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US Navy Sends Warships Near Scarborough Shoal After China-Philippines Maritime Crisis.
On August 13, 2025, two U.S. Navy surface combatants maneuvered within 30 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal days after two Chinese vessels collided while attempting to block a smaller Philippine Coast Guard ship. The deployment marks the first publicly reported U.S. destroyer operation inside the shoal’s waters in years and comes amid competing claims and rising close-quarters encounters in the South China Sea. The move underscores Washington’s stated intent to uphold navigational freedoms and reassure a treaty ally as regional partners voice concern over unsafe conduct at sea, as reported by Reuters.
The U.S. decision to put a high-end Aegis destroyer alongside a rapid, shallow-draft LCS near Scarborough Shoal, immediately after hazardous maneuvers culminated in a collision, is a calibrated show of resolve and seamanship (Picture source: U.S. Navy)
The U.S. Navy assets involved, the guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76) and the littoral combat ship USS Cincinnati (LCS-20), present a complementary mix of blue-water air defense and strike capacity with high-speed littoral maneuver. Higgins, an Arleigh Burke-class Flight II destroyer equipped with the Aegis combat system and SPY-1D radar, fields a 90-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system capable of employing SM-2/SM-6, Tomahawk land-attack missiles, and ASROC, supported by a 5-inch gun, close-in defenses, and advanced sonars. Cincinnati, an Independence-variant LCS, is an aluminum trimaran optimized for shallow-draft operations exceeding 40 knots, powered by LM2500 gas turbines, typically armed with a 57 mm gun and RAM/SeaRAM, and configured to embark MH-60R and MQ-8 for surface and ASW tasks. Together, the pairing can surveil, escort, and rapidly reposition in congested waters while maintaining credible air and strike coverage.
Operationally, Higgins brings a known record of Seventh Fleet deployments, Tomahawk strike operations, and prior freedom-of-navigation patrols in contested Asian waters, while Cincinnati, commissioned in 2019, reflects the LCS program’s maturation with Pacific assignments focused on presence, maritime security, and theater cooperation. The combination of a forward-deployed destroyer and a fast littoral platform leverages established Seventh Fleet command relationships and logistics hubs to sustain tempo near key maritime chokepoints without lengthy mobilization.
In capability terms, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer offers area air defense, long-range precision strike, and robust command-and-control that smaller regional combatants typically lack, placing it in a different weight class than Chinese Type-056 corvettes or coast-guard hulls frequently seen around Scarborough. The Independence-variant LCS, while less heavily armed than a destroyer, adds speed, shallow-water access, and aerial surveillance capacity that rival corvettes cannot easily match; compared with China’s larger 052D destroyers, the U.S. pairing trades volume of organic missiles for agility and layered air defense anchored by Aegis on the U.S. side and theater air/maritime domain integration. The net effect is a flexible deterrent posture designed to complicate coercive tactics at close range while retaining the option for precise, discriminating responses if required.
Strategically, sailing near Scarborough immediately after the Chinese-on-Chinese collision signals crisis management by presence: it reassures the Philippines, deters unsafe maneuvering by raising professional scrutiny, and frames the narrative around international law. It also tests Beijing’s risk tolerance following an incident that already prompted allied diplomatic reactions. By asserting navigational rights while avoiding escalation, Washington seeks to steady the ladder of response, maintaining access to a corridor that carries trillions in trade, preserving coalition optics with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and underscoring that unsafe conduct will draw coordinated attention.
For Philippines, the deployment aligns with a long-standing alliance. The United States has reiterated that the Mutual Defense Treaty applies to armed attacks on Philippine public vessels, aircraft, and armed forces, including in the South China Sea. Public U.S. messaging following the latest events, disputing Chinese claims to have “driven away” a U.S. destroyer and affirming the legality of operations, reinforces that commitment while keeping operational details measured. The practical takeaway is that combined presence operations, even with a two-ship footprint, meaningfully influence tactical behavior around the shoal while preserving room for diplomatic de-escalation.
The U.S. decision to put a high-end Aegis destroyer alongside a rapid, shallow-draft LCS near Scarborough Shoal, immediately after hazardous maneuvers culminated in a collision, is a calibrated show of resolve and seamanship. It reminds all actors that unsafe conduct in crowded sea lanes invites outside scrutiny and professional counter-presence; it reassures a treaty ally that U.S. ships will sail, lawfully and visibly, where international law allows; and it preserves strategic initiative without closing the door to dialogue. The message is unmistakable: maritime safety, lawful access, and alliance credibility are not negotiable, and Washington will pair the tools it needs, from Aegis air defense to high-speed littoral platforms, to enforce that standard.