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U.S. Air Force Projects 60% Stealth Fighter Fleet by 2035 With F-35 and F-47.
The U.S. Air Force projects that stealth fighters could make up roughly 60 percent of its fighter fleet by 2035: about 40 percent F-35As and a combined 20 percent F-22 Raptors and F-47s, as the F-47 gradually replaces the F-22. The projected mix would expand the proportion of aircraft designed for contested airspace while the service also seeks a larger combat-coded fighter force.

The F-35A is expected to anchor the U.S. Air Force’s projected 2035 fighter fleet, accounting for approximately 40 percent of aircraft as the service seeks both a larger combat force and a combined 60 percent stealth share with F-22s and F-47s. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)
The U.S. Air Force projects a need for about 1,509 combat-coded fighters by 2035, up from an estimated 1,271 in 2026. That increase of 238 aircraft, or about 18.7 percent, makes combat capacity central to the outlook alongside the transition to more stealth fighters.
Lt. Gen. David Tabor, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, disclosed the estimates during an October 20, 2026, Pentagon media briefing, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. His remarks described a fighter force structure report submitted to Congress on October 16, 2026,
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F-35A Lightning IIs currently make up about 30 percent of the fighter fleet, while F-22 Raptors account for about 10 percent. The projections would raise the F-35A share to about 40 percent, and the combined F-22/F-47 share to 20 percent, increasing the overall stealth share by roughly 20 percentage points.
F-15 variants and F-16 Fighting Falcons would make up the remaining approximately 40 percent in 2035, likely split broadly evenly between the two families. That compares with current shares of approximately 15 percent for F-15s and 45 percent for F-16s, making the latter’s declining proportion the largest change among the aircraft families.
The percentages exclude A-10s and remain approximate planning estimates rather than approved procurement commitments. Reporters did not receive the underlying report, so the figures reflect Tabor’s account rather than an independently examined document.
The fleet composition percentages and the combat-coded requirement also have separate denominators. Applying the percentages directly to the 1,509-aircraft requirement would produce unsupported totals for individual fighter types, while a declining fleet share alone does not establish how many F-16s would retire.
Tabor indicated that the Air Force still intends to acquire a broadly comparable number of F-47s to the 186 operational F-22s originally built. That figure describes historical production, not the number of Raptors operational today; the combined F-22/F-47 category does not specify how many successor aircraft would be operational in 2035.
Boeing received the F-47 engineering and manufacturing development contract in March 2025 under the Next Generation Air Dominance effort. The fighter remains under development, making its contribution to the projected force dependent on progress toward production and operational service.
Operationally, the proposed balance would make stealth aircraft a majority of the fighter inventory while preserving substantial conventional fighter capacity. The larger combat-coded requirement adds another challenge: replacing older jets must also support growth in the force assigned to combat missions.
The distinction between fleet composition and combat capacity matters operationally. A higher stealth share would give commanders more options for assigning aircraft to missions in contested airspace, but sustained sortie generation would also depend on aircraft availability, maintenance, trained aircrews, and supporting resources. The projected mix alone therefore cannot establish how much combat power would be available at a particular time.
Retaining approximately 40 percent F-15s and F-16s would preserve a substantial role for conventional fighters throughout the transition. Commanders would continue matching aircraft to the threat and mission, allocating stealth fighters where their survivability offers the greatest advantage. This mixed-force approach makes retirement timing consequential: withdrawing conventional fighters before replacements arrive could reduce capacity, while retaining aging aircraft longer would sustain demands on maintenance and support.
Production and retirement schedules will determine whether both objectives are achievable. Tabor said the projected force requires congressional funding and sufficient industry deliveries; the fiscal 2027 request proposes 38 F-35As and 24 F-15EXs, totaling 62 fighters, below the 72 annual purchases senior Air Force officials have advocated. He also said older F-16s would reach their service-life limits in the mid-2030s, while a possible new-build F-16 purchase remained undecided.
Tabor cautioned that industry’s assurances of higher production must translate into actual output. The operational implication is that deliveries must support both replacement and expansion: if aging fighters retire before their replacements arrive, the U.S. Air Force could approach its intended stealth percentage while still falling short of its required combat capacity.
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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.















