Russia Tests T-72B3M-Based Shturm Robotic Tank to Deliver 125mm Firepower in High-Risk Frontline Assaults.

Russia has tested T-72B3M-based uncrewed combat vehicles in armored assault scenarios during the Tsentr-2026 exercise, with TASS reporting on October 2 that the vehicles provided direct-fire support to assault units. The demonstration points to a Russian effort to keep crews farther from mines, anti-tank weapons, artillery and drones while preserving heavily armored firepower at the front of an attack.

The vehicles operated from short firing halts before shifting positions and appeared in tank-type and BMPT-type configurations, showing how remotely controlled armor could deliver different effects alongside conventional forces. Their battlefield value will depend heavily on resilient communications, sensors and protection against top-attack drones, reflecting a wider shift toward robotic systems designed to absorb risk in the most dangerous phases of ground combat.

Related Topic: Indian Army Reveals Ambition to Convert Legacy T-72 Tanks into Autonomous Armoured Fighting Vehicles

Russia deployed T-72B3M-based uncrewed combat vehicles during Tsentr-2026, testing remotely controlled armored fire support for assault units in high-risk battlefield conditions (Picture Source: Russian Media / Russian MoD) © Army Recognition Group. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use, reproduction, or distribution prohibited.

On October 2, 2026, Russia demonstrated T-72B3M-based uncrewed combat vehicles during the active phase of the Tsentr-2026 strategic command-and-staff exercise at the Chebarkul training ground in the Chelyabinsk region. Their appearance offered one of the clearest indications yet of Moscow's effort to move tank crews away from some of the most exposed positions while retaining heavily protected direct-fire support for assault formations. The concept has acquired added relevance after years of war in Ukraine, where mines, artillery, anti-tank weapons, FPV drones and persistent aerial reconnaissance have reshaped the employment and survivability of armored vehicles. TASS, reporting from Chebarkul, said the T-72B3M-based uncrewed vehicles were used during the exercise to provide fire support to assault units.

From T-72B3M to a Family of Robotic Assault Vehicles

The vehicles demonstrated at Tsentr-2026 appear closely associated with Russia's Shturm heavy robotic assault program, developed around the T-72 family, although the identification requires qualification. TASS described the systems shown to Russian President Vladimir Putin as uncrewed combat vehicles built on T-72B3M chassis, but did not identify them by the Shturm designation in its report. It confirmed that the vehicles carried two different combat-module configurations, one tank-type and another BMPT-type, referring to Russia's tank-support combat vehicle concept. A Militarnyi report identified the vehicles as part of the Shturm complex and traced the program to work disclosed by Uralvagonzavod in 2018. Earlier plans reportedly envisaged four specialized configurations, including a shortened 125 mm gun system, a rocket-flamethrower carrier, a vehicle armed with twin 30 mm automatic cannon and another intended to employ 220 mm thermobaric rockets. These should be regarded as development concepts rather than four variants confirmed to have participated in Tsentr-2026.

The principal gun-armed Shturm configuration has been associated with a shortened 125 mm D-414 smoothbore gun, a 22-round autoloader, a bulldozer blade and reinforced protection intended for close assault operations. The shorter barrel, reportedly reduced to around four meters, would limit gun overhang when maneuvering through narrow streets, rubble and restricted passages, making the arrangement particularly relevant to combat in built-up areas. The wider Shturm concept pairs the robotic vehicles with a crewed mobile control post mounted on a T-72-family chassis. According to the Russian reports, the development concept envisaged one control vehicle directing a platoon of combat vehicles within approximately 3 km, with remote-control speed reportedly limited to around 40 km/h. Conventional crew controls were also retained, allowing the vehicle to be driven manually when required. Shturm is consequently better understood as a remotely controlled armored system than as an autonomous tank: human operators remain responsible for maneuver and weapons employment even when physically separated from the forward vehicle.

Fire Maneuver, Communications and a New Center of Vulnerability

TASS provided an important indication of how the Russian Defense Ministry envisages such vehicles being employed. According to the ministry, the uncrewed tanks operated as part of armored groups, conducted fire missions against identified targets from short halts, and then moved to new firing positions. Russian officials also described the control architecture as multi-channel and resistant to jamming, with duplication of particularly vulnerable control components. In tactical terms, the method resembles remotely executed armored fire-and-maneuver: the combat vehicle exposes itself long enough to engage before displacing, while the operators remain in another protected platform. Yet crew separation also shifts part of survivability away from armor alone and toward data links, electro-optical sensors, antennas, command-and-control resilience and operation in a contested electromagnetic environment. A Militarnyi report also relayed claims that radio contact between a Shturm vehicle and its control platform was interrupted during the exercise. Those claims have not been independently confirmed and contrast with the Russian Defense Ministry's description of the control system as jamming-resistant. If such interruptions occurred, they would illustrate a central problem for heavy remotely controlled armor: a platform can remain mechanically intact yet still suffer a mission kill if its control loop is disrupted.

The protection arrangement offers another clue to Shturm's design priorities. Large angular explosive reactive armor modules around the turret cheeks and sides form an extensive protective belt, while further modules cover the frontal hull. Heavy rectangular side-skirt elements protect substantial portions of the upper track and hull flank, and additional box-shaped sections extend coverage toward the rear, where the underlying armor is generally thinner. Russian reports note that an early design requirement called for exceptionally strong all-aspect protection intended to preserve combat capability after 10–15 hits from handheld anti-tank grenade launchers and an anti-tank mine detonation. That figure describes a reported development requirement, not a demonstrated survivability standard. Publicly available imagery of the Tsentr-2026 vehicle, meanwhile, appears to show far less additional protection over the turret roof and engine compartment than along its sides. This creates an important contrast between a protection philosophy shaped heavily by mines and horizontally arriving anti-tank weapons and the threat environment exposed by the war in Ukraine, where FPV drones and munition-dropping UAVs increasingly seek thinner upper surfaces. The actual protection level cannot be established from imagery alone, and additional counter-UAV equipment could be fitted in other configurations.

Tsentr-2026 and an Emerging Russian Robotic Assault Model

The wider setting of Tsentr-2026 places the uncrewed T-72B3M-based vehicles within a much broader experiment in robotic and unmanned warfare. Putin said more than 47,000 personnel were participating across the overall exercise at 11 training grounds and in the Caspian Sea, while Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov said the Chebarkul phase involved around 6,000 personnel, approximately 700 pieces of equipment, more than 600 UAVs and over 60 robotic systems. Other ground robots were used for ammunition resupply, logistical support, fire support and overcoming engineering obstacles, while FPV drone crews and mobile counter-UAV groups operated alongside assault formations. Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov specifically identified the extensive use of UAVs, ground robotic systems, passage-making techniques and uncrewed tanks among the distinctive features of the exercise. Putin also stated that the training incorporated experience gained during what Moscow calls the “special military operation,” its term for the war in Ukraine. Seen in this setting, Shturm appears less like an attempt to replace the main battle tank with an autonomous machine and more like a possible first-echelon robotic assault element intended to operate with conventional assault units, engineering assets, UAVs and supporting fires in especially dangerous sectors.

Shturm’s Place in Russia’s Evolving Ground Warfare Concept

The Shturm-linked vehicles displayed during Tsentr-2026 point to an effort to give the mature T-72 platform a new battlefield role: a heavily protected, remotely controlled vehicle capable of entering high-risk sectors ahead of or alongside conventional assault elements. The program's reported history suggests that Shturm was conceived as more than an existing tank fitted with remote controls. Its planned mixture of tank guns, automatic cannon, rocket flamethrowers and thermobaric weapons points toward an original ambition to create a family of specialized heavy robotic assault platforms able to deliver different effects within the same tactical formation.

The approach may also offer Russia an industrially pragmatic route into heavy battlefield robotics. Building around the established T-72 family allows designers to draw on familiar chassis technology, automotive components, maintenance infrastructure and an extensive knowledge base while concentrating development effort on remote controls, sensors, communications and specialized combat modules. Retaining conventional driving controls could additionally simplify testing, recovery and movement outside combat conditions. This does not establish that Russia plans mass conversions of existing T-72 stocks, but it illustrates how a legacy armored platform could be adapted for roles in which preserving personnel may be considered more important than preserving the vehicle.

At the same time, removing the crew from the forward vehicle redistributes battlefield risk rather than eliminating it. The crewed control post becomes an important command-and-control node, while cameras, antennas, data links and other sensors become essential components of the platform's combat effectiveness. If the earlier concept of one command vehicle controlling several robotic platforms is eventually implemented operationally, disruption of that node could potentially affect several vehicles at once. Terrain masking, electronic warfare or damage to communications equipment could likewise produce a mission kill without defeating the tank's main armor.

Shturm's reported protection requirements expose a second challenge. Heavy frontal and lateral armor may be suited to an environment dominated by anti-tank rockets, mines and direct-fire weapons, but Ukraine has expanded the threat envelope into the vertical plane. FPV drones and dropped munitions can target turret roofs, engine decks and other areas traditionally given less protection. The comparatively limited visible overhead protection on the configuration displayed at Tsentr-2026 leaves open the question of how effectively such a vehicle could operate under persistent drone observation and repeated top-attack attempts.

Tsentr-2026 nevertheless marks a notable stage in Russia's exploration of heavy ground robotics because T-72B3M-based uncrewed vehicles were employed within armored-group and assault-unit fire-support scenarios, rather than presented solely as static technology demonstrators. The key measure of Shturm's future military relevance will not simply be whether a remotely controlled T-72 can maneuver and fire during an exercise. It will be whether the complete vehicle-control-sensor network can remain functional under UAV surveillance, electronic attack, artillery exposure and repeated top-attack threats. That distinction may ultimately determine whether Shturm develops into a practical assault capability or remains a specialized experiment in converting legacy armored mass into remotely controlled combat power.

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Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.