U.S. Expands Counter-Drone Defense to Protect Critical Infrastructure From Low-Cost Drone Attacks.

The growing use of low-cost drones is pushing the United States to broaden its counter-drone posture beyond interception toward critical infrastructure protection, response coordination, and resilience. The shift reflects the limits of detecting and neutralizing every hostile drone and places greater emphasis on layered defenses that can reduce damage and preserve essential operations when an attack penetrates protective measures.

The evolving approach combines counter-UAS systems with measures designed to protect critical infrastructure, improve coordination among authorities, and prepare operators for incidents before, during, and after a drone attack. Rather than relying solely on interceptors, the concept also includes hardening sensitive equipment, building redundancy into essential systems, and maintaining operational continuity when defensive measures fail.

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A U.S. Army M-LIDS assigned to the 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team engages an aerial target during a training exercise near Fort Bliss, Texas, on October 24, 2022. (US DoD)

This assessment comes as the U.S. Department of Defense has already begun reshaping its Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, or C-UAS, posture. In December 2024, the Pentagon adopted a unified strategy for countering unmanned systems, recognizing that drones now pose a threat not only to U.S. forces deployed overseas but also to installations located within the United States. The strategy includes Replicator 2, an initiative specifically focused on protecting critical military installations and force concentrations against small drones.

Replicator 2 reflects a broader change in how the Pentagon approaches counter-drone operations. Rather than developing a single system, the objective is to accelerate the integration and deployment of different technologies capable of detecting, identifying, and neutralizing increasingly diverse threats. In May 2025, the Defense Innovation Unit, U.S. Northern Command, and the Joint Counter-small UAS Office launched a search for low-collateral defeat solutions that could be integrated into existing C-UAS programs. This approach directly addresses the protection of military bases and infrastructure in environments where the use of explosive interceptors may create additional risks.

The institutional framework has also changed. In August 2025, the Department of Defense established Joint Interagency Task Force 401, or JIATF 401, replacing the Joint Counter-small UAS Office. Operating under the authority of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the organization is intended to consolidate efforts previously distributed across several entities, accelerate procurement, and facilitate the deployment of C-UAS capabilities shared across the U.S. armed forces. The memorandum establishing JIATF 401 places particular emphasis on mobility, system cost, and the integration of counter-drone capabilities directly into combat formations. This approach is already taking shape around the Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System, known as LIDS. The U.S. Army operates both fixed and mobile versions of the architecture, designated FS-LIDS and M-LIDS, which combine several sensors and effectors to provide layered protection against drones. LIDS is therefore not a single weapon but an integrated architecture combining radar detection, electro-optical and infrared sensors, electronic warfare, command and control, and kinetic defeat options. The U.S. Army currently treats M-LIDS and FS-LIDS as reference programs for its C-UAS operations.

M-LIDS illustrates this layered concept. The system uses Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control to combine information from multiple sensors. It includes the Ku-band Radio Frequency System, or KuRFS, radar developed by Raytheon, as well as electro-optical and infrared equipment. Different defeat options allow operators to select kinetic or non-kinetic effects depending on the threat and operating environment. On September 22, 2026, soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division deployed M-LIDS in Rajasthan during Exercise Yudh Abhyas 2026 with the Indian Army, demonstrating the system in support of ground forces operating in the field.

The architecture also incorporates Raytheon's Coyote interceptors and KuRFS radars. Coyote Block 2 provides a kinetic option intended to physically intercept drones, while the Block 3 Non-Kinetic variant offers a different approach against multiple targets. In February 2026, Raytheon reported that Coyote Block 3NK had been demonstrated during a U.S. Army test in which the system engaged several groups of drones. Unlike a conventional interceptor consumed during an engagement, this variant can be recovered and redeployed after its mission. U.S. procurement also provides an indication of the scale of investment in this field. In September 2025, the U.S. Army awarded Raytheon a contract valued at up to $5.04 billion for the Coyote family. The agreement covers kinetic and non-kinetic interceptors, fixed and mobile launchers, and KuRFS radars, with orders expected to continue through 2033. The program has become one of the main U.S. procurement efforts focused on defense against small unmanned aircraft.

A U.S. MRAP vehicle equipped with the Mobile Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Defeat System (M-LIDS) fires an interceptor against a fixed-wing drone target during a training exercise in Bahrain on January 26, 2026. The exercise involved U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the Bahrain Defense Force. (US DoD)

The U.S. response, however, is not limited to the Coyote-KuRFS combination. The Army continues to assess additional technologies intended to complement existing systems and reduce the cost of engaging commercial drones or systems produced in large numbers. During the Warden event held at Fort A.P. Hill in May 2026, the DEVCOM C5ISR Center evaluated solutions from 17 industry partners against more than a dozen drone types and several attack scenarios, including swarms. The technologies examined included lasers, radio-frequency jammers, and interceptor drones.

JIATF 401 is also working to standardize how new systems are assessed. During Project Flytrap 5.0, conducted in Europe in 2026, more than 20 C-UAS solutions were evaluated with U.S., British, and Australian forces. The exercise also examined the integration of these capabilities into a common command-and-control architecture, with the objective of allowing different sensors and effectors to operate as part of a coordinated system rather than as isolated platforms. This diversification addresses both economic and operational concerns. Using an expensive missile against a drone costing a few thousand dollars, or in some cases a few hundred dollars, is difficult to sustain against repeated attacks or swarms. U.S. forces are therefore seeking multiple layers of response, including electronic jamming, interceptor drones, guns, non-kinetic effectors, and missiles, allowing the type and cost of the response to be adjusted to the threat.

This is where the Atlantic Council analysis overlaps with the direction of current U.S. military programs. According to Bilal Y. Saab, C-UAS technology will remain necessary but cannot provide continuous protection across the entire United States. He therefore proposes identifying which infrastructure should receive priority protection and improving its ability to continue operating when counter-drone defenses fail. Power plants, refineries, ports, and airports are among the facilities that could be subject to specific assessments of their vulnerability to drone attacks.

The development of U.S. programs therefore points toward a layered defense architecture. Detecting and destroying a drone remains one component, but it is increasingly combined with distributed sensors, command and control, electronic warfare, lower-cost interceptors, mobile systems, and physical protection for critical facilities. For the defense industry, this evolution broadens the scope of the C-UAS market. Requirements now extend beyond the final interceptor to radars, passive sensors, electro-optical systems, electronic warfare equipment, data-fusion software, command architectures, and defeat systems designed to operate together. Investments associated with LIDS, Replicator 2, and JIATF 401 indicate that the United States is moving toward a modular set of counter-drone capabilities intended to protect forces in motion, military bases, and critical infrastructure.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests include security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.