China's Fujian might become world's first aircraft carrier with operational anti-torpedo torpedo system.

China’s newly commissioned aircraft carrier, the Fujian, has been integrated with an operational six-tube 324 mm Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) defense system designed to intercept incoming underwater ordnance, according to the South China Morning Post. This deployment might mark the first instance of an active-service aircraft carrier utilizing a dedicated hard-kill underwater terminal defense array to shield its hull from submarine-launched heavyweight torpedoes. The tactical configuration addresses critical defensive vulnerabilities within the inner naval zone by shifting the carrier’s ultimate line of protection from passive deception and broad-area depth charges to direct physical interception.

The Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier, an 80,000-tonne vessel commissioned into the People's Liberation Army Navy in November 2025, replaces legacy 12-tube depth-charge launchers with specialized port and starboard rotating six-tube ATT mounts. Operating via a permanent-magnet synchronous direct-drive motor and pump-jet propulsion, the 324 mm interceptors accelerate to speeds of 50 to 60 knots within three seconds to execute terminal active or passive homing maneuvers.

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An operational ATT would make the Fujian the world's first aircraft carrier able to physically intercept and destroy incoming torpedoes before they hit the ship, adding a previously unseen final layer of underwater defense. (Picture source: Weibo/@大龙猫果冻 and lyman2003)

On July 3, 2026, according to the South China Morning Post, China’s new aircraft carrier Fujian is now equipped with a six-tube 324 mm launcher believed to be an Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) system, which is intended to intercept incoming submarine-launched torpedoes before they strike the hull. If operational, this would make the Fujian the first known aircraft carrier in active service to be equipped with a dedicated hard-kill anti-torpedo system, a capability previously associated mainly with trials, specialized surface combatants, or programs that had not reached fleet-wide deployment. The Fujian, hull number 18, is China’s third aircraft carrier and the first designed and built domestically.

Commissioned in November 2025 after its first sea trial in May 2024, the Fujian replaces the older 12-tube depth-charge launchers carried by the Liaoning and the Shandong with a more precise underwater interceptor concept, shifting the carrier’s last line of defense from wide-area explosions to the direct engagement of incoming torpedoes. The Fujian is a larger and more capable carrier than China’s two previous ships, and the anti-torpedo installation must be understood in the context of that broader shift in carrier design. The Type 003 is about 316 m long, has a beam of 76 m and displaces roughly 80,000 tonnes at full load, compared with about 60,000 tonnes for Liaoning and 66,000 tonnes for Shandong.

Its launch system is also different: instead of the STOBAR ski-jump layout used by China’s first two carriers, the Fujian uses CATOBAR operations with electromagnetic catapults, allowing aircraft to be launched with heavier fuel loads, heavier weapons and larger mission payloads. Its estimated air wing of 50 to 60 fixed-wing aircraft could include J-15T carrier fighters, J-35 stealth fighters and KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft, giving the ship a wider range of possibilities than earlier Chinese carriers. The Fujian's defensive fit already includes at least four Type 1130 close-in weapon systems and four HQ-10 (FL-3000N) air defense systems, while the new anti-torpedo launcher adds an extra layer of protection beneath the water, to stop one of the few threats able to disable a carrier with a single successful hit. 

Based on available pictures, the Fujian's Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT) system appears to consist of rotating six-tube mounts installed on both port and starboard side structures beneath the flight deck. Although the launcher resembles a standard 324 mm lightweight torpedo mount, its role is not likely to be conventional anti-submarine warfare. A carrier does not normally use its own short-range torpedoes to hunt submarines, because that mission is assigned to escorts, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, carrier-based aircraft, sonobuoys, hull sonars, towed arrays, and the broader carrier strike group sensor network. Therefore, according to SCMP, the purpose is more likely terminal self-defense against a torpedo that has already passed through the escort screen and is closing on the carrier.

In that role, the ATT system functions as the underwater equivalent of a close-in weapon system, not by destroying the launching submarine, but by trying to intercept the incoming threat during the final phase of its attack. Indeed, the threat driving this requirement is the submarine-launched heavyweight torpedo, not the lightweight torpedo used by helicopters or escorts against submarines. Heavyweight torpedoes can strike beneath the waterline and damage the keel area, underwater hull, shafts, rudders, steering gear, machinery spaces or adjacent compartments. Their effect can be more severe than an above-water missile impact because water transmits shock far more efficiently than air, producing hull whipping, structural deformation, flooding and machinery shock over a wider area.

Wire-guided torpedoes allow the firing submarine to update the weapon during the attack; acoustic-homing torpedoes can search passively or actively and then re-attack after a miss; and wake-homing torpedoes can follow the disturbed water behind the ship instead of its acoustic signature. Those guidance modes are specifically dangerous for a large carrier because acoustic decoys, jammers, bubble screens, and towed countermeasures may not always draw the torpedo away from the real target. A likely ATT engagement would begin with the carrier’s sonar or associated torpedo-warning sensors detecting a high-speed underwater contact. The combat system would have to classify the contact within seconds, filtering out marine traffic, own-ship noise, escort noise, decoys, thermal-layer effects, reverberation and bottom clutter.

Once the bearing, depth, speed and predicted intercept point are calculated, a 324 mm interceptor would be launched from the six-tube mount toward the threat axis. After entering the water, the interceptor would activate its own nose-mounted broadband sonar, search for the incoming torpedo and refine its course during terminal homing. The kill mechanism could involve proximity detonation, underwater blast overpressure, a shaped-charge effect or direct damage to the torpedo body, seeker, control surfaces or propulsion section, with the practical goal of breaking guidance, forcing a miss, detonating the weapon prematurely or physically destroying it before impact.

According to the South China Morning Post, the Fujian's interceptor speed is estimated to reach 50 to 60 knots within about three seconds after launch, using a small rocket booster for initial acceleration and a pump-jet propulsion system for underwater movement. The motor is linked to a rare-earth permanent-magnet synchronous direct-drive design, which would provide rapid torque response, precise speed control, and lower interference with the interceptor’s own sonar. A broadband sonar array in the nose would allow the interceptor to distinguish an actual torpedo from decoys at several thousand meters, while a two-way underwater acoustic data link would allow the carrier to update the interceptor after launch.

If multiple interceptors can communicate with each other, the system could assign targets during a salvo attack, reduce duplicate shots and improve the use of a limited ready magazine. The hard-kill system does not replace the Fujian's soft-kill defenses, escorts or anti-submarine aircraft, but it changes the final layer of the defensive problem. On many warships, soft-kill systems such as acoustic decoys, jammers, bubble screens, towed decoys and wake-disruption devices remain useful because they can mislead many torpedoes without consuming a weapon. Their weakness is that they depend on deception, and modern torpedoes are increasingly designed to reject false targets, follow wakes, use multiple seeker modes, and conduct another attack run after losing the target.

A hard-kill ATT attempts to physically neutralize the weapon, which is especially relevant when a torpedo has already entered the inner defensive zone, and there is no longer enough time to rely only on maneuver or deception. The constraints remain serious: the target is small, fast, and underwater, the ATT's engagement window is short, the acoustic environment can be crowded, and a six-tube launcher has limited ready rounds against a possible multi-torpedo salvo. The international comparison shows why the Fujian would be significant if the ATT system is really operational. The U.S. Navy tested Anti-Torpedo Torpedo Defense System (ATTDS) and Countermeasure Anti-Torpedo (CAT) concepts in the 2010s, including carrier integration trials, but did not field the capability across the fleet.

European SeaSpider and PESCO Anti-Torpedo Torpedo efforts are intended to produce a qualified interceptor, validate launcher concepts, integrate the effector with combat management systems, and prove the full chain from detection to detonation during sea trials. Russia’s Paket systems already use anti-torpedo interceptors on surface combatants, but those installations are associated with frigates and other warships rather than the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. For China, an operational ATT would strongly strengthen the survivability of the Fujian, which still depends on escorts, aviation and anti-submarine networks, and allow China's most modern aircraft carrier to defend itself against air, missile and underwater threats.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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