Australia in talks to donate retired Tiger ARH attack helicopters to Ukraine.

Australia is evaluating a potential transfer of its Tiger attack helicopters to Ukraine as part of a wider assistance package that also includes new sanctions on Russia.

As reported by ABC News on December 3, 2025, Australia is reviewing the potential transfer of its retiring Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) to Ukraine, as the Albanese government is finalizing a new assistance package valued at $95 million and additional sanctions on Russia. If successful, the decision would mark the first transfer of Western attack helicopters to Ukraine, and reshape both Australia’s aviation transition and Ukraine’s air defense and reconnaissance missions.
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The Tiger ARH, based on the French Tiger HAP, can fire AGM-114 Hellfire II and Mistral missiles, as well as 70 mm rockets developed by Belgian manufacturer Thales FZ, and use a nose-mounted 30 mm cannon. (Picture source: Australian MoD)

Australia is considering transferring its retiring Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) to Ukraine as part of a possible expansion of military assistance, while finalizing a new $95 million support package and introducing additional sanctions on Russia. The decision process is being handled separately from the funding package, but remains connected to broader efforts to increase Australia’s contribution to Ukraine at a time when the U.S. is pursuing peace initiatives in Moscow. The question of whether the Tigers should be sent to Ukraine has emerged as a central issue in Canberra as officials examine how the aircraft fit within a wider combination of military aid, financial commitments, and pressure on Russian revenue streams. The decision is also influenced by Ukraine’s formal request for the helicopters, by the public outrage following the scrapping of the MRH-90 Taipan fleet, and by Australia’s ongoing shift from the Tiger to the AH-64E Apache fleet. The timing of any potential transfer now depends on how quickly Australia decides to accelerate the Tiger withdrawal schedule and how Ukraine could receive them.

The current Australian package includes around $50 million earmarked for a NATO-managed program that acquires mostly U.S.-manufactured weapons for Ukraine, alongside funding for tactical air defense radars, munitions, combat engineering equipment, and updated contributions to a multinational drone capability initiative. This assistance represents the first major increase in physical assistance since October 2024, when Australia committed 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks, and it lifts total support since the start of the full-scale invasion to more than $1.7 billion, including about $1.5 billion in military aid. Previous deliveries have included armored vehicles, loitering munitions, rigid hull inflatable boats, RBS 70 man-portable air defense systems, and the forward deployment of an E-7A Wedgetail to Europe to assist regional air surveillance. Alongside the new funding, Australia has sanctioned 45 vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers used to evade existing restrictions, showing that the government intends to combine equipment transfers with economic measures. Within this framework, any Tiger transfer is expected to be treated as a discrete component rather than a symbolic side decision, reinforcing the broader mix of actions Australia is taking to support Ukraine across both financial and operational dimensions.

The Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) fleet, consisting of 22 attack helicopters that entered Australian service in 2004, is scheduled to be fully retired by 2028, although this date could be moved forward if authorities choose to release the Tigers for Ukraine earlier. The helicopters are being replaced by 29 AH-64E Apache aircraft that will enter service by 2029, with the first two having arrived at RAAF Base Townsville in October 2025 and the remaining deliveries planned in phased increments. The transition plan includes a three-stage drawdown that shifts pilots and maintenance personnel from Tiger units to Apache units to maintain training continuity and operational readiness. Infrastructure upgrades at Townsville and long-term sustainment and training contracts have already been established to support the AH-64E introduction. Australian officials have said that if operational planners recommend bringing Tiger retirement forward to facilitate a transfer to Ukraine, this recommendation will be seriously examined. This means that the helicopters’ future now depends not only on Australia’s domestic modernization schedule but also on whether the helicopters are judged suitable for integration into Ukraine’s evolving helicopter force.

The Tiger ARH was ordered in 2001 to replace the OH-58 Kiowa and UH-1 “Bushranger” gunship helicopters, with assembly work performed partly in Australia and operational use centered around the 1st Aviation Regiment at Robertson Barracks in Darwin. The ARH variant is based on the French Tiger HAP, and includes upgraded MTR390 engines, a Strix sight with laser designation capability for firing AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles, 70 mm rockets developed by Belgian manufacturer Thales FZ, and a nose-mounted 30 mm cannon as the primary gun system. The ARH can also carry short-range air-to-air missiles such as the Mistral for self-defense or for missions that require engagement of low-altitude aerial targets. During its service life, the Tiger ARH fleet has faced recurring issues, including cockpit fume incidents, supply chain delays linked to the distance from European maintenance centers, and higher-than-expected sustainment costs, which have contributed to lower readiness rates. These difficulties were part of the reasoning behind the decision not to pursue a long-term modernization path and instead to acquire the AH-64E Apache at an estimated cost of about $3.5 billion. The accumulated technical and logistical challenges now form an essential part of the evaluation of whether the Tigers can be effectively integrated into Ukrainian service and whether their maintenance requirements can be met at a sustainable level.

Measuring approximately 15.3 meters in length, with a 13-meter main rotor diameter and a height of about 3.8 meters, the Tiger ARH features a composite airframe designed to reduce structural weight while improving resistance to corrosion and battlefield wear, with a maximum takeoff weight of approximately 6,000 kilograms and a typical cruise speed near 230 kilometers per hour. Its twin MTR390 turboshaft engines provide a combined output of roughly 1,300 kilowatts (close to 2,570 shp), giving the helicopter a hover ceiling above 3,000 meters and enabling high agility at low altitude. The ARH is equipped with a digital avionics suite that integrates navigation, targeting, and communication through a multiplex data bus that manages onboard subsystems for flight and weapon employment. Its mast-mounted IFF antennas, laser warning receivers, radar warning receivers, and missile approach warning sensors form a defensive aids subsystem that automatically deploys countermeasures through an onboard dispenser. The ARH cockpit uses multifunction displays compatible with night vision systems and a helmet-mounted sight that allows pilots to cue weapons through head movement rather than manual instrument alignment. The aircraft’s 30 mm cannon is housed in a turret with a wide traverse arc to engage ground and aerial targets independently of flight direction, improving flexibility in confined spaces.

The Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) fleet, consisting of 22 attack helicopters that entered Australian service in 2004, is scheduled to be fully retired by 2028, although this date could be moved forward if authorities choose to release the Tigers for Ukraine earlier. (Picture source: Australian MoD)

Domestic reactions to previous helicopter retirements influence how the Tiger decision is being approached, especially after the early withdrawal of the MRH 90 Taipan fleet following a fatal crash in July 2023 that killed four soldiers during a training activity. After the fleet was retired, the airframes were dismantled for spare parts and buried, despite Ukraine indicating interest in acquiring them if restoration were feasible. The disposal decision caused anger among members of Australia’s Ukrainian community and triggered a broader criticism in the country about the handling of surplus defense equipment. Defence authorities stated that the Taipans were not in the necessary condition to be returned to service without extensive remedial work, which they considered impractical. Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia later emphasized that Kyiv accepted the Taipan decision but remained interested in future capabilities, specifically referencing the Tigers as they approach the end of their service life. A Senate committee subsequently recommended that Australia establish a process to make retiring helicopters and other major systems available to Ukraine when appropriate. This earlier experience means the Tigers are now viewed as a test case for whether Australia intends to adopt a systematic approach to surplus platforms, rather than treating each retirement as an isolated matter.

Evaluations of the Tigers’ potential role in Ukraine acknowledge the helicopter’s record of reliability issues while also identifying areas where it could contribute if adequately supported. Observers frequently cite the maintenance demands, the requirement for a dedicated logistical system, and parallels with the German Tiger fleet, which has faced technical challenges and low availability that led to an early phase-out decision. At the same time, supporters note that Ukraine would be operating much closer to European support hubs, which could mitigate some of the constraints that affected the Australian fleet. The ARH configuration’s integration of Hellfire missiles, 70 mm rockets that can be equipped with laser guidance kits, a 30 mm cannon, and compatibility with short-range air-to-air missiles offers options that Ukraine could incorporate into its existing mission sets. Receiving the Tigers would introduce the first non-Soviet-designed attack helicopter into Ukraine’s inventory, providing additional tactical flexibility while also requiring investment in new training, simulators, and maintenance structures. Because the fleet consists of only 22 Tiger ARHs, Ukrainian and Australian decision-makers would need to determine whether the operational value offsets the resource demands associated with maintaining a relatively small number of complex airframes.

Potential missions under consideration emphasize counter-drone roles and flexible support tasks rather than deep strike operations against heavily defended positions. Ukraine has increasingly relied on helicopters to intercept Shahed-type loitering munitions and other low-flying drones at night and at very low altitude, taking advantage of the mobility and rapid reaction potential of helicopters. With guided rockets, air-to-air missiles, and a stabilized cannon linked to modern targeting systems, the Tiger ARH could reinforce Ukraine’s mobile air defense layer by engaging drones and various low-altitude threats while complementing fixed and vehicle-mounted air defense systems. These missions could also allow Ukraine to reassign its transport and utility helicopters to evacuation, logistics, and troop movement tasks in areas where attack helicopters are less essential. In addition to these roles, the Tiger could be used for armed reconnaissance, convoy escort, and fire support in sectors where ground-based air defenses are less dense, enabling it to contribute without being exposed to the heaviest threats. However, the vulnerability of all attack helicopters in environments with extensive short-range air defense systems and inexpensive armed drones remains a key operational factor, meaning that employment concepts would have to minimize exposure. These constraints shape realistic expectations about how much effect a limited number of Tigers could have across such a large and high-intensity battlespace.

The Tiger decision is also influenced by earlier discussions about providing fixed-wing aircraft to Ukraine, including the case of the Royal Australian Air Force’s retired F/A-18 Classic Hornets. After the Hornets were withdrawn in 2021, a commercial agreement transferred 41 airframes to RAVN Aerospace, and there were subsequent negotiations about supplying some of these fighters to Ukraine, contingent on United States approval due to intellectual property protections and end-user conditions. Ukrainian authorities focused on securing F-16 aircraft and publicly rejected claims that they had dismissed the Hornets as unsuitable, instead emphasizing the difficulty of sustaining multiple Western fighter types simultaneously. This experience shows that surplus aircraft transfers depend on alignment between operational requirements, industrial support capacity, and the conditions imposed by third-party stakeholders. In this environment, the Tigers would represent just one of several possible additions to Ukraine’s aviation inventory, and their integration would need to be balanced against other priorities that compete for training resources, technical personnel, and financial support. Australia must also ensure that any transfer fits its broader force development plans and regional commitments in the Indo-Pacific, creating a multi-layer decision process with strategic and operational implications for both countries.

The Albanese government is weighing all these factors as it considers whether to accelerate the Tigers’ retirement and make the aircraft available to Ukraine, with the choice involving strategic, operational, and domestic considerations. Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy has stated that Canberra approached Kyiv to request its level of interest and that gifting the helicopters is the leading option being reviewed. Defence Minister Richard Marles has indicated that a final decision will be made shortly within the wider assistance framework, pointing to a decision timeline that depends on coordination between departments. If Australia proceeds, the transfer would form a specific component of an assistance package that already includes financial contributions and sanctions, with the stated aim of improving Ukraine’s air defense and reconnaissance capability over the medium term. If the government decides not to send the Tigers, the aircraft may remain stored or be disposed of through other pathways, which would likely revive debate about how Australia handles retired equipment. The choice will be interpreted in relation to the Taipan case, the Senate recommendations on surplus platforms, and the practical question of whether the Tigers’ operational potential outweighs the challenges associated with their maintenance history. In each scenario, the decision will shape how Australia manages its own aviation transition while determining whether its outgoing helicopters will play a role in Ukraine’s defense.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.