Ukraine Destroys Russian Buk M3 Launcher and Nebo-SVU Radars in Coordinated Strikes.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate confirmed the destruction of a Buk M3 launcher and two Nebo-SVU radars across occupied Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea on October 23-24. The strikes weaken Russia’s southern air defense network, opening new gaps for Ukrainian precision and drone operations.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate announced on its official channels on October 23-24, 2025, that Ukrainian special operators located and destroyed a Buk M3 self-propelled firing unit and two 1L119 Nebo-SVU long-range radars across occupied Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea. The footage shows precision strikes against high-value nodes inside Russia’s layered air defense belt. The Buk M3 is Russia’s newest medium-range SAM in frontline service, while the Nebo-SVU is a VHF-band 3D AESA radar prized for cueing and counter-stealth search.
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Ukrainian intelligence forces destroyed a Russian Buk M3 air defense launcher and two Nebo-SVU radar systems in occupied southern regions, crippling key elements of Russia’s air defense network and opening new tactical gaps for Ukrainian strike operations (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD).

The Buk M3, designated 9K317M, pairs the 9A317M TELAR carrying six canisterized 9M317M missiles with a phased-array engagement radar and a digitized fire-control suite. Russian sources credit the system with a 2.5 to 70 km engagement range and intercepts up to 35 km altitude, while a division architecture offers roughly 36 target channels, a major leap over earlier Buk variants. The 581 kg 9M317M uses inertial guidance with datalink updates and terminal semi-active radar homing, and a 62 kg fragmentation warhead designed to defeat agile, high-G targets. In practical terms, a single Buk M3 launcher can rapidly prosecute multiple cruise missiles, aircraft or guided bombs while remaining mobile enough to survive counterstrikes. Neutralizing even one TELAR reduces simultaneous engagement capacity and disrupts sector coverage for adjacent batteries.

The 1L119 Nebo-SVU is a meter-wave, active electronically scanned array that operates in the VHF band, a wavelength regime that complicates low-observable shaping and makes it valuable for early warning and track initiation against stealthier or small-RCS threats. Open technical summaries indicate the radar can detect a 2.5 m² target out to hundreds of kilometers at higher altitudes and track large numbers of targets simultaneously, with published figures citing up to 100 tracks and peak power around 120 to 140 kW. The system breaks down into an antenna semi-trailer and independent diesel power units, allowing a 30-minute set-up and stow, but it remains a sizable, scarce asset. Removing two such emitters in a 48-hour window is a crippling attrition event for Russia’s southern air picture.

The loss of these nodes creates a void in the familiar Russian triad of VHF search, S/X-band target engagement, and point defense. Without Nebo-SVU cueing, Buk batteries must rely on shorter-range search radars or third-party tracks, lengthening the kill chain and shrinking defended footprints. The destroyed Buk M3 further narrows the engagement envelope for cruise-missile and glide-bomb defense over key river crossings, depots and SAM relocation routes. For Ukraine, the immediate dividend is a wider window for long-range strike packages and attritable UAV swarms to penetrate deeper into Crimea and the lower Dnipro axis with less risk of mid-course intercept. That advantage compounds at night, when dispersed FPV and one-way attack drones hunt for emitters and logistics traffic with fewer long-range search radars painting the sky.

Kyiv has intensified a campaign of systematic air defense degradation ahead of winter, combining ISR from GUR with precision strikes to thin out radars and modern engagement units along the southern arc. Independent assessments the same week recorded the GUR claim of eliminating a Buk M3 launcher and two Nebo-class radars across the occupied south, aligning with a broader pattern of Ukrainian deep-strike activity against critical enablers. The geography matters too: Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea underpin Russian sustainment and air sovereignty over the Sea of Azov. Each radar or launcher removed imposes delays in coverage reconstitution and forces Russia to draw scarce systems from other fronts.

The operation widens a capability gap that Moscow has struggled to close under sanctions and wartime wear. Nebo-series VHF radars and Buk M3 launchers are neither cheap nor fast to replace, and trained crews are harder still to regenerate. For partners watching from Washington and Brussels, the strike highlights the payoff of pairing Ukrainian intelligence with long-range precision effectors and underscores why continued air defense and strike support shape the battlefield far beyond the front line.