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France, Germany and UK send C-UAS teams to Belgium after airport drone disruptions.
Belgium is receiving counter-drone specialists and equipment from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom after drone incursions briefly halted flights at Brussels and Liège. The push, which follows a recent British deployment to Denmark, aims to harden airspace security while Belgium fast-tracks a National Airspace Security Center due to start on 1 January 2026.
Belgium has enlisted foreign military help to contain a surge of drone activity over airports, military bases, and even a nuclear plant, with Paris, Berlin, and London sending counter-UAS teams and kit to secure sensitive sites. The United Kingdom is dispatching Royal Air Force specialists and electronic jamming equipment, and officials confirmed the assistance after drones forced temporary shutdowns at Brussels Airport and disrupted traffic at Liège last week. Brussels is standing up a National Airspace Security Center on 1 January 2026 to coordinate detection and response across civil and military authorities, while investigators avoid attributing the incursions despite rising talk of hybrid tactics in the region.
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The British package centers on the Orcus capability, the UK military configuration of Leonardo’s Falcon Shield (Picture source: UK MoD)
The British package centers on the Orcus capability, the UK military configuration of Leonardo’s Falcon Shield. Designed for low, slow, small threats, the modular architecture combines surveillance radars, electronic surveillance, and electro-optical/infrared payloads. The manufacturer highlights 360-degree coverage, open IP interfaces, and ASTERIX compatibility for rapid integration with air traffic systems, as well as a human-machine interface that enables automated detection and tracking. The system can be fielded in fixed, relocatable or mobile configurations, from airport perimeters to major events. In parallel, the Belgian government has activated an emergency C-UAS plan that includes the purchase of detection assets and interdiction systems to address activity around airfields and bases.
On sensors, Falcon Shield accepts the NERIO-ULR gyro-stabilized turret, combining an HD day camera, a thermal channel, and an eye-safe laser range finder. Leonardo specifies a 360° × ±50° field of regard and a thermal zoom from 11° to 0.9°, allowing positive ID at ranges beyond the employment envelope of many commercial drones and enabling early neutralization. This is essential to confirm aircraft type, estimate size, assess likely payload, and generate a track that decision cells can act upon.
For effects, the system prioritizes non-kinetic options. ESM/EA modules support detection and tracking and, where legal authority is established, jamming of command links or disruption of navigation. The design allows geolocation of an operator when EO/RF cues converge and the federation of multiple sensor heads to optimize sector coverage. Layering shortens the timeline from radar cue to EO/IR confirmation and effect selection while preserving safety margins on arrival and departure paths.
In the UK, Orcus sits within the Synergia program as a national standby capability supporting civil authorities and has been used at major events. Recent reporting credits the RAF Regiment with an early October 2025 deployment to Denmark during two European summits amid incursions near civil and military sites. That experience shapes the Belgian posture: shorter setup times, clear liaison loops with host authorities, and police-military coordination for effect authorization. The RAF also underscores that the UAS threat is real and highly disruptive, justifying the use of trained teams with the latest equipment.
French and German contributions follow the same reinforcement logic, with C-UAS detachments focused on airports and sensitive facilities. Although no official equipment list is published, the most plausible French configuration is PARADE, a modular system combining low-elevation 3D radar, RF geolocation, EO/IR turrets for positive ID and non-kinetic effects for jamming or takeover, all integrable with ATC networks via open interfaces and ASTERIX. On the German side, a GUARDION layout with Xpeller components aligns with the stated mission, blending Hensoldt SPEXER radar for early warning, RF sensors, and day-night optronics with electronic attack, deployable in fixed or mobile mode to cover approach corridors. In both cases, the operational objective is a clean COP/RMP, strict deconfliction with IFR traffic, and a preference for RF effects in dense urban environments to restore traffic without debris risk, within an interoperable posture and disciplined EMCON.
European officials describe a pattern of hybrid coercion, with some linking incursions to the debate on using frozen Russian assets in Brussels to support Ukraine. Without formal attribution, repeated incidents near strategic infrastructure and bases create attrition. In this environment, coordinated allied C-UAS teams in Belgium are more than a technical fix: they signal alliance resilience, bridge near-term gaps in the defense industrial base, and set the foundations for a more durable European architecture built on interoperability, sensor sharing, and a common COP/RMP.