MGI Engineering unveils Vortex autonomous combat aircraft for UK StormFighter program.

British engineering firm MGI Engineering unveiled the T-022 Vortex autonomous combat aircraft in the United Kingdom for submission to the Ministry of Defence StormFighter programme. The platform is designed as an Autonomous Collaborative Platform to operate in manned-unmanned teaming configurations alongside Eurofighter Typhoon, F-35, and future Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) fighters. Its primary strategic objective is to provide a reusable uncrewed asset capable of conducting strike, electronic warfare, and intelligence missions in contested airspace at a lower unit cost than crewed fast jets.

The T-022 Vortex features a 3,500 kg maximum take-off weight, an 11.0 m airframe length, a 1,000 kg total payload capacity, and an operational range exceeding 4,000 km at speeds up to Mach 0.85. Unit acquisition costs are projected between £3 million and £6 million, positioning the platform as a scalable collaborative combat aircraft following preliminary testing under Project Brakestop.

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The T-022 Vortex is considerably shorter than the fighters it would support in combat, including the Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35A, while its narrower span reduces structural mass and drag but also limits the internal volume available. (Picture source: MGI Engineering)

On July 20, 2026, the British company MGI Engineering unveiled the T-022 Vortex, a 3,500 kg autonomous combat aircraft proposed for the UK’s StormFighter programme and intended to fly alongside Eurofighter Typhoon, F-35 and future GCAP fighters. The unmanned aircraft is 11.0 m long, has a 7.6 m wingspan, an empty weight of 1,025 kg, a maximum speed above 1,050 km/h, a cruise speed of 875 km/h, a range exceeding 4,000 km and a total payload capacity of 1,000 kg. MGI places the unit price between £3 million and £6 million depending on avionics, sensors, communications systems and mission equipment, giving the proposal a cost equivalent to 3.2% to 6.3% of a £95 million fighter and 10% to 20% of a $30 million Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA).

Unlike MGI’s SkyShark and TigerShark drones, the Vortex is intended to be recovered, refuelled, rearmed and reassigned rather than consumed during a single attack. It also follows the TigerShark testing under Project Brakestop, which gave MGI experience with high-speed autonomous flight, GNSS-denied navigation, modular payload integration and long-range strike design. The Vortex's relevance to StormFighter will depend on whether MGI can demonstrate the complete combination of weight, payload, speed and range in a flightworthy configuration rather than as separate design targets. The T-022 Vortex occupies a size category closer to advanced jet trainers than to conventional combat drones.

At 11.0 m in length, it is 0.9 m shorter than the BAE Hawk, 0.5 m shorter than the Leonardo M-346 Master and 1.1 m shorter than the Aero L-39 Albatros, while its 7.6 m wingspan is 2.1 m narrower than the M-346. It is also 4.96 m shorter than the Eurofighter Typhoon and 4.67 m shorter than the F-35A, which logically limits internal fuel volume, radar aperture, cooling capacity and weapon bay dimensions. The 1,025 kg empty weight is only 29.3% of the 3,500 kg maximum take-off weight, leaving 2,475 kg for fuel, payload, engine fluids, avionics, communications equipment and mission systems. A full 1,000 kg payload would consume 40.4% of that remaining mass, leaving 1,475 kg for fuel and all other installed equipment not included in the empty weight figure. This mass balance is central to the design because a loyal wingman drone cannot simultaneously maximise payload, range, endurance and manoeuvrability without trade-offs. 

Interestingly, the flight performance envelope is closer to a fast subsonic trainer or strike aircraft than to a fighter. Maximum speed exceeds 1,050 km/h, or Mach 0.85, while cruise speed is 875 km/h, or Mach 0.71, allowing the Vortex to transit at more than twice the cruise speed of an MQ-9A Reaper but still well below the Mach 1.6 reached by the FA-50 and the JF-17. In formation operations, a Typhoon or F-35 would therefore have to remain subsonic if it wished to keep the Vortex in close formation during transit, although the autonomous aircraft could instead fly ahead on a pre-planned route and rejoin at a designated point. The operating altitude extends from below 20 m to 12,000 m, covering terrain-masking ingress, medium-altitude electronic warfare and strike profiles, and higher-altitude surveillance or communications relay missions.

The -2g to +7g structural envelope exceeds the manoeuvring limits of most long-endurance UAVs and could therefore support missile-warning reactions, rapid turns and aggressive altitude changes, but it remains below the 9g associated with frontline fighters. Propulsion is planned around a 12-16 kN turbofan such as the Rolls-Royce Orpheus, a Pratt & Whitney Canada PW530-class engine or an equivalent powerplant. Even at 16 kN, thrust would be less than one-fifth of the Eurojet EJ200’s afterburning output and less than one-sixth of the F135’s maximum thrust, ruling out sustained supersonic flight and fighter-like acceleration. The engine choice will therefore determine whether the Vortex can achieve Mach 0.85 while carrying external stores, because external weapons and pods would increase drag and reduce acceleration, ceiling and range. 

The payload architecture is based on a 400 kg internal bay and nearly 600 kg of external carriage distributed across four hardpoints, including two under-wing and two fuselage stations. The total payload equals 28.6% of maximum take-off weight, a relatively high payload fraction for an autonomous aircraft of this size but far below the absolute weapon capacity of frontline fighters. A Rafale can carry up to 9.5 t externally, the F-35A can carry more than 8 t internally and externally, and the Gripen E can carry 7.2 t across ten stations. Logically, the Vortex would instead be limited to smaller weapons, compact jammers, passive sensors, reconnaissance packages, communications relays, or mixed mission loads. The internal 400 kg bay could carry several lightweight precision-guided weapons or one larger store if its dimensions and center of gravity limits permit.

Internal carriage would reduce drag and avoid the radar reflection penalty created by exposed stores, but it would not make the aircraft low-observable without compatible inlet shaping, engine-face masking, edge alignment, exhaust treatment, surface materials and antenna integration. The external stations would increase mission flexibility but would reduce range, top speed and radar signature control. However, MGI’s modular concept would allow the same airframe to move between ISR, electronic attack, suppression of enemy air defences, strike and decoy roles. The loyal wingman concept is intended to remove the need for a ground operator to fly the aircraft continuously. In a manned-unmanned teaming formation, one Typhoon, F-35 or future GCAP fighter would issue mission priorities to several Vortex drones, while the autonomous systems managed navigation, formation spacing, sensor use, route changes and task distribution.

A formation of four Vortex CCAs could add up to 4,000 kg of combined payload to a single crewed fighter’s mission, although actual loads would vary with fuel and mission configuration. One unmanned aircraft could carry passive radio-frequency sensors, a second could carry a jammer, a third could carry weapons, and a fourth could act as a decoy or communications relay. This distribution would force an adversary to track and engage several separate targets instead of concentrating on one crewed aircraft. The software must also maintain mission execution when datalinks are jammed or interrupted, because an aircraft that stops functioning after losing communications would be unsuitable for operations inside modern integrated air defense systems.

In a denied environment, the Vortex would need to continue navigation, identify pre-programmed threat boundaries, manage fuel, avoid friendly forces, and decide whether to continue, abort, or recover. The mission set includes ISR, electronic warfare, precision strike, suppression of enemy air defences and decoy operations. In an ISR role, the Vortex could fly ahead of a fighter formation and use passive radio-frequency sensors or electro-optical equipment to locate radars, communications nodes, missile launchers or moving vehicles without exposing the crewed aircraft. In electronic warfare, several Vortex CCAs could position jammers on different bearings, complicating an enemy radar network’s ability to isolate the source of interference.

During the suppression of enemy air defences, one aircraft could stimulate hostile radars by acting as a decoy, another could geolocate the emissions and a third could attack the radar or relay targeting coordinates to a Typhoon, F-35 or stand-off weapon. Available information alternates between range and combat radius, which creates a major planning difference; a 4,000 km total range could support a 1,500 km outbound leg, a mission segment and return reserve, while a 4,000 km combat radius would imply more than 8,000 km of total flight distance. Very-low-level flight below 20 m would also support terrain masking but would raise fuel consumption, increase navigation demands and expose the aircraft to anti-aircraft guns, small arms fire, obstacles and short-range air defense systems.

At 12,000 m, the unmanned aircraft could cover a wider sensor horizon but would remain vulnerable to medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles. Recoverability gives commanders an incentive to preserve the aircraft, but its £3-6 million price would still make its loss financially and politically less consequential than losing a crewed fighter and pilot. Speaking of which, the proposed price has direct implications for fleet size and force generation. At £3 million per aircraft, the £300 million StormFighter allocation would equal the acquisition cost of 100 Vortex airframes; at £6 million, it would equal 50, excluding development, prototype construction, autonomy software, secure communications, integration with Typhoon and F-35, weapons certification, training, simulators, ground control equipment, spares, maintenance facilities and long-term support.

If half of the £300 million allocation were consumed by development and integration, the remaining £150 million would purchase 25 aircraft at £6 million or 50 at £3 million, although the RAF could not launch the entire force simultaneously because of maintenance, training and reserve requirements. At a 70% mission-capable rate, a 50-aircraft fleet would make 35 aircraft available, providing up to 35 t of combined payload before accounting for reduced loads on long-range missions. The real economic measure would be cost per operational sortie rather than acquisition price. A £5 million aircraft completing 200 sorties would spread its purchase cost across £25,000 per sortie before fuel, maintenance and mission equipment, while the same aircraft lost on its first combat mission would impose a £5 million airframe loss.

The fleet would therefore need a low-maintenance engine, accessible avionics bays, replaceable composite sections and software that can be updated without lengthy recertification. MGI Engineering was founded in 2003 by former Formula One technical director Mike Gascoyne and employs more than 25 full-time engineers. Its design model is based on rapid prototyping, lightweight composite structures, short testing cycles and simultaneous development of multiple configurations, practices drawn from F1’s recurring two-week race and upgrade cycle. The TigerShark’s Project Brakestop testing provided experience with autonomous high-speed strike, but a recoverable CCA must also meet repeated-load fatigue requirements, landing-cycle limits and military airworthiness standards.

MGI’s 25-plus-engineer workforce is small compared with BAE Systems’ hundreds of personnel assigned to the Brontanax and the larger teams supporting Boeing, General Atomics and Anduril. Serial production would therefore logically require additional staff, suppliers, production tooling, quality-control systems and engine availability. On paper, the Vortex, like Helsing's CA-1 Europa, enters the market against several competitors with greater programme maturity, industrial capacity and flight-test experience. BAE Systems’ Brontanax has been under development with the RAF since 2022, has a completed airframe at Warton and is planned to begin flight testing in 2027.

Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat has already flown and is being developed with the Royal Australian Air Force, while General Atomics’ YFQ-42A and Anduril’s YFQ-44A are part of the U.S. Air Force CCA programme. The Vortex's lower mass could support larger fleet numbers, but it also restricts internal fuel, sensor aperture, cooling, electrical generation and weapon volume. The first decisive milestone is therefore a complete prototype with the selected engine, installed avionics, landing gear, fuel system, antennas and flight control computers. Ground testing must then validate structural loads, vibration, fuel system operation, engine integration and autonomous control before first flight.

Flight testing would need to expand progressively from take-off and landing to Mach 0.85, 12,000 m altitude, +7g manoeuvres, low-level flight and external-store carriage. Later phases would require autonomous formation flying, secure data-link operation, communications-loss procedures, electronic warfare resilience, weapon separation and integration with Typhoon or F-35 mission systems. Production qualification would then have to prove repeatable airframe quality, stable suppliers and maintenance support. Until MGI completes these stages, the central StormFighter question is whether the RAF should prioritise a larger, more survivable aircraft costing tens of millions of pounds or a lighter system such as the Vortex that could distribute the same funding across a significantly larger number of airframes.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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