US Department of War Urges Missile Contractors to Double Output for Possible China Conflict.

The US Department of War has asked major contractors to boost production of 12 priority missiles by two to four times, to rebuild stockpiles and prepare for a possible conflict with China. The push follows high-level meetings with industry and reflects shortages after recent wars, raising questions about timelines, cost, and supply chains.

The Wall Street Journal reported on September 29, 2025 that the U.S. Department of War pressed missile suppliers to double or even quadruple output across a dozen critical munitions after summer meetings with top officials and primes. The effort echoed by wire services aims to close gaps exposed by recent conflicts and ensure the U.S. isn’t constrained by precision-munition shortages in the Indo-Pacific. It matters because production lead times, seeker and rocket-motor bottlenecks, and skilled-labor constraints could slow rearmament even with more funding.
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A full Patriot missile system was deployed and set up during field operations at Fort Cavazos, Texas, on September 3, 2025. (Picture source: US DoD)

Modern missile production cannot be expanded at the flip of a switch. Programs depend on specialized suppliers for solid rocket motors, seekers, radomes, guidance electronics, fuzes, and energetic materials, many of which have long lead times and limited qualified vendors. Among a dozen priority lines cited to the industry, the Patriot surface-to-air system features prominently. A typical Patriot battery combines an AN/MPQ-65 family phased-array radar, engagement control stations, and towed launchers that can load PAC-3 MSE interceptors. The PAC-3 MSE uses hit-to-kill guidance to defeat aircraft, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles at high altitude. Experience in Ukraine highlighted the system’s value against complex threats, while also exposing the pace at which interceptor stocks can be consumed during sustained defense of urban and critical infrastructure.

The Pentagon’s guidance also points to naval and air-launched weapons that underpin theater defense and deep strike. The Standard Missile-6, deployed on Aegis destroyers and cruisers, provides long-range area air defense and has a terminal capability against certain ballistic threats. It also retains a surface-strike mode, giving commanders options against ships or other targets at sea. The Tomahawk Block V remains a principal subsonic cruise missile for long-range strikes beyond 1,600 kilometers, used to suppress integrated air defenses and strike fixed infrastructure from standoff range. The JASSM-ER extends air-launched strike beyond 900 kilometers with a low-observable airframe and combined GPS and inertial guidance, allowing bombers and fighters to reach defended targets inside layered air defenses associated with anti-access and area-denial concepts. For air superiority, the AIM-120 AMRAAM continues as the main beyond-visual-range missile across U.S. and allied fleets and also equips ground systems such as NASAMS. At the tactical end, AGM-114 Hellfire remains in wide service on helicopters and unmanned aircraft for precision engagements against armored vehicles and fortified positions.

Operationally, these families are interdependent. Patriot and SM-6 can feed data through networked fire control architectures such as the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, improving track quality and engagement timing across dispersed launchers. Tomahawk and JASSM-ER provide early strike options against key nodes like radar sites, logistics hubs, or command facilities that enable adversary missile salvos. AMRAAM supports air policing and counterair tasks and can be reassigned to ground defense when required. The problem repeatedly cited by commanders is the economics of defense: expensive interceptors are used to stop low-cost drones and rockets, and adversaries may intentionally exploit that disparity with saturation tactics.

The push for greater output reflects a strategic shift inside the Department of War after two decades of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Planning has moved toward potential high-end conflict where salvo size, magazine depth, and reload speed matter as much as platform performance. Secretary Hegseth has argued that China is rehearsing for an invasion of Taiwan while expanding conventional and nuclear forces. China’s doctrine leverages large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at air bases, ports, and naval task groups to limit U.S. access to the Western Pacific. For U.S. planners, resilient stocks of interceptors and long-range strike weapons are now treated as core readiness metrics rather than supplemental procurement.

There is also a broader geopolitical angle. While support to Ukraine has absorbed U.S. attention and resources, Washington is redirecting planning efforts toward the Indo-Pacific. Partners including Japan, South Korea, and Australia are investing in air and missile defense and in longer-range strike to complicate Chinese operational planning. Beijing describes these measures as provocative and destabilizing and frames them as efforts to intensify regional tension. Regardless of rhetoric, perceptions of thin U.S. stockpiles and fragile supply chains could invite tests of resolve if industrial capacity does not improve.

For industry, the request implies multi-year commitments. Expanding lines for motors, seekers, and warheads requires capital expenditure, workforce growth, and quality assurance for safety-critical energetics. Subtier suppliers will need long-lead funding and predictable order books to qualify additional tooling and reduce single-point failures. Government will have to address bottlenecks such as aging motor production, environmental permitting for energetics, and limited foundry capacity for radiation-hardened components. Even with these steps, raising output of complex interceptors like PAC-3 MSE by a factor of four is a multi-year undertaking due to test cycles, certification, and supply qualification.