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Estonia’s Frankenburg Mark I Missile Intercepts Shahed-Type Drone in Live-Fire Test.
Newly released footage showed Estonia-based Frankenburg Technologies successfully intercepting a Shahed-type one-way attack drone with its Mark I mini-missile during a live fire test. The demonstration matters because it targets the cost imbalance of daily drone raids, suggesting missile defences could be scaled for persistent threats rather than rare, high-end attacks.
On 19 January 2026, new test footage emerged showing Estonian company Frankenburg Technologies’ Mark I mini-missile intercepting a Shahed-type one-way attack drone. The demonstration highlights the rapid pace at which Europe’s counter-drone ecosystem is adapting to the growing operational pressure posed by low-cost, mass-employed aerial threats. The engagement reflects two years of Russian Shahed use against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, where the cost balance has often favoured the attacker. By demonstrating a very small, low-cost guided interceptor against a Shahed-class target, the test addresses the core question of whether missile defences can be scaled for daily drone raids rather than rare high-end threats.
Newly released footage shows Estonia’s Frankenburg Technologies Mark I mini-missile successfully intercepting a Shahed-type attack drone, highlighting a push toward lower-cost, scalable air defense against mass drone threats (Picture Source: Army Recognition Group / Frankenburg Technologies)
The latest video shows a complete short-range kill chain against a fixed-wing Class III target drone flying at around 200 km/h, configured to emulate a Shahed-type one-way attack UAV. An external sensor and command-and-control node first detect and track the target, then hand off the firing solution to a tripod-mounted Mark I missile launcher. Once fired, the interceptor accelerates on a solid-fuel motor to high subsonic speed in excess of 1,000 km/h, closes the distance in seconds at under two kilometres, and uses terminal guidance to manoeuvre onto the drone before a proximity-fuzed warhead detonates close enough to shred the airframe in mid-air. The debris descends in a controlled pattern that preserves range safety and, by extension, hints at potential for use over or near populated areas where falling wreckage is a concern.
Behind this performance is a deliberately minimalist missile. Mark I is roughly 60–65 cm long, with a short-range engagement envelope of about 2 km and an intercept altitude on the order of 1 km, optimised specifically for low-and-slow drones rather than higher-flying aircraft. Frankenburg has stated that the system is intended to defeat propeller-driven one-way attack drones in the 150–200 km/h band, but can also engage faster jet-powered targets in the 450–600 km/h range, including in swarm scenarios where multiple missiles may need to be guided in quick succession. The company describes Mark I as the world’s smallest and lowest-cost guided missile, built entirely from commercially available components with a solid-fuel rocket motor and an onboard guidance solution that appears to rely on sensor fusion and machine-vision techniques rather than expensive infrared or radar seekers. Earlier company briefings have linked the concept to rapid mass production in low five-figure dollar cost bands per round, seeking to drive unit prices down an order of magnitude compared with traditional short-range air-defence missiles.
The recent Shahed-type intercept was not a one-off demonstration but part of an increasingly mature testing programme. In previous trials, Frankenburg achieved a full detection-to-destruction intercept against a Shahed-style drone with a two‑metre wingspan at the Ādaži NATO base in Latvia. The test confirmed the missile’s ability to track and engage a fast-moving aerial target under realistic operational conditions rather than in a controlled range environment. Earlier still, the company formalized agreements to enable field testing and evaluation of the Mark I missile in Ukraine, with initial launches planned on Ukrainian soil and production expected to grow from dozens to several hundred units per week by late 2025. The initiative targets the ongoing Shahed‑131/136 drone threat that continues to endanger Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Frankenburg has also presented the Mark I at major defence expos, including DSEI and MSPO, positioning the system as a versatile land-based counter‑drone weapon that can be deployed from tripods, vehicles, or even palletised launchers to reinforce air defence around critical sites.
The link between these land tests and the maritime domain was made explicit in early January 2026, when Babcock International and Frankenburg signed a Memorandum of Understanding to explore the development of a containerised maritime counter-drone air-defence system built around the Estonian missile. Under the concept, Mark I rounds would be housed in a standardised container launcher that can be craned onto warships, patrol vessels or quaysides, tied into existing radar and electro-optical sensors, and used to protect naval units and coastal infrastructure against one-way attack drones approaching at low altitude over cluttered sea backgrounds. By decoupling the launcher from specific hull designs, the partnership aims to offer European navies a modular way to add missile magazine depth without waiting for new ships, at a time when improvised drone boats and low-cost UAVs have already damaged or sunk high-value surface ships in the Black Sea and Red Sea.
Tactically, the Shahed-type engagement illustrates why speed and cost are now decisive parameters in counter-drone warfare. A propeller-driven one-way attack drone flying at 150–200 km/h offers only a short reaction window once it appears over the radar horizon, especially in complex terrain or coastal waters. Traditional surface-to-air missiles can certainly shoot it down, but at a cost that can reach hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars per shot; for an attacker, forcing a defender to trade such missiles against cheap mass-produced UAVs is itself a strategic objective. Mark I’s design seeks to flip that logic by using missile-class closing speed at what are effectively MANPADS-like engagement distances, but with a dramatically smaller missile body and a supply chain based on commercial electronics and industrial processes. In practice, this could allow air-defence commanders to treat drone intercepts as routine rather than exceptional events, reserving higher-end interceptors for cruise missiles and fast jets while assigning Shaheds and similar threats to a cheaper missile tier.
From a strategic perspective, the programme reflects a wider transformation in European defence priorities, industrial resilience and strategic sovereignty now weigh just as heavily as the capabilities of any individual system. Frankenburg highlights that the Mark I has been designed with localised, sovereign mass production in mind. The company is already active not only in Estonia but also in Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Poland, and the United Kingdom. This network of operations closely aligns with the areas most exposed to Russian pressure along NATO’s eastern flank and the regions most vulnerable to long-range drone and missile threats. If production can scale across multiple partner nations, the Mark I could give Europe a dispersed reserve of affordable interceptors, reducing reliance on single supply chains and enabling sustained air-defence readiness without draining stocks of high-end missiles.
For Ukraine, which has expressed interest in testing and potentially fielding the missile, the Shahed-type intercept is particularly significant. Russian forces have used Shahed-family drones extensively to strike energy grids, logistics nodes and civilian infrastructure in an attempt to wear down Ukrainian resilience and exhaust air-defence stocks. A compact missile that can be fired from simple tripods or light vehicles, guided by external sensors and command-and-control systems already proliferating across the Ukrainian battlespace, and procured in meaningful numbers thanks to COTS-based production aligns closely with Kyiv’s requirement to defend many dispersed sites every night. If Mark I performs in Ukrainian service as it has in recent tests, it could become one layer in a broader defensive mix that also includes guns, electronic warfare, interceptor drones and larger SAM systems.
The Shahed-type live-fire engagement marks more than a technical milestone for an Estonian startup. It is a practical demonstration of a new way of thinking about missile defence in the drone age. By combining high closing speeds with a very small form factor, aggressive cost targets and a roadmap that already extends from land-based tripods to containerised naval launchers, Mark I offers European states and Ukraine a concrete option for restoring a sustainable cost balance against massed one-way attack drones on land and at sea.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.