U.S. Weighs Potential Decade-Long F-35 Production and Sustainment Framework With Lockheed Martin.

The Pentagon and Lockheed Martin are considering a decade-long F-35 production and sustainment framework to keep the growing stealth fighter fleet combat-ready during prolonged operations, Breaking Defense reported on October 9, 2026. The move would tie aircraft production more closely to the spare parts and repair capacity needed to sustain Western airpower in a high-intensity war. The potential agreement could secure critical components while sustaining production near 156 F-35s per year as fleet availability remains under pressure. Greater sustainment capacity could ultimately determine how effectively the United States and its allies generate sorties and preserve stealth airpower during an extended conflict.

The Pentagon and Lockheed Martin are weighing a potential 10-year F-35 production and sustainment agreement aimed at stabilizing the supply chain and improving fleet readiness (Picture Source: USNI)

The Pentagon and Lockheed Martin are weighing a potentially decade-long approach to F-35 production and sustainment that could reshape how the world’s largest stealth fighter fleet is built and kept combat-ready. On October 9, 2026, Breaking Defense reported that discussions have included a possible 10-year multi-year arrangement covering both aircraft production and maintenance. Beyond procurement efficiency, the talks expose a broader strategic challenge facing the United States and its allies: producing F-35s at scale while ensuring that a rapidly expanding fleet can remain operational during prolonged high-intensity warfare.

According to Breaking Defense, Honeywell Aerospace defense chief Matt Milas said discussions have included a “10-year, multi-year buy” encompassing production and sustainment. The potential model could involve larger bulk purchases of spare parts, with increased component flows beginning around Lot 21, while annual F-35 production is expected to remain near 156 aircraft. Lockheed Martin has argued that longer-term contracting could provide greater stability across the industrial base, support predictable production and give suppliers stronger incentives to invest in capacity. Yet no agreement has been announced, its eventual structure remains unresolved, and both the Pentagon and F-35 Joint Program Office declined to comment on the negotiations. Congressional authorization also remains an important hurdle, with lawmakers examining safeguards involving cost savings and the availability of initial spares.

Related Topic: Lockheed Martin Details F-35’s Expanded Role as Airborne Tracking and Targeting Node for U.S. Missile Defense

The deeper challenge is sustainment. The US Government Accountability Office reported in June that the fleet-wide mission-capable rate fell from 67 percent in fiscal 2021 to 44 percent in fiscal 2025, while the fully mission-capable rate declined from 38 percent to 25 percent. The F-35 Joint Program Office now aims to reach an 80 percent mission-capable rate and 65 percent fully mission-capable rate by 2030 under its Global Support Solution Reset. Achieving those targets is expected to require about $13.7 billion above previously planned sustainment spending through fiscal 2031, including roughly $7.3 billion for additional spare parts and repair material. GAO also identified insufficient supplier capacity for 48 F-35 parts, highlighting the extent to which industrial bottlenecks can directly affect aircraft availability.

This increasingly shifts the measure of F-35 combat power from aircraft delivered to aircraft repeatedly available for operations. In a prolonged confrontation involving China or Russia, maintenance turnaround, spare inventories, engine availability, depot throughput and the replacement of heavily consumed components could be as decisive as the number of fighters initially procured. The same industrial base supporting new production must also sustain an expanding fleet already requiring greater maintenance support. GAO reported that all 123 F135 engines delivered in 2024 arrived late amid production and supply-chain problems, while older engines are moving toward more intensive servicing requirements. Recent Pentagon spending choices reinforce this tension: the FY2026 budget request proposed 47 F-35s, down from the previously planned 74, while directing roughly $1 billion toward spare parts and additional resources toward modernization. That approach reflects a growing recognition that restoring existing aircraft to operational status can generate usable combat capability alongside new production.

The strategic implications extend well beyond the US military. F-35 operators across NATO and the Indo-Pacific depend on a global support network involving common supply chains, depots, spare-parts inventories and regional maintenance infrastructure. As allied fleets continue to expand, simultaneous high-intensity demands in Europe and the Indo-Pacific could place severe pressure on that network, particularly if several operators require engines, components and repair capacity at the same time. A decade-long arrangement could give suppliers greater visibility to expand tooling, workforce, inventories and repair infrastructure, but its strategic value would depend on whether those investments create genuine wartime surge capacity rather than simply improving peacetime efficiency. Any agreement would also need enough flexibility to accommodate Block 4 modernization, changing aircraft configurations and evolving maintenance requirements over a period in which the F-35 itself will continue to develop.

The significance of the reported negotiations goes well beyond the prospect of a very large Lockheed Martin contract. Washington is confronting an increasingly difficult equation: sustaining high-rate F-35 production while simultaneously building the spare-parts stocks, repair infrastructure and supplier capacity needed to keep a much larger US and allied fleet ready for combat. A successful decade-long framework could provide industry with the predictability needed to strengthen that support base, but its strategic value would ultimately be measured in available aircraft, repair capacity and sustainable sortie generation. For NATO and Indo-Pacific operators alike, the central question is no longer only how many F-35s can be acquired, but whether the global F-35 enterprise can keep enough of them flying when operational demand reaches its highest level.

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Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.