Ukraine and US Raytheon agree on joint Patriot missile production to counter Russian ballistic strikes.

On July 23, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced in Kyiv that Ukraine and American defense contractor Raytheon had agreed to initiate joint production of Patriot air defense interceptor missiles following talks with a delegation led by Raytheon Vice President Joseph DeAntona. The agreement aims to address severe inventory deficits resulting from monthly expenditures of up to 180 interceptors against Russian ballistic and cruise missile attacks. Localizing assembly and component manufacturing provides Ukraine with a long-term mechanism to bypass global supply bottlenecks and secure sustainable surface-to-air missile stockpiles.

Ukraine currently consumes between 60 and 180 Patriot interceptors per month to counter Russian Iskander-M and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal strikes, outpacing Western monthly manufacturing figures. The co-production partnership with Raytheon establishes a framework for licensed assembly of PAC-2 GEM-T interceptors, supported by European industrial infrastructure such as the COMLOG facility in Germany to bridge immediate operational gaps.

Related topic: Trump grants Ukraine license to build US Patriot missiles at NATO Summit amid Russian strikes

The Patriot has become Ukraine's principal means of intercepting Russian Iskander-M and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, while the NASAMS, IRIS-T and other air defense systems are more commonly assigned to aircraft, cruise missiles and drones. (Picture source: RTX)

On July 23, 2026, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine and Raytheon had agreed to jointly manufacture Patriot interceptor missiles after a meeting was held with a delegation led by Raytheon Vice President Joseph DeAntona to begin implementing a U.S.-approved plan for licensed production. The talks followed President Donald Trump’s July 8 announcement at the NATO Summit in Ankara that Washington would authorize Ukraine to manufacture Patriot missiles to counter repeated Russian ballistic attacks. A Patriot fire unit can remain operational for years, but its combat value falls rapidly once its ready and reserve missile stocks are exhausted. Ukraine is estimated to fire 60 to 70 Patriot interceptors during a normal month and as many as 150 to 180 during periods of concentrated Russian missile attacks.

At the same time, current Patriot production must also replenish the U.S. Army and supply customers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The agreement must therefore establish the access to rocket motors, seekers, guidance electronics, warheads, energetic materials, software, testing equipment and qualified suppliers. No production schedule, annual output target, factory location or interceptor variant was announced on July 23, leaving the most consequential industrial decisions unresolved. The first unresolved issue is which Patriot interceptor Ukraine would be permitted to manufacture. Raytheon produces the PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical, or GEM-T, while Lockheed Martin manufactures the PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) and PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).

The PAC-2 GEM-T is a larger missile with a blast-fragmentation warhead and an upgraded seeker intended for aircraft, cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles. The PAC-3 uses a smaller hit-to-kill interceptor that destroys the target through direct collision and is more suitable for Russia's high-speed ballistic threats, including the Iskander-M and Kh-47M2 Kinzhal that place the greatest pressure on Ukraine’s air defense. A Raytheon agreement would most directly support PAC-2 GEM-T production, but this would not automatically provide Ukraine with the technology or production rights for the PAC-3 MSE. Any PAC-3 arrangement would require a separate agreement with Lockheed Martin and additional U.S. approval for the transfer of seeker, guidance, propulsion and hit-to-kill technologies.

The difference is operationally important because the PAC-2 can increase the number of lower-cost interceptors available for aircraft, cruise missiles and selected ballistic targets, thereby allowing the more expensive PAC-3 MSE to be conserved for the most difficult terminal ballistic engagements. The industrial burden will be considerably greater than establishing a final assembly line. A Patriot interceptor contains a solid-fuel rocket motor, seeker, inertial guidance unit, flight control computer, power supply, actuators, aerodynamic control surfaces, fuze or hit-to-kill package, warhead where applicable, thermal protection, software, and secure communication interfaces.

These components are manufactured by dozens of suppliers, often at separate sites, and several rely themselves on specialized chemicals, microelectronics, radar-frequency components and energetic materials whose production capacity is already allocated under existing contracts. Ukraine would also need controlled manufacturing areas, explosive-handling infrastructure, test chambers, vibration tables, facilities, integration equipment and secure networks approved for U.S. classified data. Each production stage would require process qualification, documentation, traceability and acceptance procedures equivalent to those applied in the United States or Germany.

Serhiy Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, estimated that establishing a production capability would require at least one year, but that period would more likely produce an initial assembly capacity than a mature factory delivering missiles at a sustained rate. A practical first phase would involve Ukrainian production of mechanical structures, wiring, canister components and non-sensitive subassemblies, followed by final assembly using imported seekers, rocket motors and guidance sections. Production of the most controlled components inside Ukraine would logically require a deeper level of technology transfer and a longer qualification process. The urgency of this joint production is driven by the ratio between Russian missile output and Western interceptor production.

Russia is estimated to manufacture approximately 40 to 50 Iskander-Ms and around 10 Kinzhals each month, producing a combined flow of roughly 50 to 60 high-priority ballistic targets before other missile categories are counted. Russian strike packages also include Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, Shahed drones, decoys and reconnaissance systems to saturate Ukrainian sensors and force air defense units to divide their interceptor stocks. Patriot batteries are not used against every incoming weapon, because firing a multimillion-dollar missile at a low-cost drone would be economically and operationally unsustainable, but ballistic targets leave Ukraine with few alternatives. A single ballistic missile may require two interceptors under standard engagement doctrine when commanders seek a higher probability of kill, meaning that 50 incoming ballistic missiles can generate demand for as many as 100 Patriot rounds.

Ukraine’s estimated normal expenditure of 60 to 70 missiles per month is therefore consistent with a selective engagement policy, while the estimated peak of 150 to 180 reflects large attack waves, repeated engagements and the use of Patriot against cruise missiles or aircraft when other systems are unavailable. The burden is not only financial. Even if sufficient funding exists, missiles cannot be delivered faster than factories can produce seekers, motors, guidance sets and complete rounds. Therefore, at the Farnborough International Airshow on July 20, 2026, Lockheed Martin introduced the PAC-3 ACE, which is intended to be easier to produce. Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 MSE production figures illustrate the scale of the shortfall. The company produced approximately 500 PAC-3 MSE interceptors in 2024 and 620 in 2025, increasing its average monthly output from about 42 to 52 missiles.

A planned U.S. expansion to as many as 2,000 missiles annually will raise the average output to approximately 167 per month, but that target is not equivalent to 167 missiles available for Ukraine. Production must cover U.S. Army war reserves, training firings, foreign military sales, replacement of missiles transferred from allied stocks, and contracted deliveries to Patriot operators including Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. At an expenditure rate of 150 to 180 interceptors in a heavy month, Ukraine alone could consume the equivalent of the entire output of a 2,000-round annual production line. The same pressure applies to the PAC-2 GEM-T, whose renewed demand has led the U.S. Army to return to new production after more than three decades without purchasing newly manufactured PAC-2 rounds.

In April 2026, the Army awarded a $441.6 million GEM-T contract, while Raytheon received a separate $3.7 billion order connected to missiles for Ukraine. These contracts increase future output but also demonstrate that any new Ukrainian requirements are entering an already congested production schedule. Therefore, the European production base provides the most credible location for the first manufacturing phase. Raytheon and MBDA Deutschland operate the COMLOG joint venture in Germany and are already establishing a GEM-T production line at Schrobenhausen, with initial deliveries expected from early 2027. Germany also possesses Patriot maintenance experience, secure industrial facilities, qualified personnel, and established contractual links with Raytheon, reducing the time required to create a fully new production chain.

Starting in Germany would also reduce the risk that Russian ballistic or cruise missiles could destroy specialized machinery before the Ukrainian workforce and supply chain reach stable output. Poland has also proposed a trilateral U.S.-Polish-Ukrainian arrangement under which production or final assembly could take place on Polish territory, supported by Poland’s growing Patriot infrastructure and its position on NATO’s eastern flank. Warsaw is acquiring the Patriot-based Wisła system and is developing its domestic participation in launchers, command systems and support equipment, which could provide an industrial foundation for another regional maintenance and missile support center. A distributed model could assign seeker and guidance production to existing U.S. plants, rocket-motor manufacture to established suppliers, structural work and canister production to Ukrainian or Polish companies, and final assembly and acceptance testing to Germany or Poland.

Such a structure would be less vulnerable than concentrating all production in one Ukrainian facility, but it would also require transport security, common quality standards and cross-border handling of classified components. Ukraine is pursuing separate cooperation with France and Italy on Aster 30, SCALP and future SAMP/T-related production, while also advancing the FREYJA anti-ballistic project with partner support for sensors and other subsystems. For now, Ukraine will remain dependent on transfers from existing inventories until the new capacity becomes operational. Kyiv has approached nearly 40 partner countries for additional air defense missiles and has sought as many as 200 PAC-2 interceptors from Greece, whose Patriot inventory includes missiles acquired more than two decades ago. Ukraine has also pursued the purchase of approximately 100 Patriot interceptors through a financing package valued at about $1 billion.

That purchase can secure a place in the production queue but cannot bypass manufacturing lead times. Allied governments can deliver missiles more rapidly by transferring rounds already in storage and later placing replacement orders for their own inventories. This approach shifts the immediate readiness risk from Ukraine to the donor state, which explains why several Patriot operators have been reluctant to release large quantities from national stocks. Germany, the Netherlands, Romania and the United States have already transferred Patriot equipment or supported missile deliveries, but repeated withdrawals reduce the number of interceptors available for NATO contingency plans. Licensed production is therefore intended to reduce this competition over existing stocks, although it cannot materially change Ukraine’s inventory during the first year of implementation. 

The long-term value of the agreement will depend on annual output, not the formal existence of a production license. A plant delivering several dozen missiles per year would have political and industrial significance but would not alter the balance between Ukrainian expenditure and Russian production. An output of 120 missiles per year would equal only 10 per month, covering roughly one-sixth of Ukraine’s normal estimated consumption. A rate of 360 per year would provide 30 per month and could offset part of the requirement, but Ukraine would still depend heavily on U.S. and European production. Matching a normal expenditure of 60 to 70 missiles per month would require annual output of 720 to 840 interceptors, while sustaining a peak rate of 150 to 180 would require 1,800 to 2,160 per year.

Those figures exceed the production capacity of most individual Western missile lines and would require multiple factories, expanded rocket motor output, additional seeker production, and long-term procurement commitments. The most realistic objective is therefore not Ukrainian self-sufficiency, but a multinational network that adds several hundred missiles annually, diversifies production locations and reduces delivery time to the European theater. Ukraine would remain dependent on U.S. design authority, software control, classified components and export approval, but it could gain a direct industrial role in the Patriot assembly, maintenance, recertification and later component manufacture.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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