China could reach global nuclear strike capability with new DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile.

On September 3, 2025, China introduced the DF-5C intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during the Victory Day Parade held in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, which was organized to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. The missile was paraded in three separate sections, consisting of its first stage, upper stage, and warhead section, a format reminiscent of the DF-5’s initial appearance in 1984. The event also showcased the land, sea, and air legs of China’s nuclear forces together for the first time, underlining the establishment of a nuclear triad.
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The DF-5C is a silo-based, two-stage, liquid-fueled ICBM presented with its sections on three separate carriers, echoing the way the original DF-5 was first shown in 1984. (Picture source: Weibo/@人民日报)

The DF-5C is a two-stage, liquid-fueled, silo-based missile with a diameter exceeding 3 meters and a body design that requires separate transport of its components. Its first stage is powered by four engines, a factor suggesting significant payload capacity. Reports and commentary surrounding the parade attributed to the missile a range greater than 20,000 kilometers, which would allow it to target any point on Earth. According to various analyses and Chinese sources, the missile is able to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), with numbers ranging from 10 to 12, or a single multi-megaton warhead. Other options mentioned include combinations of nuclear and conventional warheads, as well as decoys intended to complicate missile defense interception. Expert assessments also described the DF-5C as operating at very high speeds, measured in several tens of Mach, which would reduce interception windows for missile defense systems. Its guidance reportedly combines inertial systems, starlight navigation, and the Beidou satellite network, which together are intended to improve accuracy over intercontinental distances.

The DF-5C continues the progression of the DF-5 missile family that began in the late 1960s under Project 8201. The original DF-5 was first flight-tested in 1971 and entered service in 1981 as China’s first ICBM. At 32.6 meters in length and weighing approximately 183,000 kilograms at launch, the DF-5 had an initial range of 10,000 to 13,000 kilometers and carried a single large warhead. Improvements followed with the DF-5A, which extended the range beyond 13,000 kilometers, and the DF-5B, which introduced MIRV capability with three to five warheads. By 2015, open-source estimates suggested that China operated around 83 DF-5 ICBMs, with approximately 50 being DF-5B variants. Reports indicated the existence of 20 operational DF-5 launchers in 2017, supported by a network of decoy silos designed to complicate adversary targeting. A test in 2017 reportedly involved a DF-5C equipped with 10 MIRVs, confirming its role as a further step in the family’s progression. The 2025 parade thus presented the DF-5C as both a successor to older single-warhead DF-5A missiles and a heavier strategic option compared to the DF-5B.

The 2025 parade also showcased other nuclear systems that together highlighted China’s nuclear triad. The navy displayed the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, which is being back-fitted to Type 094A ballistic missile submarines. Assessments from the U.S. Department of Defense place its range near 10,000 kilometers, though launches from the South China Sea would not provide continental U.S. coverage. The air segment featured the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile carried by the H-6N bomber, a system associated with the CH-AS-X-13 program. The H-6N was displayed in formation with a Y-20U refueling aircraft to highlight aerial refueling capability, which extends its operational range. This was the first time China publicly displayed air, sea, and land-based nuclear delivery systems together. Conventional systems, such as the DF-26D, DF-17, and CJ-1000, were displayed separately to underline the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear strike assets.

Alongside the DF-5C, other new land-based systems attracted attention. The DF-61, carried on a 16-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher, appeared similar to the DF-41 system displayed in 2019, leading to interpretations that it could be a modified or successor variant. Some analysts suggested it might serve as a platform for advanced payloads such as a fractional orbital bombardment system or an intercontinental glide vehicle. The DF-31BJ vehicle, shown with a short missile canister and a left-sided driver’s compartment, was assessed as a transporter or loading system associated with China’s large new ICBM silo fields. This designation may correspond to a DF-31-class missile for silo deployment. In total, analysts identified nine different ICBM versions in the current or emerging arsenal, spanning solid- and liquid-fuel propulsion, mobile and silo basing, and payload types including MIRVs and large single warheads. This variety reflects a diverse developmental approach rather than incremental improvement along a single design path.

Official Chinese commentary presented the DF-5C and other systems as consistent with a long-standing defensive nuclear strategy. Beijing reiterated its no-first-use policy and commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. State media and experts stated that the display was intended both to honor history and to highlight China’s need for credible deterrence in a complex security environment. Western analysts described the presentation as a message about strategic deterrence, with particular emphasis on the nuclear triad. Outside observers also highlighted potential implications for arms control, noting that the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal could complicate nonproliferation frameworks already under strain. Analysts linked the DF-5C to broader trends, including the Pentagon’s projection that China’s nuclear stockpile could reach about 1,000 warheads by 2030. These discussions underscore the dual character of the DF-5C’s public debut, which combined technical disclosure with political signaling.

The implications of the DF-5C’s introduction center on its reach, payload, and capacity to penetrate missile defenses. A silo-based system carrying multiple warheads and decoys increases the complexity of missile defense interception by multiplying the number of objects in flight and adding penetration aids. Assertions of global strike range, rapid launch preparation, and possible nontraditional trajectories would, if validated by operational testing, add to its strategic impact. Analysts cautioned that the parade presentation alone does not establish operational readiness, noting that future drills and live launches will be the key indicators. Within the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the DF-5C is positioned as a replacement for older DF-5A units and a complement to solid-fueled systems such as the DF-41 and DF-31 classes. Its public debut, therefore, functions as both a demonstration of ongoing technological development and a statement of strategic intent, with consequences for U.S., NATO, Indian, Japanese, and Australian defense planning.

Some commentators noted that the DF-5C’s description as capable of striking anywhere on Earth has been interpreted by analysts as a possible indication that it could be linked to a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). A FOBS is a system that places a nuclear warhead into a partial low-Earth orbit and then de-orbits it toward its target, which makes the attack path unpredictable and reduces the warning time available to missile defense and early warning radars. Historical examples include the Soviet R-36O, deployed in 1968 with 18 silos, which used such a flight profile before being retired after SALT II restrictions. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibited placing nuclear weapons in permanent orbit but was argued not to cover fractional orbits, leaving ambiguity that the United States and the Soviet Union later addressed in SALT II. Reports note that China tested a system with FOBS-like characteristics combined with a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021, raising speculation that the capability is under development. Technical literature also highlights trade-offs of FOBS, such as lower accuracy and reduced payload due to the extra energy needed for orbital insertion and deorbit maneuvers. Analysts link the DF-5C’s size, four-engine thrust, and global strike framing to these discussions, although no official confirmation has been provided, and some sources suggest that exotic payload roles such as FOBS might apply more directly to the DF-61, which was also displayed in 2025.