U.S. quietly revives Puerto Rico military base as Caribbean strike posture hardens near Venezuela.

The United States has quietly reactivated the former Roosevelt Roads naval base in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, while concentrating F-35s, a carrier strike group, bombers, and amphibious forces across the Caribbean. The posture, publicly framed as counter-narcotics, in practice gives Washington a ready-made launchpad for coercive options against Venezuela and a testbed for networked maritime strike operations.

Roosevelt Roads, the sprawling Cold War-era naval hub that Washington shuttered in 2004, is quietly back in business. According to a recent CBS News report from the base and corroborating satellite imagery, U.S. forces have rebuilt key airfield infrastructure and begun sustained operations from the site just as a powerful air and naval package moves into the Caribbean opposite Venezuela. Officially, Pentagon and White House officials describe the activity as part of an expanded counter-drug mission, but the scale, mix, and readiness of the forces involved point to a broader effort to reestablish a U.S. strike posture in the southern approaches to the Atlantic.
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On Nov. 4, 2025, a U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 225, U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, takes off from José Aponte de la Torre Airport in Ceiba, Puerto Rico. (Picture source: US DoD)

Roosevelt Roads once formed the core of the US framework for sea control and anti-submarine warfare in the region. The base now hosts, among other assets, a detachment of ten F-35 Lightning II aircraft deployed since early September for missions officially focused on countering drug cartels. The aircraft’s active electronically scanned radar, sensor fusion, and electro-optical system allow the crews to detect and classify surface targets or low flying aircraft at long range while maintaining a reduced signature. From Puerto Rico, an F-35 can cover most of the southern Caribbean and return without air-to-air refuelling, which offers operational planners options that did not exist when the base was closed in 2004.

The air posture becomes more complex with a B-52 Stratofortress bomber flying over the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford on its way to the Caribbean. With a combat radius of several thousand kilometres, the B-52 can launch cruise missiles or maritime strike munitions while remaining outside most air defence bubbles. For its part, the Ford class carrier employs nuclear propulsion, a dense embarked air wing, and an integrated radar and combat management system designed for layered air defence, combining fighters, airborne early warning aircraf,t and long-range surface-to-air missiles.

The western Atlantic now includes four US Navy vessels, among them USS Gerald R. Ford and three guided missile destroyers, while seven other ships operate inside the Caribbean basin itself. This second group includes two guided missile cruisers, an amphibious assault helicopter carrier, and two landing platform dock ships, forming a package that combines area air defence and the ability to project Marine units ashore. Destroyers and cruisers fitted with the Aegis combat system generally carry vertical launch cells for surface-to-air missiles and Tomahawk-type cruise missiles, creating a protective bubble around the carrier and other high-value units.

Since the beginning of September, US forces have also been conducting live fire operations against small craft identified by Washington as traffickers’ boats, with at least twenty strikes reported and around eighty people killed. These engagements sustain a narrative focused on counter narcotics and, at the same tim,e allow targeting chains, command and control architectures (C2,) and rules of engagement to be tested in the same maritime space that would be used for any action against Venezuelan assets.

The US posture combines air presence, long-range fires, and amphibious capacity. Carrier-based fighters and land-based F-35s can cooperate within a shared recognised maritime picture (RMP) and common operational picture (COP), fed by the sensors of maritime patrol aircraft, surface ship radars, and space-based assets. Amphibious forces centred on an assault ship and landing ship transports can conduct presence operations, reinforce US or allied facilities, or even threaten limited operations along the Venezuelan coastline and nearby islands, which complicates the protection of critical infrastructure. Under a regime of electromagnetic emission control (EMCON), destroyers and cruisers reduce their electromagnetic footprint while relying on off-board sensors to cue their interceptors, maintaining uncertainty on the Venezuelan side about which node in the network is actually tracking their forces.

Washington presents the pressure applied to Caracas as a response to the Maduro government’s alleged links with cartels and as a tool for regional stability, but the scale and quality of the assets assembled go well beyond standard counter-narcotics patrols. Strikes at sea, repeated meetings in the White House crisis centre, and the presence of senior officials from the vice president to the secretary of defense and the secretary of state indicate that military options on Venezuelan territory are treated as credible instruments alongside sanctions and diplomatic channels. For the Venezuelan authorities, images of US ships and aircraft operating in their immediate vicinity feed a narrative of invasion threat and external aggression, useful for closing ranks around the regime.

The reactivation of Roosevelt Roads and the concentration of advanced capabilities in the Caribbean have consequences for international security. The crisis reminds navies and air forces that access to hardened infrastructure, interoperable data links, and sustainable logistics matters as much as platform choice, encouraging renewed interest in offset mechanisms and industrial partnerships with US suppliers. For Russia and China, Venezuela becomes a potential arena for observation and military cooperation, while neighbouring states must weigh the benefits of increased US protection against the risks of escalation in their immediate environment.