Japan Shows How F-2A-Launched ASM-2 Anti-Ship Missiles Could Reshape First Island Chain Sea Denial.

Japan demonstrated that its F-2A fighter remains an active maritime-strike platform by firing ASM-2-series anti-ship missiles against the decommissioned USS Juneau during Exercise Valiant Shield 2026, with footage later released by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force confirming the live launch on June 27. The event underscores Japan’s growing role in allied maritime warfare by integrating a proven indigenous anti-ship missile into multinational strike operations while laying the foundation for a future transition to much longer-range air-launched weapons.

The footage appears to show two visually distinct ASM-2-series missiles released from the same F-2A, although Japan has not identified their exact variants, highlighting both the operational maturity and continued evolution of the weapon family. Conducted as part of a coordinated multinational SINKEX in the Philippine Sea, the firing reinforces Japan’s expanding contribution to distributed sea-denial operations and reflects the broader shift toward networked, multi-axis maritime strike capabilities across the Western Pacific. 

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A Japanese F-2A fired two ASM-2 anti-ship missiles at USS Juneau during Valiant Shield 2026 (Picture Source: Japanese Air Force)

On June 27, 2026, a Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-2A fired ASM-2-series anti-ship missiles against the decommissioned amphibious transport dock USS Juneau in the Philippine Sea. The live firing formed part of Exercise Valiant Shield 2026, held from June 22 to July 1 around Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands and the surrounding maritime operating areas. Footage released by the official account of the Air Defense Command Headquarters of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force clearly shows the launches taking place at sea and appears to show Japan releasing two visually distinct ASM-2-series types or configurations from the same F-2A, although Tokyo did not identify their exact subvariants. Japan is integrating a mature indigenous anti-ship weapon into a multinational maritime-strike network while simultaneously preparing a new generation of much longer-range air-launched missiles.

ASM-2 Remains Central to Japan’s Maritime-Strike Arsenal

The ASM-2, officially designated the Type 93 air-to-ship missile, remains one of the foundations of Japan’s indigenous maritime-strike capability. Japan conducted operational testing of the developmental XASM-2 between June and December 1992, and the weapon subsequently became part of the anti-ship armament associated with the F-2 fleet. The F-2 itself was developed by Japan and the United States from the F-16 design but adapted to Japanese operational requirements and geographical conditions, including a strong emphasis on maritime attack. The Valiant Shield firing therefore demonstrated that the ASM-2 is not merely a legacy weapon retained in storage, but an operational system still used to train crews for long-range maritime-interdiction missions. The footage is particularly noteworthy because the two released rounds display visible external differences. These may indicate separate ASM-2 subvariants, operational and evaluation configurations, or differences in instrumentation and markings; however, imagery alone cannot establish their precise technical identity. What the sequence does confirm is that a single F-2A can contribute more than one weapon to a maritime salvo, allowing a relatively small formation to generate multiple attack tracks against a surface target.

The firing took place during the multinational SINKEX against the former USS Juneau, an Austin-class amphibious transport dock that had been decommissioned in 2008 and environmentally prepared for destruction. The target was positioned in the Philippine Sea more than 200 nautical miles from Guam, where air, surface and subsurface forces conducted coordinated attacks. The exercise provided a realistic full-scale target and validated live-missile handling, aircraft release procedures, weapons deconfliction and multinational command-and-control arrangements. It should not, however, be interpreted as proof that the ASM-2 could automatically penetrate the defenses of a modern surface action group under combat conditions. A decommissioned vessel does not reproduce the maneuvering, electronic warfare, decoys, surface-to-air missiles or close-in defensive systems of an operational warship. The firing consequently demonstrated crew proficiency and terminal impact against a ship-sized target, but it did not publicly test the missile against jamming, active decoys, complex maritime traffic or a layered naval air-defense screen. This distinction is important because the operational effectiveness of an anti-ship missile depends not only on reaching the target, but also on surviving the defensive system surrounding it.

A Multidomain Salvo Built Around the Allied Kill Chain

The ASM-2’s contribution becomes more significant when viewed as one element of a heterogeneous multinational salvo. During the same sinking exercise, a U.S. Air Force B-2A Spirit launched an AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, a Royal New Zealand Air Force P-8A Poseidon fired two Australian-supplied AGM-84 Harpoons, and a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force submarine attacked the target with torpedoes. Such a combination creates a far more difficult defensive problem than a uniform wave of identical missiles. Weapons launched by bombers, maritime patrol aircraft, tactical fighters and submarines can approach from different directions, altitudes and timelines, forcing defending ships to divide radar attention, interceptor inventories and electronic-warfare resources. In this context, the ASM-2 does not need to outrange or outperform every other missile to retain operational value. Its purpose is to add another launch axis and terminal engagement problem to a coordinated attack, increasing the probability that at least part of the salvo reaches its objective. The exercise also raises an important but unanswered targeting question: the public footage does not establish whether the F-2A generated its own targeting solution or received track data from maritime patrol aircraft, airborne warning platforms, surface ships or the wider exercise network. That uncertainty highlights the real center of gravity in modern anti-ship warfare, the resilient kill chain linking surveillance sensors, commanders, communications systems and missile-launching platforms.

Geostrategically, an F-2 force armed with ASM-2-series missiles strengthens Japan’s capacity for sea denial across the approaches to the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu island chain and the wider Philippine Sea. Japan does not need to establish permanent sea control throughout the Western Pacific for these aircraft to have strategic effect. Their immediate function is to create temporary maritime areas in which an opposing fleet cannot operate without accepting greater risk. Unlike fixed coastal batteries, F-2 formations can be transferred between operational sectors, dispersed among available airfields and used to produce changing attack directions. For Chinese naval planners, this means that movement through the first island chain and into the open Pacific must account not only for Japanese submarines, destroyers and ground-based anti-ship missile units, but also for mobile fighter-launched attacks coordinated with U.S. and allied forces.

The location of the SINKEX near Guam also carries strategic weight: it demonstrates that Japanese maritime-strike aviation is being exercised beyond the immediate defense of the home islands and as part of the protection of allied operational depth around the second island chain. This mobility nevertheless comes with vulnerabilities. The F-2 depends on functioning runways, fuel, missile stocks, maintenance personnel, air defenses and secure command networks. In a high-intensity conflict, Japanese air bases would be priority targets, making aircraft dispersal, hardened infrastructure, rapid runway repair and resilient logistics as important as the performance of the missile itself.

The ASM-2 firing must finally be understood as the operational baseline of a broader transformation in Japan’s stand-off strike posture. Army Recognition Group analyzed the latest evidence of this transition after an F-2B development aircraft was observed flying from Gifu Air Base on July 30, 2026, with two previously unseen large missile test articles beneath its wings. Their size and configuration suggest a possible air-launched derivative of Japan’s upgraded Type 12 missile architecture, now associated with the Type 25 family, although the final designation and internal configuration remain unconfirmed. The sighting probably represented captive-carry or aircraft-level flight-qualification activity rather than an operational missile test, meaning that propulsion, guidance, seeker performance and terminal effectiveness have yet to be publicly demonstrated. Even so, the relationship between the two developments is strategically revealing.

The ASM-2 represents a mature weapon available for current maritime-strike training, while the suspected Type 12 or Type 25-related air-launched weapon points toward a future capability able to engage ships from considerably greater stand-off distances. Used alongside the faster ASM-3 series and land- and ship-launched missiles, these weapons could eventually provide Japan with attack options based on different ranges, speeds, routes and terminal profiles. Japan’s Ministry of Defense describes its stand-off defense program as a means of disrupting and defeating forces threatening Japanese territory from greater distances, and the emerging F-2 configuration shows that this policy is progressing from planning documents toward aircraft integration and flight testing.

Japan’s release of two visually distinct ASM-2-series missiles from an F-2A during Valiant Shield demonstrates that its established anti-ship arsenal is being integrated into increasingly realistic multinational maritime warfare. The exercise did not reproduce the defenses of a modern warship, but it proved something strategically broader: Japanese aircraft can participate in a coordinated, multi-axis attack involving bombers, patrol aircraft, surface forces and submarines far beyond Japan’s immediate coastline. Combined with the mysterious long-range missile recently observed on the F-2B, the firing points toward a layered Japanese strike force capable of attacking from different domains, distances and directions. The message for any hostile fleet attempting to move between the East China Sea, the first island chain and the Marianas is increasingly clear: Japan is building not simply a larger missile inventory, but a distributed allied reconnaissance-strike network designed to make maritime movement more dangerous, uncertain and costly.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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