U.S. Military Seeks Missile-Armed Drone Boats to Shoot Down Drones and Helicopters at Sea.

The U.S. seeks missile-armed unmanned surface vessels capable of intercepting hostile drones and helicopters with AGM-114L Hellfire missiles, AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM), Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets, or Stinger missiles. Under the second phase of its SWAP-USV competition, the U.S. Department of War/Defense wants production-ready unmanned boats with an operational range of at least 200 nautical miles (370 km), speeds of at least 10 knots (18.5 km/h), and the ability to engage airborne threats beyond three nautical miles (5.6 km).

A U.S. Navy unmanned surface vessel equipped with an aerial missile system operates during Exercise Digital Talon 3.0 in November 2024. The Pentagon's new SWAP-USV Sprint 2 competition seeks production-ready autonomous boats capable of engaging hostile drones and helicopters using Hellfire, JAGM, APKWS, Stinger, or other mature weapons. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The initiative, detailed in a U.S. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) solicitation publicized on October 15, 2026, aims to strengthen U.S. naval defenses against low-cost drones and other aerial threats. By distributing missile launchers and surveillance sensors across unmanned boats, the Pentagon could expand defensive coverage while reducing the burden on expensive crewed warships and their limited stocks of air-defense interceptors.

The requirement is particularly urgent. The United States is targeting systems that could be ready for forward operational fielding within 120 days after evaluation, prioritizing existing technologies rather than lengthy development programs. DIU is offering up to $40 million in Sprint 2 prize funding, with a separate $200 million identified for potential follow-on prototype or production agreements across the broader SWAP-USV challenge. These figures represent competition funding and possible future agreements, not confirmed procurement contracts.

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The requirement forms part of Sprint 2 of the Suitable Warfighting Adaptive Payloads for Unmanned Surface Vessels (SWAP-USV) Prize Challenge, a 12-month acquisition initiative organized by DIU in cooperation with the Pentagon's Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems. The competition targets production-ready vessels, weapons, sensors, and command systems that can be integrated rapidly and evaluated under operationally relevant conditions. Rather than funding entirely new designs, the Pentagon wants to identify mature technologies that can support an accelerated transition to operational use.

The United States has established four weapon categories reflecting different approaches to defeating aerial threats. These include heavier guided missiles such as the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire and AGM-179 JAGM, APKWS precision-guided rockets, and remotely operated weapon stations incorporating Stinger missiles, stabilized machine guns, or high-power lasers. A fourth category allows alternative mature weapons that can meet maritime counter-air requirements. The variety of weapons under consideration reflects an effort to balance engagement range, destructive capability, ammunition capacity, and cost against different aerial threats.

The AGM-114L Hellfire and AGM-179 JAGM offer potential guided engagement options that draw on established missile technologies and radar-based guidance. The Longbow Hellfire uses a millimeter-wave radar seeker, while JAGM combines semi-active laser and millimeter-wave radar guidance. Adapting them for maritime air defense would require reliable integration with vessel-mounted sensors and fire-control systems, particularly against maneuvering airborne targets. APKWS offers a different operational advantage by potentially providing a lower-cost means of intercepting certain unmanned aircraft. The weapon converts a 70 mm (2.75-inch) unguided rocket into a precision-guided munition by adding a laser-guidance section, making it relevant to efforts to avoid expending costly ship-launched missiles against comparatively inexpensive aerial threats.

Stinger missiles could provide short-range defense against low-altitude aircraft, helicopters, and some unmanned aerial threats. Stabilized machine guns and high-power lasers could complement missile systems in close engagements, though their effectiveness would depend on sea conditions, target characteristics, sensor integration, and available power. The Pentagon has not yet demonstrated a completed Sprint 2 maritime air-defense engagement using these weapon combinations, making operational testing essential to establish their effectiveness aboard unmanned boats.

Beyond weapons, the requirements indicate that the vessels must function as mobile surveillance and defensive assets rather than simply remotely controlled missile launchers. Proposed systems must support autonomous navigation, waypoint following, patrol operations, station-keeping, and collision avoidance while operating in coastal and open-ocean environments. Onboard sensors must provide 360-degree detection, identification, and tracking despite sea clutter, vessel motion, and surrounding maritime traffic. A central performance requirement is the ability to engage Group 1 through Group 3 unmanned aerial systems and rotary-wing aircraft beyond three nautical miles (5.6 km), while the ability to engage larger Group 5 unmanned aircraft is also desirable. These distances remain Pentagon performance targets rather than independently demonstrated capabilities of a selected vessel.

Command-and-control interoperability is another critical element. DIU wants modular systems compatible with Project AVO, the Autonomous Vehicle Orchestrator, enabling military operators to coordinate vessel movements, receive surveillance information, and manage defensive engagements. Although the boats are expected to navigate autonomously, humans must supervise weapon employment, with safety interlocks for arming, firing, de-arming, and terminating engagements. This human-in-the-loop requirement distinguishes autonomous maritime navigation from autonomous lethal decision-making, allowing vessels to patrol and reposition with reduced operator workload while military personnel retain control over the decision to employ weapons.

Resilience against electronic warfare is equally important. The United States requires communications redundancy and navigation capabilities that remain effective when satellite positioning signals are jammed, degraded, or spoofed. The ability to keep operating during electronic interference or communication outages would be essential in contested maritime environments, where adversaries may try to disrupt unmanned operations before launching aerial attacks. The competition also prioritizes practical deployment and sustainment, including transportation through established military and commercial logistics networks, efficient rearming procedures, and limited support requirements. These characteristics could let defensive unmanned boats operate from dispersed coastal facilities, amphibious ships, or forward locations without relying exclusively on major naval bases.

Operational evaluations are planned for early 2027, including testing at Little Creek, Virginia. Proposals are due by November 30, 2026, and selected competitors must demonstrate integrated systems within 30 calendar days of down-selection. Evaluations will examine navigation, sensor performance, weapons integration, safety, interoperability, and operational reliability under conditions representative of military employment. The accelerated evaluation process aims to identify systems that can transition rapidly to forward operational fielding, although actual deployment will depend on demonstrated performance and military acceptance.

The military rationale is closely connected to the growing threat posed by inexpensive unmanned aircraft and saturation attacks. Conventional U.S. warships rely on sophisticated radar systems and layered missile defenses, but using high-value interceptors against low-cost threats can create an unfavorable cost exchange while consuming ammunition needed for more demanding air-defense missions. Missile-armed unmanned boats could help address that imbalance by placing additional sensors and defensive weapons away from crewed warships, expanding surveillance coverage and creating new engagement opportunities around naval formations, amphibious forces, and strategically important coastal infrastructure.

This approach also supports the broader military concept of distributed maritime operations. Instead of concentrating defensive capabilities aboard a limited number of large warships, commanders could deploy multiple remotely supervised defensive vessels across a wider area, increasing tactical flexibility and complicating an adversary's ability to concentrate aerial threats against a single defended ship. Distributed unmanned defenders could also reduce the exposure of sailors and potentially provide more firing positions during coordinated drone attacks, particularly in strategically sensitive maritime regions where U.S. forces face simultaneous aerial and surface threats.

However, this concept's effectiveness will depend on successfully integrating weapons, sensors, autonomous navigation, and communications under demanding maritime conditions. Small unmanned vessels have limited ammunition capacity and must maintain accurate tracking and fire-control performance despite sea motion and electronic interference. No winning Sprint 2 system has been announced, and the Pentagon has not confirmed the successful operational deployment of a missile-armed vessel developed through this phase of the competition.

The combination of up to $40 million in prize funding, potential follow-on agreements, and an accelerated 120-day fielding objective nevertheless indicates a clear effort to move beyond experimental demonstrations toward rapidly deployable maritime defenses. If successful, SWAP-USV Sprint 2 could establish a new defensive role for unmanned surface vessels in U.S. naval operations, combining distributed sensors, potentially more economical interceptors, human-supervised weapons employment, and forward deployment to help counter increasingly numerous aerial threats without relying exclusively on expensive crewed warships.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.