in Alaska’s NATO in the North.

The Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies ran a new “NATO in the North” virtual course from Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson, Alaska, on Sept. 16–18, 2025, with Norway’s NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. It trains mid- to senior-level practitioners on Arctic domain awareness and NATO operations, skills the alliance needs as the northern flank grows in importance after Finland and Sweden’s accession.

The Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies hosted the inaugural “NATO in the North” virtual course from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Sept. 16–18, 2025, in partnership with Norway’s NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. The course mixed expert panels, interactive breakouts, and a scenario-based capstone focused on a plausible High North crisis, drawing 117 participants from 17 nations (center figures). It also touched repeatedly on equipment choices and performance in extreme cold, from C2 platforms to mobility and sustainment, so forces can actually operate with limited daylight and subzero temperatures.
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US Marines with II Marine Expeditionary Force train on BV206 tracked terrain vehicles in Setermoen, Norway, February 2, 2022 (Picture source: US DoD)

Organizers described the course as the first program jointly designed and delivered by the Stevens Center with an international partner. This matters operationally because cold-weather expertise is distributed across Europe, particularly in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, where winter infantry tactics, snow mobility, and austere air operations are routine. Speakers included NATO officials, general officers, and the Stevens Center’s National and Arctic Interest Chairs for Norway, Sweden, and Canada. The stated purpose was straightforward: help practitioners map the northern area of responsibility, understand the realities of operating in this environment, and think through deterrence and defense in a climate that quickly penalizes errors. It is an educational effort with a concrete aim, since the Arctic imposes a logistics problem even before any adversary appears.

Cold regions require a different toolset, and the course content reflected that. Movement on snow and ice depends on tracked carriers such as articulated BvS10-class vehicles or older BV206 types that spread weight over a wide footprint, enabling transit across tundra and muskeg where wheeled platforms bog down. Infantry equipment must be adapted with layered cold-weather clothing, vapor-barrier boots, and face protection that does not hinder weapon handling, along with lubricants and propellants that work when the thermometer falls. Small arms and crew-served weapons typically need low-temperature lubricants and careful condensation management when moving from shelters to outside air.

Artillery units face issues with propellant temperature and fuze reliability; command posts contend with moisture and battery performance. Radios and power systems are fragile in the cold if not hardened, so redundant batteries, heaters, and improvised insulation are not optional, they enable missions. Aviation adds further constraints. Helicopters must manage engine starts, blade de-icing, and whiteout risk. Fixed-wing ISR platforms and maritime patrol aircraft face icing, long overwater sorties, and limited diversion airfields. The course stressed that equipment is only useful if sustainment keeps it within operating limits.

Command, control, and sensing took center stage because the Arctic is vast, dark in winter, and sparsely populated. Situational awareness relies on a network of systems: over-the-horizon radar, satellite surveillance and communications, maritime patrol aircraft such as P-8-class platforms, and airborne early warning assets when weather permits. Participants examined how NATO’s mix of legacy and upgraded command systems integrate under low-bandwidth, high-latitude conditions where geostationary satellites sit low on the horizon and links fade. The practical problem is simple and unforgiving: limited line of sight, magnetic interference affecting navigation, and long distances that force planners to conserve fuel and margins. This is why cold-weather operations also rely on prepositioned stocks, protected fuel handling, and airfields hardened to withstand extreme temperature cycles. The final exercise asked students to apply these constraints realistically, trading off coverage versus survivability and speed versus preservation of equipment.

At the tactical and operational levels, the lessons are concrete. Units that intend to operate in the High North must train for movement and survival first, not only marksmanship or air tasking procedures. Patrol tempo slows; medical evacuation timelines lengthen; white camouflage and light discipline weigh as much as any fire plan. Interoperability here is a set of drills: common cold-weather SOPs, shared weather products and maps, compatible fuels and de-icing fluids, and a common operational picture that does not collapse when a satellite link degrades. Air and maritime forces need to coordinate around narrow weather windows and monitor icing forecasts closely. Ground units require rehearsed recovery plans for vehicles that break through ice and depend on engineers who can open routes, cross frozen rivers, and mark hazards that shift with freeze-thaw cycles. None of this is spectacular, but it turns deterrence into usable capability.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has reshaped defense planning in Europe and highlighted that Moscow maintains substantial military infrastructure in the Arctic, including bases, air defenses, and a fleet with ice-capable assets. China portrays itself as a near-Arctic actor and invests in polar research, shipping, and under-ice science, which may have dual-use implications over time. With Finland and Sweden now inside the Alliance, NATO’s northern frontage is longer and better anchored, but also more exposed to distance, climate, and infrastructure scarcity.

This is where education has utility. Building a cadre with Arctic awareness is a cost-effective way to harmonize doctrine, normalize cold-weather standards, and set realistic expectations for what forces can do in January north of the Arctic Circle. The Stevens Center’s decision to offer the course twice a year and co-lead it with the Norwegian center of excellence indicates a plan to maintain a transatlantic rhythm of learning rather than a one-off seminar. For a U.S. readership, there is also a local angle. Alaska is part of homeland defense architecture, not simply a training backdrop, and courses designed there and linked to European cold-weather expertise reflect that.