Drone wreckage confirms that Russian forces employ Iranian Shahed-238 jet-powered drones against Ukraine.

On June 29, 2025, Military Informant shared the first confirmed photograph of the Geran‑3 drone’s wreckage, showing a downed UAV marked with the serial number “36” and the designation “U.” This image confirms for the first time the use by Russia of this jet-powered loitering munition based on the Iranian Shahed‑238. These drones, described as producing a distinctive high-pitched whistling sound in flight, were reportedly employed in raids on Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa. The acoustic characteristics and flight profile differ from previous Geran‑2 drones, indicating the presence of a new propulsion type. Ukrainian officials and OSINT analysts identified this new variant as the Geran‑3, a drone that incorporates a miniature turbojet engine and design features linked to the Shahed‑238, which was first unveiled publicly by Iran in November 2023.
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Most estimates put the operational range of the Shahed-238/Geran-3 at 1,200 kilometers, though some suggest that a lighter configuration could reach distances up to 2,500 kilometers. (Picture source: Telegram/Military Informant and Twitter/Meshkat)

The Geran‑3 drone represents a shift from the propeller-driven Geran‑2 (based on the Shahed‑136) to a turbojet-powered platform derived from the Shahed‑238. The Iranian Shahed‑238 uses a Tolou-10 or Tolou-13 jet engine, both of which are considered unlicensed copies of the Czech PBS TJ100 and TJ150 turbojets. The Tolou-13 engine offers a thrust level of up to 1,500 newtons and a top speed of around 600 kilometers per hour, with impact speeds possibly exceeding 700 kilometers per hour during final dives. Ukrainian sources have confirmed that engine fragments recovered from downed drones match the PBS TJ150 design. The Geran‑3’s airframe is approximately 3.5 meters in length with a wingspan near 3 meters, and its flight ceiling may reach 9,000 meters. Depending on the version, the warhead weighs between 50 and 300 kilograms. The drone has been observed operating at high altitudes and cruising speeds above 500 kilometers per hour, significantly faster than the earlier Geran‑2. It is likely that several designations apply to this model, with references to MC‑236 or M‑237 appearing in leaked Russian and Iranian documentation.

Russia is manufacturing the Geran‑3 in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. Ukrainian intelligence indicates that initial production began with Iranian-supplied kits, followed by increased localization involving Russian airframes, Chinese electronics, and foreign-sourced components. Evidence from intercepted drones confirms the use of components originating from multiple countries, including Canada, the United States, and Switzerland. Due to international sanctions, these parts were not procured directly from the original manufacturers but likely entered production through intermediaries or unauthorized re-export channels. For instance, the drones recovered in Ukraine often include GNSS antennas and flight control boards containing RF transceivers, as well as microcontrollers and amplifiers made for civilian applications. This component mix closely matches earlier Geran‑2 builds. However, changes to the airframe include redesigned air intakes, reinforced fuselage structures to support the jet engine, and modified control systems. The Geran‑3 uses eight actuators compared to the Geran‑2’s four, which may improve stability, maneuverability, and fault tolerance during flight.

Multiple Geran‑3 variants are reported to be in use. One version appears to follow a standard configuration with inertial navigation and satellite guidance via GPS and GLONASS. A second version is believed to carry an infrared imaging seeker in the nose cone for passive terminal targeting, allowing it to home in on heat sources such as vehicles or infrastructure. A third version may use a passive radar homing seeker, which would enable it to target air defense systems by detecting radar emissions. A fourth configuration possibly includes an electro-optical camera, enabling visual reconnaissance or operator-assisted terminal guidance. These sensor payloads are not confirmed for every unit but have been mentioned in Iranian technical descriptions and suggested in some wreckage assessments. All known variants are launched using either a solid-fuel booster (JATO) or truck-mounted rails, and while Russian sources have hinted at potential air-launched versions, there is no operational confirmation of that method as of mid-2025.

Since early 2025, the Geran‑3 has been deployed in several high-volume drone strikes. On June 10, a drone traveling at over 515 kilometers per hour was intercepted above Kyiv, producing a high-pitched sound consistent with turbojet propulsion. This matched earlier reports from February 2025, in which Ukraine’s GUR (Main Intelligence Directorate) warned that Russia had begun mass production of jet-powered loitering munitions. On May 17–18, 2025, Russia reportedly launched 273 drones in a single night, some of which were assessed as Geran‑3 units. Although Ukrainian air defenses intercepted most of the incoming drones, the Geran‑3’s speed and altitude added complexity to interception efforts. Other sightings in Odesa and Mykolaiv throughout April and June further support that the Geran‑3 is now used operationally. This deployment has prompted Ukrainian and NATO planners to reassess drone defense strategies, especially in terms of interception cost and sensor coverage.

In terms of performance, the Geran‑3 can operate for approximately two hours, though this is affected by payload, speed, and flight altitude. Most estimates put its operational range at 1,200 kilometers, though some suggest that a lighter configuration could reach distances up to 2,500 kilometers. Its radar cross-section is estimated at approximately 0.05 square meters, making detection and tracking more difficult for legacy systems. The drone’s higher flight ceiling and dive speed reduce the effectiveness of autocannon and machine gun-based defenses. It also forces defenders to rely on surface-to-air missiles such as NASAMS or Buk, which are more expensive and limited in availability. The Geran‑3’s turbojet engine, however, increases its thermal signature, exposing it to infrared-guided interception. Ukrainian forces have had mixed results in disrupting these drones with electronic warfare, and Russian engineers are reportedly working to integrate more hardened guidance systems and terrain-following algorithms to improve resistance against jamming.

The Geran‑3’s deployment reflects a broader Russian effort to blend Iranian UAV designs with domestic production capabilities and imported electronics. While more expensive than the propeller-driven Geran‑2, it provides faster delivery of precision-guided munitions and may offer alternatives to cruise missile use in long-range operations. Production is increasing at Alabuga, where reports claim hundreds of drones may be built each month using parts sourced from Iran and China, with some labor provided under bilateral arrangements. Russian sources have suggested the drone’s mission set could be expanded to include decoy operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, or even limited air-to-air roles, such as intercepting UAVs like the MQ‑9 Reaper. No confirmed engagements of this type have been reported, but Iranian documents have described such concepts. The Geran‑3’s current usage in Ukraine indicates that Russia now possesses a domestically produced, fast, high-altitude loitering munition, marking a change in the types of aerial threats facing Ukrainian infrastructure and potentially influencing future air defense investment priorities.