North Korea Poised to Deploy Cheonma-2 Tanks With Crews to Ukrainian Front in Support of Russia.

On August 14, 2025, in an interview with The Japan Times, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence, Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, stated that North Korea is preparing to send not only engineering units but also armored vehicles with their crews to Russia. This announcement comes as Pyongyang has already confirmed the deployment of 6,000 soldiers to the Kursk region to carry out demining and infrastructure reconstruction. According to Budanov, these official missions could conceal a much more direct involvement of North Korean forces in the war in Ukraine.
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The Cheonma-2, North Korea’s latest main battle tank, unveiled in 2020
 (Picture source: KCNA)

The Ukrainian official emphasized that while part of the North Korean troops sent to Russia will likely be tasked with demining and building fortifications, it is unlikely that the entire contingent will be limited to such duties. He referred to plans that include the transfer to Russia of fifty to one hundred North Korean combat vehicles, notably BTR-80 armored personnel carriers and heavy tanks. These systems, delivered with their crews, could be engaged directly on the Ukrainian front.

For Budanov, this cooperation allows Pyongyang to join a narrow group of states acquiring experience in large-scale modern warfare. He noted that only three countries currently possess such operational knowledge on an extended front line and in a conflict that mobilizes almost all available military means: Ukraine, Russia, and North Korea. This highlights the role North Korea could play not only as a supporter of Moscow but also as an actor seeking to strengthen its combat capabilities through real battlefield conditions.

The equipment in question illustrates the nature of this contribution. Among them is the BTR-80, a wheeled armored personnel carrier already familiar to Russian forces, as well as the Cheonma-2, North Korea’s main battle tank. First unveiled in 2020 during the 75th anniversary parade of the Workers’ Party, this new-generation tank weighs around 55 tons and is powered by a 1,200-horsepower diesel engine. It is armed with a 125 mm gun derived from the Russian 2A46, an AGS-30 automatic grenade launcher, a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, and two Bulsae-3 anti-tank missiles mounted on the turret. Its composite armor is reinforced with explosive reactive armor and active protection systems inspired by Russian and Chinese models, designed to intercept anti-tank projectiles. The latest versions, observed in 2024 and 2025, feature a longer main gun and a new GL6-type active protection system.

This growing alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow reflects a broader military partnership that extends beyond the battlefield. North Korea, under heavy international sanctions, seeks both diplomatic support and technological benefits in return for supplying arms and manpower. In exchange for its assistance, Pyongyang is likely to expect discreet transfers of military technology, access to food and energy resources, and political backing from Russia in international forums such as the United Nations. For Moscow, the arrangement provides a steady supply of equipment and personnel that helps offset the constraints imposed by Western sanctions, while also signaling that Russia can still count on external partners.

The arrival of North Korean armored units would not radically alter the balance of power in Ukraine, as Russia already fields a large inventory of similar vehicles. However, their presence could provide incremental reinforcement by easing the strain on Russian units and enabling more rotation of frontline forces. For North Korea, the war offers an opportunity to test its newest equipment, refine its doctrines, and give its crews combat experience that few armies worldwide currently possess. Thus, while not a decisive factor on the battlefield, the deployment carries symbolic weight and practical advantages for both partners.

The possible deployment of this equipment and its crews to Russia could affect the dynamics of the conflict by strengthening the logistical and mechanized capabilities of Russian forces. It also raises questions about the level of coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang and the long-term consequences of such military cooperation. If North Korean participation is confirmed, it would mark another step in the progressive internationalization of the Ukrainian conflict, where external support is playing an increasingly visible role.

Budanov’s statements underline a growing risk: the transformation of the war in Ukraine into a testing ground for North Korea. With the likely transfer of BTR-80 armored vehicles and modern tanks such as the Cheonma-2, Pyongyang is no longer limiting itself to a peripheral role but is seeking direct involvement alongside Moscow. This development reinforces the perception that the conflict has moved beyond a bilateral confrontation between Russia and Ukraine to become a field of military experimentation with global strategic implications.