Breaking News
Russia Launches Full Nuclear Triad Drill While NATO Runs Parallel Nuclear Exercise.
Russia has launched a nationwide nuclear exercise under President Vladimir Putin’s direct supervision, testing land, sea, and air components of its deterrent force. The timing coincides with NATO’s annual nuclear-deterrence drill, heightening scrutiny of command readiness and signaling dynamics between the two blocs.
On 22 October 2025, Russia confirmed that President Vladimir Putin personally ordered and supervised a strategic nuclear exercise involving the full nuclear triad, land-based, sea-based, and airborne forces, as reported by the Russian News Agency TASS. Coming as NATO simultaneously runs its own annual nuclear-deterrence drill, the moment concentrates attention on competing demonstrations of readiness and command-and-control credibility. The Kremlin frames Moscow’s drill as routine, but the choreography and timing carry clear strategic messaging for Euro-Atlantic audiences and partners in Asia. This concurrency raises the risk that signals are misread while also underlining that escalation control remains central to both blocs’ deterrence doctrines.
Russia’s nuclear triad includes land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers. It ensures flexible and survivable nuclear deterrence (Picture Generated with AI)
According to official readouts and international reporting, the Russian exercise featured a launch of a land-based Yars intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk site toward the Kura range in Kamchatka, a Sineva submarine-launched ballistic missile fired from the nuclear-powered submarine Bryansk in the Barents Sea, and cruise-missile launches from Tu-95MS strategic bombers. The Kremlin said the event tested the readiness of command bodies and the practical skills of operational personnel, with all assigned tasks completed. The selection of systems and the emphasis on triad integration are consistent with a full-spectrum readiness test rather than a narrow tactical scenario.
This composition matters. The Yars ICBM remains the backbone of Russia’s land-based deterrent and is routinely exercised for both silo-based and road-mobile employment. Sineva provides a cold-weather, high-latitude sea-based firing option from Delta IV-class submarines in the Northern Fleet’s bastions, while Tu-95MS aircraft allow long-range air-launched cruise-missile profiles with flexible routing. When demonstrated together under centralized control, these arms validate cross-domain connectivity and the survivability logic at the heart of Moscow’s deterrent. The Kremlin has labeled today’s training “scheduled,” a description that is consistent with previous autumn triad drills.
NATO, for its part, is conducting Steadfast Noon, the Alliance’s long-scheduled nuclear-deterrence training exercise hosted this year by the Netherlands, with activity also taking place in the airspace of Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Denmark. NATO officials emphasize that the exercise involves no live nuclear weapons and is not directed at any specific country, focusing instead on testing the procedures, safety measures, and coordination of dual-capable aircraft under a strict security framework. The 2025 edition, running from 13 to 24 October, features participation by F-35A fighters from several allied air forces, with U.S. B-52 bombers reported to be involved in supporting roles alongside refueling, surveillance, and command-and-control aircraft.
Operationally, Russia’s current drill sits within a pattern of annual strategic-forces events that typically occur in the autumn and often include a land-based ICBM launch from Plesetsk, an SLBM from a Northern Fleet boat, and air-launched cruise-missile profiles by Tu-95MS. Similar triad demonstrations were recorded in late October 2024 and in preceding years, underscoring a continuity of training objectives and signaling practice. While each iteration is billed as routine, the context of 2025, a prolonged war in Ukraine, strained arms-control mechanisms, and expanded NATO membership, sharpens how such “routine” looks to audiences on both sides.
The fact that both blocs are conducting nuclear exercises at the same time is pivotal. For Moscow, synchronizing a full-triad script during Steadfast Noon reiterates that it can orchestrate land, sea and air components under unified command even as Western air forces exercise nuclear-delivery procedures in Europe. For NATO, continuing Steadfast Noon on schedule while Russia fires an ICBM, an SLBM, and air-launched cruise missiles communicates steadiness and confidence in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the credibility of its escalation-management architecture. Each side is messaging resolve to its own publics and to third countries, including partners and fence-sitters watching how nuclear backstops are maintained amid conventional conflict.
Geopolitically, today’s Russian drill and NATO’s Steadfast Noon compress the signaling space. The choreography is designed to deter, but parallel exercises raise the premium on transparency and reliable deconfliction to avoid unintended escalation driven by misinterpretation of telemetry, flight paths, or electronic signatures. Geostrategically, Russia’s launch sequence demonstrates the Northern Fleet’s enduring role in bastion defense and second-strike assurance, while NATO’s dispersion of dual-capable aircraft across multiple bases rehearses survivability and allied burden-sharing in a contested air environment. Militarily, both drills train the human and machine interfaces that matter most in a crisis: secure communications, positive control, and the procedural discipline to execute complex orders under stress.
The message is clear and potentially stabilizing, if managed with care. Russia has just showcased full-spectrum nuclear readiness while NATO wraps up its own strategic deterrence exercise. Though both sides frame these drills as routine, their timing amplifies the strategic stakes and global scrutiny. In today’s nuclear landscape, credible deterrence depends not only on hardware and maneuvers, but on deliberate signaling and transparent protocols that prevent a high-risk rivalry from spiraling into unintended escalation.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.