UK Instro unveils DEODE to blind drone sensors and counter fibre optic FPVs with directed Energy.

Instro Precision introduced DEODE as a British directed-energy counter-UAS system designed to permanently disable drone electro-optical payloads rather than destroy the airframe. The system is intended to create a mission kill against FPV drones, loitering munitions, and tactical ISR platforms while reducing reliance on kinetic interceptors and expendable ammunition.

DEODE targets the cameras and electro-optical sensors hostile drones rely on for observation, target identification, and terminal guidance. By attacking the sensor instead of the aircraft structure or control link, the system provides a separate counter-UAS option against platforms that remain operationally dependent on visual sensing, including fibre-optic FPV drones.

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Instro Precision’s DEODE counter-UAS system, mounted on a vehicle at DVD 2026, is designed to disable the electro-optical sensors of hostile drones using directed energy while remaining mobile with deployed ground forces. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

This approach addresses two constraints that have become central to counter-small-UAS operations. The first is the cost relationship between the threat and the interceptor. Relatively inexpensive drones can force defenders to use missiles or other kinetic effectors that cost far more than the target. The second is magazine depth. A defence architecture based on expendable munitions is limited by the number of interceptors available and by the logistical burden of moving them forward to deployed units. DEODE is intended to reduce part of that dependence by using an effector that does not rely on a physical stock of projectiles.

The concept also differs from high-power laser and high-power microwave weapons. Instro limits the intended effect to the permanent destruction of the drone’s electro-optical payload rather than the airframe itself. Once the sensor is disabled, the aim is to achieve a mission kill. In the case of an FPV drone, loss of the camera can prevent the operator from continuing the attack. The same logic applies to fibre-optic-controlled FPV systems, which are less vulnerable to conventional radio-frequency jamming. For a stand-off ISR platform or loitering munition, disabling the sensor can remove much of its operational utility without requiring the aircraft to be physically destroyed.

DEODE can be tripod-mounted for rapid deployment or integrated onto a vehicle without major structural changes to the host platform. Its reduced size, weight and power requirements are relevant because the system can operate from the electrical power available on the vehicle rather than requiring the heavier energy infrastructure associated with some directed-energy weapons. This makes it possible to employ the system closer to manoeuvre units instead of limiting it to fixed installations or large specialised vehicles.

DEODE can operate independently using an integral optical search capability, but it is also designed to function within a broader detection architecture. The system uses SAPIENT architecture to receive cueing commands from third-party sensors. A radar, SIGINT system or acoustic detection network can detect a threat and pass the information needed to orient the effector. This separates wide-area detection from the engagement function and allows DEODE to act as an additional layer within an existing C-UAS network rather than as a closed standalone system.

In operational use, this capability could complement electronic warfare and kinetic effectors while remaining mobile with the force it protects. A vehicle-mounted version can move with ground units, reposition as the threat changes and shift counter-UAS coverage rather than defending only a fixed site. Jammers remain relevant against drones that depend heavily on radio links or satellite navigation, while missiles and guns can be reserved for threats that require immediate physical destruction. DEODE introduces an intermediate option for platforms that remain vulnerable at the sensor level. Because the engagement does not rely on an explosive or fragmenting interceptor, it may also reduce risks linked to falling debris over troops or infrastructure. Performance will still depend on factors such as weather, line of sight, the type of sensor being targeted, and any optical protection fitted to the drone.

Instro also states that production lead times can be measured in weeks rather than years and that the system is intended to cost less than high-power directed-energy architectures. The industrial logic is to enable deployment in larger numbers rather than concentrating the capability in a limited number of heavy systems. Within a layered defence structure, wider use of mobile sensor-disabling effectors could also reduce pressure on missile and ammunition stocks assigned to counter-drone missions.

For the United Kingdom and other NATO members, DEODE fits into a broader shift in counter-UAS defence where the issue is no longer only whether a target can be intercepted, but whether large numbers of engagements can be sustained economically and logistically. The war in Ukraine has shown the difficulty of maintaining a favourable cost balance when a defensive system costs several times more than the drone it is intended to defeat. By targeting the sensor rather than the aircraft, DEODE proposes a different response to that problem. Its operational value will depend on its effectiveness against different sensor types and its ability to maintain performance in degraded conditions, but the concept reflects a broader diversification of C-UAS layers across electronic warfare, kinetic interception, and directed energy.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.