China modernizes its nuclear capabilities with new DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile.

During the September 3, 2025, parade in Beijing that marked the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan, China officially revealed the Dongfeng-61 intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile appeared on 16-wheeled transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) carrying canisters marked DF-61, though it remained unclear if they contained actual missiles.
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Operational readiness of the DF-61 remains uncertain, as, unlike the DF-41, which was confirmed in service by 2017, no such confirmation has been issued to date for the DF-61. (Picture source: Weibo/@人民日报 & @央视军事)

The parade was the first time China officially displayed its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear capabilities together as a triad, with the JingLei-1 air-launched long-range missile, the JuLang-3 submarine-launched missile, the DF-61 as the new land-based system, and an updated DF-31BJ variant. Other strategic assets, including the DF-5C and the DF-26D, also participated in the formation. The event followed months of preparations and reflected a pattern of introducing new strategic weapons during commemorative occasions.

The DF-61’s technical details remain undisclosed, but its appearance has been interpreted as the successor or complement to the DF-41. The DF-41, publicly shown in 2019 after development starting before 2000, measures about 20 meters in length, has an estimated range of 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers, and can carry up to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). References to a successor circulated since at least 2020 under provisional designations such as DF-45 or DF-51. Reports attributed to these concepts suggested different characteristics: one cited a 112-ton takeoff weight, a payload of 3.6 tons, seven 650-kiloton warheads, and a range of 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers; another described a 130-ton missile carrying three five-megaton warheads or up to 14 lighter warheads, with ranges up to 15,000 kilometers, and potential integration of a fractional orbital bombardment system. The DF-61’s TEL, broadly similar to that of the DF-41, indicates that China prioritized road mobility and survivability in deployment.

The introduction of the DF-61 occurred during a period of accelerated nuclear expansion by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The U.S. Department of Defense reported in December 2024 that China had surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads by mid-2024 and projected the total would exceed 1,000 by 2030, with many at higher readiness levels. The same report stated that the PLARF was advancing long-term modernization plans that included new ICBMs, expanded MIRV capacity, and large-scale silo construction. Satellite imagery has documented three new silo fields for solid-fuel ICBMs, each with at least 100 silos, alongside continuing development of liquid-fuel DF-5 variants. The DF-31BJ, also included in the parade, highlighted that mobile and silo-based designs are both being developed in parallel, providing diversity and redundancy in China’s strategic arsenal.

The appearance of the DF-61 also reflects a broader modernization trend where China is increasing the number and variety of nuclear delivery systems. Reports from U.S. Strategic Command to Congress in earlier years noted that China was working on a “new generation of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles,” which were expected to outperform the DF-41 while remaining road-mobile. The Pentagon’s analysis emphasized that Beijing seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, including both lower-yield precision strike weapons and higher-yield multi-warhead missiles. Independent assessments, including those from the Federation of American Scientists in 2025, estimated that China had produced around 600 warheads and was positioned to increase this number further through ongoing production of fissile material. These trends, combined with the appearance of DF-61 alongside other new missiles, suggest an integrated approach to expanding both warhead numbers and delivery systems.

The historical development of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles traces back to the Dongfeng series, which originated in the late 1950s with Soviet assistance. The DF-1, modeled on the Soviet R-2, was tested in 1960, and the DF-2 became the first deployed strategic missile in 1964. The DF-4, developed in the late 1960s, extended range capability to 5,500–7,000 kilometers, providing strike options against Moscow and Guam. The DF-5, entering service in the 1980s, marked China’s first true intercontinental missile with ranges of up to 13,000 kilometers and a payload capacity for multi-megaton warheads. Later improvements, such as the DF-5B and DF-5C, added MIRV capability. The solid-fuel DF-31, introduced in the 1990s, increased survivability through mobility and reduced launch preparation time. The DF-41, first paraded in 2019, represented a leap forward with greater range and larger MIRV capacity. The DF-61 now continues this evolution, appearing as the latest addition to a program that has consistently combined fixed silo-based missiles with mobile solid-fuel designs to increase survivability and deterrence.

Operational readiness of the DF-61 remains uncertain. Unlike the DF-41, which was confirmed in service by 2017, no such confirmation has been issued for the DF-61. Its parade debut establishes the system’s official designation and role in the PLARF’s order of battle, but whether it replaces or augments existing DF-41 brigades is unknown. Reports from think tanks such as the National Institute for Public Policy have speculated that multiple new systems may be under development, with one possibly intended to succeed the DF-41 and another to eventually replace the DF-5. Analysts will continue to monitor whether DF-61 deployments are observed at known PLARF missile bases, and whether future exercises confirm operational status. In the meantime, its presence alongside JuLang-3 submarine-launched missiles and the JingLei-1 air-launched system underscores China’s intent to field a complete triad with diverse delivery options.

The introduction of the DF-61 adds to the ongoing transformation of China’s nuclear posture. From a historically modest arsenal, Beijing is pursuing expansion on a scale that U.S. and allied observers assess as one of the most rapid among nuclear-armed states. The missile’s appearance at the 2025 parade confirmed long-circulated reports of a new mobile ICBM and placed it within the broader strategic modernization effort. Alongside other developments, including hypersonic glide vehicles, new intermediate-range missiles such as the DF-26 and DF-27, and updated cruise missiles like the CJ-100, the DF-61 illustrates how the PLARF is diversifying its arsenal across range categories, payload types, and launch modes. Whether as a replacement for older systems or as an addition to the growing force, the DF-61 signals that China’s land-based ICBM force is entering a new phase that will influence strategic calculations well into the next decade.