China conducts first-ever strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile test in Pacific Ocean.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted its first publicly acknowledged strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the Pacific Ocean on July 6, 2026. The operational drill utilized a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine to deploy a mock warhead into a designated international maritime impact zone following advance notification to regional governments. This exercise explicitly validates the Chinese military’s end-to-end maritime second-strike procedures, underwater ejection mechanics, and long-range strategic command-and-control capabilities under realistic wartime employment conditions.

The strategic exercise involved an unspecified People’s Liberation Army Navy nuclear-powered submarine executing a submerged launch of a long-range ballistic missile carrying a non-nuclear training simulation warhead. This Pacific operation complements a prior September 2024 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile test, demonstrating an expanding, highly survivable maritime leg within China's modernizing nuclear triad.

Related topic: China to expand submarine fleet toward 70 boats by 2027 and 80 by 2035 to challenge US Navy

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted its first publicly acknowledged strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the Pacific Ocean on July 6, 2026, as Australia and Fiji signed the Ocean of Peace defence agreement. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

On July 6, 2026, the Chinese Navy launched a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a dummy warhead from a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine into designated waters in the Pacific, marking China’s first publicly acknowledged strategic SLBM launch into the Pacific. The launch followed the September 2024 DF-31B intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) shot from northern Hainan, which flew about 11,000 km before impact near French Polynesia. These two Pacific launches show that China is practicing long-range nuclear deterrence procedures under conditions closer to wartime employment. The July 2026 launch was a demonstration that the Chinese Navy can perform submerged launch operations, nuclear command procedures, ocean-range tracking, and regional notification during a single drill event. 

The missile carried a dummy warhead, not a nuclear payload, and landed in a designated impact area after advance notification to several regional governments. That distinction matters because the test was not about yield or warhead design, but about the operational chain required for a sea-based second-strike mission. A submerged ballistic missile submarine must receive an authenticated order, maintain secure communications, determine its launch position, align the missile’s navigation system, execute underwater ejection and ignition procedures, and support a flight path long enough to test reentry performance. China has conducted many ballistic missile tests over land, but an SLBM launch into the Pacific is a more demanding event because it combines submarine crew readiness, strategic command-and-control, long-range telemetry, impact-area management and political signalling beyond China’s immediate coastline. 

China’s maritime nuclear force is centered on six Type 094 Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which represent the current sea-based leg of the country’s nuclear triad and are officially recognized by the U.S. as China’s first credible naval nuclear deterrent. These submarines are assessed to carry the JL-3 SLBM, an intercontinental-range missile exceeding 10,000 km. Earlier Chinese submarine-launched missiles forced SSBNs to move farther into the Pacific if they were to hold the continental United States at risk, increasing exposure to U.S., Japanese, Australian, and allied anti-submarine warfare networks. With the JL-3, a Type 094 can threaten U.S. targets from waters much closer to China, including operating areas in or near the South China Sea.

That allows the Chinese Navy to protect its submarine patrol zones with surface combatants, maritime patrol aircraft, underwater sensors, shore-based missiles, and land-based air cover rather than relying on long transits into less protected ocean areas. The July 6 launch is important because sea-based nuclear deterrence depends on more than possessing a missile with intercontinental range. It requires reliable submarines, trained crews, secure command links, tested launch procedures, and confidence that a missile can leave the water, complete its boost phase, follow the assigned trajectory, and deliver its warhead to the planned impact zone. Ballistic missile submarines are valuable because they can remain concealed during a crisis, preserving a retaliatory option even if missile silos, air bases or mobile launch units are attacked first.

A public SLBM launch indicates that China is testing the operational credibility of that survivable force, not merely the missile itself. Such launches are less frequent than land-based ballistic missile tests because every stage involves higher coordination risk, especially when a nuclear-powered submarine, a long-range strategic missile and a Pacific impact area are involved. The event also occurred during a major expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal. China had more than 600 operational nuclear warheads in 2024 and remains on track to exceed 1,000 by 2030. Its modernization includes large solid-fuel ICBM silo fields, more than 100 loaded DF-31-class silos, additional mobile missile brigades, theatre nuclear-capable delivery systems, strategic bombers and a larger sea-based deterrent.

The Type 096 SSBN, under development, is expected to improve on the Type 094 through lower acoustic signature, longer patrol endurance and better survivability. If paired with longer-range follow-on SLBMs, future Type 096 units would allow China to sustain more regular deterrent patrols from protected waters while complicating U.S. and allied anti-submarine warfare planning. The July 2026 launch therefore fits into a broader transition from a limited retaliatory force toward a larger, more redundant and more survivable nuclear structure. Notably, the launch took place the same day Australia and Fiji signed the Ocean of Peace defence agreement, under which both countries committed to support each other in the event of an attack.

Australia called the Chinese launch destabilizing, while New Zealand said the missile impacted within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone established by the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1986. Japan also raised concern about China’s expanding strategic military activity and warned against ballistic missile training that could threaten Japanese security, including trajectories through Japanese airspace. China’s advance notification reduced the risk of immediate miscalculation, but it did not remove the political effect. For Pacific governments, the central concern was that China may be normalizing long-range strategic missile activity in the South Pacific after the September 2024 DF-31B launch and the July 2026 submarine-launched missile event. 

China still maintains a No First Use nuclear policy, but the structure of its modernization increasingly supports a more responsive retaliatory posture. Sea-based deterrence now complements silo-based ICBMs, road-mobile launchers and strategic bombers, while early warning satellites, TJS/Huoyan-1 infrared systems, large phased-array radars and upgraded nuclear command-and-control networks largely improve China’s ability to detect incoming missile attacks and preserve retaliation options. In 2024 and 2025, China expanded its space-based missile warning architecture, while its ground-based radars can track ballistic missiles at long range and support early warning counterstrike procedures.

The December 2024 rapid sequence of ICBM launches from a western training center showed an ability to practice multiple silo-based launches under compressed timelines. The July 2026 SLBM launch adds the maritime component to that same trend: a nuclear force built not only to survive, but to respond through multiple delivery paths if China’s leadership concludes that retaliation is required. Strategically, the July 6 launch demonstrated China's operational maturity rather than a new missile breakthrough. Its significance lies in the combination of an SSBN launch, a Pacific impact area, a dummy reentry vehicle, advance regional notification, and China’s public acknowledgement of the event.

Consecutive Pacific strategic launches in 2024 and 2026 indicate that Beijing is becoming more willing to show parts of its nuclear deterrent that were previously kept less visible. Long-range SLBMs reduce reliance on vulnerable forward patrol areas by allowing submarines to remain closer to Chinese waters, while continued Type 094 patrols, JL-3 deployment, Type 096 development and nuclear warhead growth point toward a larger maritime deterrent through the 2030s. The event also marks the PLA Navy’s growing role inside China’s nuclear posture, with the rapidly expanding submarine force moving from a supporting element of deterrence to a more central instrument of strategic signalling and second-strike credibility.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News