Ukraine targets mass production of FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles for long range strikes in Russia.

Ukraine’s Fire Point design bureau says it can shift to mass serial production of its new FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles by mid-2026, if Kyiv locks in funding and firm orders, with codification of the FP-7 expected by the end of this year. That level of output, measured in hundreds of missiles per month, would give Ukraine an indigenous long-range strike magazine that can pressure Russian logistics, command nodes, and energy infrastructure even if Western deliveries slow.

Ukraine is quietly preparing for a world in which its long-range firepower depends less on foreign stocks and more on its own factories. In a recent interview with Ukrainian media, Fire Point’s chief designer indicated that, once state orders and financing are confirmed, the company could pivot to mass serial production of ballistic missiles as early as May, speaking of “hundreds per month” rather than dozens. That projection comes as Fire Point finalizes codification of its FP-7 tactical ballistic missile and advances work on the longer-range FP-9, a pairing that would move Ukraine from ad hoc deep strikes to something closer to a standing ballistic arsenal.
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The combined fielding of the FP-7 and FP-9 would alter Ukraine’s operational depth (Picture source: Fire Point)

The FP-7 is the entry point of Ukraine’s modern ballistic program. Its declared range exceeds 200 kilometers, it carries a 150-kilogram warhead and reaches a peak velocity of 1 500 meters per second. The missile’s airframe is constructed entirely from composite materials, providing the rigidity required to withstand thermal loads during atmospheric reentry. A flight altitude of roughly 65 kilometers and a stated accuracy of 14 meters position it as a versatile option for targeting command posts, intermediate storage sites or energy infrastructure located within the operational depth near the front. Codification should enable accelerated integration into existing firing units, particularly those equipped with ground platforms adapted for this class of munition.

The FP-9 represents a shift in scale. Its declared range of 855 kilometers and an 800-kilogram warhead open operational scenarios comparable to certain intermediate-range systems developed in parts of Asia. A terminal speed of 2 200 meters per second and an estimated flight altitude of 70 kilometers give it a trajectory capable of circumventing some of the standard layouts of Russian layered air defenses. An accuracy of about 20 meters allows strikes on critical infrastructure without relying on an area-effect warhead. The missile retains a monoblock configuration with a single propulsion phase, yet it aligns with Ukraine’s requirement for a comparatively economical long-range strike option when contrasted with cruise missiles.

The external appearance of the FP-7 and FP-9 has drawn attention due to its similarity to the 48N6 missiles used by the S-300PM and S-400 systems. Fire Point acknowledges this lineage, noting that the geometry of such a missile is the product of long-term optimization. Adopting a proven design reduces development risk while replacing all guidance, control and electronic components with Ukrainian systems. The original 48N6, developed during the late Soviet period and introduced around 1990, is not exclusively a Russian technology. Its repeated use in a surface-to-surface mode against Ukrainian urban areas prompted Ukrainian engineers to study its ballistic behaviour before designing a lighter composite structure with the inertial characteristics needed for the trajectories sought.

The industrial expansion outlined to BBC News Ukraine becomes clearer when viewed within Fire Point’s broader ecosystem. The company routinely delivers Flamingo FP-5 cruise missiles, which can reach 3 000 kilometers and carry a 1 150-kilogram warhead powered by an Ivchenko AI-25TL engine and guided by an inertial system coupled with GPS. FP-1 first-person-view drones, widely employed for long-range harassment strikes, account for more than half of Ukrainian attacks on targets inside Russia. This demonstrates a production base that is agile and relies heavily on locally manufactured components. Such experience with complex platforms makes the projection of several hundred ballistic missiles per month plausible, although actual implementation will depend on access to solid propellants, high-density composites and the quality-control infrastructure required for this category of weapons.

The combined fielding of the FP-7 and FP-9 would alter Ukraine’s operational depth. A 200-kilometer ballistic missile launched near the contact line gives Russian forces minimal reaction time. An 855-kilometer system, by contrast, enables strikes on major logistics centers, key railway junctions or fuel depots located well within Russian territory. The strategic effect would be twofold: it would limit Moscow’s logistical freedom while broadening Kyiv’s options in a context where foreign deliveries remain uncertain. Producing hundreds of missiles per month would change stability on the theater by enabling repeated salvos designed to strain defensive systems and create tactical openings for ground maneuver units.