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Inside U.S. Army’s New PAC-3 Edge Missile: How It Differs From the Patriot PAC-3 MSE
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The U.S. Army's future Patriot surface-to-air defense missile capability could gain substantially greater interception range, altitude, and maneuverability with Lockheed Martin's new PAC-3 Edge missile, developed to counter advanced ballistic missiles and emerging hypersonic threats. Building on the combat-proven PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), PAC-3 Edge introduces a new-generation seeker, advanced rocket propulsion, and upgraded flight controls intended to expand the area U.S. forces can defend against increasingly sophisticated missile attacks.

Lockheed Martin displays its new PAC-3 Edge next-generation air defense interceptor at AUSA 2026 in Washington, designed to deliver greater interception range, altitude, and maneuverability than the current PAC-3 MSE against advanced ballistic and hypersonic missile threats. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)

Unlike the existing PAC-3 MSE, which already provides highly maneuverable hit-to-kill interception against tactical ballistic missiles and other aerial threats, PAC-3 Edge is designed to maintain greater speed and maneuverability at longer ranges and higher altitudes. Its principal operational advantage is giving U.S. Army air defense units more opportunities to intercept fast-moving or maneuvering missiles before they approach protected military bases, command centers, airfields, and critical infrastructure.

The difference between PAC-3 Edge and earlier Patriot interceptors matters as Russia and China continue developing missiles with more demanding flight trajectories and maneuvering characteristics. Conventional ballistic missiles follow broadly predictable trajectories after their powered flight, but maneuvering reentry vehicles and certain hypersonic weapons can complicate interception by changing their flight paths. PAC-3 Edge is being developed to address these challenges by improving detection precision, propulsion energy, and terminal maneuverability.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Seeks to Stop Advanced Ballistic Missiles With Longer-Range PAC-3 Edge Patriot Interceptor

Lockheed Martin unveiled PAC-3 Edge on October 9, 2026, as its proposed interceptor for the U.S. Army's competitive Future Interceptor program. The company has identified initial testing in 2027 and a targeted deployment timeline around 2031. The missile remains under development, and publicly reported operational interception tests have not yet validated its projected performance improvements.

The PAC-3 Edge represents the latest evolution of the Patriot interceptor family, which has undergone several major improvements since the original PAC-3. Earlier Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) interceptors, including the PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T), use blast-fragmentation warheads to engage aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile threats. By comparison, PAC-3 introduced hit-to-kill technology, using direct kinetic impact to destroy incoming missiles rather than relying primarily on an explosive warhead.

The original PAC-3 and subsequent PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) established this precision-interception approach, combining active radar guidance with a compact missile design. PAC-3 MSE later introduced a larger dual-pulse solid rocket motor, redesigned control surfaces, and enhanced maneuverability, expanding the engagement envelope beyond earlier PAC-3 variants. These improvements allowed the U.S. Army to engage more demanding ballistic missile threats at greater distances and altitudes.

PAC-3 Edge builds on these improvements but introduces a more advanced propulsion architecture designed to provide better control of the missile's energy throughout an engagement. Northrop Grumman is developing an advanced multi-pulse solid rocket motor intended to improve the interceptor's ability to sustain speed and maneuver at extended ranges. Unlike a conventional rocket motor that delivers much of its thrust early in the powered phase, a multi-pulse design distributes propulsion energy across separate flight periods.

This capability matters because an interceptor's effectiveness depends not only on its maximum speed but also on how much energy remains when it reaches the target. A missile that loses substantial speed during a long engagement may struggle to make the rapid course corrections needed to strike a maneuvering ballistic missile. PAC-3 Edge is intended to reduce this limitation by combining improved propulsion with greater maneuvering authority during critical engagement phases.

Comparison table of the Patriot PAC-3 MSE and Lockheed Martin’s new PAC-3 Edge interceptor, highlighting differences in status, propulsion, seeker, maneuverability, integration, and intended operational role. (Picture source: Army Recognition editing)

Another major difference concerns the missile's seeker. Lockheed Martin is developing a new seeker through its Strigo Product Center, supported by a reported $250 million company investment in advanced sensor technology. The manufacturer says the new seeker will improve interception precision against increasingly complex threats, but it has not publicly disclosed its detailed technical architecture, detection performance, or resistance to countermeasures.

For a hit-to-kill interceptor, seeker performance is essential because the missile must continuously refine its target position and correct its trajectory before impact. At extremely high closing speeds, even small guidance errors can result in a missed interception. The combination of a more advanced seeker and upgraded flight controls is therefore intended to improve PAC-3 Edge's ability to respond to changes in target trajectory during the final seconds of flight.

PAC-3 Edge also introduces control-system improvements to enhance maneuverability at higher altitudes and greater distances. While PAC-3 MSE already combines aerodynamic control surfaces with lateral attitude-control capabilities, the newer interceptor is intended to extend performance beyond the MSE's existing engagement envelope. This could be especially relevant at high altitudes, where thinner air reduces the effectiveness of conventional aerodynamic control surfaces.

For U.S. Army air defense crews, the practical difference would be the ability to engage certain threats earlier and across a larger defended area. A longer-range interceptor can expand coverage around protected military installations and give commanders more flexibility in positioning launchers. Increased maneuverability could also improve the ability to respond to missiles that change their flight paths during the terminal phase.

A Ukrainian Patriot air defense missile system highlights combat experience against Russian missile threats and supports the development of Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Edge interceptor, with improved range, altitude, and maneuverability. (Picture source: Ukrainian Armed Forces / Wikimedia Commons)

The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that interceptor performance alone cannot guarantee sustained air defense. Repeated large-scale missile and drone attacks place pressure on available ammunition stocks, even when individual interceptors achieve high effectiveness. PAC-3 Edge would not eliminate this problem, and its potential benefits would require sufficient production capacity, reliable resupply, and lower-cost interceptors such as the proposed PAC-3 ACE.

Cost will therefore remain a critical consideration for PAC-3 Edge. PAC-3 MSE already represents a substantial investment, with recent U.S. Army budget figures indicating a unit procurement cost of approximately $5.3 million. Lockheed Martin has not disclosed a reliable production price for PAC-3 Edge, and its advanced propulsion, seeker, and control technologies may introduce additional manufacturing complexity. Assess its operational benefits alongside affordability, industrial production capacity, and available missile inventories.

From a technical perspective, the most important difference between PAC-3 MSE and PAC-3 Edge is the intended improvement in interception performance at the limits of the missile's flight envelope. PAC-3 MSE expanded the original PAC-3's capabilities through more powerful propulsion and improved flight controls. PAC-3 Edge seeks to advance this approach by combining multi-pulse propulsion, a new seeker, and upgraded maneuvering controls to counter threats that may exceed the engagement capabilities of current interceptors.

These improvements could significantly affect U.S. military operations in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In Europe, advanced missile defenses are essential for protecting NATO forces against Russian ballistic missile attacks, while in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. forces face increasingly sophisticated Chinese missile systems capable of threatening air bases, logistics facilities, and military infrastructure. An interceptor with greater engagement range and maneuverability could expand defensive coverage and create more opportunities to defeat incoming missiles.

The introduction of PAC-3 Edge also reflects the U.S. Army's transition to a layered missile-defense architecture that combines multiple sensors, launchers, and interceptor types. PAC-2 GEM-T provides established blast-fragmentation interception capabilities, PAC-3 CRI introduced compact direct-impact interception, and PAC-3 MSE extended the engagement envelope. PAC-3 Edge is intended to provide higher performance against increasingly complex threats, while PAC-3 ACE addresses the separate requirement for more affordable interception capacity.

For the U.S. Army, PAC-3 Edge's ultimate value will depend on whether testing confirms that its new propulsion, seeker, and flight-control technologies deliver meaningful improvements against representative advanced missile threats. With initial testing expected in 2027 and Lockheed Martin targeting deployment around 2031, the missile remains a future capability rather than an operational solution to current threats. If it meets its development objectives, PAC-3 Edge could give American and allied forces a longer-reaching, more maneuverable defensive weapon, while Ukraine's experience reinforces that effective missile defense will continue to require both advanced interception technology and enough ammunition to sustain prolonged combat operations.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
France and Netherlands Launch Nuclear and Conventional Dialogue to Complement NATO Deterrence
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France and the Netherlands are moving their defense relationship into a more sensitive strategic domain by opening a dedicated dialogue on nuclear and conventional deterrence, linking France’s independent nuclear arsenal with the Netherlands’ growing role in NATO’s F-35-based nuclear mission. The initiative could become a significant step in Europe’s effort to build a more credible deterrent posture, deepen high-level coordination on nuclear and conventional forces, and strengthen the European pillar of NATO at a time when allies are reassessing how much military responsibility Europe must be prepared to carry on its own.

France and the Netherlands have launched a strategic dialogue on nuclear and conventional deterrence to strengthen Europe’s defense contribution while reinforcing NATO’s existing deterrence framework (Picture Source: French Air Force)

France and the Netherlands have opened a new strategic dialogue on nuclear and conventional deterrence as European governments reassess their long-term security posture. During the first meeting of the bilateral Nuclear Steering Group on October 14, 2026, senior officials discussed how Europe could strengthen its contribution to deterrence while remaining firmly anchored in NATO. According to the Dutch Ministry of Defense, the initiative follows French President Emmanuel Macron’s March offer to deepen strategic consultations with European partners and is intended to complement, rather than replace, NATO’s existing collective deterrence and defense architecture.

France occupies a unique position in these discussions because it is the only nuclear-armed member state of the European Union. According to the official Dutch statement, Paris and The Hague discussed possibilities for strengthening the European dimension of both nuclear and conventional deterrence, although no specific decisions on weapons, deployments, command arrangements, or nuclear sharing were announced. France has also made clear that any decision concerning the employment of its nuclear forces would remain under sovereign French authority. Macron stated in March that France’s developing concept of “forward deterrence” would not involve sharing the ultimate decision, planning, or conduct of nuclear employment. This makes the French-Dutch dialogue strategically significant, but it should not be interpreted as evidence that a new bilateral nuclear-sharing arrangement has already been agreed.

Related Topic: Dutch Nuclear-Capable F-35s Take Central Role in NATO’s Steadfast Noon Exercise

The Netherlands, meanwhile, already has an established role within NATO’s nuclear deterrence framework. Since June 1, 2024, the Dutch F-35A has taken over the NATO nuclear mission previously performed by the F-16, making the Netherlands the first European country to transition its Dual-Capable Aircraft role to the F-35. That role is again receiving attention during Steadfast Noon 2026, NATO’s annual nuclear deterrence exercise, which began in Italy on October 13 with participation from 17 Allied nations. Army Recognition Group reportedon October 14 that Dutch F-35As certified for NATO’s nuclear mission are playing a prominent role in the exercise, highlighting the Netherlands’ position in the modernization of NATO’s airborne deterrence capabilities. NATO has emphasized that Steadfast Noon is a routine, long-planned exercise and that no live nuclear weapons are used.

A central question is whether deeper French-Dutch cooperation could eventually resemble NATO’s existing U.S.-led nuclear-sharing arrangements. Such a development remains highly speculative, and no official announcement supports that interpretation at present. Dutch F-35As are certified for their existing NATO role, while France maintains an independent nuclear deterrent with its own nationally controlled delivery systems. There is no publicly confirmed integration of French nuclear weapons with the F-35, nor has Paris announced an intention to provide French nuclear weapons for employment by Dutch aircraft or to transfer custody or final employment authority to the Netherlands. Consequently, a model in which French nuclear weapons would simply become available for Dutch F-35 operations should not currently be regarded as the most likely outcome of the dialogue.

A more cautious and potentially more realistic hypothesis is the development of a complementary European deterrence framework. Dutch F-35s could continue performing their established NATO role while France’s independent nuclear forces provide an additional strategic dimension under exclusive French control. Cooperation could focus on areas that Paris has already publicly identified in connection with its emerging “forward deterrence” concept, including participation in deterrence exercises, conventional military contributions, early warning, air and missile defense, deep precision strike, strategic consultation, and improved coordination during crises.

France has also explicitly opened the door to the temporary deployment of elements of its strategic air forces on allied territory. In the Dutch context, this raises the possibility, although no such deployment has been announced, that French strategic aircraft, including nuclear-capable Rafales, could at some point operate temporarily from Dutch territory for exercises, interoperability activities, or deterrence signaling while remaining entirely under French command and control. Any such arrangement would, however, require separate political decisions and should not be assumed from the opening of the current bilateral dialogue.

Another potential direction would be closer strategic coordination between France’s independent deterrent and NATO’s established deterrence structure without merging the two. Under such an approach, Dutch aircraft would continue operating within NATO arrangements while France maintained sovereign control over its nuclear forces, with greater coordination in exercises, conventional capabilities, planning assumptions, and political signaling. The strategic value of such cooperation would not necessarily depend on transferring nuclear weapons or creating a French equivalent of the U.S. nuclear-sharing system. Instead, increased interoperability and consultation could strengthen Europe’s contribution to deterrence while preserving the separate national and Alliance frameworks on which the existing security architecture is based.

The launch of the French-Dutch Nuclear Steering Group represents the beginning of a strategic process rather than a confirmed change in Europe’s nuclear posture. The most credible assessment at this stage is that Paris and The Hague are examining how France’s independent nuclear deterrent, Dutch conventional and NATO-certified F-35 capabilities, and the Alliance’s broader deterrence architecture could reinforce one another. No public evidence indicates that French nuclear weapons are being assigned to Dutch F-35s or transferred under a bilateral nuclear-sharing arrangement. What has changed is the level of political dialogue: France and the Netherlands are now formally exploring how a stronger European contribution to deterrence could be developed while remaining complementary to NATO and preserving French sovereign control over its nuclear forces.

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Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
Inside the U.S. Army’s New XM8 6.8mm Carbine: What Changes From the M7 and M4A1
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The U.S. Army is introducing the new SIG Sauer XM8 Carbine, a compact 6.8×51 mm assault rifle developed from the M7 following feedback from American soldiers who requested a lighter, shorter, and more maneuverable weapon. Equipped with a 279 mm (11 in) barrel, a gas-piston operating system, ambidextrous controls, and an integrated suppressor, the XM8 combines the increased ballistic performance of next-generation 6.8 mm ammunition with improved handling characteristics intended to address limitations identified during early M7 evaluations.

The XM8 on display at AUSA 2026 in Washington, D.C., highlights the latest developments in U.S. military equipment and weapon technology. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)

The XM8 is intended to replace the 5.56 mm M4A1 carbine in designated U.S. Army Close Combat Force units, combining the ballistic performance of the Army's 6.8 mm ammunition with a shorter and lighter configuration developed in response to soldier feedback. Its design aims to improve effectiveness against protected enemy soldiers while preserving the mobility and weapon handling required for urban combat, dismounted operations, and engagements in confined environments.

The XM8 represents an important evolution of the M7 rifle, originally selected under the U.S. Army's Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program to increase infantry lethality against modern battlefield threats. Although the M7 introduced a more powerful 6.8 mm cartridge and advanced fire-control capabilities, evaluations by American soldiers highlighted concerns about its weight, overall dimensions, and handling compared with the familiar M4A1. These observations prompted the Army and SIG Sauer to develop a more compact carbine that could preserve the ballistic advantages of the original weapon while better meeting the physical and tactical requirements of dismounted infantry.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Takes Delivery of First XM8 Carbine 6.8mm for Close-Combat Speed and Lethality

The XM8 retains the fundamental mechanical architecture of the M7 while introducing a shorter barrel, revised dimensions, and ergonomic improvements. According to SIG Sauer, the new carbine is approximately 12 percent lighter than the M7, while the U.S. Army reports that it is about 89 mm (3.5 in) shorter and more than 0.45 kg (1 lb) lighter. These changes are intended to improve mobility and weapon handling during rapid infantry movements, vehicle operations, and engagements in confined spaces. Rather than developing an entirely new rifle, the Army has refined an existing design using experience gained from soldiers evaluating the M7 under realistic operational conditions.

The main improvement over the M4A1 currently used by U.S. Army soldiers is the adoption of 6.8×51 mm hybrid ammunition. Unlike the M4A1, which fires the 5.56×45 mm NATO cartridge, the XM8 uses ammunition designed to generate higher ballistic performance and retain greater energy at extended distances. Its hybrid case construction can withstand higher chamber pressures than conventional brass ammunition, supporting increased projectile velocity and energy. For American infantry, the intended advantage is improved effectiveness against enemy combatants equipped with modern body armor, although actual penetration depends on the projectile, impact velocity, engagement distance, and protection level.

The M4A1 remains a proven assault carbine valued for its relatively low weight, manageable recoil, and effectiveness in close combat. Its 368 mm (14.5 in) barrel offers a practical balance of mobility and ballistic performance, and decades of operational use have built a mature logistical and maintenance infrastructure. By comparison, the XM8 uses a shorter 279 mm (11 in) barrel while firing the more powerful 6.8 mm cartridge. This reflects the Army's effort to combine the compact handling expected from a modern infantry carbine with the increased ballistic effectiveness introduced through the NGSW program. The shorter barrel also creates a ballistic compromise: reducing barrel length generally shortens the time available for propellant gases to accelerate a projectile, which can affect muzzle velocity.

The new SIG Sauer XM8 Carbine features a compact 279 mm (11-inch) barrel, 6.8×51 mm ammunition, a gas-piston operating system, ambidextrous controls and an integrated suppressor. Developed from the M7 rifle, it combines enhanced firepower with improved maneuverability in a shorter and lighter design. (Picture source: Sig Sauer)

According to the technical specifications published in SIG Sauer's XM8 brochure, the carbine weighs approximately 3.31 kg (7.3 lb) unloaded. With its suppressor and protective heat shield installed, the weight increases to approximately 3.99 kg (8.8 lb). The weapon measures 833 mm (32.79 in) with the stock collapsed and suppressor fitted. These figures illustrate the manufacturer's efforts to reduce the size and weight of the M7 while retaining the capabilities associated with the 6.8 mm ammunition family.

The comparison with the M4A1 is more nuanced. The standard M4A1 weighs approximately 2.86 to 2.90 kg (6.3 to 6.4 lb) unloaded, making it lighter than the XM8 in its basic configuration. However, the XM8 delivers the intended ballistic advantages associated with the larger 6.8 mm cartridge while remaining substantially lighter than the original M7. Its principal improvement is therefore not a reduction in every aspect of weapon weight but the ability to combine greater potential lethality with dimensions and handling characteristics closer to those of the M4A1. This balance is particularly important for infantry soldiers who must carry body armor, ammunition, communication devices, batteries, and other mission-essential equipment.

From a firearms design perspective, the XM8 differs visibly from the traditional M4A1 through its compact receiver and handguard arrangement, shortened barrel, integrated suppressor configuration, and distinctive side-mounted charging handle. Based on Army Recognition's analysis of the weapon illustrated in SIG Sauer's technical brochure, the carbine follows a design philosophy focused on reducing the length of the forward assembly while preserving familiar handling characteristics for American soldiers transitioning from existing service rifles. The upper receiver features a continuous mounting rail extending toward the handguard, allowing optical sights and other equipment to be positioned according to operational requirements.

The XM8 incorporates a short, free-floating M-LOK handguard with accessory attachment interfaces along its sides and lower section. Army Recognition analysts assess that this arrangement provides mounting options for weapon lights, aiming lasers, forward grips, and other mission-specific equipment without introducing unnecessary bulk around the barrel. Its compact front section is particularly relevant because the suppressor extends beyond the shortened barrel. Reducing the barrel length to 279 mm (11 in) helps offset the additional length introduced by the suppressor, allowing the weapon to remain relatively compact for operations inside armored vehicles, buildings, and other restricted environments.

At the rear, the XM8 features an adjustable, collapsible stock designed to accommodate different shooting positions and protective equipment configurations. Army Recognition's visual assessment indicates that the stock follows a relatively straight alignment with the receiver, consistent with modern military rifle designs emphasizing stable shoulder positioning and controlled handling. The compact overall configuration also reduces the space required to maneuver the weapon, a practical advantage when soldiers must move through narrow entrances, vehicle compartments, or complex urban terrain.

Another distinguishing feature is the XM8's non-reciprocating charging handle positioned on the left side of the receiver. Unlike the M4A1, which primarily uses a rear charging handle, the XM8 provides an additional operating control accessible from the side. The side-mounted handle remains stationary during firing, preventing continuous external movement near the shooter's support hand. The weapon also retains a rear charging handle arrangement familiar to M4A1 users, providing additional handling flexibility without requiring soldiers to adopt an entirely unfamiliar manual of arms.

The XM8 incorporates fully ambidextrous controls, including the safety selector and bolt release, enabling operation from either side of the weapon. These features support right-handed and left-handed shooters and allow soldiers to manipulate the carbine more consistently when changing firing positions. From Army Recognition's technical perspective, the combination of ambidextrous controls, dual charging arrangements, and compact dimensions reflects a deliberate effort to improve ergonomics rather than simply shorten the original M7 design.

Mechanically, the XM8 is a magazine-fed, select-fire assault carbine using a gas-piston operating system with a rotating bolt. It supports semiautomatic and fully automatic firing modes and incorporates an adjustable gas system. This architecture differs from the M4A1's direct-gas operating mechanism, in which propellant gases are routed into the bolt-carrier assembly to cycle the action. The XM8's piston-driven mechanism transfers energy through a mechanical operating assembly, reducing the amount of combustion residue introduced directly into the receiver through the gas system.

The gas-piston configuration is particularly relevant because the XM8 is designed for regular suppressor use. Suppressors alter gas pressure and flow characteristics during firing, potentially affecting the operating cycle and increasing gas exposure around the shooter. The XM8's adjustable gas system and suppressor integration are intended to accommodate these conditions while supporting military reliability requirements. However, long-term durability, maintenance demands, and reliability under combat conditions will depend on continued testing and operational experience.

The weapon illustrated in SIG Sauer's brochure also incorporates a suppressor heat shield, which covers the external suppressor assembly. Army Recognition analysts assess that this feature addresses one of the practical limitations of suppressed military rifles: the rapid accumulation of heat during repeated firing. The shield can reduce the risk of accidental contact with heated surfaces, particularly during weapon transitions and close-quarters movement, although it does not eliminate heat generation. The suppressor itself is intended to reduce visible muzzle flash and firing noise while limiting gas blowback, potentially making the weapon less conspicuous during night operations. Nevertheless, the XM8 remains acoustically detectable because its high-velocity 6.8 mm ammunition produces a supersonic shock wave.

The XM8 also retains compatibility with the M157 Small Arms Fire Control system developed by Vortex Optics for the NGSW program. This advanced optical sight combines variable magnification with electronic capabilities that include laser rangefinding, ballistic calculations, and environmental sensing. By measuring target distance and calculating aiming corrections, the system is intended to assist soldiers in engaging targets at varying ranges. Combined with the higher-performance 6.8 mm ammunition, the M157 could improve first-round hit probability and reduce the time required to establish an accurate firing solution.

Compared with conventional optical sights commonly installed on M4A1 carbines, the M157 provides a more integrated approach to target engagement. However, advanced optics can also enhance existing rifles, and the M157 is not exclusive to the XM8. The new carbine's main advantage lies in combining electronic fire-control assistance with 6.8 mm ammunition, suppressor integration, and a weapon architecture developed around the Army's next-generation infantry lethality requirements. The XM8's effectiveness against protected targets will ultimately depend on the complete weapon, ammunition, and fire-control combination rather than any single component.

The transition to 6.8 mm ammunition also introduces logistical and operational trade-offs. The larger cartridge is heavier and bulkier than 5.56 mm ammunition, potentially reducing the number of rounds a soldier can carry for a given ammunition weight. This consideration is important during prolonged infantry engagements, where ammunition endurance can be as significant as the ballistic performance of individual rounds. The Army is examining improvements to ammunition carriage and magazine capacity as part of its continuing NGSW development effort, seeking to balance increased lethality with the physical demands placed on soldiers.

SIG Sauer's new XM8 6.8 mm carbine displayed at AUSA 2026 in Washington, D.C. Developed from the U.S. Army's M7 rifle, the XM8 is approximately 12% lighter and 3.5 inches shorter, improving soldier mobility and weapon handling in close combat while retaining the M7's 6.8 mm ammunition and advanced fire-control compatibility. (Picture source Army Recognition Group)

The XM8 remains part of the broader Next Generation Squad Weapon family, alongside the M7 rifle and M250 automatic rifle. The M7 and M250 were originally selected to replace the M4A1 and M249 Squad Automatic Weapon in designated Close Combat Force formations. The subsequent introduction of the XM8 reflects the Army's willingness to modify the original rifle configuration after evaluating how its weight and dimensions affected soldiers during training and operational assessments. The Army has also established interim production capacity for 6.8 mm ammunition at the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant to support the introduction of these weapons and the expansion of ammunition manufacturing.

The development timeline reflects the influence of soldier feedback on the program. Personnel from the 101st Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment participated in evaluations of the shorter carbine configuration at Fort Benning, Georgia, in September 2025. The Army subsequently advanced procurement of the XM8 in December 2025 and approved the carbine following technical testing and soldier evaluations in March 2026. On April 3, 2026, the service announced acceptance of its first delivery from SIG Sauer, including weapons, accessories, spare parts, and contractor support.

During AUSA 2026 in Washington, D.C., SIG Sauer confirmed that production had increased to support the planned fielding schedule, with initial deliveries to Close Combat Force units expected to begin in December 2026. This transition marks the movement from developmental testing and initial deliveries toward operational introduction. The weapon's broader performance, including long-term reliability, maintenance requirements, and effectiveness under demanding combat conditions, will continue to be assessed as soldiers begin using the XM8 in field units.

The XM8 designation should not be confused with the experimental Heckler & Koch XM8 rifle developed during the early 2000s. Although both weapons share the same designation, the current SIG Sauer XM8 is a completely different design derived from the M7 and chambered for the 6.8×51 mm hybrid cartridge. Its development represents the refinement of an existing infantry weapon family rather than the revival of the earlier experimental rifle program.

From Army Recognition's assessment, the XM8's importance lies in the way its design combines characteristics associated with two generations of American infantry weapons. The M4A1 established a widely used standard for compactness, low weight, and manageable handling, while the M7 introduced improved 6.8 mm ballistic performance and advanced fire-control technology. The XM8 seeks to combine these advantages through a shorter barrel, reduced weight compared with the M7, ambidextrous controls, integrated suppressor, and modular configuration developed in response to U.S. soldier feedback.

For American infantry, the XM8 therefore represents more than a simple reduction in barrel length. Its development demonstrates how direct soldier experience can influence the evolution of a new-generation assault rifle, ensuring that improvements in lethality do not come at the expense of mobility and practical handling. If operational fielding confirms its expected performance, the XM8 could provide U.S. Army soldiers with greater effectiveness against protected adversaries while reducing some of the weight and maneuverability disadvantages associated with the original M7, establishing a new balance between firepower, ergonomics, and battlefield endurance.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
How South Korea’s K2 Tank Challenged German Leopard 2 and U.S. M1A2 Abrams in Europe
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Poland is turning South Korea’s K2 Black Panther Main Battle Tank (MBT) into one of the most important challengers to the German Leopard 2A8 and U.S. M1A2 SEP V3 Abrams tanks in Europe, not because the Korean tank has conclusively defeated either rival in comparative trials, but because it combines modern firepower, a relatively low combat weight, high mobility, and an industrial model capable of delivering tanks rapidly.

As of September 2026, Poland operates 208 K2GF tanks after the first 28 vehicles from its second contract arrived in August, while the future K2PL is moving toward Polish production with additional protection and counter-drone capabilities. The result is a competition increasingly shaped not only by armor and firepower, but by how quickly European armies can turn procurement decisions into deployable armored combat mass.

Related Topic: South Korea Positions K2PL Tank to Challenge U.S. M1E3 Abrams and Leopard 2A8 in Western Market

German Leopard 2A8 at left, South Korean K2 Black Panther at center, and U.S. M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams at right illustrate the three main battle tank approaches shaping Europe’s armored modernization, where firepower and protection are increasingly weighed alongside mobility, delivery speed, industrial capacity, and local production. (Editing Army Recognition Group)

This matters because Poland now operates three distinct Western main battle tank families: South Korean K2s, German Leopard 2s, and American M1A2 Sep V3 Abrams. Few European armies provide such a direct operational environment for comparing different approaches to firepower, protection, mobility, logistics, and sustainment. At the same time, Poland’s position on NATO’s eastern flank means these characteristics are measured against a concrete requirement: generating heavy forces that can deploy rapidly, survive increasingly drone-saturated battlefields, and sustain high-intensity operations close to the Alliance’s eastern border.

Poland signed its first contract for 180 K2 tanks in August 2022, and the final 20 vehicles arrived on November 13, 2025, completing the order in just over three years. That delivery tempo is central to understanding why the K2 has become strategically important in Europe. Poland needed to rebuild armored mass rapidly after transferring large quantities of Soviet-designed equipment to Ukraine while simultaneously expanding its land forces, and South Korea could draw on an active production base to provide combat capability on a timetable measured in a few years rather than potentially extending toward the end of the decade.

The second Polish contract pushes that approach considerably further. Signed in August 2025, it covers another 180 tanks for delivery between 2026 and 2030, including 116 K2GF and 64 K2PL vehicles. Sixty-one K2PLs are planned for production at Bumar-Łabędy in Gliwice, while the first three will be manufactured in South Korea and tested before Polish production expands. The agreement also covers technology transfer, production equipment, full maintenance capabilities, and 81 K2-based support vehicles, turning the program from a rapid foreign acquisition into the foundation of a longer-term Polish armored-industrial capability.

At MSPO, Army Recognition Group brings you an exclusive look at Hyundai Rotem's cooperation with Poland, featuring the K2 Main Battle Tank and the Armored Recovery Vehicle (ARV). In an insightful interview, we explore the strategic importance of this collaboration.

That transition became increasingly visible at MSPO 2026 in Kielce, where Army Recognition examined how the K2PL is being positioned against the Leopard 2A8 and current and future Abrams designs. The K2PL is expected to incorporate an active protection system, counter-drone capabilities, additional armor and enhanced observation equipment, while integrating more Polish components. Poland’s Ministry of National Defense confirms that additional armor, active protection and a counter-UAS system are among the planned changes, with modifications also drawing on experience accumulated with the K2GF fleet.

Technically, the K2 occupies a different part of the design spectrum from the latest Abrams. The current K2GF weighs around 55 tonnes and combines a 1,500-hp diesel engine with a three-person crew and a 120 mm smoothbore gun using an autoloader. Its resulting power-to-weight ratio of roughly 27 hp per tonne and hydropneumatic suspension give the tank a strong mobility baseline, while the suspension lets the hull attitude and ground clearance be adjusted to suit the terrain. These characteristics are particularly relevant to operations requiring rapid movement across mixed road networks, bridges, and difficult terrain along NATO’s eastern flank.

The K2's lower mass therefore has significance beyond maximum road speed. A lighter tank generally places different demands on heavy transporters, bridging equipment, recovery vehicles and infrastructure, potentially increasing commanders' options when moving armored formations between operational axes. This does not automatically make the K2 more mobile under every battlefield condition, because terrain, track characteristics, fuel endurance, crew proficiency and support arrangements also matter, but it gives the design greater weight margin before additional armor, sensors, active protection and electronic systems push it toward the mass of heavier Western tanks.

Polish Army K2 Black Panther main battle tank, part of Warsaw’s rapidly expanding armored force and the foundation for the future K2PL variant to be produced locally with enhanced protection, counter-drone capabilities, and greater Polish industrial involvement. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)

The Leopard 2A8follows a heavier design approach while benefiting from one of Europe's strongest armored-vehicle support ecosystems. Depending on configuration, it weighs roughly 61.5 to 64.3 tonnes and retains a 1,500-hp diesel engine and a four-person crew. Its 120 mm L55A1 smoothbore gun and modern protection architecture, including active protection, make it a formidable benchmark for any tank competing for European contracts. The Leopard's greatest advantage may nevertheless extend beyond the tank itself: numerous NATO armies already operate Leopard 2 variants, creating established structures for training, maintenance, ammunition, spare parts and multinational cooperation.

Firepower illustrates the different engineering choices particularly clearly. The K2 uses a long-barrel 120 mm smoothbore gun combined with an autoloader, allowing Hyundai Rotem to reduce the crew to three. The Abrams retains a manually loaded 120 mm M256 and a four-person crew, while the Leopard 2A8 similarly retains four crew members. A fourth crewman can contribute to maintenance, observation, and other tasks during sustained operations, whereas an autoloader reduces manpower requirements and turret crew volume. For European armies facing recruitment and personnel pressures, that difference could matter more, but neither arrangement provides a universal operational advantage.

Protection is harder to compare because the most important armor characteristics of all three tanks remain classified. Public specifications cannot establish that the K2 is better protected than the Leopard 2A8 or M1A2 SEPv3, and combat weight alone is not a reliable measure of survivability. What is clear is that Poland intends to substantially strengthen K2PL protection through additional armor and active protection, while adding counter-drone capabilities and improved situational awareness. These modifications reflect lessons from Ukraine, where tanks must increasingly survive not only anti-tank guided missiles and artillery but persistent aerial surveillance, loitering munitions and inexpensive FPV attack drones.

The comparison with the Abrams is equally important because Poland is already operating both tank families in substantial numbers. Warsaw has acquired all 116 M1A1 Abrams ordered from the United States and contracted for 250 M1A2 SEPv3 tanks, with deliveries scheduled for completion in 2026. The Abrams brings a mature protection architecture and direct compatibility with the U.S. military ecosystem, giving Poland access to American training, logistics, and operational experience. Poland has also required its K2 fleet to use communications equipment compatible with Polish systems and a battlefield management system interoperable with that fitted to its Abrams, reducing operational separation between the two fleets.

A comparison of the South Korean K2 Black Panther, German Leopard 2A8, and U.S. M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams highlights three distinct approaches to modern armored warfare, each combining 120 mm firepower with different trade-offs in weight, crew size, protection, mobility, automation, and logistical demands. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)

The K2'sEuropean rise should therefore not be portrayed as a straightforward technical victory over either the Leopard or Abrams. Norway offers the clearest warning against that conclusion. Its procurement process pitted the K2 against the Leopard 2, and Norwegian authorities said testing showed both candidates were very good modern tanks that met the military requirements. Oslo ultimately selected the Leopard 2 after considering not only military performance but industrial cooperation, bilateral relations, logistics and life-cycle support, initially deciding to acquire 54 tanks with an option for another 18.

The Norwegian decision actually reinforces the broader lesson emerging from Poland: modern tank competitions are no longer decided by armor, gun performance or mobility alone. Industrial capacity, delivery schedules, national production, logistics, interoperability and political-military relationships can be as important as individual technical specifications. On these criteria, South Korea has found a different route into a European market historically dominated by German and American armored systems.

That formula addresses a weakness exposed across Europe after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. An army can possess highly capable tanks yet still struggle to increase combat strength rapidly if manufacturing capacity, spare parts, ammunition, trained crews and heavy maintenance infrastructure cannot expand at the same pace. A tank that can be delivered in quantity within a few years answers a different military requirement from one whose production slots may extend much further into the future. Poland's experience with the K2 demonstrates how industrial responsiveness and delivery speed can effectively become military capabilities in their own right.

The K2's significance could now extend beyond Poland. Hyundai Rotem is pursuing additional export opportunities, and Romania represents the most relevant potential next European case. Romanian forces conducted firing and field evaluations of the K2 at the Smârdan training area in May 2024 as Bucharest examined options for longer-term tank modernization. Romania has already ordered 54 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, but local reporting has described a much larger requirement to replace its aging TR-85-series fleet. A future K2 procurement could therefore create another NATO army operating Korean and American tanks in parallel rather than requiring the Korean tank to replace Abrams already ordered.

The Romanian case is important because Hyundai Rotem does not necessarily need to displace existing Abrams or Leopard fleets to expand in Europe. It can instead compete for follow-on requirements created as Central and Eastern European countries replace remaining Soviet-era equipment. Poland demonstrates that a military can operate K2 and Abrams simultaneously, while common battlefield-management arrangements can mitigate some interoperability problems. If that approach proves sustainable over the long term, the K2 could position itself as an additional component of European armored forces rather than simply an alternative to every German or American tank.

Interest has also emerged outside the European Union. Armenia explored acquiring the K2 during Defense Minister Suren Papikyan's visit to South Korea in September 2024, although it has not announced a procurement contract. The K2's adjustable suspension could be particularly relevant to mountainous terrain, but reported Armenian interest remains exploratory rather than a confirmed acquisition.

In North Africa, Egypt has previously examined cooperation with Hyundai Rotem on a locally produced K2 variant. Egypt's Ministry of Military Production confirmed discussions about possibly co-manufacturing a K2-EGY main battle tank, an industrial approach that fits South Korea's broader willingness to discuss localization with export customers. Egypt already has extensive experience assembling Abrams tanks domestically, meaning any K2 program would likely be judged not only on vehicle performance but also on technology transfer and local industrial participation.

Morocco has also emerged as a prospective customer. During an April 2025 visit to Seoul by Moroccan Industry and Trade Minister Ryad Mezzour, reports indicated Moroccan interest in the K2 alongside the KSS-III submarine and Cheongung air-defense system. Morocco already operates Abrams tanks, making the case strategically similar to Poland and potentially Romania: the K2 could be considered as a complementary source of armored capability rather than simply a direct replacement for American equipment. No K2 contract has been announced, however, and the discussions remain prospective.

A broader K2 export breakthrough would create its own challenge. Poland already requires hundreds of vehicles while South Korea must sustain its domestic armored forces, and additional large export contracts would increase pressure on Hyundai Rotem and its suppliers. Maintaining the delivery-speed advantage that helped establish the K2 in Poland would therefore require additional production capacity, deeper supplier networks or greater reliance on licensed manufacturing abroad.

This is where Poland may prove more important than its own tank numbers suggest. The second K2 agreement creates production and full support capabilities at Bumar-Łabędy, with 61 K2PLs planned for Polish manufacture. If that industrial base develops as intended, Poland could give the K2 family what South Korea previously lacked: a substantial manufacturing, maintenance, and modernization foothold inside NATO and the European Union. That does not automatically make Poland a future export center, but it creates the industrial foundation from which a broader European role could eventually develop.

The K2 therefore has not “beaten” the Leopard 2 or M1A2 Abrams in the conventional sense. Norway selected the Leopard after evaluating both German and Korean tanks, Poland continues investing heavily in Abrams alongside the K2, and the Leopard 2 remains supported by a large European user and industrial community. The more consequential development is that South Korea has inserted a credible third option into a European heavy-tank market long shaped primarily by German and American designs.

For future competitions, governments will consequently have to evaluate more than which tank carries the most armor or the most powerful gun. They will have to determine how many tanks can actually be produced, how quickly operational battalions can be equipped, whether national industry can maintain and modernize them, how easily they can move across European infrastructure, how much growth margin remains for future systems, and how rapidly protection can evolve against drones, top-attack weapons and other emerging threats.

On those terms, the K2 has become a serious competitor. Poland has already moved from emergency imports to a localized K2PL program; Romania has physically evaluated the tank; and reported interest from Armenia, Egypt, and Morocco indicates that other armies are examining the Korean model. The Leopard 2 retains the advantage of an extensive European ecosystem, while the Abrams connects operators directly to the enormous U.S. military and industrial structure. The K2 offers a different proposition: a comparatively lighter, highly automated main battle tank combined with rapid production, customization and technology transfer.

That may ultimately be the K2 Black Panther's most consequential success in Europe. It has helped move the tank debate beyond a simple contest of armor, guns and engines toward a more demanding measure of military power: how rapidly an industrial base can turn a modern tank design into deployable armored combat mass, sustain it in wartime and adapt it quickly enough to survive the changing battlefield.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Patriot® GEM-T: Combat-Proven, Built Through European Partnerships
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Raytheon’s Patriot® Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical (GEM-T) is a primary effector for the combat-proven Patriot air and missile defense system.

Propelled by the largest single-stage, all-boost solid‑propellant rocket motor in its class, GEM‑T combines high missile speed with shorter engagement timelines—an advantage that outpaces and outmaneuvers evasive threats. GEM-T offers proven ability to defend against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or enemy aircraft in complement to the PAC-3 missile, another Patriot interceptor.

An obsolescence modernization program has introduced significant performance improvements against tactical ballistic missiles, small airborne threats and cruise missiles.

GEM‑T delivers the precision and proven performance designed to meet critical mission demands. Continuous technical refresh efforts enable ongoing product maturity, offering unmatched reliability today and growth opportunities for tomorrow. These modernization efforts ensure GEM‑T remains ahead of emerging threats and aligned with dynamic operational demands.

With hundreds of combat intercepts, GEM-T has demonstrated accuracy and reliability on the battlefield. This record of success has spurred a spike in global demand -- two recent contracts for Patriot highlight that momentum:

• In September, Raytheon was awarded a $627 million contract in partnership with the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) to supply Germany with additional GEM-T missiles
• Raytheon recently signed a $3.7 billion contract to supply Patriot GEM-T interceptors for Ukraine
• In June, Raytheon was awarded a $988 million contract to supply GEM-T missiles to Poland

“These awards highlight how our international partnerships are strengthening global security. By increasing production capacity and building resilient supply chains through industry partnerships, we’re ensuring Patriot remains ready to defend our allies against the full spectrum of modern threats.”- Pete Bata, Raytheon Senior Vice President, Global Patriot.

Today Patriot serves as the backbone of air defense for nine European countries – and 19 nations worldwide – thanks to its decades-long record in combat, where it has proven its ability to counter cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles and advanced air-breathing threats. Raytheon continues to meet increased global demand for GEM-T with higher production capacity, a growing global footprint, and continued investment in product modernization.
New Version of PrSM Missile Could Push U.S. Army Rocket Launcher Strike Range Beyond 1,000 km
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The U.S. Army’s planned Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) Increment 4 could extend HIMARS and M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs) strike range beyond 1,000 km, giving mobile ground launchers the ability to threaten air bases, missile sites, and command centers deep inside Chinese or Russian operational areas. The added reach would move HIMARS beyond its traditional tactical role and give Army formations a direct theater-level strike capability against targets far behind the front line.

A 1,000-kilometer-class PrSM would place high-value objectives normally assigned to bombers, tactical aircraft, submarines, and sea-launched cruise missiles within reach of dispersed land forces. Combined with HIMARS mobility and survivability, the capability would strengthen U.S. deep fires, complicate enemy rear-area operations, and expand the Army’s role in joint long-range strike.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Plans Acquisition of 1,134 PrSM Missiles and More HIMARS in FY2027 to Expand Long-Range Strike

A U.S. Army Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is launched during a live-fire test, demonstrating the long-range deep-strike capability that the Army plans to expand beyond 1,000 km with future PrSM Increment 4 for HIMARS operations against high-value targets in contested theaters. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

For the U.S. Army, the significance goes well beyond another missile upgrade. If PrSM (Precision Strike Missile) Increment 4 achieves its planned range while retaining compatibility with HIMARS and M270A2 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), U.S. Army units could strike Chinese missile infrastructure, air bases, and command nodes across the Western Pacific, or Russian air defenses, headquarters, missile units, and logistics hubs in Europe, without moving launchers as close to the forward battle area. The Army’s Increment 4 effort specifically prioritizes three capabilities: range exceeding 1,000 kilometers, compatibility with M142 HIMARS, and the ability to neutralize, suppress, or destroy moving maritime and relocatable land targets.

The transformation begins with the current PrSM, which already gives the Army a substantial improvement over the Army Tactical Missile System. In the PrSM vs ATACMS comparison, PrSM provides greater range and doubles the missile load carried by HIMARS, allowing one launcher to carry two PrSM rounds instead of a single ATACMS. This increases the volume of long-range precision fire available before reload while preserving an existing launcher architecture already embedded in Army formations.

That change matters because modern deep fires increasingly focus on the systems that allow an enemy force to operate effectively, not just formations already in direct contact. PrSM can target long-range surface-to-air missile batteries, ballistic and cruise missile launchers, surveillance radars, command-and-control centers, communications nodes, assembly areas, logistics concentrations, and operational reserves. By attacking those systems before they directly influence the close battle, Army fires can disrupt missile attacks, weaken air-defense coverage, slow reinforcement, and isolate frontline formations from the command and sustainment networks that keep them combat effective.

Greater range also changes how HIMARS and M270A2 units survive. Launchers can operate farther behind friendly forces, exploit terrain and dispersed firing positions, and relocate rapidly after firing, reducing exposure to reconnaissance drones, counter-battery sensors, and long-range strike systems. The September 2026 U.S. Army acquisition update also shows that PrSM has been tested under conditions including GPS jamming, updated software, and representative operational scenarios, reflecting the expectation that the missile must operate inside heavily contested reconnaissance and electronic-warfare environments.

Modern deep strike, however, is fundamentally a sensor-to-shooter problem. A missile capable of reaching hundreds or eventually more than 1,000 kilometers provides little battlefield advantage if a mobile radar, missile launcher or command vehicle has already relocated before a firing decision is made. PrSM therefore depends on a broader targeting architecture linking satellites, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, ground sensors and joint command networks to Army launchers, with the speed of detection, identification, authorization and engagement determining whether fleeting targets can actually be destroyed.

The PrSM Increment 4 matters because the U.S. Army is not pursuing range alone. Its requirement to attack relocatable land targets means the future missile is intended to address the kind of mobile targets that dominate modern deep battle, including missile launchers, radars, and other high-value systems that survive by moving between firing or operating positions. The same Increment 4 requirement includes moving maritime targets, giving the future weapon relevance not only against land forces but also against naval forces operating within reach of U.S. Army launch positions.

Lockheed Martin’s PrSM Increment 4 concept completes critical ground testing of the booster-to-ramjet transition, supporting the development of a future U.S. Army missile designed to push HIMARS deep-strike reach beyond 1,000 km. (Photo credit: L3Harris.)

Against China, a future HIMARS or M270A2 with a 1,000 km range would be especially relevant across the Western Pacific. U.S. Army batteries dispersed across allied territory and island chains could potentially threaten Chinese missile sites, air bases, air-defense systems, command nodes, and logistics infrastructure while avoiding concentration at large fixed bases. That would give the U.S. Army a substantially larger role in a conflict otherwise dominated by naval and air forces and force the People’s Liberation Army to account for mobile land-based deep-strike weapons across a much wider geographic area.

This capability would be particularly important against China missile forces. The Western Pacific battlefield places a premium on attacking long-range missile launchers, supporting sensors and command networks before they can generate repeated strikes against U.S. and allied airfields, ports and naval forces. Mobile HIMARS batteries operating from distributed positions would give commanders another way to reach those targets while complicating Chinese efforts to determine where U.S. long-range fires are concentrated.

The maritime-strike requirement makes the China scenario even more significant. Because PrSM (Precision Strike Missile) Increment 4 is intended to attack moving maritime targets as well as relocatable land targets, a future HIMARS battery positioned on an island or coastline could contribute directly to sea denial while retaining a land-attack mission. It could receive targeting data from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or allied sensors and add another axis of attack against Chinese surface combatants moving through key maritime approaches.

Operationally, this would make HIMARS more than a land-attack artillery launcher in the Indo-Pacific. The same mobile firing unit could potentially threaten Chinese missile infrastructure on land and naval forces at sea, forcing the People’s Liberation Army to search for dispersed U.S. Army missile batteries across islands and allied territory while simultaneously protecting high-value facilities and ships. This creates the kind of multi-domain targeting problem the Army increasingly wants its long-range fires to impose on a peer adversary.

Australia’s firing of PrSM from a HIMARS during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025 demonstrated another important element of this concept: allied launcher compatibility and geographically distributed fires. The event showed that an Australian HIMARS could successfully launch PrSM, illustrating how U.S. and allied forces could expand the number of firing positions available across the Indo-Pacific rather than depending solely on U.S.-operated launchers.

Against Russia, the tactical geometry would be different. A European conflict would likely involve a dense land front backed by Russian long-range fires, electronic warfare, mobile surface-to-air missile systems, headquarters, missile forces, and extensive logistics infrastructure. Current PrSM-equipped HIMARS and M270A2 units could attack targets well behind the forward line, while a future Increment 4 missile exceeding 1,000 kilometers could extend the Army’s reach into operational and theater-level rear areas.

This is particularly relevant to Russian air defenses. Long-range surface-to-air missile systems and associated radars can constrain NATO aviation and protect command centers, missile units, and other rear-area targets, so land-based deep fires could suppress or destroy parts of those networks without relying exclusively on aircraft penetrating defended airspace. A PrSM Increment 4-equipped HIMARS would give theater commanders another way to keep Russian air defenses and supporting command systems under continuous threat.

The same logic applies to Russian missile forces and reinforcement networks. Rail transfer points, ammunition storage sites, assembly areas, and command nodes are critical to sustaining a continental campaign, and extending HIMARS fires beyond 1,000 km could force Russia to disperse those assets across a much larger area. Even when a target is not destroyed, the threat of rapid long-range attack can force headquarters to relocate, radars to limit emissions, and missile units to spend more time moving instead of preparing to fire.

This is where the comparison with ATACMS becomes strategically important. ATACMS gave the U.S. Army a valuable tactical ballistic missile capability, but PrSM is intended to combine greater range, increased missile capacity, and an evolutionary architecture able to add new target sets and significantly longer reach. The result is not simply an ATACMS replacement but a gradual expansion of what an Army rocket artillery formation can influence across the battlefield.

The missile is also relevant beyond hypothetical peer conflict. Operations against Iran have demonstrated why the U.S. military values mobile land-based deep fires against dispersed missile infrastructure, air-defense systems, and command facilities. Those target categories mirror many of the operational problems PrSM is designed to address: important military systems located beyond conventional artillery range, protected by air defenses and frequently distributed across large areas.

The Iran scenario also highlights the geographic limits of existing land-based missiles. In a theater where key targets may be separated by hundreds of kilometers, greater range lets Army launchers stay farther from hostile forces while still striking deep inside an adversary’s military network. A PrSM Increment 4 exceeding 1,000 km would expand the number of targets Army units could hold at risk without moving those launchers significantly closer to the threat.

Iran also illustrates a broader issue that would matter more in a war with China or Russia: missile inventory depth. A high-intensity campaign could require repeated attacks against numerous missile launchers, radars, headquarters, air-defense systems, and logistics facilities over days or weeks. A deep-strike weapon is therefore only as operationally useful as the stockpile and industrial capacity available to sustain its use after the opening phase of a conflict.

PrSM's compatibility with HIMARS and M270A2 remains one of the program’s strongest advantages. The Army can expand long-range strike without creating a completely separate launch vehicle, and soldiers can transition from ATACMS to PrSM while retaining familiar launcher procedures and infrastructure. The September 2026 Army acquisition report specifically identified preserving HIMARS and M270 compatibility as an important result of soldier feedback during development.

This allows the same launcher family to support a layered fires architecture. HIMARS and M270A2 can employ guided rockets for shorter-range engagements and PrSM for deep strike, giving commanders the ability to attack targets at different depths without changing the fundamental launcher fleet. It also complicates enemy intelligence because observing a HIMARS vehicle does not by itself reveal whether the launcher is configured for shorter-range rocket fires or a deep-strike PrSM mission.

PrSM Increment 4 would take that evolution much further. The Army plans competitive fly-off events during 2027 and 2028, with testing centered on 1,000-kilometer range, HIMARS compatibility, and engagement of moving maritime and relocatable land targets. If those objectives are achieved, field artillery would move into a category of theater strike previously associated primarily with tactical aircraft, bombers, submarines, and long-range naval missiles.

Mobile ground units could then threaten critical targets across extremely large areas while dispersing among road networks, allied territory, and concealed firing positions, rather than relying on fixed missile sites. Against China, that could support distributed Indo-Pacific operations, attacks against China missile forces, and land-based maritime denial. Against Russia, it could extend Army fires deep behind a continental front against Russian air defenses, missile infrastructure, headquarters, and reinforcement networks. Against regional adversaries such as Iran, it would expand the number of dispersed military targets mobile land forces could reach.

For the U.S. Army, PrSM's strategic significance is therefore the transformation of HIMARS itself. A launcher best known for tactical and operational rocket artillery is evolving into a mobile deep-strike weapon capable of attacking the systems that generate enemy combat power hundreds of kilometers from the front, while PrSM Increment 4 is intended to push that reach beyond 1,000 kilometers.

If the U.S. Army achieves that objective, HIMARS would become part of the United States’ theater-strike architecture rather than remaining primarily an artillery launcher. The combination of a HIMARS or M270A2 1,000 km range, mobile launch operations, the ability to attack relocatable land and moving maritime targets, and integration with joint sensors could give U.S. ground forces a much larger role in deep strike against China and Russia while expanding options in regional conflicts where commanders need long-range precision fire without relying exclusively on air and naval weapons.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Army Special Forces Expand Small Drone Use for Faster Battlefield Reconnaissance
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U.S. Army Special Forces are expanding the tactical use of small unmanned aerial systems to give Green Berets faster reconnaissance and a clearer picture of threats before moving on an objective, a capability demonstrated during the inaugural Best Drone Team Competition in Alabama. Operating drones closer to the point of contact can shorten the sensor-to-decision cycle and reduce the exposure of troops conducting reconnaissance in complex terrain.

The competition at Fort McClellan and Clarke Range Complex tested U.S. Special Forces teams alongside elements of the 75th Ranger Regiment and 101st Division in realistic rural and urban scenarios. The results highlight how small drones are becoming an increasingly important tool for tactical surveillance, target detection, and rapid decision-making at the small-unit level.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Green Berets Demonstrate Special Forces Arctic Operations Capability in Alaska

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, including the 75th Ranger Regiment and 101st Airborne Division, operate small drones in realistic tactical scenarios to assess unmanned-systems proficiency and battlefield reconnaissance capabilities. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

From Aug. 24 to 28, 2026, the 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) brought together 15 teams to assess how soldiers integrate Army small drones into tactical missions. The event focused not only on flight proficiency but on how operators used unmanned aircraft to solve tactical problems, support reconnaissance, adapt to changing conditions, and give commanders faster access to information.

For U.S. Special Forces, the operational value of small drones lies in their ability to extend battlefield reconnaissance without unnecessarily exposing soldiers. A Green Beret team can launch a drone from concealment to inspect roads, compounds, tree lines, buildings, defensive positions, or infiltration routes before moving into an area where it could be detected or engaged. This is particularly important for Special Forces detachments that often operate in small, dispersed formations and cannot always rely on larger intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.

Organic drones give teams a faster way to confirm enemy movement, assess terrain, monitor an objective, or update the tactical picture immediately before an operation. In urban terrain, small quadcopters can look over rooftops, around buildings, and into streets that are difficult to observe from ground level; in rural environments, the same Army small drones can examine roads, wooded areas, ridgelines, landing zones, and approaches to an objective.

Imagery released by 1st Special Forces Command during the Alabama event showed operators using drones while remaining concealed, with information passed to collection elements positioned farther to the rear. This demonstrates how unmanned aircraft can separate the sensor from the soldier while still contributing to a wider intelligence picture. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Phil Schleicher, G3 Aviation/UAS and Robotics Operations Warrant Officer for the Special Operations Robotics Detachment of 1st Special Forces Command, said the event was intended to evaluate how teams applied unmanned systems in a tactical context rather than simply how well they could fly them.

That emphasis on judgment and adaptability reflects a broader shift toward making drone employment a routine battlefield skill. The war in Ukraine has already shown why this matters, with Ukrainian and Russian forces using small drones extensively for reconnaissance, target acquisition, artillery correction, and direct attack. The conflict has demonstrated how quickly a relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft can identify a position, transmit information, and shorten the time between detection and engagement.

For U.S. Army Green Berets' drone warfare, however, the central challenge is not simply acquiring more unmanned aircraft. It is keeping those systems effective when an adversary is actively trying to jam, detect, deceive, or destroy them. Many small drones depend on radio-frequency command links, digital video feeds, and satellite navigation, all of which can be vulnerable to electronic warfare that disrupts control links, interferes with positioning, degrades video transmission, or helps locate the operator through electromagnetic emissions.

The Ukraine conflict has highlighted how rapidly this electronic contest evolves. Russian and Ukrainian forces continuously adjust frequencies, antennas, navigation methods, and control systems in response to new jamming techniques, while fiber-optic-controlled first-person-view drones have emerged as one way to reduce dependence on radio links in heavily contested environments. For U.S. Special Forces, the lesson is clear: a Green Beret team may gain a major advantage from an organic drone, but that advantage can disappear quickly if navigation or communications are disrupted.

The same issue would be central in any confrontation with a technologically advanced adversary such as China. U.S. Special Forces operating in the Indo-Pacific could use small drones for local reconnaissance, route monitoring, force protection, and objective surveillance, but they would also face sophisticated electronic warfare, signals intelligence, cyber capabilities, and layered air defenses. Drone proficiency must therefore extend beyond piloting to include emissions discipline, alternative navigation, communications loss, flight-profile adaptation, and the tactical risks created when a drone is detected or jammed.

Small unmanned aircraft can also contribute directly to force protection. Teams can use them to monitor approaches to temporary positions, inspect landing zones, investigate suspicious activity, or check terrain where sending a patrol would unnecessarily expose personnel. For a small Special Forces team, this can expand the amount of ground observed without increasing manpower, and the information collected can also be shared with rear collection elements, other units, or commanders coordinating a broader operation.

Integrating U.S. Special Forces drones at this level also creates logistical and technical requirements. Batteries, replacement parts, antennas, communications equipment, software, maintenance, and the ability to modify systems quickly can all become as important as the drone itself. This is another lesson reinforced by Ukraine, where drone technology and countermeasures often evolve faster than traditional military procurement cycles.

For 1st Special Forces Command, the inaugural Best Drone Team Competition therefore matters less as a contest than as evidence of a broader transformation. The event showed how U.S. Special Forces are treating small unmanned aircraft as organic battlefield reconnaissance tools that can support movement, force protection, situational awareness, and tactical decision-making.

For U.S. Army Green Berets, the main advantage is the ability to see farther without immediately exposing personnel and to obtain fresher information before committing to action, while the main vulnerability is equally clear: electronic warfare can rapidly reduce or eliminate that advantage. The future of Green Berets' drone warfare will therefore depend not only on how many drones Special Forces units field, but on how effectively they can combine battlefield reconnaissance, low-signature operations, technical adaptation, and electronic-warfare awareness against capable adversaries such as Russia and China.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
How Radio-Frequency Detection and Visual Identification Strengthen Counter-Drone Defense
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The U.S. Army has awarded Xtremis a $46.8 million research and development contract to build an artificial intelligence-enabled system that detects frequency-agile drones through their activity in the electromagnetic spectrum. The effort could strengthen Army defenses against unmanned aircraft designed to evade conventional radio-frequency surveillance.

Known as Augur Shield, the program will develop a radio-frequency DevOps pipeline capable of drawing data from a network of multi-domain sensors. The system is intended to use artificial intelligence and machine learning to detect, track, and characterize unmanned aerial systems that change communication frequencies during flight, a technique that can complicate interception and electronic attack. The contract includes two option years, according to available award information.

Related News: Belgium’s IDDEA Unveils Offline AI System for Real-Time Battlefield Military Equipment Identification

A U.S. Army soldier monitors the electromagnetic spectrum during training in Germany, illustrating the type of RF awareness underpinning the Army’s Augur Shield research. (Picture source: US DoD)

At this stage, Augur Shield does not involve the procurement of a finalized, off-the-shelf counter-drone system. It is an applied research effort intended to develop, train, and test new electromagnetic detection methods. The US Army is examining how RF sensor networks combined with artificial intelligence models can improve the detection of drones whose communication methods change rapidly.

Xtremis specializes in monitoring, analyzing, and managing the electromagnetic spectrum. The company develops architectures that combine distributed radio-frequency sensors, computing resources, and algorithms to produce a real-time picture of electromagnetic activity within a defined area. Xtremis presents Augur Shield as a combination of hardware and AI-enabled software designed to monitor the RF spectrum, detect devices operating within it, characterize their activity, and exploit the resulting information. This approach builds on technologies previously developed by the company, including Advanced Dynamic Spectrum Reconnaissance, or ADSR.

ADSR is a spectrum reconnaissance system intended to help wireless networks observe and adapt to their electromagnetic environment. It relies on data collected by sensors distributed across the field rather than on a single centralized monitoring point. These observations can be compared to detect new signals, monitor changes in the RF environment, and characterize different forms of electromagnetic activity. The US Army has previously tested ADSR with soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division. In that context, the system was intended to help military communication networks detect and avoid jamming while reducing RF emissions that could be identified and exploited by an adversary. Through Augur Shield, this experience is now being redirected toward the drone threat.

Xtremis is therefore developing methods that allow sensors to collect electromagnetic signatures and models to be trained to recognize activity associated with unmanned systems. Artificial intelligence does not replace the RF sensor. It processes observations, identifies recurring patterns, and distinguishes relevant signals within a dense electromagnetic environment. The funding of Augur Shield indicates that the US Army is not only investing in additional sensors. It is also seeking to automate the interpretation of the growing volume of electromagnetic data generated by those sensors. This reflects changes in the threat environment. Drones may use different protocols, change frequencies, adapt their behavior, or be assembled from commercially available components. Research must therefore focus on methods that can evolve alongside the systems being observed.

MEGA enables fully offline, AI-powered visual identification of distant aerial threats, delivering rapid classification and key technical data directly to the operator. (IDDEA)

A comparable approach can be found in visual identification through MEGA, a technology developed by Belgian company IDDEA.

MEGA was initially created to recognize military land equipment from images or video feeds. The system combines a visual recognition algorithm with a structured database of military platforms. Its role is not limited to indicating that a vehicle is present. It is intended to identify the type of equipment, as well as its model or variant, and then provide related technical and operational information, including data on its combat capabilities, armament, and protection.

As with Augur Shield, MEGA relies on model training. In this case, the algorithm learns to recognize visual features such as turret shape, chassis configuration, wheel or track layout, armament, sensors, and the overall architecture of the observed system. The two technologies therefore process different forms of data, electromagnetic information for Augur Shield and visual information for MEGA, while following a comparable principle: converting a raw observation into information that can be used by an operator.

One of MEGA’s main characteristics is its ability to operate entirely offline. The database and algorithm are loaded onto the hardware in advance, allowing identification to be performed locally without sending imagery to a remote server or relying on internet access or cloud infrastructure. IDDEA has also developed an embedded version based on a dedicated artificial intelligence module. This architecture allows MEGA to be integrated directly into a combat vehicle, observation station, air-defense system, remote weapon station, or drone. Imagery from the platform’s sensors can then be processed locally, providing an initial identification of the detected equipment together with the associated technical information.

Building on its work involving land equipment, IDDEA is now extending MEGA to the identification of aircraft and drones. The objective is not only to confirm the presence of an airborne object, but also to determine whether it is, for example, a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, MALE unmanned aircraft, attack drone, or another type of aerial system. The system may attempt to identify the exact model. This task becomes more difficult with small FPV drones assembled locally or manufactured from commercially available components. Two aircraft may have a similar configuration while having been modified in the field or adapted for different missions.

In these cases, recognizing the payload may be more relevant than determining the precise model. The system can be trained to identify the presence of a mine, grenade, mortar round, improvised explosive charge, or weapon fitted to the platform. This information can help distinguish a drone being used for observation from one prepared for an immediate attack, allowing the operator to adapt the response to the assessed threat level.

US Army soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division operate a counter-UAS system during Combined Resolve 25-02 to detect, identify, and counter unmanned aerial systems in an operational environment. ( US DoD)

The comparison between Augur Shield and MEGA therefore highlights two complementary requirements: detecting that a drone is approaching, and then determining which type of drone is approaching and what it is carrying.

An electromagnetic capability such as Augur Shield can provide an initial warning and direct other sensors toward a particular area. A visual system such as MEGA can then process imagery from an electro-optical camera, infrared sensor, observation drone, or surveillance station to classify the target in greater detail. An additional layer can subsequently support target tracking and neutralization. An RF sensor depends on the presence of detectable electromagnetic activity. A camera can provide more detailed information, but its performance depends on range, visibility, lighting conditions, and sensor resolution. Radar can detect an object independently of its radio emissions, but the small size and low-altitude flight profile of some drones can make them difficult to distinguish from background clutter.

Combining several sensors and levels of analysis therefore appears better suited to the diversity of current drone threats. Artificial intelligence can help connect the different stages of this chain: detection, classification, identification, prioritization, tracking, and response selection. Through Augur Shield, the US Army is funding research into electromagnetic detection and characterization. Through MEGA, IDDEA is developing a capability centered on visual identification. Against drones that differ widely in size, control method, mission, and payload, combining several levels of detection and identification appears more suitable than relying on a single sensor.

The same principle applies to neutralization. Upper-tier air and missile defense systems such as Patriot or THAAD may be assigned to complex or high-value aerial and ballistic threats, but lower and less costly defensive layers are required to respond proportionately to drones and loitering munitions. A layered counter-UAS architecture must therefore combine detection and identification tools with effectors adapted to the type, value, and level of threat posed by each target.

Discover more about IDDEA and MEGA here.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
How China's Reported QW-12 Air Defense Missile Delivery to Iran Could Affect U.S. & Israeli Air Operations
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China's QW-12 man-portable air defense missile system (MANPADS) could significantly increase the operational challenges facing future U.S. and Israeli air campaigns against Iran by threatening aircraft and unmanned systems that sustain precision strike operations after the opening wave of attacks. While the missile is unlikely to deny the overwhelming air superiority enjoyed by U.S. and Israeli fifth-generation fighters, its mobility, passive operation, and modern infrared guidance could complicate helicopter operations, tactical UAV missions, special operations support, and post-strike reconnaissance around Iran's most sensitive military and nuclear facilities.

According to a Reuters report citing sources familiar with the agreement, Iran is expected to acquire between 300 and 400 Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 man-portable air defense systems in a contract reportedly valued at approximately $60–70 million. If confirmed, Army Recognition assesses that the QW-12 would represent the most significant enhancement to Iran's short-range air defense capability, reinforcing the lowest layer of its integrated air defense network after recent Israeli and U.S. strikes exposed vulnerabilities in the country's strategic air defense architecture.

Related Topic: China reportedly supplies Iran with hundreds of MANPADS air defense missiles to counter US air strikes

A Chinese soldier operates the QW-12 man-portable air defense system (MANPADS). If delivered to Iran, the advanced short-range surface-to-air missile could strengthen Tehran's ability to defend strategic military and nuclear sites against low-altitude aerial missions supporting future U.S. and Israeli air campaigns. (Picture source: Chinese Internet)

Recent operations conducted by Israel and the United States against Iranian military infrastructure demonstrated the effectiveness of modern air campaigns built around stealth aircraft, electronic warfare, stand-off precision weapons, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Initial strikes are typically carried out by aircraft such as the Israeli Air Force's F-35I Adir and F-15I Ra'am, or U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II aircraft and B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, employing long-range precision-guided munitions that allow them to engage strategic targets while remaining outside the engagement envelope of short-range surface-to-air missiles.

In this opening phase, the QW-12 would have only limited influence on the outcome of operations. Aircraft employing JDAM precision-guided bombs, Spice glide weapons, AGM-158 JASSM cruise missiles, or other stand-off munitions generally operate from medium or high altitudes, well above the QW-12's reported maximum engagement altitude of approximately 4,000 meters. Likewise, stealth characteristics and electronic warfare support further reduce the opportunities for successful engagement by shoulder-fired air defense systems.

The operational value of the QW-12 emerges after the first wave of strikes. Once strategic air defense systems such as the Russian-made S-300 PMU2, the indigenous Bavar-373, and other radar-guided missile batteries have been degraded, air operations shift toward maintaining persistent pressure on remaining targets. This phase requires continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), battle damage assessment, target confirmation, special operations support, and combat search-and-rescue (CSAR), all of which rely on aircraft operating at significantly lower altitudes than those employed during the initial strategic strikes.

Developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the QW-12 is considered one of China's most advanced exportable MANPADS. Open-source assessments indicate an effective engagement range of approximately 6 to 7 km and an engagement altitude of up to 4,000 m. Equipped with an imaging infrared seeker, the missile is designed to engage helicopters, low-flying combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and medium-sized unmanned aerial vehicles while offering improved resistance to infrared countermeasures compared to earlier generations of Chinese shoulder-fired missiles. Read the full Technical Review about the Chinese QW-12 at this link.

These performance characteristics make the system particularly relevant against rotary-wing aviation. Israeli Air Force CH-53 Yas'ur heavy-lift helicopters, UH-60 Yanshuf utility helicopters, and future special operations aviation assets would remain vulnerable whenever operating close to defended military facilities. Similar considerations apply to U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force rotary-wing aircraft conducting personnel recovery, special operations insertion, tactical transport, or medical evacuation missions. These aircraft routinely operate below the QW-12's maximum engagement altitude and often fly predictable routes during takeoff, landing, or hovering operations, making them among the most exposed assets during a sustained air campaign.

Unmanned aerial systems would also face increased operational risk. Israeli forces have extensively employed reconnaissance and strike UAVs to identify, monitor, and verify targets before and after precision attacks, while the United States routinely integrates MQ-9 Reaper aircraft and other unmanned systems into regional intelligence and strike operations. Although high-altitude, long-endurance UAVs generally operate above the engagement ceiling of MANPADS, tactical reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, and unmanned systems descending for target identification or battle damage assessment could enter the QW-12's engagement envelope, forcing operators to adopt more cautious flight profiles or rely on higher-altitude sensors.

One of the QW-12's greatest military advantages is not its range but its survivability. Unlike radar-guided surface-to-air missile systems that emit detectable electronic signatures and become primary objectives during SEAD missions, MANPADS operate passively. Missile teams require no dedicated radar, can remain concealed until the moment of missile launch, and rapidly relocate after firing. This mobility makes them significantly more difficult to detect and eliminate, allowing Iran to preserve effective short-range air defense capabilities even after its strategic missile batteries and surveillance radars have been targeted.

If integrated into Iran's broader command-and-control architecture, QW-12 operators could receive early warning from surveillance radars, electro-optical sensors, or passive detection systems without activating any emissions of their own. Such networking would enable dispersed missile teams to establish multiple concealed engagement zones around ballistic missile bases, nuclear installations, command centers, air bases, and logistics facilities, increasing uncertainty for attacking aircraft throughout the duration of an air campaign.

The reported acquisition should therefore be viewed less as an attempt to challenge U.S. and Israeli air superiority than as an effort to strengthen the resilience of Iran's layered air defense architecture. The QW-12 would not prevent Israeli F-35Is or U.S. stealth aircraft from conducting stand-off precision strikes against strategic targets. Instead, it would increase the operational cost of sustaining those campaigns by threatening the helicopters, unmanned systems, and supporting aircraft required to exploit initial battlefield success and maintain continuous pressure on Iranian military infrastructure.

From an operational perspective, the introduction of several hundred Chinese-made QW-12 air defense missiles would force U.S. and Israeli planners to devote additional intelligence, surveillance, electronic warfare, and suppression resources to locating and neutralizing dispersed missile teams before follow-on operations could be conducted safely. While the system would not alter the regional balance of air power, it would complicate the execution of prolonged air campaigns by increasing the risks faced by aircraft operating below approximately 4,000 m, precisely where many of the most critical supporting missions are conducted after the first wave of strategic strikes.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Japan FY2026 Defense Budget Positions SHIELD Drones as Core Pillar of Southwestern Island Defense
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Japan’s FY2026 defense budget formally elevates the SHIELD concept into a core operational pillar, marking its clearest embrace yet of massed unmanned warfare, according to the Ministry of Defense. The move signals a strategic judgment that future fighting in the southwestern islands will hinge on exhausting an adversary’s strike complex rather than preserving a small number of high-value platforms.

Japan has taken a decisive step toward reshaping its military doctrine, with the Ministry of Defense confirming on December 26, 2025, that the FY2026 defense budget formally positions the SHIELD concept as a core operational pillar. The shift reflects a growing consensus inside the ministry that deterrence and warfighting in the southwestern islands will depend less on the survivability of exquisite platforms and more on the ability to generate sustained pressure through large numbers of unmanned systems operating across air, sea, and land domains.
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Rather than a discrete drone program, SHIELD, forms a joint combat architecture networked across unmanned air, surface, and underwater assets of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.(Picture source: Japanese MoD)

SHIELD, an acronym for Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated, and Enhanced Littoral Defense, is not a standalone drone program but a fully integrated combat architecture designed to network unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater systems across all three branches of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The FY2026 budget allocates approximately JPY 312.8 billion to unmanned asset defense capability, including JPY 128.7 billion specifically dedicated to standing up SHIELD by FY2027. Japanese defense planners describe the system as a multilayered coastal denial framework intended to overwhelm enemy sensors, dilute missile salvos, and impose a punishing cost-exchange ratio on any attacking force.

At the tactical level, the Ground Self-Defense Force will field an entirely new family of expendable attack drones designed for mass production and rapid replacement. Three primary categories are planned. The Type I small attack UAV is optimized for short-range strikes against vehicles, dismounted forces, and exposed equipment, closely resembling FPV-style loitering munitions adapted for military use. The Type II variant extends range and payload, enabling attacks against fortified positions, logistics nodes, and amphibious landing craft operating near the coastline. The Type III UAV represents the most disruptive element, with an advertised engagement range of up to approximately 100 kilometers against ground and surface targets, effectively functioning as a low-cost, long-range precision strike asset intended to complement traditional missiles.

These attack drones are supported by modular reconnaissance UAVs and quadcopters for real-time target acquisition, battle damage assessment, and fire correction. Japan is also introducing specialized interceptor UAVs tasked with defending radar sites and air defense nodes, reflecting an understanding that fixed sensors will be prime targets in the opening phase of any high-intensity conflict. Rather than relying solely on surface-to-air missiles, SHIELD uses cheap aerial interceptors to counter enemy drones and loitering munitions at close range.

Maritime elements form the second pillar of the system. The Maritime Self-Defense Force plans to deploy ship-launched UAVs for over-the-horizon reconnaissance and strike missions against surface targets, extending the sensor and engagement reach of destroyers and patrol vessels without exposing manned aircraft. In parallel, SHIELD includes the acquisition of small multipurpose unmanned surface vehicles capable of operating in coordinated swarms. These USVs are designed for surveillance, target designation, electronic decoy roles, and direct attacks against enemy vessels, forcing adversaries to choose between expending expensive anti-ship missiles or allowing unmanned attackers to close the distance.

Below the surface, small multipurpose unmanned underwater vehicles provide persistent intelligence collection in chokepoints and littoral approaches. These UUVs are optimized for reconnaissance, seabed mapping, and monitoring of amphibious movements, providing data that feeds into the broader SHIELD command network. Their contribution is critical in maintaining continuous situational awareness in contested waters where traditional manned submarines and patrol aircraft may be constrained.

What binds these disparate systems together is SHIELD’s centralized yet resilient command-and-control architecture. The Ministry of Defense emphasizes the ability to simultaneously control heterogeneous unmanned assets across domains, creating a distributed sensor-to-shooter network where low-cost platforms generate targeting data for higher-end weapons such as stand-off missiles, coastal artillery, and naval strike systems. This architecture allows Japan to conserve scarce high-value munitions while maintaining pressure across the battlespace.

Operationally, SHIELD reflects direct lessons drawn from Ukraine, where inexpensive drones have repeatedly forced adversaries into unfavorable cost exchanges and exposed the vulnerability of concentrated forces. Japanese planners increasingly view attrition not as a failure but as a deliberate tool. By forcing an opponent to expend advanced interceptors and long-range missiles against expendable drones, SHIELD aims to erode offensive momentum before decisive engagements occur.

Strategically, the system represents a profound cultural shift for Japan’s defense posture. Long defined by quality, restraint, and defensive interception, Tokyo is now explicitly planning for saturation, redundancy, and acceptance of losses in unmanned assets to preserve human life and combat power. The FY2026 budget makes clear that Japan no longer assumes future wars will be short or containable. Instead, it is building the capacity to fight under sustained missile pressure across the first island chain.

For regional adversaries, the implication is stark. Any attempt to coerce or seize territory in Japan’s southwestern approaches would encounter not only layered missile defenses and long-range strike capabilities, but also a dense, adaptive cloud of unmanned systems designed to disrupt sensors, exhaust magazines, and degrade decision-making from the opening hours of a conflict. SHIELD transforms Japan’s defense budget from a conventional rearmament plan into a declaration of how it intends to fight and endure in a high-intensity Indo-Pacific war.
Exclusive Analysis: U.S. Trump-Class Warship Introduces Next-Generation Stealth and Combat Systems
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The U.S. Navy has announced plans to design a Trump-class guided missile battleship, beginning with USS Defiant (BBG-1), as part of a broader Golden Fleet expansion. The proposed ship emphasizes hypersonic strike capabilities, deep missile capacity, and fleet command survivability in high-end conflicts.

On December 22, 2025, the U.S. Department of War announced its intent to construct a new Trump-class guided missile battleship, starting with the future USS Defiant (BBG-1), as the centerpiece of a wider “Golden Fleet” buildup. The move revives the battleship label, but the hardware being proposed is closer to a missile-heavy large surface combatant built to fight inside a saturated anti-ship missile environment, while also acting as a fleet command node. The War Department’s Pentagon News account describes the ships as 30,000-to 40,000-ton combatants now in the design phase, with construction of the lead ship targeted for the early 2030s.
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Trump class battleship concept is a 35,000-ton missile-heavy flagship built for hypersonic strike, dense air defense, and layered self-protection with deep magazines and advanced sensors (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

For the U.S. Navy, the operational problem is keeping surface forces lethal after the first days of a peer fight, when carriers may need to operate at longer stand-off ranges and when destroyers can burn through their missile magazines quickly. The Golden Fleet portal frames the battleship as a platform that can strike an adversary at vastly longer range than the previous class and, crucially, can deploy with hypersonic and nuclear-capable missiles. Official reports describe the plan as beginning with two ships, with an eventual ambition for 20 to 25 hulls, positioning the class as a magazine and presence multiplier rather than a boutique capability.

The concept design places the Trump-class in the 30,000 to 40,000 ton displacement range, with USS Defiant shown as a roughly 35,000 ton combatant exceeding 840 feet in length and approaching 880 feet overall, with a beam between 105 and 115 feet and a draft estimated at 24 to 30 feet. Propulsion is described as a combined gas turbine and diesel configuration delivering more than 30 knots of top speed, while providing sufficient electrical margin to support energy intensive sensors and weapons. Crew size is projected between 650 and 850 personnel, reflecting both the ship’s scale and its role as a command flagship rather than a traditional escort.

The announced main battery is missile-centered. Navy messaging ties the class to Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic weapons and to the Surface Launch Cruise Missile Nuclear, commonly referred to as SLCM-N, indicating an intent to combine long-range conventional strike and a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile option on a surface combatant. The concept art and accompanying technical material circulating in coverage also describe a large Mk 41 Vertical Launching System fit on the order of 128 cells, plus a dedicated 12-cell battery for CPS. In practical terms, this would let a single ship carry a mixed load of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, SM-2 and SM-6for area air defense and surface strike, and potentially SM-3 for ballistic missile defense, alongside hypersonic rounds intended for time-sensitive or heavily defended targets. The Navy’s own press language emphasizes larger missile magazines and deep strike weapons as the central idea.

In addition to its missile armament, the Trump class design reintroduces advanced gun systems as part of a layered engagement strategy. The Golden Fleet concept promotes directed energy weapons for more favorable exchange ratios against incoming threats, and reporting on the technical package attributes to the ship a 32 megajoule railgun firing hypervelocity projectiles, plus two 5-inch guns paired with hypervelocity ammunition. If those elements mature, they would give Defiant a menu of lower-cost shots for close and medium range engagements, particularly against drones, fast attack craft, and potentially certain missile profiles. The same reporting describes an option of two 300-kilowatt or two 600-kilowatt class lasers, complementing kinetic close-in systems and providing sustained defensive fire limited mainly by power generation and thermal management. At the same time, both railguns and high-end shipboard lasers remain technically demanding, and outside observers have noted that the Navy previously reduced emphasis on railgun development after years of work, which is why early hulls would likely need a conservative path that does not hinge on any single revolutionary weapon to reach initial operational capability.

Defiant’s defensive concept is built around layered sensing, electronic warfare, and rapid engagement. The Navy press release explicitly assigns the ship an Integrated Air and Missile Defense role and describes it as capable of operating with a carrier strike group or commanding its own surface action group. The artwork associated with the announcement depicts an Aegis-type architecture, and the intent is clearly to make the battleship a high-value air defense node that can protect itself and others while also delivering long-range fires. For close in defense, the ship is shown equipped with two Mk 45 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, multiple Mk 38 30 millimeter guns positioned fore and aft, and at least two 20 millimeter class close range systems to counter leakers that penetrate the outer defensive layers.

The Trump-class battleship also integrates two Counter Unmanned Systems modules, reinforcing its role in defending itself and nearby vessels against drone swarms in congested littoral or open ocean environments. The flight deck and hangar depicted for a large tiltrotor, such as the V-22, point to a ship that is designed to move people, parts, and sensors quickly, extend its scouting radius, and support maritime interdiction or special operations support missions without immediately leaning on the carrier air wing.

The tactical reason to build a ship in this size class is magazine depth married to survivability and command capacity. A larger hull can accept more redundancy in power distribution, more compartmentation, larger damage control margins, and greater space for cooling and electrical growth, all of which become decisive if directed energy and advanced sensors are to be fielded at scale. It also provides room for a robust command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence suite, which Navy messaging highlights by describing the battleship as a quarterback for wider fleet operations, including manned and unmanned platforms. In a distributed maritime operations construct, that combination matters because it allows the Navy to push decision-making and engagement authority forward while still retaining a heavily defended node that can coordinate a surface action group and keep firing after smaller escorts have expended their weapons.

On development and feasibility, official accounts state the Navy will lead design while partnering with the defense industrial base, and they add that the Trump class would replace the earlier DDG(X) destroyer plan, with intended DDG(X) capabilities folded into the new hull. That phrasing implies a program strategy built around adopting mature subsystems where possible, such as Mk 41 and established combat systems, while treating railguns and the highest power lasers as spiral upgrades. Broader reporting has emphasized the scale ambition and the administration’s message about expanding industrial output across the country, which, if pursued, would require long-term funding stability, workforce growth, and shipyard throughput improvements to avoid colliding with other major naval construction priorities.

Against Western competitors, the Trump class concept sits in a displacement and magazine category that NATO navies do not currently field. Britain’s Type 45 destroyers and the Franco-Italian Horizon class are optimized for air defense in the roughly 7,000 to 8,000 ton range, with far smaller missile capacities than the roughly 140 launch cells suggested for Defiant when Mk 41 and CPS cells are combined. Even Japan’s Maya class, among the most capable Aegis destroyers outside the U.S. Navy, carries 96 Mk 41 cells at around 10,000 tons full load. The closest Western analogue in ambition is the U.S. Navy’s own Zumwalt class, built around large electrical power margins and now being adapted for hypersonic weapons, but it remains far smaller in displacement than a 35,000-ton battleship concept.

If built as described, the new Trump-class battleship would shift U.S. Navy surface combat power by concentrating long-range strike and air defense into fewer, higher-capacity flagships that can carry the fight deeper and longer without immediate resupply. The neutral capability impact is straightforward: more missiles per hull, more growth margin for directed energy, and a platform designed to act as a forward command node, all aimed at sustaining sea control and power projection in the 2030s and beyond.

Read full technical review here: Trump-class battleship

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
U.S. Army unveils lean Mobile Brigade Combat Team built for modern warfare
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The U.S. Army is moving toward a new Mobile Brigade Combat Team that cuts brigade manning to about 1,900 troops while packing in more sensors, drones, and precision weapons, according to a new Congressional Research Service note based on Army data. The design is meant to help light infantry survive and win in drone-saturated, electronically contested battles similar to Ukraine, trading sheer numbers for speed, dispersion and precision fires.

The U.S. Army is preparing to replace traditional Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with a lighter, more technically dense Mobile Brigade Combat Team built around mobility vehicles, organic drones and long-range precision strike, according to a December 9 Congressional Research Service note drawing on official Army force design data. The future MBCT trims brigade strength to roughly 1,900 soldiers, less than half the manpower of a current IBCT, while adding layers of small UAS, loitering munitions, electronic warfare, and mobile command nodes designed to maneuver and survive under constant observation and long-range fire.
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Soldiers from the 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), start their Infantry Squad Vehicle after a UH-60 Black Hawk drop at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Johnson. (Picture source: US DoD)

The reduction in organizational size is the first major shift. The MBCT will consist of approximately 1,900 soldiers, compared with 4,500 in a traditional Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is the standard infantry brigade designed for sustained operations in low-intensity environments. The new format redistributes essential functions to prioritize mobility, autonomy and the ability to disperse, while retaining a core of fires, logistics, communications, medical support and information advantage. This reduction does not imply a loss of capability; instead, it reflects a technological densification intended to replace mass with speed and precision.

Enhanced tactical mobility relies on the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), now fielded across every rifle squad. The Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) is a lightweight nine-seat platform able to transport a full squad and its equipment across complex terrain without dependence on established routes. Designed as an expendable platform, it enables rapid maneuver and improves survivability against drones, observers and indirect fires. The report reveals two additional variants in development: the ISV-Utility (ISV-U), which will integrate command modules, energy storage and distribution, electronic warfare, counter-UAS systems, precision-fires payloads and mortar options; and the ISV-Heavy (ISV-H), intended to serve as a brigade-level mobile command platform with a hybrid powertrain producing the electrical output needed for EW systems and tactical networks. This approach turns a light vehicle into a technical node supporting high-intensity operations.

The second pillar of the MBCT concept is the increased density of sensors and effectors across all echelons. Small UAS become organic from squad to battalion, supporting reconnaissance, target acquisition and maneuver. Loitering munitions provide the capability to strike beyond line of sight, enabling dispersed units to engage targets at several kilometers. The document confirms the gradual replacement of the TOW 2B missile by the Mobile Long-Range Precision Strike Missile system, developed to extend anti-armor reach for dispersed elements. This technical layer builds on weapons already present in the squads, including the Javelin missile, effective against armored platforms at extended ranges, and the Carl-Gustaf launcher, suited to fortified positions and tactical obstacles.

The creation of the Multi-Function Reconnaissance Company (MFRC) represents a major organizational innovation. It merges traditional reconnaissance with the Tactical UAS platoon, the EW platoon and an Effects platoon equipped with loitering munitions and anti-armor systems. Teams can be task-organized to support battalions during distributed operations. This integration of sensors, jamming and precision effects within a single company reflects a shift toward light units built around modular technical capabilities.

The report also details the Multi-Purpose Company (MPC), which will replace assault companies in Infantry Battalions. It centralizes mortars, reconnaissance and counter-UAS assets while controlling most of the battalion’s loitering munitions. This consolidation aims to reposition sensors, indirect fires and counter-drone systems quickly, increasing battalion responsiveness in battlefields dominated by aerial observation and precision strike.

The transformation timeline is tied to concrete capability milestones. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY2025 includes MBCTs already equipped with full ISV fleets, organic small UAS and initial quantities of loitering munitions integrated into tactical command structures. FY2026 budget lines allocate more than 300 million dollars for the ISV and 75 million for loitering munitions, reinforcing three technical pillars: mobility platforms, aerial sensor density and organic strike capabilities. As ISV-U and ISV-H variants are fielded, the brigade will gain dedicated vehicles for mobile command, onboard energy generation, EW systems and C2 functions, strengthening tactical networks.

The internal configuration of the MBCT establishes a continuous chain of technical effects from squad to brigade. Sections combine ISV mobility with the engagement capabilities of the Javelin, which can reach armored targets beyond two kilometers, and the Carl-Gustaf, suited for destroying structures or light armor. Small UAS provide observation and fire adjustment. The MFRC adds integrated layers of sensors, jamming and loitering munitions, while the MPC coordinates mortars, reconnaissance and counter-UAS assets. The result is a light but technologically dense brigade able to disperse forces without losing tactical coherence, supported by mobile platforms generating the power required for sensors, data links and precision-strike systems.
INTEL: North Korea’s Hwasong-20 ICBM Missile Emerges as New Strategic Threat to Indo-Pacific and U.S.
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North Korea’s new Hwasong 20 InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is drawing heightened scrutiny from defense analysts, who say the system’s design points to a more survivable and flexible nuclear threat than anything Pyongyang has fielded before. Early assessments suggest the missile could introduce a step change in range, mobility, and potential payload options, raising concerns about how the United States and its regional allies will need to adapt their deterrence posture.

The Hwasong 20, first publicly displayed during an October 2025 military parade in Pyongyang, now sits at the center of U.S. and South Korean intelligence reviews of its operational potential. The oversized transporter launcher and the apparent multi-stage configuration have prompted analysts to revisit long-standing assumptions about North Korea’s ability to disperse, conceal, and rapidly ready its strategic systems. Although no flight-test data have been released, the platform’s architecture suggests that Pyongyang is pursuing an ICBM designed for extended range and reduced vulnerability. This combination could complicate missile defense planning and early warning timelines.
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The Hwasong 20 intercontinental ballistic missile moves through central Pyongyang during North Korea’s October 2025 military parade, carried on an enlarged transporter launcher that analysts say underscores the regime’s push for greater range, mobility, and nuclear survivability. (Picture source: North Korea Press Agency)

A new-generation solid-fuel engine reportedly powers the missile, believed to deliver thrust in the range of 1,960 to 1,970 kilonewtons. This performance level surpasses that of the earlier Hwasong-18, North Korea’s first solid-fuel ICBM, by roughly 40 percent. Solid-fuel propulsion brings decisive advantages. Unlike liquid-fueled missiles, which require hours of pre-launch preparation, solid-fuel systems can be fired with minimal warning, significantly improving survivability and responsiveness.

Accompanying the missile is a newly developed 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher. The TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) design is a key element of this weapons system, offering road mobility and a quick-launch capability that makes preemptive targeting by enemy forces substantially more difficult. Unlike previous TELs that relied on side-mounted elevation systems, the Hwasong-20 launcher employs a central vertical erection mechanism. This configuration more closely mirrors the architecture of Russian and Chinese TELs, indicating growing sophistication in North Korea’s missile deployment platforms.

The missile is housed in a sealed canister on the launcher, further improving its combat readiness and resistance to environmental degradation. This canisterized configuration supports long-term storage, faster field deployment, and reduced visibility during pre-launch operations. The canister also likely protects the missile’s sensitive components and simplifies transport logistics, enhancing its credibility as a deployable deterrent rather than a symbolic display asset.

Strategic analysts have taken particular note of the missile’s widened payload shroud and enlarged airframe, which suggest the Hwasong-20 could be capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs. If true, this would enable a single missile to deliver several warheads to distinct targets, dramatically increasing its threat potential. Such a capability would also place significant strain on regional missile defense systems, including THAAD, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which are optimized for single-warhead trajectories and may be overwhelmed in a saturation scenario.

The projected range of the Hwasong-20 is estimated at over 15,000 km, placing the entire continental United States within reach. This reach is particularly concerning for Indo-Pacific security planners, as it reinforces North Korea’s strategy of threatening the U.S. homeland in order to erode confidence in Washington’s extended deterrence commitments. If South Korea or Japan begins to doubt that the United States would risk nuclear retaliation to defend them, the foundation of alliance-based deterrence in the region could begin to crack.

In the context of regional dynamics, the Hwasong-20 arrives amid heightened military competition. China’s military assertiveness in the South China Sea, Russia’s growing defense relationship with Pyongyang, and renewed trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea have created a complex and volatile environment. The Hwasong-20’s introduction can be seen not just as a weapons milestone but as a strategic maneuver to exploit regional uncertainty and widen divisions among U.S. allies.

Satellite imagery and open-source intelligence have tracked increased activity at known North Korean test sites, including movement of TELs and construction work at static engine test stands. This activity coincides with Pyongyang’s public claims of successfully testing a high-performance carbon-fiber composite engine, purportedly the core propulsion system for the Hwasong-20. However, no live launch footage or telemetry data has been made public, leaving the missile’s actual performance in question.

Despite the lack of a verified flight test, defense officials across the United States and East Asia are treating the Hwasong-20 as a credible threat. The Pentagon has acknowledged intensified surveillance over North Korean missile facilities and reaffirmed its defense commitments to allies in the region. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan have both accelerated their own missile defense upgrades and continue to deepen defense integration with U.S. forces.

Operationally, the Hwasong-20 presents several challenges. Its mobility makes it harder to track. Its solid-fuel nature means it can launch faster than traditional liquid-fueled missiles. And its suspected MIRV capability means it can potentially overwhelm current missile defenses with multiple warheads from a single launch. These factors combine to create a system that is not just more powerful but more unpredictable, reducing early warning time and increasing the complexity of response options.

Viewed through the lens of regional deterrence, the Hwasong-20 is a deliberate signal by Pyongyang. It is not merely a technological upgrade but a political message aimed at shaping the behavior of adversaries and allies alike. By introducing a missile that threatens both the regional and strategic reach of U.S. forces, North Korea is attempting to alter the risk calculus and strategic posture of the entire Indo-Pacific theater.

Until a successful flight test is confirmed, the full operational credibility of the Hwasong-20 remains uncertain. But its debut and the capabilities it claims cannot be ignored. It reflects North Korea’s continued prioritization of missile modernization, and its strategic doctrine is clearly evolving to include mobile, survivable, and multi-warhead nuclear platforms.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
British Army tank regiment soldiers train with drones in Estonia to boost battlefield awareness
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British soldiers from the Royal Tank Regiment have finished a small drone operators course in Estonia, training alongside NATO partners in Baltic winter conditions. The course signals a major shift as one of the UK’s oldest armored units adapts to modern reconnaissance needs using tactical sUAS platforms.

British soldiers from Dreadnaught Squadron of the British Army Royal Tank Regiment completed a small Unmanned Aircraft System operators course in Estonia, according to information posted by the Royal Armoured Corps on its official X account on November 30, 2025. The training, conducted alongside allied instructors and tested in winter conditions, reflects a growing push to equip armored crews with lightweight reconnaissance drones that can scout ahead of heavy vehicles and improve battlefield awareness.
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British soldiers from Dreadnaught Squadron, Royal Tank Regiment, operate a small tactical drone during sUAS training in Estonia, enhancing battlefield reconnaissance capabilities in coordination with NATO forces. (Picture source: Royal Armoured Corps X account)

The training was deliberately set against Estonia’s unpredictable late-autumn weather, with high winds, persistent rain, and limited daylight, testing the operational limits of small drone systems. British troops progressed from theoretical classroom modules to hands-on flying, executing live drone operations during both daylight and nighttime conditions. The goal was clear: to equip armored units with organic aerial reconnaissance capabilities to enable faster, more informed decision-making on the modern battlefield.

Historically, the British Army's Dreadnaught Squadron has relied on the Challenger 2 main battle tank for its combat effectiveness. While these heavily armored platforms remain critical to ground dominance, they have long lacked immediate situational awareness beyond line of sight. That gap is now being filled by drones. Small uncrewed systems allow tank crews to scout terrain, detect enemy positions, and map movement corridors before exposing their vehicles to potential ambush or long-range anti-tank threats.

Incorporating drone operations into armored doctrine represents a fundamental shift in how British forces prepare for conflict. As one senior officer involved in the training explained, “This isn't just a side skill. It’s a core enabler that lets tanks act with precision rather than brute force. It’s how we win before contact.” By launching a drone ahead of an armored column, commanders can identify kill zones, spot dismounted threats, or even mark enemy armor for indirect fires. This new layer of awareness transforms how the Royal Tank Regiment maneuvers in contested environments.

In addition to enhancing their own capabilities, Dreadnaught Squadron troops trained alongside partner forces from NATO's enhanced Forward Presence. This joint context ensured full interoperability and built on shared tactics that reflect the changing nature of war in Eastern Europe. With Russian aggression still looming across the region, integrated drone use is no longer experimental. It is a frontline necessity.

The training also has strategic implications. By embedding sUAS operators within tank formations, the British Army is signaling that its heavy forces will no longer operate in isolation or ignorance of their surroundings. Instead, these units are being configured to operate as part of a larger sensor-to-shooter network, where real-time intelligence drives maneuver and fires. Analysts from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) have noted that such capabilities will be essential in any future peer conflict, particularly in densely contested areas such as the Suwałki Gap or in urban environments where tanks are vulnerable to asymmetric threats.

Although the British Ministry of Defence has not yet formalized a regiment-wide doctrine for integrating drones into all armored units, sources suggest a broader rollout is likely. Troops from this training cycle are expected to return to the UK and serve as instructors, bringing sUAS integration into the wider force structure of the Royal Armoured Corps.

Crucially, this shift is not about replacing tanks. It is about enhancing their relevance in a digitized battlefield where information dominance often determines victory. As a junior NCO from Dreadnaught Squadron put it during the course, “We’re still tankers. We’re just tankers who can see further and strike smarter.”

For the British Army Royal Tank Regiment, the move toward drone-supported operations is not just a tactical upgrade. It is part of a generational evolution that fuses historical battlefield muscle with the intelligence and adaptability demanded by 21st-century conflict.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Prepares for Possible Military Action in Venezuela, Nigeria and Iraq After President’s Announcement
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U.S. President Donald Trump has ordered preparations and publicly floated military options in three theaters, Venezuela/Caribbean, Nigeria/West Africa and Iraq/ West Asia, while the U.S. has increased naval and air assets in the southern Caribbean. The moves concentrate on coercive, precision options near maritime approaches and standoff strike packages in each theater, with distance, partner access and legal constraints shaping feasible courses of action.

According to articles and statements since his reelection in 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump has pursued a double-edged foreign policy. On one side, he pledges to end America’s “forever wars” and restore global economic stability; on the other, he has reignited commercial rivalries by imposing new tariffs even on traditional allies. In recent weeks, Trump has gone further, openly mentioning potential U.S. military interventions across three continents. In South America, tensions with Venezuela have surged as the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, recently redeployed from the Mediterranean, arrived in Caribbean waters. In Africa, the president has spoken of “taking action” in Nigeria, a country marked by religious conflict and immense oil wealth. And in Western Asia, he has warned Iraq’s leadership of possible “operations” if American interests are threatened. Behind the rhetoric lies a consistent pattern: each of these nations maintains strained relations with Washington while controlling key energy resources. Should economic or diplomatic levers fail, the administration appears ready to rely on nearby military assets tailored to each theatre, at sea, in the air, or on land.
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A carrier strike group operating as part of the U.S. Fleet, soon to be deployed near Venezuela (Picture source: U.S. Navy).

The geography and posture are not symmetrical: in the southern Caribbean, U.S. naval and air assets surged in late summer and early autumn, giving Washington proximate tools for precision maritime interdiction, coastal strikes and limited special operations. Multiple reports have documented strikes on suspected drug craft near Venezuela in September and October, alongside the arrival of warships, a fast-attack submarine and F-35s forward in Puerto Rico. These deployments provide credible means to act quickly at sea and against select coastal targets without a ground invasion. The same is not true in West Africa, where the United States dismantled its Sahel basing network after the 2024 withdrawal from Niger, creating a logistics problem that would slow any Nigeria operation and drive the Pentagon toward air-centric or special operations options that rely on partner access.

Venezuela is the theater where the United States can most rapidly scale effects. The posture today includes surface combatants armed with Tomahawk land-attack missiles and SM-6 multi-mission rounds, maritime patrol P-8A aircraft for targeting and battle damage assessment, and forward fifth-generation fighters staged in Puerto Rico. Tomahawk’s in-flight retargeting and loiter capability make it suitable for dynamic targeting, while SM-6 adds over-the-horizon anti-air and limited strike options that expand a destroyer’s magazine utility. The P-8A brings the AN/APY-10 radar and multi-INT payloads suited to find go-fast boats, coastal assembly areas and emissions associated with Venezuelan radars along the littoral. The strategy Washington has sketched is coercive and iterative: strike at sea against smuggling craft and staging nodes, threaten infrastructure that supports illicit trafficking cycles, and pair maritime interdiction with limited land-attack options if coastal defenses actively challenge U.S. ships or aircraft. A carrier air wing, if tasked, would add persistent ISR and suppression of enemy air defenses.

Target sets in this scenario are maritime and coastal. They include semi-submersibles and fast boats outbound from Venezuelan waters, fuel and logistics clusters that support trafficking along the Paria and Orinoco deltas, and coastal surveillance radars that cue patrol craft. The Tomahawk Block V family gives surface action groups a standoff option with modernized navigation and communications, while a B-1B or B-52H launching JASSM-ER from the continental United States or Puerto Rico would offer complementary land-attack standoff if required. JASSM-ER’s reach exceeds 500 nautical miles, and the B-1 has demonstrated internal carriage of twenty-four JASSM-class weapons. Those combinations create a ladder of escalation from naval gunfire and helicopter-borne visit, board, search and seizure, up through precision cruise missile strikes on coastal command nodes if Venezuelan forces escalate first.

The Trump administration has identified targets in Venezuela that include military facilities used to smuggle drugs, according to U.S. officials, if Trump decides to move forward with airstrikes https://t.co/CBWbPqIf9Q
— The Wall Street Journal (@WSJ) October 31, 2025

Venezuela’s integrated air defense is not negligible. Caracas is widely reported to operate S-300VM batteries and legacy Pechora-2M systems, with public imagery of transporter-erector-launchers at sites near Caracas and Maracay, and periodic analyses that track their dispersal patterns. Those point defenses, paired with mobile coastal radars and legacy fighters, complicate low-altitude routes and make a suppression package prudent before any land-attack sortie over the littoral. The U.S. Navy’s AARGM-ER, now advancing through operational testing, is being integrated on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G and is designed to reach farther from maritime launch points than legacy HARM. That matters for an opening salvo that first degrades emitters, then authorizes follow-on strikes with Tomahawk or JASSM-ER. The emphasis would be maritime control and coastal denial effects, not regime change.

Venezuelan Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system deployed west of Caracas, Venezuela. Image captured from local media footage showing the movement of launcher vehicles and radar units on October 25, 2025, indicating full combat readiness. (Picture source: Venezuela TV)

The logistics underpin the strategy: San Juan to Caracas is roughly 478 nautical miles, a fighter-sized hop that can be comfortably bracketed by KC-135 and KC-46 refueling or avoided by standoff weapons from ships. Cooperative Security Locations on Curaçao and Aruba, long used for counter-drug aviation, further reduce transit times for ISR aircraft. Put simply, the Caribbean theater offers enough basing depth and naval mobility to sustain a days-to-weeks coercive campaign without large land footprints. That proximity is precisely why the administration’s Caribbean moves occurred first.

Nigeria is a very different math problem. The closest enduring U.S. base in Africa is on the opposite side of the continent, and the retirement of the Niger hub forced AFRICOM to rely on long legs, partner access or expeditionary staging. Djibouti to Abuja is approximately 2,068 nautical miles. MQ-9s can loiter for more than twenty-seven hours for ISR and precision attack, but establishing a persistent strike pattern over Nigeria would still require forward operating locations, diplomatic permissions, and tankers to support manned aircraft if called in. The most credible near-term tools are ISR and limited air-to-ground fires where Abuja consents, coupled with special operations advisory teams or hostage-recovery elements on a short leash. Anything resembling an amphibious or armored incursion is not plausible on short notice without host-nation basing in West Africa and weeks of staging. U.S. still hold bases near Nigeria, even if they cannot be considered as enduring bases, they still can host military assets to conduct preventive strikes or operations while waiting for other forces and armaments to be deployed.

U.S. Bases in Africa (Mail and Guardian - John McCann).

Because the U.S. President tied possible action in Nigeria to the protection of civilians, targeting logic would emphasize rapid ISR cueing of mass-atrocity incidents, interdiction of armed convoys threatening population centers, and strike support to Nigerian units if requested. MQ-9s with Hellfire, GBU-12 and GBU-38 give discriminate effects against mobile targets, while aerial refueling opens options for a small package of F-15E or F-35 aircraft to deliver JASSM-class standoff weapons from regional airspace if access is granted. Tanker math matters here. The KC-46 carries up to 212,000 pounds of fuel. KC-135 fleet upgrades improved offload capacity and reliability. Without regional clearances, however, tankers must orbit far from the target area, creating long drag chains that quickly erode sortie efficiency. The operational takeaway is that Nigeria's options remain bounded by permissions and distance, a point echoed by experts analyzing the planning guidance.

Nigeria’s adversaries present a fragmented and elusive target set. Boko Haram and Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) operate from dispersed rural sanctuaries across Borno, Yobe and Lake Chad, using light vehicles, small arms, and mobile camps rather than fixed infrastructure. The Nigerian Air Force fields a mix of older Chinese and Russian aircraft with limited radar coverage, leaving wide airspace gaps over the north. Urban density in cities like Lagos and Abuja further complicates air operations, creating a risk of collateral damage and restricting kinetic options to remote areas where target identification can be verified through persistent ISR.

Iraq sits between these poles. The United States retains a lean but real footprint at bases such as Ain al-Asad and within the Kurdistan region, along with theater ISR and strike assets on call. The declared policy is a phased drawdown and consolidation by end-2026, which means any new kinetic activity would be framed as force protection and counter-ISIS or as select strikes on Iran-aligned militia infrastructure after attacks on U.S. personnel. CENTCOM’s public record over the last two years describes repeated militia drone and rocket attacks and U.S. retaliatory strikes on weapons depots and command nodes in Iraq and Syria. That pattern suggests a continued advisory mission with episodic precision strikes rather than ground maneuver, constrained by Baghdad’s sovereignty concerns and by the announced timeline to reduce forces.

U.S. Bases in Middle East, near Iraq (Picture source: Al Jazeera).

If hostilities escalated in Iraq, the opening U.S. targets would again be enablers: one-way attack drone stockpiles, rockets and launch sites, militia C2, and air defense systems that threaten U.S. aircraft. Standoff munitions like JASSM-ER allow strikes from outside Iraqi airspace if required by diplomacy, while armed MQ-9s provide overwatch for advisers and convoys. The political reality is that Baghdad’s tolerance has limits, and Washington’s current posture is designed to apply pressure with precision while avoiding actions that force the Iraqi government to curtail the partnership outright.

In Iraq, the principal threat environment is defined by Iran-aligned militias equipped with short-range rockets, improvised loitering munitions, and armed drones that target coalition installations and logistics convoys. These groups maintain small, concealed firing sites near populated zones, making counter-battery and counter-UAS operations complex and politically sensitive. Their decentralized structure allows rapid relocation and plausible deniability, forcing U.S. forces to rely on high-precision strikes and persistent surveillance rather than large-scale maneuvers. The Iraqi security forces’ uneven control across provinces further complicates target coordination and deconfliction.

The Ain al-Asad Airbase, the remaining U.S. base in Iraq (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

Across all three theaters, the escalation ladder should be explicit. At sea near Venezuela, it begins with surveillance and interdiction, moves to disabling fire and armed helo actions, then to coastal SEAD with AARGM-ER if Venezuelan emitters illuminate U.S. aircraft, followed by Tomahawk or JASSM-ER against fixed nodes only if lethal threats persist. In Nigeria, it begins with ISR and information support to Abuja, then time-sensitive strikes with MQ-9s on armed perpetrators of mass violence under Nigerian request, and only then, if partners grant access, limited manned airpower presence. In Iraq, the rung below major escalation is already routine: retaliatory precision strikes on militia infrastructure after a credible attack on U.S. forces, followed by diplomatic de-escalation. That clarity helps manage risk to aircrews and to civilians.

Risks are material and legal. Any land-attack options in Venezuela would raise sovereignty issues and risk miscalculation with air defenses around population centers. In Nigeria, civilian protection operations would demand positive identification, host-nation authorization and careful rules of engagement. In Iraq, any expansion of strikes inside federal territory without Baghdad’s buy-in could fracture the coalition and accelerate the drawdown timeline. Those constraints are one reason Pentagon officials have kept options short of invasion in public discourse.

Tomahawk Block V provides long-range, subsonic precision with in-flight retargeting and battle damage imagery. SM-6 adds flexible defense and limited strike from Aegis ships. JASSM-ER offers low observable penetration beyond 500 nautical miles, with proven employment and heavy bomber carriage that allows mass. P-8A’s APY-10 radar, EO/IR and acoustic suite strengthen maritime kill chains and post-strike assessment. MQ-9 endurance allows broad-area surveillance and discriminate engagement with Hellfire and laser-guided bombs. Tankers enable all of this, but they also telegraph operational feasibility. The distance from San Juan to Caracas is under 500 nautical miles, which simplifies tanker plans. Djibouti to Abuja is over 2,000 nautical miles, which does not. Erbil to Al Qaim is roughly 180 nautical miles, a short reach for persistent overwatch. These numbers define the difference among the three options on the table.

If Washington chooses to apply limited force, the most executable play is in the Caribbean, where naval and fifth-generation air assets already sit close enough to deliver controlled, reversible pressure. Nigeria remains a planning problem where intelligence and special operations can move quickly but sustained airpower cannot without permissions and staging. Iraq is accessible but politically bounded, suited to the current pattern of retaliatory precision and partner enablement.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
Northrop Grumman’s F-35 Fighter output highlights industrial power behind US air dominance
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On July 2, 2025, Northrop Grumman announced from Palmdale, California, that it had reached a new milestone in military aircraft manufacturing with the ability to deliver a center fuselage for the F-35 Lightning II every thirty hours. This announcement, taken from an official company release, reflects the significant transformation of defense manufacturing methods, where production speed is now combined with strict standards of precision and reliability. For the United States and its international partners, this achievement provides additional assurance of the availability and modernization of the fifth-generation fleet.
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A U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II (Picture source: US DoD)

The F-35 Lightning II, developed by Lockheed Martin with contributions from Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, and Pratt & Whitney, is a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter designed for air superiority, ground attack, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. It is produced in three versions: the F-35A, intended for air forces and equipped with conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL); the F-35B, which combines stealth with short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) capability, enabling operations from smaller ships or austere bases; and the F-35C, adapted for carrier operations with a larger wing and reinforced structure. Sharing a common technological foundation, the variants provide operators with a coherent and flexible tool suited to different operational environments.

Powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 turbofan producing up to 43,000 pounds of thrust with afterburner, the F-35 reaches a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 (1,930 km/h) and a range of 2,220 km with internal fuel. Its maximum takeoff weight is 31,800 kg, allowing it to carry a wide range of armaments. The internal 20 mm cannon (GAU-22A or M61A2, depending on the version) is complemented by AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, as well as ground-attack weapons such as the GBU-31 JDAM, the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, and the AGM-88 HARM, designed to neutralize air defense systems. The internal weapons bay preserves stealth, while six external hardpoints allow a payload of more than 15,000 pounds when discretion is not required. The aircraft is equipped with advanced sensors, including the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), the Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and the Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS), providing comprehensive battlefield coverage and extended situational awareness.

At the core of this architecture, the center fuselage plays a critical role. It houses the air intakes, part of the fuel tanks, the internal weapons bay, and the flight-operable doors and mechanisms. The accuracy of its assembly, particularly edge alignment and application of coatings, directly determines the aircraft’s stealth performance and reliability in missions. Northrop Grumman has already delivered more than 1,400 such fuselages, confirming its central role in the Lightning II program and its expertise in producing complex aerospace structures.

This production pace is made possible by the Integrated Assembly Line (IAL), inaugurated in 2011, which remains one of the most advanced facilities worldwide for fighter aircraft manufacturing. Designed to assemble all three versions of the F-35 on a single line, it incorporates advanced processes such as automated guided vehicles, robotic drilling, and on-site molding. These operations are reinforced by real-time production data analysis, improving quality control while optimizing the use of human resources. The IAL thus represents the convergence of automation, robotics, and precision engineering.

The scale of the facility illustrates the magnitude of the project. Covering an area equivalent to a football field, it includes more than 115 assembly stations and processes around ten million parts annually. With this capacity, completing one center fuselage every thirty hours has become feasible, symbolizing a shift in the standards of defense aerospace manufacturing.

Beyond fuselage production, Northrop Grumman is also responsible for several other F-35 subsystems, including radars, communications equipment, and logistics support. This vertical integration, bringing together design, production, and sustainment, aims to secure supply chains and ensure technical consistency across the program. It reflects an industrial strategy designed for long-term requirements and the continuous adaptation of client armed forces.

The consequences of this acceleration extend well beyond the Palmdale plant. In a context of technological competition and regional tensions, the ability to deliver fifth-generation aircraft rapidly is a decisive factor. For U.S. forces, it ensures increased fleet availability, while international partners rely on these production rates to meet delivery schedules and strengthen their air capabilities.

Since entering service in 2015, the F-35 has become the most widely distributed fighter program globally. In the United States, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each operate their respective variants. Among historical partners, the United Kingdom employs F-35Bs for both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, Italy has acquired both F-35As and F-35Bs, and the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark are already fielding F-35As.

Additional customers have joined this initial group. Israel, the first to use the aircraft in combat, operates customized F-35As. Japan, already equipped with F-35As, began deploying its first F-35Bs in the south of the country in August 2025. Australia, South Korea, and Belgium have also received their first aircraft, while Finland, Poland, Switzerland, Canada, Romania, Greece, Germany, and the Czech Republic have signed firm contracts but are still awaiting deliveries.

This diversity of buyers, combined with production having already passed 1,200 aircraft delivered by mid-2025, highlights the pressure on the global supply chain and the need for Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin to further increase throughput. Forces already equipped are working to integrate the F-35 into their operational doctrines, while those still waiting for deliveries depend on the reliability of industrial schedules. In this context, the declared pace of one center fuselage every thirty hours is critical, as it underpins both the credibility of the program and the fulfillment of commitments to allied nations.
Report: V-MAX2 marks a new phase in France’s hypersonic weapons strategy
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On June 26, 2023, France reached a decisive milestone in the field of hypersonics with the successful launch of the V-MAX hypersonic glider from Biscarrosse. This first flight, the result of cooperation between the French defence procurement agency (DGA), ArianeGroup, and Onera, validated key technological choices and marked a European first. By succeeding in stabilising and manoeuvring a vehicle at speeds above Mach 5, France demonstrated its ability to develop capabilities in a sector where only the United States, Russia and China had been active until then. Yet this test was only a first step. France’s ambition is now to move further with VMAX2, followed by the SyLex programme and finally ASN4G, to fully integrate these technologies into a national defence strategy.
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Concept rendering of France’s VMAX2 hypersonic glider flying at extreme speed above the Earth’s atmosphere. (Picture source: Editing content from Army Recognition Group)

Hypersonic glider weapon systems are designed to strike targets by penetrating enemy air and missile defences. Propelled into the upper atmosphere by carrier systems, these gliders reach speeds from Mach 5 to Mach 20. Their trajectories, made unpredictable by extreme manoeuvrability, render them very difficult to intercept. This combination of speed and agility provides a rapid intervention capability at both medium and long ranges. To overcome air and missile defence networks, a hypersonic glider must maintain very high velocity throughout its flight while being able to perform complex manoeuvres in the terminal phase, precisely when it is most exposed to interceptors. This requires a high lift-to-drag ratio, heat-resistant materials and a control system able to respond to extreme conditions.

Aware of these challenges, the Ministry of the Armed Forces appointed ArianeGroup as prime contractor for the V-MAX programme. The company possesses unique expertise in Europe in ballistic launchers, space vehicles and atmospheric re-entry. The first phase of work focused on aerothermodynamic modelling, high-temperature materials and thermal protection, inertial navigation and guidance systems, as well as sensors and antennas. The demonstrator launched in 2023 was designed to test manoeuvrability during re-entry, under severe mechanical and thermal constraints. The flight confirmed structural integrity and the performance of on-board systems, marking a technological success recognised as a first for France and Europe.

The next stage is embodied by VMAX2. This programme, part of the incremental roadmap defined by the DGA, is intended to demonstrate France’s ability to design and control a hypersonic glider equipped with an advanced command system. The vehicle, whose shape and thermomechanical strength are based on several technological breakthroughs, comes very close to an operational system. It will be used to experiment with critical subsystems under representative conditions while anticipating advances in adversary interception technologies. The aim is to achieve a precise understanding of hypersonic flight dynamics to guide future military capabilities.

In continuity with this programme, the SyLex project, presented at the Paris Air Show in 2025, represents an ambition to reach a new threshold. This demonstrator is expected to achieve speeds of up to Mach 16, or around 20,000 km/h. To reach such a leap, France will need to build a sovereign test infrastructure able to reproduce and analyse these extreme conditions. Initial flight experiments are scheduled for 2027, with potential operational integration around 2030. SyLex reflects a clear determination: to provide France with autonomous hypersonic capability, avoiding dependence on foreign infrastructures or technologies.

In parallel, France is preparing the replacement of the ASMP-A airborne nuclear missile with the ASN4G programme. Scheduled for around 2035, this system will be powered by a ramjet engine, combining hypersonic velocity with a strategic payload, thereby ensuring the credibility of French deterrence in the face of advancing missile defence systems. Led by MBDA and Onera under the MIHYSYS contract awarded in 2024, this project is directly embedded in France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine and will be a central element of future strategic posture.

These developments are taking shape in the context of international competition. Russia already fields the Avangard and Kinzhal systems, while China is multiplying tests of the DF-ZF glider. The United States continues several programmes but struggles to convert prototypes into operational capabilities. In this environment, France, despite more limited resources, is seeking to maintain credible status by relying on technological innovation and a reinforced deterrence doctrine.

Ultimately, the evolution of France’s hypersonic sector, from VMAX to VMAX2, then SyLex and ASN4G, reflects a progressive but ambitious strategy. Each demonstrator provides vital knowledge, each test is a milestone towards capabilities that could reshape military balances. The coming years will reveal whether France can translate these technological advances into a lasting strategic advantage. One thing is certain: in the global race for hypersonic missiles, Paris has chosen not to remain on the sidelines but to assert its place among the powers shaping the warfare of tomorrow.
Analysis: How Greenland makes Denmark indispensable to NATO’s Arctic strategy
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The contract signed by Denmark’s Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization (FMI) with the Swedish company T-KARTOR to deliver new flight charts for the ice-free areas of Greenland might appear minor at first glance. Yet this technical decision reflects a much deeper strategic reality. Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, is increasingly at the heart of global geopolitical rivalries. The island is becoming a focal point of the struggle for influence in the Arctic, where sovereignty enforcement, military posturing, and resource competition converge.
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The new flight charts now cover all ice-free regions of Greenland.
(Picture source: Danish MoD)

For Copenhagen, securing accurate and updated aeronautical charts is not just about aviation safety. It is part of a broader effort to guarantee sovereignty over a vast and remote region that defines Denmark’s role as an Arctic power. With the Royal Danish Air Force relying on these maps to conduct patrols, surveillance, and search-and-rescue missions, the ability to fly at lower altitudes and operate more effectively strengthens the country’s presence in a territory that is central to NATO’s northern flank.

Greenland’s importance extends well beyond Danish defense. The island sits at the crossroads of global strategic interests. As Arctic sea ice continues to retreat, new maritime routes are gradually opening. These potential shipping corridors could shorten transit between Asia, Europe, and North America, bypassing traditional chokepoints like the Suez and Panama canals. Even though these routes remain hazardous and commercially uncertain, the prospect alone has drawn the attention of major powers, making Greenland a natural point of interest in future Arctic shipping governance.

The United States views Greenland as indispensable to its defense posture. Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) remains a critical hub for missile warning systems and space surveillance. During his presidency, Donald Trump famously floated the idea of buying Greenland, a move that was met with rejection in both Nuuk and Copenhagen but underscored Washington’s enduring perception of the island’s value. Meanwhile, Russia has stepped up its Arctic military presence, reinforcing bases along its northern coast and conducting naval operations. China has expressed interest as well, focusing on Greenland’s mineral wealth and potential role in future trade routes, even if its projects have often faced political resistance or economic setbacks.

The island’s mineral resources, especially rare earth elements, place it at the center of global competition for critical raw materials. These resources are vital for the green energy transition and modern defense technologies. Western states see Greenland as an opportunity to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on China. At the same time, Greenland’s own government has placed strict limits on uranium mining and oil exploration, balancing environmental concerns with economic aspirations. For many Greenlanders, resource exploitation is not merely an economic question but a step toward greater autonomy, or even independence, from Denmark.

Since gaining self-rule in 2009, Greenland has expanded its authority over domestic affairs and has openly articulated its long-term ambition for independence. The government’s 2024-2033 Foreign, Defense, and Security Strategy makes clear its intent to engage internationally on its terms. Local leaders insist that decisions about the island’s resources and future will be made by Greenlanders themselves, rejecting external attempts to impose geopolitical agendas.

In this context, Denmark’s investment in flight charts acquires symbolic significance. It reflects a commitment to safeguard sovereignty in the Arctic, strengthen NATO’s northern defenses, and ensure that operations over Greenland remain safe and effective. At the same time, it underscores how even small technical steps are inseparable from the broader geopolitical currents shaping the Arctic.

As climate change accelerates and great power rivalry intensifies, Greenland’s role will only grow. What may seem like a routine defense procurement is, in fact, a reminder that the Arctic is no longer a peripheral theater but a central arena of global competition. For Denmark, ensuring control and operational capacity in Greenland is not only about today’s security needs but also about maintaining influence in a region where the balance of power is rapidly shifting.
Analysis: China’s Strategy to Undermine the US Undersea Surveillance Network
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According to an article published on August 13, 2025, by Defense News, citing an essay by Ryan Martinson for the Center for International Maritime Security, some officers of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recommend a strategy aimed directly at the United States undersea surveillance network, which is considered a major threat to China’s submarine fleet. Martinson, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, reports that Chinese experts view this system as vulnerable due to the vast maritime area to be monitored in the Western Pacific. According to these experts, disabling enough sensors could paralyze the entire system and significantly reduce its effectiveness.
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China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

To understand this concern, it is necessary to outline the structure of the U.S. undersea surveillance network, and the technical means China already possesses or seeks to develop, whether coercive or non-coercive but dual-use, that is, applicable for military purposes.

The U.S. system is built on an integrated architecture combining fixed sensors, mobile systems, and airborne platforms. At its core is the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), a successor to the Cold War-era SOSUS network, consisting of arrays of seabed acoustic sensors connected to shore by undersea cables. This fixed network continuously monitors strategic areas, particularly maritime choke points and likely submarine transit routes. Complementing it are towed-array systems such as the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), deployed on specialized ships such as the Victorious and Impeccable classes. These are capable of using passive or low-frequency active sonar to detect submarines over long distances, even in complex acoustic environments. U.S. destroyers, frigates, and attack submarines add capability with hull-mounted sonars and towed arrays, while airborne assets, the P-8A Poseidon and MH-60R Seahawk, deploy sonobuoys, dipping sonars, and torpedoes. The network is further supported by satellites, unmanned undersea vehicles, and oceanographic research ships, which gather environmental data critical to optimizing detection.

This American view contrasts sharply with China’s perception. Washington and its allies are concerned about the rapid expansion of China’s submarine fleet, expected to reach 65 units in 2025 and 80 by 2035, including nuclear-powered ballistic missile and attack submarines, as well as advanced conventional types such as the Yuan class. Beijing, for its part, believes the increasing sophistication of U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts threatens the stealth of its submarines, a key factor in their operational effectiveness. The article in Military Art describes U.S. cables and sensor networks as “fragile and easily severed” and identifies the command and control systems as the network’s “Achilles’ heel,” potentially vulnerable to kinetic or cyberattacks. The authors call for the development of acoustic, magnetic, optical, and electronic detection technologies, supported by artificial intelligence, as well as autonomous undersea vehicles capable of destroying these infrastructures.

Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former U.S. Navy submarine officer, considers this assessment credible. He notes that the IUSS and SURTASS vessels have been effective for decades but acknowledges that targeted attacks on specific network nodes are possible. However, he emphasizes the difficulty of locating small devices at sea or on the seabed and the operational cost of such a campaign, which would require substantial resources and restrict the use of Chinese submarine forces within the first island chain, when they might be more effective beyond it. Clark also outlines another potential approach, saturating the U.S. network by deploying a large number of submarines before a conflict, making it more difficult for U.S. forces to track and engage them all simultaneously.

China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions, and the Sea Wing (Haiyi) oceanographic drone, used in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea to gather environmental data suitable for military exploitation. These platforms can be launched from military or civilian vessels, including China’s large fishing fleet, which could be tasked with support missions. Conventional naval forces, such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines, could also directly target SURTASS ships or other U.S. surveillance vessels. In addition, China’s cyber capabilities provide another means to disrupt command and control.

In parallel, Beijing is investing in advanced detection and localization systems such as the Qianlong series (Qianlong-1, Qianlong-2, Qianlong-3) and the Haishen-6000, designed for deep-sea exploration but adaptable for military purposes. Equipped with multiple sensors and coupled with artificial intelligence, they could locate hidden or buried installations and prepare them for neutralization.

On the offensive side, China is considering militarizing research submersibles such as the Jiaolong and Shenhai Yongshi, which can dive to great depths, to place charges, cut cables, or disable sensors. This could be combined with a saturation strategy involving the simultaneous deployment of a large number of submarines, forcing the United States to disperse its surveillance resources and creating opportunities to penetrate areas normally well covered by U.S. ASW.

If China were to conduct a systematic campaign against the U.S. network of undersea sensors, the consequences would be wide-ranging. The U.S. Navy’s ability to monitor and track Chinese submarines in the Western Pacific would be reduced, complicating the implementation of sea-denial and sea-control plans. This might lead Washington to invest heavily in redundant, more discreet, and resilient systems, including increased use of autonomous undersea vehicles to patrol sensitive areas. Strategically, the partial or temporary loss of undersea information dominance would increase operational uncertainty for U.S. and allied forces, potentially creating windows of opportunity for Chinese operations within the first and second island chains. Such a development would also heighten the role of regional allied ASW capabilities, particularly those of Japan and Australia, in a more decentralized surveillance architecture that would remain exposed to adversary countermeasures.
Analysis: The Wing Loong II Drone and China’s rise in the global armed UAV market
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From Africa to the Middle East and South Asia, China’s Wing Loong-2 (WL-2) unmanned aerial vehicle has become a consistent presence across multiple operational theatres. Developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, it is operated both by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a range of foreign customers. It has been widely deployed by Nigeria against Boko Haram, by Saudi Arabia against Houthi positions, by Pakistan in cross-border operations, and in Libya’s civil war, reflecting the growing export of Chinese armed drone technology. In its domestic configuration, designated GJ-2, it has been in PLA service since 2018, participating in live-fire exercises around Taiwan and patrols over the South China Sea.
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The WL-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle designed for both reconnaissance and strike operations.
(Picture source: Wikimedia Commons)

First unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2016 and making its maiden flight the following year, the WL-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone intended for reconnaissance and strike missions. Measuring 11 meters in length with a wingspan of 20.5 meters, its aerodynamic design is similar to the US MQ-9 Reaper. However, its performance is lower in several respects. With a maximum take-off weight of 4,200 kg, around 500 kg less than the Reaper, it carries only 480 kg of external payload compared to the Reaper’s 1,400 kg. Its top speed is 370 km/h, service ceiling 9,000 meters, and range 1,500 km, compared to 480 km/h, 15,000 meters, and 1,900 km for the Reaper. These differences are partly due to its WJ-9 turboprop engine, rated at 500 to 600 shaft horsepower, less powerful than the Reaper’s Honeywell TPE331-10, delivering up to 900 shaft horsepower.

In endurance, the WL-2 can operate for 20 hours with a full weapons load and up to 32 hours with a reduced load, compared to the Reaper’s 27 hours. It also features certain technological characteristics, such as the use of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, providing redundancy in the event of GPS signal denial in contested environments. A truck-mounted ground station can control several aircraft with a range of 200 to 300 km in beyond line-of-sight mode, and up to 3,000 km via satellite link, although this configuration is not always offered to foreign buyers.

In terms of sensors, the WL-2 is fitted with a stabilized electro-optical/infrared turret, a synthetic aperture radar, and a datalink capable of transmitting real-time imagery and intelligence to deployed units. It has six underwing hardpoints for a variety of guided munitions, including the YJ-9E anti-ship missile, LS-6 glide bomb, TL-2 and AG-300M air-to-ground missiles, and FT-series satellite-guided bombs. In maximum configuration, it can carry up to 12 munitions, or 18 TL-2 missiles of 16 kg each using triple-ejector racks. The BA-7 missile, modeled on the US AGM-114 Hellfire, is also part of its inventory.

Outside PLA service, the WL-2 has been exported to and operated by several countries, including Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Libya, where it has been employed in various combat environments ranging from counter-insurgency operations to conventional strike missions. These export cases demonstrate its adaptability to different operational contexts and its appeal to a diverse set of armed forces.

Beyond reconnaissance and strike roles, the WL-2 can be fitted with an electronic warfare module, identifiable by its disc-shaped antenna, for jamming and countermeasures missions. Its modular design also supports civilian applications such as meteorological observation and emergency communications, with the WL-2H version deployed in typhoon and earthquake zones to assess damage and restore communications. The system can take off and land autonomously, execute simplified maneuvers, and be operated by a single person using a point-and-click control interface.

Artificial intelligence algorithms allow the aircraft to monitor its systems, identify threats, and return autonomously if damaged, using trajectory optimization and glide control technologies. These features reduce the need for advanced operator training, making it viable for countries without a full UAV pilot training program.

Commercially, its main advantage lies in its cost. While an MQ-9 system for US forces starts at about USD 30 million and export contracts can reach into the billions, the WL-2 is estimated at USD 4–6 million per unit, including munitions, ground control stations, and after-sales support. Pakistan ordered 48 units in 2018 with an option for local co-production. China also offers more flexible payment terms and fewer political restrictions, making it accessible to buyers excluded from Western systems.

Although more advanced Chinese drones such as the stealth GJ-11 and CH-7 are emerging, the WL-2 and its PLA variant, the GJ-2, remain key assets and competitive internationally. While it does not match the highest Western performance standards, it provides an operational and financial balance suited to low- and medium-intensity conflicts, reinforcing China’s position in the armed drone sector.

Compared to similar-class systems, the WL-2 is a lower-cost alternative to the US MQ-9 Reaper, the Chinese CH-5, Türkiye’s Bayraktar Akıncı, and Israel’s Hermes 900. The Reaper leads in payload capacity and altitude but is costlier and subject to stricter export controls. The CH-5 emphasizes long endurance at low cost, while the Akıncı offers a heavy, multi-role platform with a wide range of domestically produced weapons. The Hermes 900, more compact, is oriented toward endurance ISR missions with a broad civilian and military user base.

In export markets, the WL-2 benefits from competitive pricing, compatible munitions, and permissive political conditions, with Beijing also less hesitant than Western suppliers to sell to non-democratic states or governments with mixed human rights or civilian protection records. Other systems occupy distinct niches: the MQ-9B serves NATO and Indo-Pacific allies seeking interoperability and maritime capability, the Akıncı appeals to non-NATO countries requiring heavy strike capability, the CH-5 targets budget-limited buyers, and the Hermes 900 is selected for dual-use and certifiable missions. This segmentation shows that, despite its limitations, the WL-2 retains a strong position in markets where cost-effectiveness and minimal political restrictions are priorities.
How the Compact Mako Hypersonic Missile Could Transform U.S. Air Power
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First unveiled at the Sea Air Space 2024 exhibition, the Mako hypersonic missile was developed by Lockheed Martin to reach speeds of Mach 5 while being compatible with a wide range of aerial platforms. Its compact size, modularity, and ability to be carried in the internal weapons bays of the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters represent a notable development in the design of hypersonic weapons, which have long been limited by their bulk. This characteristic could mark a turning point in the United States’ long-range strike capabilities at a time when mastery of hypersonic technology is becoming a decisive factor in operational superiority.
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Physical compatibility tests have confirmed that the Mako can be carried internally by the F-22 and F-35A/C, as well as externally on aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8A Poseidon (Picture source: Lockheed Martin)

Development of the Mako began in 2017 under the U.S. Air Force’s Stand In Attack Weapon (SiAW) program, with approximately $35 million in funding. The aim was to provide the Air Force with a weapon capable of quickly and precisely neutralizing strategic targets within anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, particularly in response to Chinese threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Measuring between 3.6 and 4 meters in length depending on the variant, with a diameter of 33 centimeters and a weight of approximately 590 kilograms, the missile can carry interchangeable 60-kilogram warheads and integrate various guidance systems. Its open digital architecture allows for rapid upgrades and reduces reliance on proprietary processes, offering advantages for future updates and cost control.

Physical compatibility tests have confirmed that the Mako can be carried internally by the F-22 and F-35A/C, as well as externally on aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8A Poseidon. Virtual tests have validated internal carriage on the B-1B, B-52H, and B-21Raider bombers. Equipped with standard 30-inch lugs, it can be integrated with nearly the entire U.S. aerial arsenal and, with an additional booster, could also be launched from the vertical launch tubes of U.S. Navy ships, similar to the AGM-158C LRASM missile.

This level of compatibility enables new operational concepts. Lockheed Martin has, for example, considered a combined deployment in which fifth-generation stealth fighters act as forward scouts to detect and designate targets, passing the data to fourth-generation aircraft equipped with Sniper targeting pods and armed with Mako missiles to execute the strike. This division of roles would maximize available firepower while leveraging the specific strengths of each platform, especially in highly contested environments.

The Mako is powered by a solid-fuel rocket motor capable of reaching Mach 5 at high altitude while retaining maneuverability, significantly reducing the reaction time available to enemy defenses. Its modular design, combined with additive manufacturing for components such as the seeker fairing and control surfaces, helps shorten production timelines and improve industrial responsiveness. The use of advanced digital engineering makes it possible to simulate and validate variants directly in a virtual environment before manufacturing, optimizing development and facilitating series production.

The strategic context further underscores the relevance of this program. China is actively developing the YJ-21 hypersonic missile, already tested in both naval and air-launched versions. The Mako could enable the United States to close the gap in the hypersonic arms race and maintain strategic balance against such threats. In parallel, the May 2025 development of the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Technologies illustrates the complementary nature of offensive and defensive programs in this domain.

Internationally, Lockheed Martin has expressed interest in initial production in the United Kingdom before transferring industrial activity to the United States, as part of potential cooperation under the AUKUS agreement. The UK Ministry of Defence, aiming to achieve a sovereign hypersonic missile capability by 2030, is considering the Mako as a viable option. Collaboration with British and Australian industrial partners could facilitate technology sharing, cost distribution, and capacity building among the participating nations.

At present, the Mako has not yet received production funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. However, its inclusion by the U.S. Navy in the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) category would allow for accelerated funding should a favorable decision be made. If approved, the Mako could become a key element of the U.S. military inventory, combining speed, flexibility, and multi-platform compatibility, and could serve as an important asset in both aerial and naval operations in the coming decades.
How US Army Is Rebuilding Its Missile Defense Around Mass and Preemptive Action
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As ballistic and aerial threats proliferate and diversify, the US Army is preparing to release, by October 2025, a complete overhaul of its air and missile defense strategy, with a planning horizon extending to 2040. This new doctrinal framework, announced by Lieutenant General Sean A. Gainey during the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, comes at a time of growing saturation, increasing sophistication of offensive vectors, and major shifts in command and control architectures. Far from being a mere update, this strategy signals a clear break from the post-2018 legacy by reaffirming the centrality of mass in air defense and embedding preemptive action as a core operational principle.
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MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems for a readiness exercise in Germany (Picture source: US DoD)

Since the last version was published in 2018, the global strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. Drone campaigns in the Middle East, precision strikes in Ukraine, and saturation maneuvers by both state and non-state actors have exposed the limitations of sequential interception models. Adversaries are no longer attempting to breach a shield; they seek to overwhelm it. Within this context, General Gainey calls for a return to fundamentals, explicitly naming mass as a critical factor in tactical resilience. Warfare is once again a matter of volume, in munitions, sensors, and command nodes. As more coordinated salvos of theater-level weapons emerge, the ability to absorb the initial blow becomes as decisive as the ability to respond.

However, mass alone is no longer sufficient. The US Army now aims to go further by adopting a proactive posture centered on the neutralization of threats before they are launched. This approach, referred to as smart missile defeat, goes beyond linear defense logic and fits within a broader framework of informational and multi-domain attrition warfare. It entails integrating non-kinetic capabilities such as cyber disruption, electronic warfare, and AI-driven ISR strikes to delay, degrade, or disrupt adversary supply chains, launch platforms, and command systems.

In this light, artificial intelligence is no longer viewed as a tactical aid but as a core doctrinal enabler. The Army is investing in hybrid decision-making architectures, where machines help absorb operators’ cognitive workload and offer near-real-time distributed targeting decisions. According to General Gainey, this shift implies a redefinition of the human role, from operator to supervisor. This transition underpins the development of the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), designed to connect all available sensors and effectors, regardless of origin, within a modular command and distributed fires framework.

The broad deployment of IBCS, combined with the fielding of new sensors such as LTAMDS and short-range interceptors like M-SHORAD, is intended to produce a more agile, distributed, and lethal force. Alongside this, the US Army is also asserting a stronger role in homeland defense, working with NORAD and the Missile Defense Agency to support the development of the Golden Dome, a layered missile defense shield intended to address both theater-level and strategic threats. Though still in early stages, this effort reflects the growing ambition of the Space and Missile Defense Command to operate not just beyond the perimeter but within the national defense architecture itself.

The forthcoming 2040 strategy is thus a structural response to a dual challenge: absorbing saturation while regaining the initiative. It aligns with broader doctrinal shifts outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for more adaptable, distributed forces capable of operating in contested, high-intensity environments. The return to mass is not a conservative fallback. It is a capacity expansion backed by command tools and technologies designed to strike before adversaries can act. In other words, the goal is not merely to survive the initial blow but to prevent it from occurring at all.
Report: Reimagining Mesh-Based Radar Detection Against Hypersonic and Saturation Threats
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In the face of increasingly complex, saturating, and hypersonic strikes carried out by adversarial powers, traditional air defense systems are reaching their physical and economic limits. In a forward-looking report publishedin July 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analysts Masao Dahlgren, Patrycja Bazylczyk, and Tom Karako propose a fundamental shift: replacing architectures built around a few powerful radars with a dense mesh of passive, proliferated sensors forming a "distributed sensory skin" capable of detecting, tracking, and identifying threats while surviving in highly contested environments.
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Hensoldt's TRML-4D radar, though an active sensor, is used within the IRIS-T SLM network and could serve as a nodal element in a more discreet and distributed mesh architecture (Picture source: Hensoldt)

This approach, referred to as mesh sensing, breaks away from the traditional detection-identification-engagement triad by distributing each function across specialized nodes within a network. The proposed sensors include acoustic detectors (such as Zvook or Sky Fortress deployed in Ukraine), infrared sensors (MWIR, LWIR), electro-optical cameras (TV/CCD), passive RF listening devices (e.g., Silent Sentinel), miniature Doppler radars mounted on lightweight drones, as well as hyperspectral sensors and transient event detectors. With unit costs now often below $10,000, these systems can be widely deployed in fixed, semi-mobile, or airborne configurations, using micro-UAVs such as the Black Hornet, RQ-28A, or Anavia HT-100. They can be layered operationally, acoustic systems positioned forward, infrared and optical sensors placed in-depth, and data fusion nodes secured in covered terrain.

The operational value lies in the ability of these networks to detect increasingly stealthy threats, such as subsonic cruise missiles like the Kh-101 or modified Shahed-136 drones, even in environments affected by electronic countermeasures, spectral camouflage, or active jamming. In a scenario modeled by CSIS, a ground-based air defense system in eastern Poland saw its performance improve by 26% against a ballistic missile salvo when supported by a passive EO/IR network of 14 sensors. The benefit was not only quantitative: early warning was improved by 3 to 4 minutes, allowing sufficient time for repositioning a Patriot PAC-3 MSE battery or activating a SkyCeptor interceptor within the IBCS framework.

The network infrastructure proposed by CSIS is based on a high-redundancy mesh architecture coupled with local data processing via edge computing. Sensor data does not require full centralization but can be partially processed at the source using dimensionality reduction, neural network classification (such as YOLOv7 or ResNet), or contextual interpretation (embedded LLMs in micro-instances). This localized processing improves resilience against jamming, reduces latency, and minimizes dependence on SATCOM or LTE relays vulnerable to electronic warfare. In this context, systems like the KORNET Passive Surveillance Sensor (KORNET-PSS) from Thales, the Silent Watch by Leonardo, or SAAB’s SHORAD Enhanced EO Mesh could be integrated as specialized nodes within a federated architecture.

This distributed network is not intended to replace active radars like the AN/MPQ-65A (Patriot) or the GM200 MM/C used by Dutch forces, but rather to complement them. It could also be used to multiply false targets against enemy anti-radiation missiles by deploying active decoys or intermittent emitters. The system may also support dynamic camouflage strategies, with regular shifts between emission sources, similar to the approach implemented in the Israeli Scorpius-T system.

Growing interest in distributed sensor architectures can be observed among armed forces. In 2024, the Bundeswehr approved a test of the ABF-Passiv (Aufgeklärte Bedrohung Früherkennung) program, based on deployable tripod-mounted LWIR sensors. The Italian Army is currently testing EO/IR sensor networks developed by Elettronica, in conjunction with its Kronos Grand Mobile radars. The US Army, for its part, has included in the FY2026 budget a program titled Passive Integrated Ground Sensors (PIGS), aimed at equipping Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) with EO/IR acoustic sensor meshes to detect small drone movements at squad level.

Ultimately, mesh sensing could be integrated into a cloud-based command and control system capable of fusing sensor tracks in real time, prioritizing them, and automatically cueing intercept platforms. This direction, referred to as autopoietic sensor fusion, would represent a doctrinal shift comparable to the introduction of C-RAM systems or hit-to-kill interceptors in the 1990s. It reflects a step toward the emergence of a territorial immune system based not on kinetic mass, but on informational omnipresence.
Analysis: How Ukraine’s Agile Warfare Model Shapes NATO Military Modernization
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At the inaugural LANDEURO event organizedby the Army Sustainment University on July 17, 2025, in Wiesbaden, Germany, a key session titled “Ukrainian Innovation at the Speed of Relevance” provided an in-depth perspective on the technological transformation underway within the Ukrainian armed forces. The discussion brought together defense industry experts, military representatives, and technology innovators to examine how Ukraine is accelerating the development of military solutions in direct response to battlefield demands. The objective was not simply to assess the current state of innovation but to demonstrate how the Ukrainian approach could redefine operational standards for NATO forces.
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At the core of the discussions, participants emphasized the remarkable adaptability of Ukrainian industry and military units working closely together to meet frontline requirements (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)

At the core of the discussions, participants emphasized the remarkable adaptability of Ukrainian industry and military units working closely together to meet frontline requirements. A significant focus was placed on the integration of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems in military operations. Speakers highlighted Ukraine’s ability to rapidly design and deploy FPV drones (First Person View), loitering munitions, and autonomous systems built from 3D-printed components, open-source mapping tools, and embedded AI modules. These systems are designed to identify, track, and engage targets even in environments heavily contested by electronic warfare.

Sebastian Kuhl, Director of Land Sales at Helsing, noted that faced with the high costs of complex sensors such as gimbals, Ukrainian engineers favor embedding AI algorithms directly onboard drones. This approach enables image stabilization and automatic target recognition without relying on costly and fragile mechanical devices. This "software-first" strategy supports better scalability of capabilities at lower costs, which is critical for a military operating under resource constraints.

Another topic addressed during the session was digital finance and disintermediation mechanisms used to support the war effort. Speakers explained how Ukraine has circumvented traditional financial and procurement systems through the use of cryptocurrency and crowdfunding. These methods help bypass administrative delays, allowing for the rapid funding and delivery of equipment directly to the frontlines. This alternative procurement strategy was presented as a model of financial agility under wartime conditions that may hold relevance for Western forces.

Yaroslav Azhnyuk, CEO of TheFourthLaw, stressed the advantages of software over hardware, explaining that the scalability of software solutions enables rapid deployment of updates and new capabilities in the field without requiring the replacement of physical platforms. Ukrainian-developed software modules are designed to be adaptable across various platforms, from FPV drones to autonomous ground vehicles. Azhnyuk described massively scalable autonomy as the most decisive defense technology of this decade while reaffirming that final engagement decisions remain under human control.

In the context of Ukraine's industrial efforts, drone production has undergone significant development. In 2024, nearly 2 million drones were manufactured domestically, including over 1.5 million FPV drones, many equipped with autonomy kits such as the ZIR module. This module enables low-cost drones to automatically recognize targets, such as armored vehicles or artillery, over distances exceeding 1 kilometer and to pursue moving targets at speeds of up to 60 km/h. This type of equipment reflects Ukraine's capability to combine affordable hardware with advanced software functionalities.

The session also shared insights on the Ukrainian military's innovative doctrine, which now favors modular systems and incremental approaches rather than complex, lengthy, and expensive developments. This doctrine translates into the progressive integration of autonomous features on existing platforms, such as last-phase autonomous navigation that enables drones to continue toward their targets even under communication jamming, as well as automated reconnaissance and fire correction functions.

The session concluded with a shared observation: Ukraine's approach presents a practical model of adaptability and pragmatism for NATO forces. Instead of pursuing perfect or technologically ambitious solutions that may prove unrealistic in wartime, Ukraine favors rapid experimentation, continuous field feedback, and iterative development. This innovation culture, driven by immediate operational needs, constitutes a unique operational laboratory for Western alliances that may soon face environments characterized by electronic warfare, drone swarms, and pervasive artificial intelligence.

Discussions at LANDEURO demonstrated that military innovation lies not solely in the sophistication of equipment but in the capacity to industrialize adaptable solutions rapidly, supported by innovative financial models and an agile ecosystem. Ukraine's case, shaped by the conditions of a war of attrition, may well define the path for modern armed forces facing future threats.
SIPRI 2025 Warns of Rising Proliferation of Nuclear Multiple-Warhead and Dual-Use Systems
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its annual Yearbook on 16 June 2025, which confirms the end of an era: the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals that began after the Cold War is now over. In contrast, all nuclear-armed states pursued in 2024 a strategy of modernization, expansion, or innovation in their nuclear capabilities. This return to nuclear competition coincides with the weakening of arms control frameworks, with no immediate prospects for replacement.
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In Russia, despite delays and another RS-28 Sarmat failure in 2024, plans to reload silos and increase warheads per missile remain unchanged. (Picture source: WikiCommons)

The report records an estimated total of 12,241 nuclear warheads as of 1 January 2025, of which 9,614 are in military stockpiles and 3,912 are deployed on operational delivery systems. Around 2,100 warheads are maintained at high operational alert, mainly by the United States and Russia. SIPRI also notes that China may now keep some warheads mounted on missiles during peacetime.

Modernization covers all components of the nuclear triads. In the United States, programs to replace the Minuteman IIIICBMs, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, and air-launched cruise missiles are underway, despite budget-related delays. Washington is also developing new non-strategic nuclear warheads, raising concerns about the program’s long-term sustainability. In Russia, while strategic forces remain a priority, the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile experienced another failure in 2024, and several other systems are delayed. Still, plans to reload silos and increase warhead counts per missile remain intact.

China is undergoing the fastest expansion. Its arsenal increased from 500 to around 600 warheads within a year, and it has completed or nearly completed construction of more than 300 new ICBM silos across desert and mountainous regions. At this pace, China could possess 1,500 warheads by 2035. The country is actively developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities and continues to enhance its dual-capable naval and airborne systems.

The United Kingdom did not expand its stockpile in 2024 but remains on a growth trajectory laid out in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. London is moving forward with the construction of four new SSBNs. France continues to develop its third-generation SSBN and a new air-launched cruise missile, while upgrading the payload of its M51 ballistic missile.

India has continued the development of MIRV-capable canisterized missiles, which can be transported with mated warheads and may remain on alert. Pakistan is expanding fissile material production and delivery systems, suggesting continued growth. North Korea now holds an estimated 50 assembled warheads and the fissile material for 40 more. It is advancing its doctrine of tactical deterrence and preparing to introduce theater nuclear weapons, according to South Korean sources.

Israel, while maintaining its policy of deliberate ambiguity, tested a propulsion system in 2024 that may be related to the Jericho missile series. Upgrades were also reported at the Dimona plutonium production site.

SIPRI highlights a concerning doctrinal shift. In November 2024, Russia revised its nuclear posture to broaden the scenarios in which it might use nuclear weapons. The United States replaced its forward-deployed B61 bombs in Europe with modernized versions. The report also notes that MIRV-capable systems, once limited to the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, are now being developed or deployed by China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

Emerging technologies are introducing new uncertainties. Warhead miniaturization, developments in artificial intelligence, automated command and control, cyber defense, and space warfare are reshaping deterrence architectures. Several states are investing in long-range maneuverable missiles, antisatellite weapons, and hypersonic glide vehicles. These advancements may shorten decision-making timelines and increase the risk of miscalculation or accidental use.

The SIPRI Yearbook 2025 concludes that the global nuclear order is entering a phase of increased strategic instability. The anticipated expiration of the New START treaty in 2026, with no replacement in sight, could trigger an unregulated cycle of warhead deployments, including rapid silo reactivation and submarine reloads. For armed forces and defense industries, these developments imply renewed attention to second-strike capabilities, the resilience of command-and-control systems, and the flexibility permitted under evolving nuclear doctrines.
Missile Defense: US Highlights Key Role of SM3 Interceptors After First Combat Use in Middle East
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The U.S. Department of Defense has officially announced a major modification to a contract awarded to Raytheon, now a subsidiary of RTX Corporation, concerning the sustainment of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. This contract modification, valued at $2.134 billion, raises the total ceiling from $1.198 billion to $3.332 billion. The announcement comes in a strategically significant context, as the SM-3 was recently used for the first time in an operational combat scenario by the U.S. Navy during the interception of Iranian missiles targeting Israel.

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The Standard Missile-3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor designed to neutralize short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats through direct kinetic impact, without the use of an explosive warhead (Picture source: Raytheon)

The contract covers ongoing engineering and logistical support services for the various SM-3 variants, including the Block IA, Block IB, and Block IIA versions. It encompasses complex technical services such as configuration management, obsolescence mitigation, cybersecurity measures, service life evaluation, support for flight testing, industrial base assessments, and the provision of spare parts. It also includes specific activities related to the defense of Guam and support under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Work will be carried out at Raytheon facilities in Tucson, Arizona, and Huntsville, Alabama, under the supervision of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), also based in Huntsville. The performance period remains unchanged and extends through October 29, 2029.

The Standard Missile-3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor designed to neutralize short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats through direct kinetic impact, without the use of an explosive warhead. Developed by Raytheon on behalf of the MDA, the system employs a "hit-to-kill" approach, which relies on direct collision to destroy targets. It is deployed from both sea-based Aegis-equipped ships and land-based Aegis Ashore sites in Europe. The SM-3 plays a central role in the ballistic missile defense architecture of the United States and its allies, particularly within NATO's Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). With over 30 successful space intercepts and more than 400 missiles delivered to the U.S. and Japanese navies, the system has established a credible operational track record.

Among the operational variants, the SM-3 Block IB features a dual-color infrared seeker and a Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System (TDACS), enhancing terminal guidance accuracy. The Block IIA variant, developed in cooperation with Japan, represents a significant evolution. It incorporates a wider 21-inch diameter, more powerful rocket motors, a larger kinetic warhead, and an improved seeker coupled with a High Divert DACS. These enhancements provide extended range and speed, allowing the missile to defend larger areas against advanced ballistic threats. This version forms the core of EPAA Phase III, with deployment already underway in Romania and planned for Poland. It has demonstrated its effectiveness in NATO multinational exercises and in a successful live interception of a ballistic missile target in 2017.

The SM-3 Block IA, the earliest version deployed since 2004, features a 13.5-inch propulsion system, a monochrome seeker, and a Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS). It serves as the technological foundation of the program. The Block IB, operational since 2011, introduced important improvements while maintaining compatibility with the original design. The Block IIA represents a capability leap, not only in terms of range but also in strategic flexibility, as it can be launched from both naval and land-based platforms, enabling a wider range of operational scenarios.

The recent combat use of the SM-3 in intercepting ballistic threats launched from Iran has further reinforced its strategic relevance among U.S. allies. This event demonstrated the interceptor's technical maturity and its ability to counter high-altitude missile attacks in a complex environment. It also highlights the missile’s growing role in protecting strategic sites, deployed naval forces, and allied territories across Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region.

By enabling Raytheon to continue and expand its technical support to U.S. and allied forces, this contract modification underscores the increasingly central position of the SM-3 in U.S. missile defense doctrine. In a global context marked by the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and intensifying strategic rivalries, the SM-3 program remains a key tool for deterrence, international cooperation, and collective protection. This contract confirms Raytheon's pivotal role in sustaining Western exo-atmospheric interception capabilities.

EvolutionoftheStandardMissile-3 (SM-3)interceptorsundertheAegisBallisticMissileDefense (BMD)program (Picture source: MDA)
US Speeds Up Nuclear Triad Overhaul Amid Growing Global Nuclear Competition
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According to a report updated on May 1, 2025, by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the United States is undertaking a vast effort to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, involving both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This program aims to ensure the credibility, flexibility, and resilience of the U.S. deterrent posture in a context shaped by the rise of nuclear-armed competitors, notably Russia and China. Estimated at $946 billion over ten years by the Congressional Budget Office, this investment includes the renewal of the three components of the nuclear triad, warhead modernization, and the upgrade of nuclear command and control systems. The DoD’s FY2025 budget request allocates $49.2 billion to support these efforts, highlighting the strategic priority given to long-term nuclear deterrence.

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The Minuteman III will soon be replaced by the Sentinel ICBM (formerly GBSD), a new-generation missile integrating digital systems, advanced countermeasures, and a modular design, offering intercontinental range, improved precision, and increased resilience to a first strike (Picture source: US DoD)

The land-based leg of the triad is centered on Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed from three U.S. Air Force bases in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. Each missile, with a range exceeding 13,000 kilometers, is powered by three solid-fueled stages and guided by an inertial navigation system. Originally capable of carrying up to three thermonuclear warheads, the missiles now carry only a single W78 or W87 warhead in compliance with New START treaty limits. Of the 450 existing silos, 400 are operationally deployed, with the remaining 50 retained as reserve or dispersal infrastructure. The current fleet has undergone life extension programs to enhance reliability and accuracy. The Minuteman III will soon be replaced by the Sentinel ICBM (formerly GBSD), a new-generation missile integrating digital systems, advanced countermeasures, and a modular design, offering intercontinental range, improved precision, and increased resilience to a first strike. The program plans to acquire 659 missiles to support the deployment of 400 operational units and testing. The Sentinel will carry the new W87-1 warhead, currently under development by NNSA. This warhead will incorporate modernized safety features, enhanced accident resistance, and fully redesigned components.

The sea-based leg of the triad is composed of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each capable of carrying up to 20 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These three-stage missiles, guided by GPS and inertial navigation, have a range of over 12,000 kilometers and are designed to deliver multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), including the W76-1 (100 kilotons), W76-2 (low-yield variant, 6–8 kilotons), and W88 (475 kilotons). Each submarine can carry up to 96 warheads, though the actual number varies depending on operational needs and treaty limits. Two submarines are generally in maintenance, while twelve are operationally deployed across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with homeports at Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. The Ohio-class will be replaced by the Columbia-class, which features 16 launch tubes per boat (down from 24), low-maintenance propulsion, digital systems, and acoustic reduction technologies. These submarines are expected to remain in service until 2080. The D5LE and D5LE2 programs are extending the operational life and capabilities of the Trident missiles to match the deployment timeline of the Columbia-class. Simultaneously, NNSA is developing the W93 warhead, incorporating enhanced safety features and intended to be paired with the future Mark 7 reentry vehicle.

The air-based leg is currently composed of two types of bombers: 20 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, based at Whiteman AFB in Missouri, and 74 B-52H Stratofortress aircraft stationed at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and Minot AFB in North Dakota. The B-2is a subsonic flying wing designed for penetrating enemy defenses and delivering B61-7, B61-11, or B83 gravity nuclear bombs. The B-52, which lacks stealth capabilities, carries AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) equipped with W80-1 warheads (approximately 150 kilotons), capable of low-altitude flight over a distance exceeding 2,400 kilometers. Both platforms can also carry conventional weapons. The future of the air leg is embodied in the B-21 Raider, a new stealth bomber under development for both nuclear and conventional missions, designed to operate in contested environments. Initial units are undergoing testing and limited production, with a minimum of 100 aircraft planned. The B-21 will also be equipped with the new Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, designed to evade modern air defenses with a range exceeding 2,500 kilometers, and armed with the upgraded W80-4 warhead.

Gravity bombs are also undergoing modernization. NNSA has consolidated several B61 variants into a single B61-12 version, GPS-guided, featuring modern safety systems, and compatible with platforms such as the F-35, B-2, and future B-21. The B83 bomb, with a yield of 1.2 megatons, was slated for retirement in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. However, in 2023, the Pentagon announced the development of the B61-13, a new high-yield gravity bomb intended for hardened or deeply buried targets, set to replace the B83 gradually.

The sea-based leg of the triad is composed of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each capable of carrying up to 20 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (Picture source: US DoD)

In parallel, the United States is investing heavily in the modernization of its NC3 (Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications) infrastructure, which comprises satellites, radar systems, cable networks, command centers, and secure communications platforms to ensure decision-making continuity and launch authority in all scenarios. The FY2025 budget includes $11 billion for the ongoing overhaul of this architecture, with an emphasis on improving resilience to cyber threats and space-based disruptions.

Nuclear force employment planning remains the responsibility of the U.S. President, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). In 2024, a new presidential directive expanded U.S. deterrence objectives to address the simultaneous threat posed by Russia, China, and North Korea. The directive outlines the potential need to adapt the size, posture, or composition of the force. In March 2025, STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton publicly raised the possibility of increasing the number of B-21 bombers ordered, suggesting that the current modernization plan may be insufficient to meet the challenges of a two-peer nuclear environment. This perspective aligns with the 2023 findings of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which concluded that the existing modernization program is "necessary but not sufficient."

In summary, the United States is implementing a comprehensive overhaul of its strategic nuclear architecture, combining the replacement of delivery platforms, warhead modernization, and the digital transformation of its command systems. This long-term effort aims to preserve a flexible, survivable, and credible deterrent posture in a global context increasingly defined by the nuclear competition between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. By integrating technological investments, doctrinal adjustments, and sustained industrial efforts, U.S. nuclear modernization reaffirms its central role in the country’s national security strategy.
Pakistan Leverages Its Alliance With China to Counter India’s Air Power
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As military tensions between India and Pakistan have escalated in recent days, Islamabad continues to strengthen its defensive posture by relying on a range of air defense systems supplied by China. The confrontation, which began with an attack in India and was then fueled by artillery exchanges in Kashmir, armed drone overflights, and several mutual airspace violations, revives the specter of a conventional conflict between the two nuclear-armed powers. In this context, the modernization of Pakistan’s air defense has become a strategic priority. Pakistan now relies on a layered network composed of the HQ-9P, HQ-9BE, FD-2000, HQ-16FE, as well as older systems such as the LY-80 and FM-90, to build an aerial shield against Indian air superiority.

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The HQ-9 air defense missile systems are attached to a surface-to-air missile brigade of the air force under the PLA Central Theater Command (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

The HQ-9P system today constitutes one of the pillars of Pakistan’s air defense. Introduced by the army in 2021, it is a derivative of the Russian S-300 system, developed by the Chinese company CPMIEC with Moscow's agreement. Equipped with an HT-233 3D phased-array radar, it can track up to 100 targets and simultaneously engage between 8 and 10. Its estimated range is 125 kilometers against aircraft and about 25 kilometers against cruise missiles. This system uses a Track-Via-Missile (TVM) guidance method, combining inertial navigation, mid-course corrections, and active radar homing in the terminal phase. Deployed around sensitive sites such as Rawalpindi and Karachi, the HQ-9P provides credible deterrence capabilities but remains limited in range compared to Russian standards.

Additionally, the Pakistan Air Force deploys the HQ-9BE, a more recent and enhanced variant, with a maximum range of up to 260 kilometers against combat aircraft and 25 kilometers against tactical ballistic missiles. Capable of intercepting targets at speeds up to Mach 14, the HQ-9BE represents a significant upgrade, featuring the JSG-400 target designation radar and the JPG-600 surveillance radar, supported by advanced electronic counter-countermeasures. Its limited anti-ballistic capability, however, places it behind India's S-400 system in overall effectiveness.

The FD-2000, an export version of the HQ-9A, is also operational within the Pakistan Air Force. Designed to engage multiple aerial targets and low-flying cruise missiles simultaneously, it relies on the HT-233 radar and has a range of 125 kilometers against aircraft. Compared to the American Patriot PAC-3, the FD-2000 offers broader coverage at a lower cost, although its proximity-fused warhead reduces its effectiveness against certain ballistic threats.

To reinforce its medium-range defense, Pakistan has integrated the HQ-16FE, an improved version of the HQ-16 (or LY-80), developed based on the Russian Buk missile system. This system offers a range of 160 kilometers and an interception altitude of 27 kilometers. It uses a 2D active electronically scanned array radar with a surveillance range of 250 kilometers, capable of tracking twelve targets and engaging eight simultaneously. With its combined semi-active and active radar homing guidance, the HQ-16FE effectively complements the HQ-9BE, ensuring seamless coverage between defense layers.

These various systems are integrated into Pakistan’s CLIAD (Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence) architecture, developed by the army to coordinate surveillance, command, and control across multiple radar and missile layers (Picture source: @Defence_IDA X Channel )

Older but still in service within certain units, the LY-80 (or HQ-16A) provides coverage between 40 and 70 kilometers and can intercept targets flying at speeds of up to Mach 2.5. Paired with IBS-150 radars, it remains effective against subsonic threats. At shorter range, the FM-90, derived from the Chinese HQ-7 and inspired by the French Crotale system, continues to be used with a 15-kilometer engagement range. It employs command-to-line-of-sight radar guidance, sufficient against drones or helicopters but vulnerable to modern missiles like the Meteor or BrahMos.

These various systems are integrated into Pakistan’s CLIAD (Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence) architecture, developed by the army to coordinate surveillance, command, and control across multiple radar and missile layers. Regular exercises, such as Al-Bayza, are held to test this integration. Additionally, efforts are underway to develop indigenous capabilities, notably through the LoMADS and FAAZ-SL programs, although these remain at an early stage.

In comparison, India fields a far more advanced air defense system, centered around the Russian S-400 Triumf, complemented by multiple national and Israeli-origin layers. Delivered starting in December 2021, the S-400 offers a detection range of 600 kilometers and an engagement range of up to 400 kilometers, employing four types of missiles: the 40N6 for very long-range targets, the 48N6E3 for medium-range aerial and missile threats, and the 9M96E/9M96E2 for highly maneuverable targets. Capable of tracking 100 targets and simultaneously engaging 36, the S-400 provides India with formidable in-depth air defense.

The S-400 units, now renamed "Sudarshan," have been deployed on both the Chinese and Pakistani fronts. In July 2024, a military exercise demonstrated their effectiveness, achieving an 80% success rate against simulated targets. This capability is reinforced by complementary systems such as Akash(30–70 km range), Barak-8 (70–100 km range), QRSAM (25–30 km range), SPYDER (15–35 km range), and SR-SAM, offering comprehensive national airspace coverage. Additionally, most Indian radars are based on AESA technology, providing significant advantages in detection, resilience against electronic countermeasures, and simultaneous multi-target tracking.

In comparison, India fields a far more advanced air defense system, centered around the Russian S-400 Triumf, complemented by multiple national and Israeli-origin layers (Picture source: Vitaly V.Kuzmin)

This layered architecture enables India to manage a two-front challenge against China and Pakistan while ensuring credible conventional deterrence. Furthermore, the “Make in India” program has allowed the local development of Akash and QRSAM missiles, reducing dependence on imports and securing logistical continuity during prolonged conflicts.

Despite Chinese support, Pakistan remains disadvantaged on several fronts: detection range, number of simultaneous engagements, radar coverage, and operational experience. While the HQ-9BE and HQ-16FE offer significant capabilities, their effectiveness against saturation attacks or stealth strikes remains uncertain. Moreover, although China and Turkey themselves operate the S-400 and could share sensitive insights into its weaknesses, this would not be sufficient to offset the broader technological gap.

As the Indo-Pakistani conflict enters an uncertain and potentially escalating phase, air defense is becoming a central component of bilateral deterrence. While Pakistan has made notable progress in surface-to-air defense through its partnership with Beijing, India retains a clear technological and doctrinal advantage. This gap could prove decisive in the event of a direct aerial confrontation over South Asia.
Can Russia Challenge NATO’s Dominance in the Baltic Sea Despite an Unfavorable Balance of Power
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While the Baltic Sea now appears as a strategic stronghold firmly held by NATO, Russian military capabilities in the region remain significant and could offer Moscow unexpected room for maneuver in the event of a crisis. In an article published by Challenges on April 25, 2025, Vincent Lamigeon relies on satellite images provided by Maxar and analyzed by Safran AI to present a detailed overview of Russian naval, aerial, and hybrid forces in the Baltic, with a particular focus on the Kaliningrad enclave.

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The naval base at Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet, hosts a diverse and significant naval force. (Picture source: @VincentLamigeon on X for Challenges /Maxar/Safran AI)

With Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 and Sweden’s in 2024, the Baltic Sea has increasingly become a NATO-dominated maritime area. Access to this semi-enclosed sea passes through Denmark’s Øresund, Great Belt, and Little Belt straits, strategic chokepoints that Copenhagen and Stockholm could theoretically seal off in the event of conflict. Russia’s access to the Baltic is now limited to two vulnerable points: the military enclave of Kaliningrad and the city of Saint Petersburg. The Gulf of Finland, which leads to Saint Petersburg, could be blocked through mining operations or submarine interdiction conducted by Finland and Estonia. Despite this strategic isolation, Russia maintains considerable military capabilities in the region.

The naval base at Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet, hosts a diverse and significant naval force. Satellite imagery analysis identifies around fifteen warships docked there. Among them is a Buyan-M class missile corvette, equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles with a range exceeding 1,500 kilometers, capable of striking deep strategic targets. A Kilo-class conventional attack submarine, specialized in coastal submarine warfare, is also present. The force includes two destroyers: a Sovremenny-class vessel for anti-ship warfare and a Udaloy-class vessel for anti-submarine warfare, each equipped with heavy missiles and advanced detection systems. Two multi-role Steregushchiy-class corvettes are moored alongside several Krivak-class frigates, intended to protect convoys and coastal installations. Additionally, three Dyugon-class landing ships, two Kashtan-class support vessels, and an Ivan Papanin-class icebreaking patrol vessel are based at the port.

The Baltiysk facilities are protected by reinforced defensive measures, including two camouflaged air defense systems, likely Pantsir-S1s, and a floating barrier designed to counter surface drones at the port entrance. These measures aim to prevent drone attacks, a threat demonstrated on April 7, 2024, when the missile corvette Serpukhov was severely damaged by a Ukrainian GUR operation.

Beyond the ships visible at the docks, other Russian naval units operate in the Baltic but are not visible on satellite images. These include Karakurt-class corvettes armed with Kalibr and Oniks missiles, as well as Ropucha-class landing ships. According to the Military Balance 2025 by the IISS, the Baltic Fleet comprises a total of 69 vessels. However, many of these are older, smaller patrol ships more suited to coastal operations than high-intensity conflict.

Russian aerial capabilities in the region remain active. In Kaliningrad, Chkalovsk Air Base hosts about twenty Su-27 multirole fighters, capable of performing air superiority and long-range interception missions. The base also occasionally hosts Il-78M tanker aircraft, which extend the operational range of Russian fighters and bombers. In 2022, Chkalovsk also temporarily hosted MiG-31K aircraft armed with hypersonic Kinjal missiles, capable of striking targets over 2,000 kilometers away. The Chernyakhovsk Air Base, less active, nonetheless hosts several S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries, providing dense aerial coverage for the enclave.

A Kilo-class conventional attack submarine, specialized in coastal submarine warfare at Baltiysk (Picture source: Wikimedia Commons)

Beyond Kaliningrad, Russia relies on its northern installations on the Kola Peninsula to maintain strategic reach over the Baltic. Radar imagery of Olenya Air Base reveals a notable concentration of Tu-95 strategic bombers. These aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional cruise missiles, regularly conduct demonstration flights over the Baltic. Having been relocated from Engels Air Base following repeated Ukrainian attacks, their deployment reflects Moscow’s operational adaptation. Nearby, at Olenya Guba naval base, the intelligence-gathering ship Yantar is stationed, suspected of conducting underwater espionage operations targeting Western communication infrastructures.

In light of these capabilities, Baltic coastal states are concerned that Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare efforts—GPS jamming, undersea infrastructure sabotage, and radar targeting of NATO aircraft—could escalate into open conflict. The overall balance of power remains unfavorable to Russia, which fields only one or two submarines in the Baltic compared to about ten NATO submarines, and a few dozen fighter aircraft against nearly 400 operated by NATO members. However, according to Danish military intelligence, if hostilities in Ukraine were to cease, Russia could refocus its military assets westward within just six months, posing a potential threat to a Baltic state or seeking to alter the regional balance by force.

Several possible scenarios are under consideration. One involves seizing the Suwalki Corridor, a strategic strip connecting Kaliningrad to Belarus and cutting off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO. Another scenario envisions Russia launching a naval operation to seize three strategic islands: Gotland (Sweden), Bornholm (Denmark), and the Åland archipelago (Finland). Control of these islands would enable the deployment of anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, establishing a denial zone that would impede NATO reinforcements.

Aware of these threats, regional states have taken action. Sweden re-militarized Gotland in 2017; Bornholm has hosted numerous NATO exercises, and in 2024, the US Navy deployed a Typhon missile system there, capable of striking Kaliningrad from 1,500 kilometers away. The Åland archipelago, however, remains demilitarized, representing a vulnerability in NATO’s defensive posture.

Despite its structural weaknesses, Russia retains a significant destabilization capacity in the Baltic Sea. Its naval, aerial, and hybrid means enable it to contemplate rapid and targeted actions that could catch NATO forces off guard should tensions in Eastern Europe suddenly escalate. Vigilance among coastal states and the strengthening of NATO’s presence in the region thus remain essential to prevent any strategic surprise.
Europe Strengthens Its Saturation Strikes: MLRS at the Core of Long Range Artillery Renewal
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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has profoundly transformed artillery doctrines in Europe. The massive use of long-range firepower, combined with real-time ISR capabilities, has brought multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) back to the forefront, after having been largely neglected by European armies. Whereas many countries had reduced or even eliminated this capability after the Cold War, the trend has now reversed. Today, several European NATO members are reequipping themselves with modern systems for saturation fire and precision strikes at medium range. Three major models dominate this renewed push for capability: the American M142 HIMARS, the South Korean K239 Chunmoo, and the Israeli PULS.

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New wheeled MLRS face off against older tracked models as Europe modernizes its firepower (Picture source: US DoD/ Elbit Systems/ Polish MoD/ Uk MOD)

The war in Ukraine has elevated the M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) to the status of a benchmark system. Capable of firing both GMLRS rockets (with a range of 70–80 km and a precision of 10 meters CEP) and ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (with a range of up to 300 km), it has proven its effectiveness against logistical hubs, headquarters, and troop concentrations. Several European countries have followed suit in acquiring it.

Estonia signed a contract for six HIMARS equipped with ATACMS capabilities, valued at over 200 million USD, with deliveries expected from 2024. Lithuania followed with an order for eight HIMARS under a 495 million USD contract, with deliveries anticipated starting in 2025. Latvia formalized a contract for six systems worth 194.47 million USD, with delivery scheduled for 2027. All these acquisitions are made through Lockheed Martin, reinforcing the American group’s position within the European precision artillery market.

Mounted on a 6x6 truck chassis and operated by a small crew, the HIMARS can fire six guided rockets or a single ATACMS missile at a time. Its easy integration into NATO C2 networks, air transportability, and simplified maintenance make it a preferred system for expeditionary forces or smaller armies seeking medium-range precision strike capabilities.

Poland, having already ordered HIMARS in 2019, diversified its suppliers following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It signed two large contracts for the South Korean K239 Chunmoo system, designated Homar-K in its Polish version.

The first contract, signed in November 2022, covers 218 launchers for 3.55 billion USD, with deliveries scheduled between 2023 and 2027. A second contract, signed in April 2024, adds 72 additional units for 1.6 billion USD, with deliveries expected between 2026 and 2029. This brings the total to 290 systems, making it the largest MLRS acquisition in Europe since the Cold War.

The Chunmoo system is mounted on an 8x8 truck and can fire a wide range of munitions, from 130 mm rockets to guided 239 mm missiles, with ranges between 36 km and nearly 290 km depending on the type of projectile used. It features a dual modular pod system that allows different munitions to be loaded based on mission requirements. Poland also plans to integrate nationally produced munitions, reflecting its aim for greater defense autonomy and industrial reinforcement.

Estonia signed a contract for six HIMARS equipped with ATACMS capabilities, valued at over 200 million USD, with deliveries expected from 2024(Picture source: Estonian MoD)

The PULS (Precise & Universal Launching System), developed by Elbit Systems, offers an alternative adapted to the growing European need for MLRS capabilities. It is characterized by its modular flexibility, capable of firing a variety of munitions from 122 mm to 370 mm, including the EXTRA rockets (with a 150 km range and 10 meters CEP) and Accular.

Denmark signed a contract in 2023 for eight PULS launchers as part of a broader deal valued at 252 million USD, which also included ATMOS howitzers. The Netherlands ordered 20 PULS systems for 305 million USD, with deliveries scheduled between 2024 and 2027. Spain, as part of its national SILAM program, signed in 2024 for 12 PULS launchers, with a total value of 754.41 million USD, in partnership with Rheinmetall, Expal, and Estribano. The SILAM program (Sistema Lanzacohetes de Alta Movilidad) aims not to develop a new system from scratch but rather to locally produce the PULS under license and adapt it to Spanish operational standards.

Similarly, in Germany, Elbit Systems has partnered with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) to develop the EuroPULS project. Beyond simple local assembly, EuroPULS aims to incorporate European munitions, a software architecture compatible with NATO networks, and launchers adapted to European land forces’ standards. The system is currently undergoing technical demonstrations and could eventually become part of Europe’s broader strategic defense projects.

The PULS is based on a 6x6 or 8x8 truck chassis and can fire two different pods: for example, four EXTRA rockets of 150 km range or twenty Accular rockets of 35 km range. This multi-caliber capacity provides significant operational flexibility, from targeted strategic strikes to area saturation missions.

The Chunmoo system is mounted on an 8x8 truck and can fire a wide range of munitions, from 130 mm rockets to guided 239 mm missiles, with ranges between 36 km and nearly 290 km depending on the type of projectile used(Picture source: Polish MoD )

While many European countries are massively reinvesting in MLRS capabilities, a significant portion of their inventories remains characterized by Cold War-era systems. This notably includes M270 launchers still in service in Germany, France, and Italy, whose performance no longer meets current operational standards. Their modernized version, the LRU(Lance-Roquettes Unitaire), although digitized and equipped with GMLRS munitions, remains limited to a range of about 70 km and cannot fire extended-range GMLRS-ER rockets or ATACMS ballistic missiles. In France, only between 13 and 18 operational units remain, significantly limiting deep strike capabilities.

In response, several initiatives are underway. The most concrete is the EuroPULS project led by Elbit Systems. In parallel, a Franco-German project for developing a new long-range strike capability is being discussed, potentially linked to the MGCS (Main Ground Combat System) program. However, no prototype has yet been revealed, and current efforts appear more focused on developing long-range drones, surface-to-surface missiles, and guided munitions, such as the KATANA program.

Beyond simple local assembly, EuroPULS aims to incorporate European munitions, a software architecture compatible with NATO networks, and launchers adapted to European land forces’ standards (Picture source: Army Recognition)

These rapid and large-scale MLRS procurements reflect a major doctrinal shift. Once considered imprecise, costly, and indiscriminate, rockets have regained a critical role, especially for counter-battery missions, logistical attrition, and disruption of rear-echelon command structures. The integration of MLRS with real-time intelligence sources (drones, satellites, counter-battery radars) heralds a new era of precision long-range indirect fires.

The resurgence of MLRS in European arsenals is primarily driven by their tactical effectiveness and operational versatility. Modern systems combine mobility, range, precision (with CEPs of less than 10 meters for guided munitions), and high-volume salvo capabilities. They can deliver devastating strikes within seconds and relocate immediately to avoid enemy counter-fire, making them effective tools for precision and area denial operations up to 300 km away.

Recent conflicts have demonstrated that deep strike capabilities, persistent effects on the battlefield, and the psychological impact of massed fires are again becoming decisive factors in high-intensity warfare. Unlike traditional artillery, which primarily supports maneuver forces, MLRS platforms now enable the disorganization of enemy structures at operational depth.

The diversity of suppliers — the United States, South Korea, and Israel — reflects Europe’s intention to diversify its strategic dependencies. However, it also raises major challenges in terms of interoperability, maintenance, and technological sovereignty. The development of an autonomous European capability, encompassing both launcher production and munitions manufacturing, remains an unmet strategic necessity.
Lockheed Martin Harnesses F-35 Fighters and Missile Systems to Drive a Comprehensive Model of Multi-Domain Superiority
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On April 22, 2025, during the release of its first-quarter results, Lockheed Martin confirmed the strength of its economic model, driven by steady revenue growth in its Aeronautics and Missiles & Fire Control segments. Beyond its financial performance, this beginning of the year reflects a deliberate strategic shift: positioning the F-35 at the center of a connected combat architecture capable of coordinating a distributed network of sensors and effectors across all operational domains. By linking its stealth aircraft with long-range strike missiles (JASSM, LRASM) and layered air defense systems (PAC-3, THAAD), Lockheed Martin is shaping a coherent and modular system-of-system tailored to the demands of 21st-century networked warfare. This convergence is rooted in both industrial planning and doctrinal evolution, aligned with the ongoing transformation of U.S. joint operations.

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Crucially, the F-35 acts as a frontline digital node, capable of collecting, analyzing, and sharing tactical information in real time via networks such as Link 16, MADL, and future ABMS/JADC2 architectures. (Picture source: US DoD)

With over one million flight hours logged, the F-35 is now fully operational in numerous allied air forces and continues to evolve at the core of an expanding ecosystem. Available in three variants—F-35A (conventional takeoff), F-35B (short takeoff/vertical landing), and F-35C (carrier-based)—the aircraft combines radar stealth, deep-strike capability, sensor fusion, and advanced connectivity. Its AN/APG-81 AESA radar enables detection of airborne targets at extended ranges.

The EOTS (Electro-Optical Targeting System) provides laser and infrared targeting, while the DAS (Distributed Aperture System) delivers 360° coverage for missile warning and situational awareness. All sensor data is integrated into a centralized data fusion and command system called ODIN (Operational Data Integrated Network), which replaces the earlier ALIS interface. Crucially, the F-35 acts as a frontline digital node, capable of collecting, analyzing, and sharing tactical information in real time via networks such as Link 16, MADL, and future ABMS/JADC2 architectures. This integration within joint tactical networks positions the F-35 as both a force multiplier and an operational coordinator.

These information capabilities support long-range strike missions, a core element of the U.S. military’s stand-off doctrine. The F-35A is certified to carry the JASSM-ER (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range), a stealthy cruise missile capable of striking fixed or mobile targets at ranges exceeding 900 kilometers while maintaining a low-altitude flight profile. Equipped with a terminal infrared seeker, the JASSM-ER is optimized for use in contested environments with dense radar coverage and air defense systems.

The naval variant, LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile), is built on the same platform but incorporates onboard artificial intelligence to autonomously acquire maritime targets. These weapons significantly extend the F-35’s strike reach, enabling attacks on command nodes, surface-to-air missile batteries, or naval vessels while remaining outside enemy engagement zones. This integration of advanced sensors and long-range precision munitions has become central to U.S. strategies for offensive denial and conventional deterrence.

However, this convergence is not limited to strike capabilities. Lockheed Martin also integrates its air and missile defense systems within the same operational framework. The THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system is a key component of U.S. ballistic missile defense.

Deployed in South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and slated for future deployment in Eastern Europe, THAAD is designed to intercept medium- to intermediate-range ballistic threats at high altitudes (up to 150 km) and ranges up to 3,000 km. It relies on AN/TPY-2 radars capable of tracking targets with high precision at distances exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Its kinetic-energy interceptor employs a hit-to-kill mechanism, destroying incoming threats without explosive warheads, thus reducing the risk of fragmentation in populated areas.

THAAD is designed to intercept medium- to intermediate-range ballistic threats at high altitudes (up to 150 km) and ranges up to 3,000 km. (Picture source: US DoD)

Complementing this, the PAC-3 MSE (Patriot Advanced Capability - Missile Segment Enhancement) addresses lower-altitude threats, with intercept envelopes between 15 and 35 kilometers. This enhanced Patriot variant features a more powerful propulsion system and enlarged control surfaces, allowing it to intercept theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems with rapid reaction capability. It is fully integrated into the IBCS (Integrated Battle Command System), which links sensors, command centers, and effectors in an adaptive network. The F-35 contributes by detecting threats beyond ground-based radar coverage and transmitting targeting data to THAAD or PAC-3 batteries via secure tactical data links, enabling intercepts beyond line-of-sight.

This cross-platform cooperation is underpinned by a broader industrial transformation. Through its 1LMX program, Lockheed Martin aims to digitize the entire product lifecycle—from design using digital twins to in-service support—facilitating seamless integration across open, scalable, and quickly reconfigurable architectures. Meanwhile, the APEX initiative focuses on enhancing industrial agility to meet increased production rates driven by allied procurement needs and U.S. stockpile replenishment. The convergence of digital manufacturing, technological modularity, and tactical interoperability now serves as a foundational element for long-term operational relevance.

This approach has gained traction internationally. Poland, Germany, Japan, and Australia have pursued cross-domain acquisitions that include the F-35, HIMARS, PAC-3, and, in some cases, THAAD. These countries no longer seek isolated capabilities but rather pre-integrated solutions tested in real-world scenarios. For Lockheed Martin, this convergence also functions as a geopolitical lever—proposing a unified American model in contrast to more fragmented European offerings, static Russian systems, or emergent Chinese solutions. In an era where rapid responsiveness, flexible deployment, and multi-domain coordination are decisive, this model is positioned to become the new standard.

The convergence of the F-35 with long-range precision strike missiles and ground-based air defense systems like PAC-3 and THAAD is not merely a technological development, it reflects a deeper doctrinal shift. The emphasis is now placed on information dominance, connectivity, and synchronized effects rather than sheer firepower. By adopting this approach, Lockheed Martin is no longer just supplying weapon systems but delivering an integrated operational architecture—a modern vision of warfare that is distributed, dynamic, and designed to function in increasingly contested environments.
Europe Rearms Its Artillery: Howitzers as Core of the New Defense Strategy
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Since the outbreak of the large-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, European NATO members have undergone a rapid and profound reassessment of their defense capabilities, with a particular focus on artillery. In contrast to decades of post-Cold War reductions, this new wave of procurement reflects a clear intent to restore firepower depth, enhance NATO interoperability, and bolster defense capabilities in the face of emerging high-intensity threats. A core component of this revitalization is the acquisition of self-propelled 155mm howitzers, with several systems emerging as the most sought-after: the CAESAR, K9 Thunder, Krab, Archer, PzH 2000, and ATMOS 2000. These platforms are now central to European defense strategies, each offering distinct advantages in mobility, firepower, and integration with NATO forces.

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The experience of Ukraine has underscored the importance of mobility, rapid deployment, and logistical agility in an environment saturated with sensors and threatened by drones and counter-battery fire(Picture source: German MoD, French MoD, Polish MoD, Ukrainian MoD, Bae Systems, Elbit Systems)

The CAESAR 6x6, developed by KNDS France, continues to play a pivotal role in France’s modernization efforts, with 18 units scheduled for delivery between 2023 and 2024, valued at 89.58 million USD. Additionally, a larger order for 109 CAESAR MkII units has been placed, with deliveries set to occur between 2026 and 2031, at a cost of 380.91 million USD. The CAESAR MkII is a significant upgrade from the original model, offering enhanced crew protection, digital fire control systems, and improved operational resilience. It is capable of firing a range of munitions, including Excalibur guided shells, with a maximum range of 55 km using rocket-assisted projectiles. Its shoot-and-scoot capabilities make it a highly mobile artillery system, capable of firing and relocating in under a minute.

France’s export success is also notable. Belgium has ordered 28 units of the CAESAR MkII, with deliveries beginning in 2027, for an estimated cost of 203 million USD. Lithuania has procured 18 units of the CAESAR MkII, with deliveries scheduled by 2027. Estonia has placed an order for 12 units, with expected delivery between 2024 and 2025. The system’s widespread adoption across Europe highlights its reliability, precision, and ability to operate in modern battlefield environments.

The K9 Thunder by Hanwha Aerospace has become one of the most sought-after self-propelled howitzers in Europe. Poland, one of the largest buyers, has placed an order for 212 K9A1 units, valued at 2.4 billion USD, to be delivered between 2022 and 2026. Additionally, Poland has ordered another 152 units of the K9A1 and K9PL (Polish version) for 2.6 billion USD, to be delivered from 2025 to 2027. Romania has also joined the K9 bandwagon with an order of 54 units to be delivered from 2027 for a total value of over 1 billion USD.

The K9 Thunder, with its impressive fire rate of up to 6 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 40 km using rocket-assisted projectiles, is a highly versatile and effective artillery system. The platform’s mobility is supported by its German-made MTU 1000 hp engine, providing a top speed of 67 km/h and a cruising range of 360 km. The K9 features an automatic loading system and an advanced fire control system, allowing for quick and accurate strikes. Its widespread adoption in NATO countries, including Norway, Estonia, and Finland, reflects its operational success.

The CAESAR 6x6, developed by KNDS France, continues to play a pivotal role in France’s modernization efforts, with 18 units scheduled for delivery between 2023 and 2024, valued at 89.58 million USD (Picture source: KNDS)

The Krab, an indigenous Polish design, combines a South Korean K9 chassis with a British AS90 turret and a Polish fire control system. The system is capable of firing NATO-standard 155mm shells with a range of up to 40 km and is equipped with an automated loading system that enhances its rate of fire. The Polish Army has placed an order for 48 units, expected to be delivered between 2025 and 2027, valued at approximately 797 million USD.

The Krab’s design allows it to fire in less than a minute and relocate within 30 seconds, making it well-suited to the fast-paced, highly mobile battlefield. Its combination of proven international components and local production highlights Poland’s ongoing efforts to enhance its defense autonomy while contributing to NATO’s artillery capabilities. Poland has already delivered several Krab units to Ukraine, demonstrating its effective integration into modern combat operations.

The Archer 155mm howitzer, developed by BAE Systems Bofors in collaboration with Sweden’s FMV, is a fully automated, wheeled self-propelled system designed for rapid deployment and repositioning. Sweden has placed an order for 48 units of the Archer, with deliveries beginning in 2025, valued at approximately 500 million USD. The United Kingdom has also acquired 14 units, with deliveries between 2023 and 2024.

The Archer is known for its speed and efficiency. It can go from a standstill to firing its first round in under 30 seconds, and it is capable of firing up to 21 rounds in just 2.5 minutes. The system’s maximum firing range extends to 60 km with precision-guided munitions such as the Excalibur shell. The system is mounted on a Volvo 6x6 truck chassis, which provides excellent mobility across varied terrains. Its fully automated systems for ammunition handling and fire control reduce the crew size to just 3–4 operators, making it a highly efficient and cost-effective artillery platform.

The K9 Thunder, with its impressive fire rate of up to 6 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 40 km using rocket-assisted projectiles, is a highly versatile and effective artillery system(Picture source: Poland MoD)

The ATMOS 2000 by Elbit Systems is a wheeled 155mm self-propelled howitzer designed for rapid deployment and long-range strikes. It is mounted on a Tatra 6x6 chassis and capable of firing NATO-standard 155mm shells at ranges up to 40 km. The system features a semi-automatic loading system and advanced fire control capabilities, allowing it to fire 6 rounds in less than two minutes and reposition swiftly to avoid counter-battery fire.

The Danes have ordered 19 units of the ATMOS 2000, with deliveries set for 2023–2026, valued at 252 million USD. The ATMOS 2000 has proven its worth on the global stage, being deployed by various countries such as Azerbaijan, Thailand, and Uganda. Its lightweight design and high mobility make it ideal for countries seeking a balance between firepower and flexibility. The ATMOS is also known for its ability to integrate with existing NATO command and control systems, ensuring interoperability with allied forces.

The PzH 2000 (Panzerhaubitze 2000), developed by Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) in collaboration with Rheinmetall, remains one of Europe’s most advanced and widely deployed 155mm self-propelled howitzers. The system is designed for both long-range fires and high accuracy, featuring a Rheinmetall 155mm 52-caliber gun and a fully automated loading system. The PzH 2000 is capable of firing up to 10 rounds per minute, with a maximum range of 40 km using base-bleed shells.

Germany has confirmed its order of 22 PzH 2000 units for approximately 437.82 million USD, with deliveries scheduled for 2025–2026. Additionally, Germany has provided Ukraine with 24 PzH 2000s in response to the ongoing conflict with Russia. Italy and the Netherlands have also been key users, with Germany maintaining an order for 12 new units to replace those delivered to Ukraine. The PzH 2000's extensive combat testing and proven capabilities have made it a central pillar of Germany’s artillery strength.

The PzH 2000 features an advanced fire control system, including a ballistic computer, a muzzle velocity measuring system, and an inertial navigation system, making it a fully autonomous weapon system capable of “shoot-and-scoot” operations. The turret of the PzH 2000 can rotate a full 360° with an elevation range from +65° to -2.5°. The system is designed for high operational flexibility, making it suitable for various combat scenarios, from traditional conflict zones to peacekeeping operations.

The PzH 2000 is known for its high mobility, achieving a top speed of 60 km/h and a cruising range of 420 km. Its all-welded steel armor offers protection against small arms fire and artillery shell fragments, while the vehicle can be fitted with additional armor for increased survivability in high-intensity combat.

The Archer 155mm howitzer, developed by BAE Systems Bofors in collaboration with Sweden’s FMV, is a fully automated, wheeled self-propelled system designed for rapid deployment and repositioning (Picture source: British MoD)

The shift towards self-propelled howitzers in Europe marks a significant doctrinal shift in artillery strategy. The experience of Ukraine has underscored the importance of mobility, rapid deployment, and logistical agility in an environment saturated with sensors and threatened by drones and counter-battery fire. As such, wheeled platforms like the CAESAR, ATMOS, and Archer offer distinct advantages in terms of maneuverability, often surpassing their heavier tracked counterparts, except in highly mechanized doctrines like those of Germany and Poland.

These acquisitions also respond to the growing political pressure to meet NATO’s defense spending goals, particularly the 2% GDP threshold for defense spending. They fit into a broader European effort to modernize and strengthen defense capabilities in the face of a major conflict with Russia. In addition, these purchases support the European defense industry while opening the door to non-European suppliers, such as South Korea and Israel, who are making significant inroads into the European market.

Ultimately, Europe is engaged in a massive reconstitution of its artillery, both in terms of volume and quality. While the diversification of suppliers reflects a desire for strategic autonomy and industrial resilience, it also raises questions about interoperability within NATO. The challenge ahead will not only be to deliver these systems on time but also to integrate them effectively into national and multinational defense structures, with doctrines, munitions, and training tailored to a possible return of high-intensity warfare on the continent.
Why a Russian Military Base in Indonesia Could Shift the Indo-Pacific Balance Against the US and Australia
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As Australia navigates a crucial electoral campaign, an article published by Janes triggered a wave of concern in Canberra. The report alleged that Russia had formally requested permission from Indonesia to deploy long-range military aircraft at Manuhua Air Force Base, located on Biak Island in Indonesia’s Papua province. Just 1,400 kilometers from Darwin, this airbase could provide Russia with a strategic platform in the Western Pacific, drastically altering the military landscape of the Indo-Pacific region. Despite official denials from Indonesian authorities, the very possibility of such an agreement has raised serious concerns among regional powers, particularly Australia and the United States.

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In 2017, two Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers landed at Manuhua during a South Pacific patrol, triggering a temporary alert at the Royal Australian Air Force base in Darwin (Picture source: Alexander Shukhov)

According to Janes, the proposal was reportedly made in February 2025 by Sergei Shoigu, then Secretary of the Russian Security Council, during a meeting with Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. Indonesian sources cited by Janes confirmed the request had been received, although its official status remains ambiguous. Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles later stated that his Indonesian counterpart assured him the reports were “simply not true.” Still, experts suggest the idea might have been discussed informally at lower levels of government, leaving room for plausible deniability. The Kremlin, for its part, declined to confirm or deny the report, citing the prevalence of "fake news."

Russia's interest in Biak is not new. In 2017, two Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers landed at Manuhua during a South Pacific patrol, triggering a temporary alert at the Royal Australian Air Force base in Darwin. Since then, Russia's Aerospace Forces (VKS) have made several requests to land Tu-95s and Il-76 airlifters at the same base. These aircraft, including the Tu-95MS and possibly the supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack, are capable of long-range missions and can carry Kh-101/Kh-102 cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads, enabling Russia to project power across vast distances.

If Russia were to establish a permanent presence at Manuhua, it would mark a significant geopolitical shift in the Indo-Pacific. From this location, Russian bombers could conduct ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) missions over Northern Australia, including Darwin and the nearby Tindal Air Base, currently being upgraded to host US B-52 bombers. It would also place US military assets in Guam and allied installations across the South Pacific within potential reach. This would allow Russia to collect sensitive data on regional force deployments, logistics hubs, and naval operations, particularly those involving the US Marine Rotational Force – Darwin.

Operationally, Russian strategic bombers based in Biak could monitor and threaten a wide arc of territory encompassing northern and eastern Australia, parts of Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, and key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca. This would complicate defense planning for both Canberra and Washington, particularly in scenarios involving deterrence, crisis response, or open conflict in the Pacific.

The implications extend far beyond Australia. A Russian military footprint in Papua would significantly enhance Moscow’s ability to project power into an area of increasing strategic importance, where US, Chinese, and allied forces are already expanding their presence. It would also give Moscow a stronger position in maritime Asia, closer to global trade routes and vital sea lanes that pass through the region. From Biak, Russian forces could potentially support broader geopolitical aims, including coordination with Chinese military activities. Notably, Russia and China have stepped up joint bomber patrols over the Pacific in recent years, and a forward-operating location in Indonesia could reinforce that axis.

From this location, Russian bombers could conduct ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) missions over Northern Australia, including Darwin and the nearby Tindal Air Base, currently being upgraded to host US B-52 bombers (Picture source: Google Earth)

Strategically, this development would place considerable strain on the US-Australia alliance and the broader regional security architecture. Washington has invested heavily in reinforcing its presence in the Indo-Pacific, including under the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. This includes the construction of new naval and air facilities, frequent joint exercises, and forward deployment of key assets such as submarines and long-range bombers. A Russian base near Australia would not only pose an intelligence and missile threat but also serve as a political statement, signaling that Moscow can project power far beyond its immediate periphery, despite its ongoing military campaign in Ukraine.

For Indonesia, however, the calculus is far more complex. Officially, Jakarta adheres to a long-standing “free and active” foreign policy that opposes alignment with any major power bloc. The Indonesian constitution explicitly prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory. In 2020, Jakarta rejected a US proposal to use its airfields for P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, underscoring its resistance to any permanent foreign military footprint. Indonesian lawmakers, including retired Major General TB Hasanuddin, have reiterated this position in recent days, warning that any agreement with Moscow would violate national law and compromise the country’s neutrality.

That said, Indonesia’s relationship with Russia has evolved. Following the election of President Prabowo Subianto, bilateral defense cooperation has expanded. In November 2024, the two nations held their first bilateral naval drills off the coast of Java—a symbolic gesture of growing ties. Russia has also sought to export arms to Indonesia, including Su-35 fighter jets, although a 2018 deal was canceled under US sanctions pressure. More recently, Indonesia joined the expanded BRICS group, further signaling its openness to deepening ties with non-Western powers.

Even so, the idea of hosting Russian long-range bombers on Indonesian soil appears politically risky and strategically contentious. It would alienate regional partners such as Australia and Singapore, heighten tensions with the United States, and potentially expose Indonesia to retaliatory diplomatic or economic measures. Most importantly, it could undermine Indonesia’s reputation as a neutral actor in a region increasingly shaped by great power rivalry.

Even if Indonesia ultimately rejects the Russian request, as officials claim—Moscow is actively exploring new avenues to extend its reach into the Indo-Pacific. The episode highlights the fragile balance of power in the region and the competing strategic interests at play. For Australia and the United States, the possibility of a Russian air base in Indonesia serves as a stark reminder that the Indo-Pacific is no longer a peripheral theater, but rather a central arena in the unfolding contest for global influence.
Faced with Russian and Chinese Hypersonic Missiles US Accelerates Interceptor and Satellite Sensor Programs
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The latest report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), published on April 10, 2025, outlines the growing strategic priority of the United States to counter the emerging hypersonic weapons threat posed by China and Russia. While American offensive hypersonic missile programs are progressing cautiously, detection and interception have become central elements of national defense planning, supported by new technological initiatives and international cooperation frameworks.

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The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), led by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), aims to intercept hypersonic weapons during their atmospheric glide phase—when they are traveling at extreme speed after separation from their booster (Picture source: Northrop Grumman )

Russian and Chinese hypersonic capabilities are now viewed by the U.S. Department of Defense as a strategic shift. Russia has officially deployed several systems, including the Avangard, a maneuvering glide vehicle launched atop an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, and the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile. These weapons, designed to evade current missile defense systems, are reportedly already in operational service. China, for its part, has conducted repeated tests of the DF-ZF glide vehicle and is actively developing scramjet-powered cruise missiles such as the Lingyun-1 prototype. Beijing is also significantly investing in the integration of these systems into its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.

The core concern for the United States lies in the speed, maneuverability, and trajectory unpredictability of these weapons. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, hypersonic systems follow non-ballistic paths and are able to strike mobile or hardened targets with little warning, limiting decision-making time and response options. Moreover, while U.S. systems are intended for conventional precision strikes, Russia and China maintain the option to equip their hypersonic systems with nuclear warheads, raising the risk of escalation and strategic ambiguity.

The CRS report underlines that due to their velocity and flight profile, hypersonic missiles challenge current early-warning and interception architectures. Ground-based radars cannot detect them until the final phase of flight, offering only a narrow time window for response. Existing space-based sensors in geostationary orbit are also inadequate, as hypersonic missiles exhibit lower infrared signatures than ballistic missiles.

In response, the U.S. Department of Defense has adopted a dual-track approach: developing a new interceptor designed for the glide phase of hypersonic flight and deploying a dedicated low-earth orbit sensor constellation for early tracking and targeting support.

The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), led by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), aims to intercept hypersonic weapons during their atmospheric glide phase—when they are traveling at extreme speed after separation from their booster. Originally scheduled for deployment around 2035, GPI’s timeline has been expedited through the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act, mandating an initial operational capability by late 2029. In May 2024, the United States formalized a cooperative development agreement with Japan. Under this arrangement, Japan is responsible for propulsion components, while the United States oversees the interceptor's overall architecture.

In parallel, the MDA is developing the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) program. These low-orbit satellites are intended to detect hypersonic threats earlier, track their trajectories continuously, and provide real-time targeting data to systems such as GPI. This effort was reinforced by the presidential executive order titled The Iron Dome for America, issued on January 27, 2025, directing the Department of Defense to accelerate the deployment of HBTSS and outline a new national missile defense framework that addresses ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missile threats.

The MDA’s FY2025 budget request reflects these objectives, with $182.3 million allocated to hypersonic defense programs and $76 million specifically for HBTSS. However, the CRS notes ongoing uncertainty surrounding the technical feasibility of broad-area hypersonic interception. While existing point-defense systems such as THAAD may be adapted for hypersonic scenarios, scaling these for nationwide coverage would likely be cost-prohibitive.

Meanwhile, DARPA is pursuing the Glide Breaker initiative, aimed at developing key components for a lightweight and precise interceptor capable of neutralizing hypersonic threats at long range. The FY2025 budget allocates $38 million to this effort.

Together, these programs reflect a shift toward technological resilience and a more comprehensive deterrence posture. As of today, the United States does not field any operational system capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles in flight. The CRS emphasizes that both Russian and Chinese hypersonic weapons are considered significant threats to strategic stability, particularly as some may carry nuclear payloads. Consequently, missile defense is increasingly seen not only as a military challenge, but also as a political issue with potential implications for future arms control frameworks.

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