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North Korea still possesses 90 year-old Soviet T-8 Chekan minesweeper beside new Kang Kon destroyer.


The Korean People's Navy publicly displayed the 90-year-old Soviet-built Project 53 minesweeper T-8 Chekan at Wonsan Port during the commissioning ceremony of the new guided-missile destroyer Kang Kon. The appearance of the 1930s-era vessel alongside a modern 5,000-tonne surface combatant visually underscores the vast technical evolution of North Korea's naval fleet over nearly nine decades. This juxtaposition highlights both the historical lineage of Pyongyang's maritime forces and the ongoing modernization drive centered on multi-role missile destroyers.

Originally launched in December 1936 and transferred to North Korea in December 1953, the 500-ton T-8 Chekan is the last known surviving Project 53 minesweeper globally. Its recent identification at a major fleet event contrasts sharply with the contemporary Kang Kon destroyer, which displaces roughly 5,000 tonnes and features advanced vertical-launch missile systems.

Related topic: North Korea commissions second nuclear-capable destroyer Kang Kon one year after launch failure

The T-8 Chekan is a Soviet Project 53 minesweeper launched in 1936 and transferred to North Korea in 1953, which survived nearly 90 years through the Korean People's Navy's transition from Soviet-built ships to the Kang Kon destroyer. (Picture source: KCNA and X/Soviet Navy)

The T-8 Chekan is a Soviet Project 53 minesweeper launched in 1936 and transferred to North Korea in 1953, which survived nearly 90 years through the Korean People's Navy's transition from Soviet-built ships to the Kang Kon destroyer. (Picture source: KCNA and X/Soviet Navy)


On September 8, the X account Soviet Navy noted that North Korea still possesses the 90-year-old Soviet-built Project 53 minesweeper T-8 Chekan, as the vessel was visible at Wonsan during the commissioning of the Kang Kon nuclear-capable destroyer on September 6, 2026. The 500-ton minesweeper T-8 was launched on December 27, 1936, commissioned on November 2, 1938, and transferred to North Korea in December 1953, meaning the ship had been afloat for almost 90 years and in North Korean hands for nearly 73. At 62 m and 490 to 535 tonnes, it is 43-44% as long as the Kang Kon, but only 9.8 to 13.4% of its estimated displacement. The T-8 had already appeared beside USS Pueblo during the 2000s, while its sister ship T-2 Tros disappeared after a 1993 appearance. As the last surviving Project 53 minesweeper known to remain worldwide, its survival suggests that the old minesweeper now serves mainly as a surviving piece of the country's naval history, but its appearance at a commissioning ceremony in 2026 physically connects North Korea's first postwar Soviet transfers with its new destroyer program.

The T-8 Chekan belonged to the Project 53 subclass within the Fugas-class minesweeper family, which encompassed Projects 3, 53, 53-U and 58 series and totaled 44 ships built between 1933 and 1946. These vessels measured 62 m by 7.41 m with a 2.5 m draft and displaced between 490 and 535 tonnes, producing an 8.37:1 length-to-beam ratio. Two 1,400 hp diesel engines supplied 2,800 metric hp to two shafts, equivalent to 5.23 metric hp per tonne at 535 tonnes, for a maximum speed of 17.5 knots. Range reached 7,200 nmi at 12 knots, mathematically equal to 25 days of continuous economical steaming. Crew was around 52 to 61 sailors; the hull contained nine watertight compartments; and construction combined riveting and welding. Stability was apparently a persistent constraint of the class, with a maximum righting-force angle near 38 degrees, forcing additional anti-aircraft (AA) armament to be balanced against mine and ammunition loads during World War II.

Weapons density was nevertheless substantial for a hull below 550 tonnes. The basic fit centered on one 100 mm B-24 gun, with T-8 also carrying 37 mm and 12.7 mm weapons, while the class could embark up to 31 M1926 mines, equivalent to one mine per 17.3 tonnes at 535 tonnes displacement. Mine warfare equipment included three mechanical sweeps, later supplemented by magnetic and acoustic systems and three-section degaussing coils, while anti-submarine armament included BMB-1 bomb throwers, depth-charge racks and loads reaching 40 depth charges in certain configurations. The more specific North Korean configuration for the T-8 Chekan is listed at 503 tonnes full load, 2,800 hp, 17.8 knots, 60 tonnes of diesel fuel and 3,000 nmi at 13.9 knots, with one 100 mm B-24-BM, three 37 mm 70-K guns, four 12.7 mm weapons, 20 depth charges and 31 mines. That configuration devoted a considerable part of its displacement to guns and mine warfare, but the minesweeper class could also be employed as a transport, including carriage of up to ten 45 mm anti-tank guns or 600 lightly armed troops.

The December 1953 transfer of T-8 and T-2 was significant because North Korea had entered the Korean War with a much lighter surface force. Its 1950 naval fleet included three OD-200 submarine chasers, five G-5 torpedo boats, two U.S.-origin YMS minesweepers, one former Japanese minesweeper, one floating base, one transport and six motorboats. The imbalance against the larger NATO fleet became clear off Chumonchin on July 2, 1950, when four North Korean torpedo boats, two motor gunboats and ten ammunition trawlers encountered the American light cruiser USS Juneau, the British light cruiser HMS Jamaica and the British sloop-of-war HMS Black Swan. Gunfire began at about 11,000 yards and the engagement contracted to 4,000 yards, with three of the four North Korean torpedo boats and both motor gunboats destroyed. The Soviet T-8 and T-2 therefore brought larger and more armed hulls into a fleet previously centered on small coastal craft. Only two Project 53 ships were transferred in 1953, rather than the eight sometimes associated with the acquisition.

North Korea subsequently reproduced the basic hull geometry of these two ships to create five Sariwon-class corvettes during the 1960s. Each Sariwon measured 61.5 m by 7.5 m by 2.4 m against the Fugas family's 62 m by 7.41 m by 2.5 m, differences of only 0.8% in length, 1.2% in beam and 4% in draft. Full-load displacement nevertheless increased to 650 tonnes, 21.5% above the T-8, while speed fell from 17.5 to 16 knots and quoted range became 2,700 nmi at 16 knots. Armament shifted from mines toward guns: four 57 mm, four 37 mm, and sixteen 14.5 mm weapons, or one barrel per 27 tonnes of full-load displacement, supplemented by depth charges, RBU-1200 anti-submarine rocket launchers, Type 351 radar and decoy launchers. North Korea thus retained almost exactly the Project 53 minesweeper size while converting it into a gun-heavy coastal corvette.

The T-2 also demonstrated how far North Korea modified the transferred hulls. Its early-1990s refit removed the original 100 mm and 37 mm armament and installed one turreted 85 mm ZIS-S-53, two twin 37 mm V-11M mounts and four twin 14.5 mm mounts, increasing the gun battery to 13 barrels. Type 351 and Don-2 radars and four six-round decoy launchers were also added, while its displacement increased to 440 tonnes standard and 580 tonnes full load; fuel capacity rose to 96 tonnes; complement reached 60; and range became 4,100 nmi at 14 knots. However, the T-2 disappeared after 1993, whereas the T-8 somehow survived into the 2000s and was again visible in 2026. Naval inventories list T-8 as stricken in 2005, making its Wonsan presence evidence that the physical hull survived, not that a 1930s minesweeper remained an operational combat unit.

The T-8 now represents a negligible combat mass within a fleet containing hundreds of coastal craft but only a small number of major surface combatants. Current counts include two North Korean destroyers, 71 submarines, more than 500 landing craft, three frigates, eight corvettes, 30 mine-countermeasure vessels, 30 missile boats, more than 114 torpedo boats, and more than 187 patrol boats. Approximately 470 ships and small craft are allocated to the east and 300 to the west, a 61:39 split, with the two fleets unable to routinely shift ships between coasts because the Korean Peninsula separates their operating areas. This makes the distribution of the new destroyers operationally important: the Choe Hyon provides a major combatant on the western side while the Kang Kon is assigned to the East Sea Fleet at Wonsan. Earlier missile boats such as Osa and Soju carried four SY-1 anti-ship missiles with roughly 25 nmi range, meaning several such craft were required to equal even the numerical missile capacity now concentrated in one large VLS-equipped hull.

The displacement progression quantifies the change most clearly: Project 53 at 490-535 tonnes, Sariwon at 650 tonnes, later missile corvettes above that level, and Choe Hyon/Kang Kon at 4,000-5,000 tonnes and 140-144 m. North Korea had already moved toward guided weapons when a surface-effect craft fired a Kh-35-type missile in 2014, a Najin frigate received Kh-35-type missiles, and an Amnok corvette launched a Hwasal-2 land-attack cruise missile on August 21, 2023. The Amnok alone combines eight Kumsong-3/KN-19 anti-ship missiles, six FN-6 SAMs, one 76 mm gun, two AK-230 mounts, four 533 mm torpedo tubes, and four RBU-1200 launchers, giving at least 14 guided missiles plus torpedoes and ASW weapons. The new destroyers increase displacement by 648-920% over the T-8 Chekan, and provide volume for dozens of VLS cells rather than 31 mines and a single 100 mm gun. The Wonsan appearance therefore compresses almost nine decades of naval change into two hulls: the T-8 represents a WWII design optimized for sweeping, minelaying, and escort, while the Kang Kon represents North Korea's latest move toward concentrating anti-ship, land-attack, air defense, and other missile functions in individual warships.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.


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