U.S. Considered Special Forces Operation with Army Rangers and Navy SEALs to Secure Iran's Uranium.

The United States has reportedly examined a military option that could involve Army Rangers and Navy SEALs in an operation to recover Iran’s enriched uranium, according to an exclusive New York Post report published on July 25, 2026. The concept would seek to secure nuclear material that air strikes might leave intact, but neither the U.S. Department of Defense nor U.S. Central Command has publicly confirmed that such an operation has been approved or assigned to specific units.

Citing a source familiar with U.S. military planning, the newspaper described a large and highly complex ground mission involving troops, engineers, explosive-ordnance specialists, aviation support, and a smaller retrieval force. If authorized, the operation could require U.S. forces to enter defended nuclear sites, clear damaged or obstructed access points, establish secure perimeters, and move radioactive material through contested territory.

Related Topic: U.S. Sends F-16CJ Wild Weasels to the Middle East to Target Iranian Radars and Missile Defenses

U.S. Navy SEALs participate in a training exercise. According to a July 25, 2026, New York Post report, U.S. military planners reportedly considered a contingency operation that could involve elite special operations forces to secure Iran's enriched uranium if military intervention became necessary. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The New York Post said a possible retrieval force could include personnel from SEAL Team 6’s Silver Squadron, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and the U.S. Army’s 21st Ordnance Company. However, the newspaper attributed those unit-level details to the independent outlet The High Side, and no official U.S. source has confirmed that these formations have been selected or ordered to prepare for the mission.

The reported option would differ fundamentally from a conventional air campaign. Precision strikes can damage centrifuge halls, power systems, tunnel entrances, and supporting infrastructure, but they cannot guarantee the destruction or recovery of enriched uranium stored in protected containers or moved before an attack. A ground force would instead attempt to locate, secure, package, and remove the material.

Before losing regular verification access following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency had documented a substantial Iranian inventory of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235. Material at that level is classified as high-enriched uranium and would require significantly less additional enrichment to approach the level commonly associated with nuclear weapons, although its current quantity, condition, and location remain uncertain.

The New York Post identified Fordow and Isfahan among the facilities that could be relevant to such an operation. Any recovery effort at hardened or damaged nuclear sites would require accurate intelligence on the location of storage cylinders, radiation conditions, structural damage, Iranian defenses, and possible explosives placed around entrances or tunnels.

Army Rangers could, in theory, establish defensive positions and secure access routes while specialized assault elements entered sensitive areas. Nuclear specialists and explosive-ordnance personnel would then be required to identify hazardous material, assess damaged containers, and prepare the uranium for transport. Rotary-wing aircraft, strategic airlift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, electronic warfare support, and conventional ground forces could also be needed.

This force composition remains analytical rather than confirmed. The scale of the mission would depend on whether the uranium remained concentrated at known sites, had been distributed across several locations, or was buried behind rubble following earlier strikes. A dispersed inventory would transform a focused raid into a prolonged search-and-security operation with greater exposure to Iranian counterattacks.

The United States has experience in sensitive-site exploitation and long-range special operations, but neither the 2003 search of suspected Iraqi weapons sites nor Operation Neptune Spear provides a direct model for recovering enriched uranium. Iraq demonstrated the need for technical teams and site security, while the 2011 raid in Pakistan showed how intelligence, specialized aviation, and assault forces can be integrated for a politically sensitive mission. An operation inside Iran would likely be larger, longer, and more logistically demanding.

Physically removing enriched uranium could produce a more durable counter-proliferation result than damaging enrichment infrastructure alone. If successful, it could prevent part of the inventory from being hidden or reused and allow specialists to establish custody over the recovered material. Failure to locate the entire stockpile, however, could leave uncertainty over how much uranium remained and where it had been transferred.

Earlier Washington Post reporting said the U.S. military had drafted a proposal to seize Iranian enriched uranium at the request of the president, providing separate support for the broader claim that such an option has been examined. The July 25 New York Post article adds possible force and logistical details, but those details continue to depend on anonymous and secondary sourcing.

The available evidence therefore supports reporting that Washington has considered a highly risky uranium-recovery operation. It does not establish that Army Rangers or Navy SEALs have received execution orders, that the described force package is final, or that a raid is imminent.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.