U.S. Army tests shared counter-drone system with Polish and Romanian forces.

U.S., Polish, and Romanian air defense units have completed a two-week course in Nowa Dęba, Poland, capped by a live fire event that showcased a mobile counter-unmanned aircraft system based around the Merops truck-mounted interceptor drone architecture. The system offers NATO commanders a lower-cost way to defeat small drones on the alliance’s eastern flank, easing pressure on high-end air and missile defense assets as Russian UAV activity continues to probe Polish and Romanian airspace.

The U.S. Army has confirmed that soldiers from the United States, Poland, and Romania gathered at Nowa Dęba training area to fire a new mobile counter-drone system that links radar and electro-optical sensors to a small interceptor drone launched from the back of a pickup truck. The capability, closely aligned with the U.S.-developed Merops system already combat-proven in Ukraine, is being introduced on NATO’s eastern flank at a time when Russian Shahed-type and other unmanned aircraft have repeatedly violated Polish and Romanian airspace.
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A Polish soldier prepares to launch a C UAS system during a demonstration at the Nowa Deba Training Area in Poland on Nov. 18, 2025. (Picture source: US DoD)

The core of the capability is a compact and mobile counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) architecture that combines a radar and electro optical sensors with a small interceptor drone designed to neutralise hostile UAS at short range. All major subsystems fit on a light tactical vehicle or civilian-style pickup truck, allowing a four-person crew to move, emplace, and reload the system in a matter of minutes. At Nowa Dęba, the crews use a truck-mounted launcher to engage target drones acting as surrogate threats, then recover the interceptors under parachute for reuse in training. This approach immediately reduces the cost of each training sequence and allows a higher number of live engagements, instead of limiting preparation to screen-based simulations.

During these exercises, several systems are employed. Among them is a Merops-type solution integrating the Surveyor interceptor drone, already used in Ukraine against Shahed-type attack drones. The interceptor drone reaches speeds above 175 mph, follows adaptive trajectories and carries a military payload intended to destroy the opposing drone on impact or in proximity.

It is also recovered under parachute in training mode, which matches the profile observed at Nowa Dęba. These elements are consistent with the official description of a mobile system, reusable for training and originally designed as an expendable munition in operations, intended to remain less costly than the drones it is supposed to shoot down.

For the commanders who will employ this capability, the main argument is not only the ability to destroy the target, but also the cost balance it offers against low-cost aerial threats. Brigadier General Curtis King, commanding general of the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, notes during the demonstration that this type of interceptor has already been used in Ukraine against Russian unmanned platforms and that it proves both effective and economical to employ. Designed as an expendable munition, the drone effector makes it possible to engage inexpensive quadcopters or one-way attack UAS without firing long range surface to air interceptors reserved for crewed aircraft, cruise missiles or ballistic threats. The experience gained in Ukraine provides concrete data on reliability and performance even before the system arrives on NATO territory, shortening the cycle between battlefield improvisation and formal fielding decisions.

Polish and Romanian officers present on the range directly link the Nowa Dęba course to recent airspace violations and drone incidents over their territories. Each unexplained flight, whether it ends with debris found in a rural area or with a radar track disappearing near a border, forces national authorities to choose between launching costly interceptors, scrambling fighter aircraft, or accepting an unidentified contact inside the air picture. A short-range system mounted on a truck, deployable close to borders, ammunition depots, logistics hubs, or energy infrastructure, offers a more flexible option. It gives local commanders a graduated response, especially when the political and military costs associated with using crewed aircraft or heavy missiles would be out of proportion with a single small UAS.

The course follows a train-the-trainer model that forms part of NATO’s broader effort to harmonise counter-UAS procedures along the eastern flank. U.S. soldiers from 1st Battalion, 57th Air Defense Artillery Regiment work closely with their Polish and Romanian counterparts in classrooms, simulators, and live fire conditions, forming crews that will become the core of national training teams.

From the outset, instructors focus on integrating the system into existing command and control (C2) arrangements and feeding its tracks into the recognised multi-domain picture and the common operational picture (RMP/COP) used by headquarters to manage air defence fires. Once these habits are in place, apparently secondary factors such as radio discipline, emission control (EMCON) practices, and interoperability with other NATO short-range assets weigh as heavily as the interceptor’s technical performance.

On a front where Russian forces continually test NATO reactions with drones, electronic warfare activity, and occasional airspace incursions, each practical layer of protection reinforces the credibility of allied deterrence without requiring demonstrative measures. The ability of U.S., Polish, and Romanian units to deploy, train, and operate a shared C-UAS solution sends a clear signal that the eastern flank rests not only on large tactical formations and high-end air and missile defence systems, but also on tools adapted to the drone attrition campaigns that now shape high-intensity conflicts.

For the European defence, repeated demonstrations of systems proven in combat generate demand for production, maintenance, and industrial compensation arrangements, while giving engineers direct feedback from operating crews. In the longer term, integrating mobile C-UAS units into NATO’s eastern flank deterrence line confirms that protecting forces and infrastructure against low-cost unmanned threats is becoming a central task of European defence, rather than a marginal issue at the edge of high-intensity scenarios.