Israel considers P-8 Poseidon purchase from the US to counter Turkish submarine expansion in Eastern Mediterranean.

Israel began force-planning assessments for the potential acquisition of US-made Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to establish its first dedicated anti-submarine warfare unit in the Eastern Mediterranean. The procurement strategy addresses expanding regional submarine capabilities, notably the deployment of air-independent propulsion diesel-electric vessels by Türkiye and Egypt. Acquiring dedicated P-8A ASW aircraft would allow Israel to execute continuous acoustic surveillance and target tracking without diverting multi-mission assets such as the Gulfstream G550 Oron intelligence jet from broader regional operational theaters.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense is likely evaluating the acquisition of the P-8A Poseidon aircraft to establish dedicated acoustic tracking and sonobuoy barrier operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Driven by regional submarine modernization, the proposed procurement depends on potential integration into U.S.-Israel military financing structures to offset the platform's high unit acquisition, sensor integration, and long-term sustainment costs.

Related topic: Denmark buys two Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft from the U.S. to track Russian submarines in the Arctic

Israel is assessing a potential P-8A Poseidon purchase to establish its first dedicated anti-submarine warfare capability as Turkish and Egyptian submarine fleets expand and operate more extensively across the Eastern Mediterranean. (Picture source: US Navy)

According to The Jerusalem Post on July 22, 2026, Israel began assessing the acquisition of the Boeing P-8A Poseidon to create its first dedicated maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare force, primarily driven by the growth of Turkish and Egyptian submarine activity in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Israeli Air Force already operates the Oron ISR aircraft to collect and fuse strategic intelligence across several theaters, but this aircraft cannot remain committed to a single submarine search area for hours. A P-8A unit would be able to deploy sonobuoys, process acoustic contacts, localize submerged targets, and carry torpedoes while leaving the Oron available for operations over Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the Red Sea.

Israel does not currently identify an immediate anti-submarine warfare deficiency, and its existing combination of naval vessels, submarines, helicopters, shore sensors and airborne intelligence assets is considered effective. Therefore, the proposal remains at the force-planning stage because the cost would extend well beyond the aircraft purchase, but would become more feasible if incorporated into a wider U.S.-Israel defense financing agreement with Washington rather than paid entirely through Israel’s domestic procurement budget. The IDF requirement is centered on the time needed to find and follow a quiet conventional submarine, not simply on detecting naval activity at the surface.

A diesel-electric submarine can remain on batteries at low speed, reduce machinery use and exploit the heavy merchant traffic, shallow-water reverberation and variable temperature layers of the Eastern Mediterranean to complicate acoustic detection. Air-independent propulsion (AIP) further reduces the need to snorkel and operate diesel engines, removing one of the periods during which a conventional submarine is most exposed to radar, infrared and visual sensors. An Israeli P-8A could establish sonobuoy barriers outside Haifa, Ashdod, offshore gas fields and approaches used by Israeli naval forces, then reposition those barriers as a submarine changed depth, speed or heading. The aircraft could also investigate a contact first detected by a Dolphin-class submarine, a Sa’ar 5 or Sa’ar 6 corvette, a shipborne helicopter or a shore-based sensor without forcing the detecting unit to remain in the area.

The 2,200 km maritime range of the Poseidon would also permit operations beyond Israel’s immediate coastline, including sectors south of Cyprus, near Crete and across the central Eastern Mediterranean. The P-8A Poseidon, derived from the Boeing 737-800ERX, was developed under the U.S. Navy’s Multimission Maritime Aircraft program to replace the ageing Lockheed P-3C Orion. It uses the 737-800 fuselage, wings derived from the 737-900 family, and two CFM56-7B turbofan engines, giving the aircraft a maximum speed above 900 km/h and a substantially faster transit than the turboprop P-3C. The nine-person crew normally includes two pilots and seven mission personnel assigned to tactical coordination, acoustic processing, radar, electro-optical surveillance, communications and mission management.

The Poseidon combines maritime search radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers, electronic surveillance equipment and acoustic processors linked to passive and active sonobuoys. Passive sonobuoys listen for machinery, propeller and hydrodynamic signatures, while active sonobuoys transmit acoustic pulses and measure reflected energy to determine range and bearing. The aircraft’s mission computers correlate individual buoy detections, estimate submarine speed and direction, predict the next probable position and recommend where additional sonobuoys should be deployed. The crew can therefore narrow a search from a large uncertainty area to a localized contact rather than rely on radar or visual detection of a mast or a snorkel.

Sensors intended to identify atmospheric traces associated with diesel-powered submarines provide another search option, although their usefulness depends heavily on altitude, wind, weather and the submarine’s recent operation. The Poseidon is also equipped to convert a detected contact into an engagement. Its internal weapons bay and external stations can carry lightweight torpedoes, naval mines and other maritime weapons, allowing it to prosecute submarines and surface vessels without waiting for another aircraft or ship to arrive. The principal U.S. anti-submarine weapon is the 324 mm Mk 54 lightweight torpedo, which combines a digital guidance and processing section with components derived from earlier Mk 46s and Mk 50s.

Consequently, a P-8A can deploy sonobuoys ahead of a naval formation, place barriers across likely submarine transit routes, monitor a contact as it maneuvers, and release a torpedo once the track meets identification and engagement requirements. Its jet speed matters operationally because the aircraft can move between two search areas separated by several hundred kilometers faster than a helicopter or a turboprop patrol aircraft. It can also use the same radar and electro-optical systems to classify frigates, corvettes, missile craft, merchant vessels and auxiliary ships, providing the Israeli Navy with a broader maritime picture during periods when submarine activity is only one component of the threat. A single sortie could therefore begin with surface surveillance, transition to an acoustic search after receiving a cue, support a search-and-rescue operation and relay targeting data to naval headquarters.

The Poseidon would not eliminate the need for shipborne helicopters or surface-ship sonar, because those systems can remain close to a contact and operate in conditions where an aircraft is constrained by fuel or weather. Its role would be to connect distant sensors, cover large areas rapidly, and provide the acoustic processing capacity required for sustained submarine prosecution. Currently, the only Israeli aircraft that could be used for submarine detection is the Oron, a modified Gulfstream G550 business jet jointly developed by the Directorate of Defense Research and Development, Israel Aerospace Industries, ELTA, the Israeli Air Force, Military Intelligence and the Israeli Navy. Israel’s investment has been estimated at $1 billion, a figure that includes modification of the G550, integration of nationally developed sensors, mission computers, communications systems and the supporting intelligence infrastructure.

The Oron reaches 40,000 ft in about 25 minutes, cruises at roughly 900 km/h and can remain airborne for about 10 hours. Its mission complement includes eight intelligence officers in addition to the flight crew, while dozens of computers process inputs from thousands of sensors and system channels. The aircraft combines AESA radar, signals intelligence equipment, electro-optical sensors and artificial-intelligence processing to detect, correlate and prioritize activity across multiple theaters. Its radar can survey areas spanning thousands of square kilometers from stand-off distance, allowing the aircraft to monitor land and maritime sectors without flying close to hostile air defense zones. During a single sortie, the Oron can support intelligence collection over Gaza and Lebanon, track activity in Syria and contribute to missions involving Iran or Yemen.

Committing such an aircraft to repeated low-priority maritime patrol patterns would therefore not be relevant for Israel. However, the Oron combines signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, wide-area radar surveillance, maritime observation, electro-optical reconnaissance and strategic battle management in one jet. The aircraft is operated by 122nd Nachshon Squadron from Nevatim Air Base, which also supports Israel’s other Gulfstream-based intelligence aircraft. Artificial intelligence is used to compare successive radar scans, identify anomalous movement, correlate signals with imagery, and direct human operators toward contacts requiring immediate attention. This processing is necessary because a mission covering several theaters can generate more data than the eight intelligence officers onboard and ground personnel can manually examine in real time.

The Oron, like the earlier Shavit and Eitam, therefore functions as an intelligence aircraft rather than a sensor carrier assigned to one target category like the Poseidon. Planned development toward broader electronic warfare and electronic attack capabilities would move future Nachshon aircraft further into electromagnetic operations, including the collection, classification, disruption or deception of hostile emissions. That trajectory makes the conversion of the Oron into a routine anti-submarine patrol aircraft operationally inefficient even if its radar and electro-optical sensors can contribute to maritime surveillance. Turkey’s submarine force is the central regional variable in the Israeli assessment. The Turkish Navy operates more than ten active diesel-electric submarines, with a force built mainly around Type 209 variants and now transitioning toward the Reis-class based on the German Type 214.

Older boats are increasingly assigned to training or prepared for withdrawal, while the Reis-class introduces air-independent propulsion (AIP), modern sonar, updated combat management equipment and longer submerged endurance. AIP allows a conventional boat to remain submerged for extended periods without snorkeling to recharge batteries; this also reduces the number of radar, infrared and electronic signatures available to Israeli aircraft and surface ships. Turkey is also expanding its naval force through Istanbul-class frigates, Ada-class corvettes, missile craft, fast patrol vessels, amphibious ships and the TCG Anadolu drone-carrying amphibious assault ship. These assets provide the Turkish Navy with more opportunities to coordinate submarines with surface formations, unmanned aircraft and amphibious operations rather than employ them as isolated vessels.

Egypt adds a second modern conventional submarine fleet to the same region through its four Type 209/1400mod boats and four older Romeo-class units, increasing the number of quiet submarines that Israel may need to identify during exercises, crises or periods of political deterioration. The issue for Israel is not that every Turkish or Egyptian deployment constitutes hostile intent, but that a denser underwater environment raises the number of contacts requiring classification and continuous monitoring. A P-8A acquisition would therefore produce a defined division of labor inside the Israeli force structure.

The Oron would continue to build the strategic picture by tracking radar emissions, communications, surface force movements and activity across several theaters, while Poseidon crews would conduct the repeated sonobuoy deployment and acoustic analysis required to maintain a submarine track. The P-8A could exchange contact data with Sa’ar 5 and Sa’ar 6 corvettes, Dolphin-class submarines, naval helicopters, coastal surveillance stations and command centers, but this would require compatible data links, secure communications and Israeli acoustic-signature libraries. Fleet size would also be a critical decision because aircraft availability is lower than the number purchased once training, maintenance and modification are included.

A fleet of two or three aircraft could support periodic operations but would struggle to maintain continuous coverage while one aircraft underwent scheduled maintenance and another was used for training. A force of four to six aircraft would provide more credible rotational availability, but it would also increase procurement, infrastructure and personnel costs. As of 2026, more than 170 P-8 Poseidons have been delivered or contracted globally, including 135 for the U.S. Navy, 12 for Australia, 12 P-8I Neptunes for India, 9 for the United Kingdom, 5 for Norway, 4 for New Zealand, 6 for South Korea, 8 for Germany and 16 selected by Canada, in addition to the new order of two units by Denmark.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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