UAE to expand integrated air defense cooperation with South Korea after Iranian missile and drone attacks.

EDGE Group and Hanwha signed a strategic term sheet in Abu Dhabi on September 16, 2026, to develop an integrated air defense network for the United Arab Emirates. The agreement establishes a formal framework to expand bilateral defense-industrial cooperation beyond individual procurement by introducing South Korea's L-SAM, additional M-SAM capabilities, and K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher systems. Both conglomerates will pursue a local joint venture, technology transfer, and phased domestic production to strengthen the sovereign defense capabilities of the UAE.

The agreement encompasses the introduction of South Korean long-range and medium-range surface-to-air missile tiers alongside rocket artillery to reinforce the multi-layered air defense architecture of the UAE. Pending regulatory approvals, the framework outlines localized manufacturing and joint venture operations managed jointly by EDGE Group and Hanwha.

Related topic: South Korea starts L-SAM-II development to intercept modern ballistic missiles at higher altitudes

The UAE is now working with South Korea’s Hanwha to include the L-SAM and more M-SAM launchers in its air defense force while also expanding both local production and cooperation on the K239 Chunmoo. (Picture source: EDGE)

On September 16, 2026, EDGE Group and Hanwha signed a Term Sheet in Abu Dhabi to expand both the UAE's existing air defense force and its local production capacity, which covers the L-SAM, additional M-SAM systems, and more K239 Chunmoo MLRS. Potentially bringing a South Korean high-altitude ballistic missile layer to the Emirates, the agreement also follows the earlier November 20, 2025 MoU covering air and missile defense, long-range precision strike, unmanned systems and defense AI. Laying the foundations for new negotiations on a UAE joint venture, technology transfer, phased localisation and production, this strategic cooperation builds on the UAE's $3.5 billion Cheongung-II purchase in January 2022, which included a $1.01 billion radar component from Hanwha Systems, and sits within a broader UAE-South Korean defense-industrial framework valued at about $35 billion.

The requirement is also being driven by combat expenditure: by April 9, 2026, the UAE had faced 2,819 aerial attacks from Iran, including 537 ballistic missiles, 2,256 drones and 26 cruise missiles. Abu Dhabi is consequently expanding several parts of its air defense chain, with simultaneous purchases from the U.S., including a $4.5 billion THAAD-related package, 10 FS-LIDS counter-UAS systems with 240 Coyote Block 2 interceptors, 12 Sentinel A4 radars and 400 additional AIM-120 air-to-air missiles. The M-SAM requirement is fundamentally a capacity problem because the UAE already possesses the system and has used it successfully in operations. Also known as the Cheongung, the M-SAM combines one multifunction radar, one engagement-control center, and four to six launchers carrying eight missiles each, for a total of 32 to 48 ready-to-fire interceptors per battery.

The January 2022 acquisition was worth $3.5 billion, while Hanwha Systems' multifunction-radar portion was valued at about $1.01 billion; the overall UAE program also includes launchers, canisters, missile components, command elements and support equipment. The UAE plans a force of 12 M-SAM II batteries, and part of it is already operational: the IISS assessed that two Cheongung-II batteries were in UAE service by mid-March 2026 and had entered combat against Iranian missiles and one-way attack UAVs. Twelve complete batteries at that configuration correspond to 48 to 72 launchers and 384 to 576 launcher-ready interceptor positions once the entire force is fielded. Additional launchers increase magazine depth, whereas additional complete batteries also increase radar coverage and simultaneous engagement capacity. The September agreement does not specify how many additional batteries the UAE is considering, but it explicitly addresses the parallel requirement to sustain and replenish a larger force after prolonged combat expenditure.

The L-SAM is the most significant development in the September 16 agreement because the UAE does not currently operate the system, and it would extend the Korean-supplied portion of its missile defense architecture above the upgraded M-SAM II, a variant designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Developed by South Korea's Agency for Defense Development with Hanwha Aerospace and LIG Nex1, the L-SAM combines a long-range multifunction radar, a command-and-control system, and separate interceptors for ballistic missiles and aerodynamic targets. Its ballistic missile interceptor uses hit-to-kill and is intended to engage ballistic targets at altitudes of approximately 40 to 80 km, compared with about 20 km for the M-SAM II. South Korea completed the L-SAM development in 2024 and began preparations to deploy it in 2027, while the follow-on L-SAM II will have a High-Altitude Interceptor and Glide Phase Interceptor to extend coverage against higher and more complex trajectories.

For the UAE, the L-SAM would effectively bring another engagement opportunity before surviving ballistic missiles descend toward M-SAM and Patriot coverage. Even a 90% successful first engagement rate against 100 ballistic targets would leave 10 targets requiring another layer, while a second independent 90% engagement opportunity would mathematically reduce the residual number to one before reaching the lower M-SAM layer. That upper tier would not depend on the L-SAM alone, as the UAE already operates two THAAD batteries. The Emirati THAAD recorded its first combat interception on January 17, 2022, when it destroyed a medium-range ballistic missile approaching an oil installation near Al Dhafra Air Base. Four years later, the UAE is expanding the sensor and command structure associated with that mission, as a new U.S. package in March 2026, valued at $4.5 billion, included one long-range discrimination radar, two fire control and tactical operations stations, two launch-and-control stations, and 12 Sentinel A4-related uplinkers.

This produces three distinct ballistic missile engagement bands if the L-SAM is acquired: the THAAD at the upper end, the L-SAM at approximately 40 to 80 km of altitude, and the M-SAM II around 20 km, with Patriot providing another terminal layer. The L-SAM would therefore increase the number of successive engagement windows potentially available against one missile, as the failure or saturation of one layer does not leave only a single opportunity to destroy an incoming ballistic threat. The scale of the 2026 Iranian campaign against the UAE shows why those engagement opportunities must be supported by large magazines. By April 1, the UAE had engaged 438 ballistic missiles, 19 cruise missiles and 2,012 UAVs, meaning the Emirates faced 2,469 incoming threats in just over one month. Drones accounted for 81.5% of that total, ballistic missiles for 17.7% and cruise missiles for 0.8%.

The cumulative count climbed to 537 ballistic missiles, 2,256 UAVs and 26 cruise missiles by April 9, an increase of 350 targets in eight days. The composition of individual attacks imposed simultaneous rather than sequential demands: a late-March attack contained 16 ballistic missiles and 42 UAVs, the March 31 attack contained eight ballistic missiles, four cruise missiles and 36 UAVs, and the April 3 attack included 18 ballistic missiles, four cruise missiles and 47 UAVs. Against that number, the Emirati command network has to decide which targets warrant THAAD, Patriot, or M-SAM interceptors, which can be assigned to fighters or shorter-range air defense systems, which trajectories do not threaten key assets, and whether more than one interceptor must be allocated to particularly dangerous targets.

The UAE's planned 10 FS-LIDS sets include 240 Coyote Block 2 interceptors to counter drones, thus preserving the missiles for more dangerous ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. The Air Force provides another layer to intercept aerial targets before they enter the terminal SAM zones, reducing the number of missiles fired by M-SAM and Patriot batteries. The UAE operates 76 F-16E/F Block 60 Desert Falcons, and has 80 Rafale F4 fighters on order, substantially increasing the number of aircraft available for defensive combat air patrols and other missions. Five Saab GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft provide elevated surveillance, reducing the radar-horizon limitation that constrains surface-to-air missile systems, while five A330 MRTTs can extend the endurance of fighter patrols and permit aircraft to remain between likely approach routes and defended areas for longer periods.

The March 2026 approval of 400 additional AIM-120 AMRAAMs adds another air-to-air missile reserve, although actual stocks would be divided among operational loads, reserve inventories and training. A fighter patrol cued by a GlobalEye can intercept an Iranian cruise missile or UAV tens or hundreds of kilometers before it reaches the terminal defence around an air base or energy installation, reducing the number of targets subsequently presented to M-SAM, Patriot and point-defence weapons. The K239 Chunmoo MLRS extends the September agreement from defensive interception into long-range precision fires. The UAE Army already operates 12 K239 rocket launchers, each based on an 8×8 chassis weighing about 31 tonnes and using interchangeable munition pods.

The prospective industrial relationship therefore covers two Korean systems already selected by the UAE and could add the L-SAM as a third major family. As EDGE and Hanwha are considering a UAE joint venture, local production, technology cooperation and phased localisation, this industrial component has a direct operational relationship to the 2026 experience because defense is not determined solely by how many missiles are purchased before a conflict. It also depends on how quickly damaged equipment can be repaired, launchers returned to service, radars maintained, missiles assembled, and inventories replenished during a campaign lasting weeks rather than hours.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.