UK to grant troops clear legal authority to neutralize drones near bases.

The UK government plans to give troops and MoD police an explicit legal basis to take down unidentified drones that threaten military installations, Defence Secretary John Healey said in London on 20 October 2025. The move, driven by a rise in incursions across Europe linked by allies to Russian activity, could later extend to critical infrastructure like airports.

British forces will be empowered to kinetically engage hostile or unidentified uncrewed aircraft around UK military sites under proposals tied to the next Armed Forces Bill, according to briefings ahead of a speech by Defence Secretary John Healey. Initial authority would cover domestic bases and MoD facilities, with options to designate additional locations if threat conditions warrant, media reports indicate. The plan follows months of European drone sightings near sensitive areas and recent incursions near RAF bases used by the United States.
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UK RF directed-energy demonstrator mounted on a truck during counter-UAS trials, 2025 (Picture source: British MoD)

Currently, site defense in the UK relies mainly on non-kinetic measures. Counter-UAS units detect and track small aircraft using radio-frequency and optronic sensors, intercept control links, and force landing or diversion when feasible. The plan within the forthcoming Armed Forces Bill would allow soldiers or the Ministry of Defence Police to use force, individual weapons, adapted munitions, or other effectors when a drone poses an immediate threat to personnel, facilities, or operations above a designated site.

Two technical elements shape this evolution. First, base protection already uses fusion of RF sensors (direction finding, protocol analysis) and EO/IR to classify Class-1 platforms before applying soft-kill effects such as link disruption or GNSS interference. Second, UK authorities tested in 2025 radio-frequency directed-energy options capable of addressing swarms, offering a scalable path where ammunition-heavy solutions are unsuitable. These components do not replace kinetic engagement; they precede and frame it to resolve most cases without firing.

Commanders would move from soft-kill to hard-kill within one legal framework rather than relying on exceptions. Practically, this implies closer integration between security posts, C-UAS operators, and military police, with identification when possible, followed by graduated effects, jam, take over, destroy, based on distance, flight profile, and risk assessment (potential payload, rapid approach, inspection trajectory). Coordination with air traffic control and local police remains essential to avoid airspace conflicts, particularly near airport approaches.

The British posture against light drones combines three layers. First, multi-sensor detection that blends RF scanners, low-RCS radars, and EO/IR cameras to maintain track on low-altitude targets. Second, electronic attack through uplink or GNSS disruption, favored for low cost and reversibility. Third, hard-kill for very short-notice threats or suspected explosive payloads, ranging from individual weapons with frangible cartridges to specific effectors or directed-energy systems. The explicit authorization to use force fully legalizes this third layer and limits the window in which a hostile device can act over a sensitive site.

The immediate context drives the reform. Recently, Warsaw reported several drones entering from its eastern border, while airspace violations were noted over Estonia. In the UK, suspicious activity has been observed near bases, including those hosting allied assets. Such below-threshold actions create uncertainty and disrupt sortie generation, whether for strategic transport, ISR, or training. By clarifying engagement authority, London aims to deter opportunistic reconnaissance flights, reduce operational interruptions, and protect the confidentiality of activities on its territory.

At the European level, the measure fits a broader effort to structure peacetime counter-drone defense. Work launched in Brussels targets initial common capabilities by 2026 and a broader baseline by 2027, acknowledging that very low-cost platforms can harass critical infrastructure far from front lines. For the UK, asserting the ability to quickly neutralize a drone over a base also carries an allied dimension: facilities supporting NATO missions will not depend on ad hoc procedures when the threat is small, fast, and ambiguous. Moscow contests links to such incidents, but the intended effect is to reduce reaction times, stabilize practice through domestic law, and raise the cost of pressure tactics in the gray zone.