Russia creates Kinzhal interceptor to prevent Ukrainian kamikaze drones from hitting key targets.

As reported by Bes Pilot on July 7, 2025, at the Innoprom 2025 exhibition in Yekaterinburg, Russia revealed the Kinzhal, a new interceptor drone developed by ASF‑Innovations. The UAV, bearing the same name as the Russian hypersonic missile, is designed to intercept enemy drones through direct collision. It features a mid-wave infrared homing seeker installed in the nose section for thermal-based guidance, and reaches a maximum speed of 300 kilometers per hour.
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The interceptor drone, developed by the Russian company ASF-Innovations and named identically to the Kh-47M2 hypersonic missile, is intended to function as a short-range kinetic interceptor in contested airspace, primarily by ramming hostile unmanned systems. (Picture source: Telegram/Bes Pilot)

The Kinzhal’s structural elements were manufactured by multiple domestic firms: the airframe and fuselage by Farmplast, the electric propulsion system by Pro-Technology, the propellers by Vector, and the flight control electronics by Krait. Its structural layout is comparable to the Yolka FPV interceptor, which has been previously fielded by Russian forces. The Kinzhal was presented in prototype form and is intended as a short-range kinetic interceptor, aimed at engaging hostile UAVs at low altitude by means of ramming. In parallel, Russia has initiated development of several interceptor drone models, including the Yolka, Tarantul-Ptitselov, and now the Kinzhal.

While Ukraine’s programs have scaled toward mass deployment, Russian interceptor drones remain in prototype or limited testing phases. The Yolka, introduced in May 2025, is described by Russian sources as a fire-and-forget kinetic interceptor, intended to collide with enemy drones autonomously. The Tarantul-Ptitselov uses a net-based mechanism to entangle enemy drones at close range. Russian military bloggers and affiliated outlets have also reported ongoing design work on high-speed interceptor UAVs capable of targeting fixed-wing reconnaissance drones and long-range loitering munitions. Though these systems have not yet been documented in operational service at scale, their development suggests an effort by Russian industry to establish an indigenous short-range UAV interception capability. The Kinzhal’s unveiling at Innoprom 2025 indicates a possible transition from experimental research to pre-production demonstration, with a focus on domestic sourcing of all critical components.

The interceptor drones have their origins in Cold War-era concepts, when both the United States and the Soviet Union began exploring the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for various roles, including aerial target practice and rudimentary interception. However, technological limitations in propulsion, guidance, and sensor systems restricted these early platforms to basic functions. One example from this period is the U.S. Navy’s Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH drone, introduced in the 1960s, which was designed for anti-submarine warfare but demonstrated that remote-controlled aerial systems could carry weapons. At the time, the idea of an unmanned aerial platform intercepting hostile aircraft or missiles remained largely theoretical. During the late 20th century, additional experimental drones were tested for similar purposes, but none entered widespread operational use due to the lack of reliable autonomous guidance or real-time control.

It was not until the 2010s that systems like the Raytheon Coyote, originally conceived as a decoy, began being adapted for kinetic interception missions. By integrating radar guidance and expendable airframes, the Coyote demonstrated that small drones could be used to counter other UAVs in a cost-effective manner. These developments laid the groundwork for the emergence of tactical interceptor drones, which would be rapidly accelerated following the full-scale use of drones in the Ukraine conflict from 2022 onward. The operational demand for low-cost, short-range air defense against loitering munitions and small reconnaissance drones catalyzed a shift from theoretical applications to practical deployment of interceptor UAVs by both state and non-state actors.

Therefore, the introduction of the Kinzhal drone reflects a broader military-industrial trend driven by lessons learned from the Russia–Ukraine war, where the widespread use of drones has challenged conventional air defense doctrines. The conflict has seen large-scale use of drones for surveillance and attack missions, including kamikaze UAVs such as the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 (designated Geran-2 by Russia) and Russian-made Lancet loitering munitions. Ukraine has responded by fielding a wide range of interceptor drones, including FPV platforms modified for ramming enemy drones mid-flight. These have been integrated into Ukraine’s “Clear Sky” network, which combines radar detection, ground observers, and decentralized drone teams capable of launching interceptors in real time. According to Ukrainian sources, the country is manufacturing up to 200,000 drones per month, with interceptor variants forming a growing portion of this output. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with private-sector and volunteer organizations, has approved and begun procurement of multiple interceptor drone types, including the Chief-1, VARTA DroneHunter, and Wild Hornets’ Sting. These interceptors are used to down enemy UAVs using direct impact or short-range projectile fire.

Globally, other states are accelerating the development and integration of interceptor drones into layered air defense strategies. The United States has operationalized Raytheon’s Coyote Block 2 drone interceptor and tested autonomous ramming drones like Anduril’s Anvil. Israel’s XTEND offers a manually guided quadcopter system capable of mid-air interception, and Fortem Technologies’ DroneHunter uses a net-capture approach for both military and security applications. In Europe, Latvia’s Origin Robotics is developing the BLAZE high-speed interceptor with funding from the European Defence Fund, while Germany’s Argus Interception GmbH and France’s CERBAIR are building autonomous drones capable of intercepting small UAVs near critical infrastructure. Ukraine’s DroneHunter and Chief-1 have entered testing or limited service and are available via the Brave1 defense tech marketplace. These developments are driven by operational demand for low-cost alternatives to traditional missile interceptors in environments characterized by high drone saturation and limited missile stockpiles.

Operationally, interceptor drones fall into two main categories: expendable and reusable. Expendable systems include FPV drones such as Ukraine’s Sting and Shulika, which destroy enemy UAVs through kinetic collision and are not recoverable. These drones cost between $500 and $5,000 per unit and are commonly used to intercept Shaheds or Lancets at low altitude, particularly during nighttime attacks. Reusable systems, such as VARTA’s DroneHunter and Russia’s Tarantul-Ptitselov, use either shotgun-style payloads or net mechanisms and are capable of returning to base for rearming. Ukraine’s Chief-1 combines automatic target recognition with short-range shotgun fire and can operate either manually or autonomously. Reusable interceptors offer greater persistence, but their effectiveness depends on the ability to detect and engage targets within short timeframes. In both categories, drones are increasingly integrated with radar networks and AI-based targeting systems to reduce operator workload and improve reaction times during saturation attacks.

Interceptor drones face several limitations that constrain their operational envelope. Their engagement range and flight endurance are limited, typically to a few kilometers and under 30 minutes of flight time. Weather conditions such as wind and precipitation can reduce stability and range. Most current models cannot reach medium or high-altitude targets and are ineffective against cruise missiles or fast reconnaissance UAVs flying at altitudes above 5,000 meters. Additionally, saturation attacks using large swarms of drones can overwhelm available interceptor units. Interceptors are also susceptible to jamming and electronic warfare unless equipped with hardened guidance systems or operating autonomously. They depend on timely detection from external sources, such as radar or observers, which can introduce delays or coverage gaps. Efforts to mitigate these vulnerabilities include the development of swarm-capable interceptors, autonomous engagement algorithms, and integration with existing air defense systems such as surface-to-air missile batteries or anti-aircraft guns.