China delivers first J-10CE fighters to Uzbekistan to challenge Russian influence in Central Asia.

On August 28, 2026, Uzbekistan publicly displayed six Chengdu J-10CE multirole fighters carrying national military markings at Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, confirming the first operational introduction of a Chinese fighter platform into Central Asia. The acquisition transitions the Uzbek Air Force away from complete reliance on legacy Soviet-designed MiG-29 and Su-27 combat aircraft toward an integrated Chinese ecosystem featuring AESA radar and modern datalink architecture. Assigned to the 60th Separate Mixed Aviation Brigade, the single-engine fighters represent the initial batch of a projected 24-aircraft procurement intended to modernize the nation's multirole interceptor capacity.

Uzbekistan has officially integrated at least six Chengdu J-10CE multirole fighters into its 60th Separate Mixed Aviation Brigade at Karshi-Khanabad Air Base. The single-engine platform incorporates active electronically scanned array radar, WS-10B turbofan propulsion, 11 hardpoints supporting up to 5,600 kg of payload, and compatibility with PL-10E and PL-15E air-to-air missiles.

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Uzbekistan received at least six Chengdu J-10CE multirole fighters, marking the first introduction of a non-Soviet fighter type into Uzbek service since independence and establishing the country as the J-10CE's second foreign operator after Pakistan. (Picture source: Uzbek MoD)

On August 28, 2026, Uzbekistan publicly displayed at least six Chengdu J-10CE multirole fighters carrying Uzbek markings at Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, confirming the first operational introduction of a Chinese fighter into Central Asia and making Uzbekistan the second foreign operator of the J-10 after Pakistan. The aircraft have been seen with serials 1011, 1014, 1017, 1020, 1023 and 1026, while aircraft 1020 had already been photographed at Chengdu Aircraft Corporation facilities on August 23-24. The transfer from Chengdu to Uzbekistan covers close to 3,000 km, and the fighters arrived carrying two 1,600-liter underwing tanks and one 800-liter centerline tank. The Uzbek configuration notably omits the fixed starboard in-flight refueling probe normally associated with the J-10, consistent with Uzbekistan having no tanker aircraft and therefore no existing operational requirement for probe-and-drogue refueling.

The six fighters are assigned to the 60th Separate Mixed Aviation Brigade at Karshi-Khanabad, the same base that concentrates a large portion of Uzbekistan's MiG-29s and Su-27s, and that hosted U.S. forces between 2001 and 2005 during Afghanistan operations. Uzbekistan had been pursuing a requirement for 24 new fighters, which would make the six aircraft now identified equivalent to one quarter of that requirement and leave 18 aircraft outstanding if the original procurement objective is completed. The significance is therefore not simply the arrival of six new aircraft: Uzbekistan has begun introducing a completely different fighter ecosystem encompassing Chinese-made engines, AESA radar, datalinks, electronic warfare equipment, air-to-air weapons, diagnostic equipment, spare parts, training syllabi and maintenance procedures into an air force that has operated Soviet-designed combat aircraft for more than three decades.

A July 2026 inventory counted 38 MiG-29s, 25 Su-27s and 13 Su-25 attack aircraft, giving Uzbekistan 63 nominal fighters and 76 combat aircraft across those three types, although those totals do not establish the number actually available for daily flying. A separate unit breakdown assigns 32 MiG-29s and six Su-27s to the 60th Separate Mixed Aviation Brigade at Karshi-Khanabad, meaning as many as 38 Soviet-designed fighters have historically been concentrated at the same base now receiving the J-10CE. That concentration is the result of a long restructuring process: the 60th Bomber Aviation Regiment and the 61st and 62nd Fighter Aviation Regiments were consolidated into the 60th Mixed Aviation Brigade in 1999 as aircraft serviceability deteriorated after the Soviet collapse. Even a completed fleet of 24 J-10CEs would equal only 38.1% of the nominal MiG-29/Su-27 inventory, so the acquisition cannot replace the entire existing fighter force on a one-for-one basis unless the real number of operational Soviet aircraft is substantially below the nominal inventory.

Conversely, 24 J-10CEs would be four times the size of the group now visible and could support more than one operational squadron once aircraft are allocated among combat, conversion-training, maintenance, and reserve requirements. If Uzbekistan ultimately operates only six, the J-10CE would remain a small supplementary fleet requiring its own independent logistics chain; if it reaches 24, the economics of dedicated simulators, larger missile inventories, deeper maintenance capability and permanent Chinese-origin support infrastructure become much more rational. The J-10CE itself is substantially smaller than the Su-27 but combines a relatively high thrust-to-weight ratio with a five-tonne-class external weapons capacity.

According to available information, the J-10C measures 16.9 m long, 9.8 m across the wings and 5.7 m high, with a 37 m² wing area and a gross weight of 14,000 kg. Its single WS-10B afterburning turbofan produces 89.17 kN without afterburner and between 135 and 144 kN with afterburner, resulting in a thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.04. Wing loading is 381 kg/m². Maximum speed is Mach 1.8, stall speed is 200 km/h, maximum climb rate is 300 m/s, and service ceiling exceeds 18,000 m. Published range figures include 1,850 km standard range, 1,240 km combat range and 2,950 km ferry range, although those values depend heavily on altitude, weapons carriage, external fuel and mission profile. The three tanks fitted to the Uzbek aircraft contain 3,120 kg of fuel, equivalent to 22.3% of the aircraft's cited 14,000 kg gross weight, which illustrates the extent to which ferry and long-endurance missions depend on external fuel when aerial refueling is unavailable.

Eleven hardpoints, consisting of six underwing, three under-fuselage and two under-intake stations, support up to 5,600 kg of external fuel and weapons, equal to 40% of the cited gross weight. For Uzbekistan, this means that the J-10CE is not merely a lighter replacement for the Su-27: it combines single-engine operating economics with a weapons load exceeding five tonnes, more than 1,000 km of cited combat radius and a radar-and-missile architecture developed two decades after the Soviet fighters it is beginning to supplement. The most important capability change, however, lies in the sensor and engagement chain rather than in top speed, because Mach 1.8 by itself does not fundamentally alter Uzbekistan's ability to detect, classify and attack aircraft at long range. The J-10C first flew in December 2013, entered serial production in 2015, and entered Chinese combat service in April 2018; the J-10CE is its export derivative.

Its principal sensor is an active electronically scanned array fire-control radar, allowing the beam to be repositioned electronically rather than by moving the radar antenna mechanically. That permits faster sector changes, multiple simultaneous tracks, more flexible target prioritization, and greater resistance to some forms of electronic interference. The cockpit incorporates a wide-angle head-up display, multifunction displays, and helmet-mounted display compatibility, while the aircraft also carries radar-warning, missile-approach-warning, electronic warfare, and datalink equipment. The practical difference is that the fighter can detect or receive a target track, transmit or receive updates through a datalink, launch an active-radar missile, and continue supporting the weapon during its mid-course phase without requiring the target to remain continuously illuminated as in older semi-active missile engagements.

Uzbekistan also already operates Chinese HQ-9B/FD-2000, FM-90, and KS-1C surface-to-air missile systems. That creates the possibility of combining fighter, ground-radar, and surface-to-air missile tracks within a common Chinese-origin air defense architecture, although the actual Uzbek datalink gateways and level of J-10CE-to-HQ-9B connectivity have not been identified. If such connectivity is implemented, the J-10CE would improve not only fighter interception but also how Uzbekistan distributes target information between airborne and ground-based air defense units. Weapons inventories will determine whether Uzbekistan can exploit that sensor architecture at its intended range. The J-10C/CE fighter can carry PL-8 and PL-10 short-range air-to-air missiles and PL-12 and PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles, while the aircraft's staggered dual missile pylons allow two missiles to be carried on some stations.

Pakistan's first six J-10CEs were associated with a representative air-combat configuration of two PL-10E short-range missiles and four PL-15E beyond-visual-range missiles, providing a six-missile air-to-air load without occupying every aircraft station. The PL-10 uses an imaging-infrared seeker and can be cued through a helmet-mounted sight, allowing high-angle engagements without pointing the fighter directly at the target. The export PL-15E combines an active radar seeker with datalink-supported mid-course guidance and is associated with an engagement range of 150 to 200 km, although the actual usable envelope can fall substantially below that figure against a maneuvering target flying away from the missile.

The J-10 family also carries KD-88 stand-off attack missiles, YJ-91 anti-radiation weapons, YJ-83K anti-ship missiles, LS-500J and LT-2 laser-guided bombs, LS-6 and other glide bombs, FT-1 satellite-guided bombs, 250 kg and 500 kg conventional bombs and 90 mm rocket pods, in addition to an internal 23 mm GSh-23 cannon. These are aircraft integration capabilities, not evidence that Uzbekistan possesses every associated weapon. No confirmed Uzbek quantities have been established for either PL-10E, PL-15E, precision-guided bombs, or stand-off weapons, and this is more important for immediate combat capacity than the difference between six and eight theoretical missile stations. Six J-10CEs supported by several dozen PL-15Es would constitute a usable long-range interceptor capability; six fighters with a small initial training and evaluation missile allocation would provide much less sustained combat capacity.

Pakistan provides the clearest indication of what an operational J-10CE force requires because it has used the fighter since 2022 and employed it during the May 2025 confrontation with India. Pakistan announced the acquisition of 25 J-10CEs with an option for 11 more in December 2021; its first six aircraft reached PAF Base Minhas on March 4, 2022, and entered No. 15 Squadron "Cobras" seven days later, on March 11. By May 2025, the Pakistan Air Force operated 20 J-10CEs with another 16 listed on order, giving it more than three times Uzbekistan's currently confirmed six-aircraft fleet. Pakistani J-10CEs subsequently participated in long-range interception missions during the May 2025 India-Pakistan fighting, with Pakistan claiming five Indian fighter losses, including three Rafales, one Su-30MKI and one MiG-29. Lower assessments reduce the result to one Rafale and possibly a second aircraft, so the five-aircraft figure cannot be treated as an independently verified kill total.

What can be established is that the engagement involved beyond-visual-range combat and the PL-15E, making missile kinematics, radar tracks, mid-course updates, and coordination between aircraft more relevant than traditional close-range maneuverability. China acknowledged on January 9, 2026, that the export J-10CE had achieved combat results during 2025 but did not provide more details. Pakistan's experience also exposes a less visible requirement for Uzbekistan: Chinese personnel were deployed at Pakistani air bases to provide on-site technical support, demonstrating that fielding the aircraft involves manufacturer-country involvement in troubleshooting and maintenance during the early years of service. Uzbekistan's transition will similarly have to produce qualified pilots, weapons specialists, avionics technicians, WS-10B engine personnel, and ground crews before the six aircraft can be regarded as a self-sustaining combat unit rather than merely delivered airframes.

The procurement figures also indicate that airframe price is only a fraction of the cost of establishing a usable J-10CE force. A 24-aircraft Uzbek program, estimated at a value near $1 billion, would correspond to $41.7 million for each aircraft-equivalent if the entire package were divided evenly by fleet size, while estimates placing the fighter itself in the $40-50 million class overlap that figure. Pakistan's cited $1.5 billion expenditure for 24 aircraft produces a package-equivalent value of $62.5 million per fighter, 49.9% higher than a $1 billion Uzbek package divided across the same number of aircraft. Bangladesh's planned acquisition gives a still larger comparison: 20 J-10CEs are associated with a $2.2 billion program covering aircraft, training, maintenance and logistical support through 2035-2036, equivalent to $110 million per aircraft when the entire program value is divided by 20.

That is 2.64 times the $41.7 million Uzbek package-equivalent figure. The $68.3 million difference between those two per-aircraft calculations, subsequently, cannot be explained by the physical fighter alone and instead reflects different quantities of missiles, spare engines, replacement components, simulators, ground equipment, infrastructure, training, and years of support. For Uzbekistan, expanding from six to 24 fighters means acquiring 18 more aircraft, equivalent to three additional batches of six if the present delivery group is repeated. A 24-aircraft fleet would also require enough pilots to cover operational crews, instructor pilots, conversion training, leave, medical unavailability, and staff assignments rather than merely one pilot per aircraft.

The same applies to maintenance, as Chinese spare parts and weapons require stocks large enough to prevent a single failed component from grounding an aircraft for extended periods. The wider significance is that Uzbekistan is not replacing Russian dependence with Chinese dependence across its entire air force; it is building a mixed fleet in which different combat functions increasingly depend on different foreign industrial systems. Soviet and Russian equipment still accounts for most nominal combat aircraft, including the MiG-29, Su-27, and Su-25, while Uzbekistan also acquired 12 Russian Mi-35M attack helicopters under a 2018 arrangement and resumed participation in Joint CIS Air Defense System exercises at Sary Shagan in September 2019.

Chinese equipment already had an established role before the J-10CE through the HQ-9B/FD-2000, FM-90 and KS-1C air defense systems. Transport aviation follows another supply chain: Airbus C295 aircraft operate alongside Soviet transports, while Uzbekistan became in February 2026 the first Central Asian customer for the C-390 Millennium, with two aircraft acquired. Fighter aviation had remained the major exception because MiG-29s and Su-27s continued to dominate the air-combat inventory more than 30 years after independence. The J-10CE therefore establishes China as a fighter supplier in a region where Russian aircraft have historically dominated, while Kazakhstan continues to operate Russian Su-30SMs and the fighter forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain much smaller.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, South Korea, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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