Saudi Arabia to become first Arab country with U.S. F-35 stealth fighters as Israel expands its air power.

The United States State Department approved a potential $24.3 billion Foreign Military Sale of 48 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighter jets and 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines to Saudi Arabia. The proposed transaction includes comprehensive cryptographic equipment, electronic warfare support, and secure communications infrastructure designed to enhance Royal Saudi Air Force operational capabilities. This defense package aims to reinforce the security of a major non-NATO ally while maintaining regional stability and interoperability with United States forces.

The $24.3 billion foreign military procurement package covers 48 conventional takeoff and landing F-35A aircraft along with 49 engines, support systems, simulators, and technical logistics. Principal contractors Lockheed Martin Aeronautics and Pratt & Whitney will manage fulfillment through an administrative review framework that grants Congress a 30-day evaluation window.

Related topic: Saudi Arabia may buy up to 48 F-35 fighter jets after new U.S. defense talks

The U.S. approval of a possible $24.3 billion sale of 48 F-35As would make Saudi Arabia the first Arab F-35 operator, while forcing Washington to balance Riyadh's fifth-generation access against Israel's legally protected qualitative military edge. (Picture source: US Air Force)

On September 17, 2026, the U.S. State Department approved the possible sale of 48 F-35A stealth fighters to Saudi Arabia in a $24.3 billion Foreign Military Sale (FMS), which also includes 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines and the equipment required to establish the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF)'s first fifth-generation fighter force. Forty-eight engines would be installed, with one supplied as a complete spare, and Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney would be the principal contractors. The $24.3 billion ceiling equals $506.25 million per requested aircraft, compared with a cited F-35A price near $82.5 million, leaving $423.75 million per fighter to finance engines, software, cryptography, electronic warfare support, spares, simulators, modifications, training and logistics.

The approval follows Donald Trump's November 18, 2025, confirmation that Washington intended to sell F-35s to Riyadh and the February 11, 2026, appearance of a Saudi-marked F-35 mock-up at the World Defense Show. Forty-eight aircraft could equip two squadrons, although Saudi basing and squadron organization remain unspecified. The relevant comparison is not 48 Saudi F-35s against Israel's roughly 50 F-35Is in 2026, as Israel is moving toward 75 contracted F-35s and has approved a fourth squadron intended to raise the fleet to 100, alongside 50 planned F-15IAs, but rather the configuration available to each air force when Saudi F-35s actually reach operational service. The $24.3 billion package is unusually heavy, as the support architecture required to keep those 48 F-35s operational needs to be created from scratch.

The request consequently includes AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders for loading cryptographic keys, KIV-78 cryptographic appliqués, secure communications equipment, precision-navigation equipment, additional cryptographic devices, electronic warfare database support, and classified and unclassified software delivery and support. It also includes cartridge-actuated and propellant-actuated devices, aircraft and munitions support equipment, spare parts, consumables, accessories, repair-and-return services, training devices and their spares, major and minor modifications, maintenance support, publications, site surveys and U.S. engineering, technical and logistics services. The single complete spare F135 represents only 2.08% of the engine fleet, although engine components, repairs and the Engine Component Improvement Program provide additional propulsion support.

Simulators, training devices and personnel instruction must create a pilot and maintainer pool larger than the F-35 inventory itself, while site surveys, engineering services, ferry flights and aerial refueling support the transport from U.S. production facilities to Saudi operational bases. The 48 F-35s would add a mission set that Saudi Arabia's 231 F-15s and 72 Eurofighter Typhoons cannot reproduce, as its combination of reduced radar signature, internal weapons carriage, electronic warfare, onboard sensors, and fused targeting information is critical during the opening phase of operations against functioning air defenses. A representative low-observable strike configuration combines two AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles and two 2,000-lb GBU-31 JDAMs in internal bays, permitting simultaneous beyond-visual-range air combat and precision strike without the radar penalty of external pylons and stores.

Smaller weapons such as the Small Diameter Bomb can increase the number of internal aimpoints, while the AIM-120's active radar seeker performs terminal homing after launch. When reduced radar signature is no longer the priority, the F-35 can move to external carriage and carry up to 18,000 lb of weapons. This permits Saudi planners to assign F-35s to early penetration, electronic sensing, air defense suppression and precision attack, then employ F-15SAs and Typhoons with larger external payloads after the surface-to-air missile and radar coverage has been reduced. The F-35 can therefore improve the employment of fighter jets already in Saudi service, particularly if sensor tracks and targeting data can be exchanged securely across the wider Saudi command-and-control network.

Nevertheless, the Israeli force that a Saudi F-35 fleet could encounter in the early 2030s will be quantitatively different from the one existing in September 2026. Israel declared the F-35I Adir operational in 2017 and received 48 of its initial 50 F-35s in January 2026. Israel subsequently contracted for 25 additional F-35Is for roughly $3 billion to establish a third squadron, raising the contracted total to 75, with deliveries beginning in 2028 at a rate of three to five fighters annually. Israel subsequently approved the procurement of a fourth F-35 squadron and a second F-15IA squadron under its ten-year force-development program, taking the planned fleets toward 100 F-35Is and 50 F-15IAs. Israel also retains roughly 70 older F-15s and more than 100 F-16s, with a F-16 self-protection upgrade intended to keep those aircraft operational rather than replace them immediately.

The planned structure can therefore reach at least 100 F-35Is, 50 F-15IAs and more than 100 F-16s, or more than 250 fighters across those categories, before any surviving older F-15s are counted. Saudi Arabia likewise has a much larger fighter inventory, but the numerical comparison that matters in the early 2030s will involve complete fighter forces, not a 48-versus-100 comparison isolated from F-15s, Typhoons, F-16s, tankers, airborne early-warning aircraft, and weapons stocks. Experience creates another measurable difference. By early 2025, Israel's F-35I force had accumulated more than 15,000 flight hours across operations in Iran, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, and also includes a dedicated test aircraft supporting national modifications.

Moreover, Israel remains the only foreign F-35 operator authorized to modify the aircraft with nationally developed systems, software, electronic warfare equipment, and weapons such as the SPICE 1000, supported by a domestic testing infrastructure. Israeli F-35s have been employed against Iranian radar and air defense networks, while wartime modifications enabled JDAM carriage from external wing stations when greater weapons capacity took precedence over the lowest radar signature, creating a unique experience in route planning, electronic warfare, air defense penetration, weapons employment, and maintenance under sustained operational conditions. Israel is also developing external fuel tanks for the F-35I under a contract exceeding $34 million, using an Elbit Systems Cyclone design derived from previous F-16 work; the objective is to increase unrefueled range and reduce dependence on tankers for some long-distance missions.

A Saudi force with deliveries beginning in the early 2030s would still need to create instructors, pilots, combat-qualified crews, maintainers, mission planners, support personnel, and weapons procedures. Moreover, the U.S. policy defines Israel's qualitative military edge (QME) as its ability to counter and defeat credible conventional military threats while sustaining minimal damage and casualties, and any congressionally notified regional arms transfers require an assessment of their effect on that edge. For a 48-aircraft Saudi fleet, mission-capable rate alone can materially change available combat mass: a 60% availability corresponds to 29 F-35s; 70% produces 34; 80% produces 38. A 100-aircraft Israeli F-35I fleet produces 60, 70, or 80 available aircraft at those same respective rates, but it could be misleading if the two air forces differ in maintenance experience, spare parts stocks, engine availability, or annual flying hours.

Pilot-to-aircraft ratio is another critical variable. A ratio of 1 qualified combat pilot per aircraft would provide 48 Saudi pilots, while 1.5 would require 72 and 2 would require 96, even before accounting for pilots unavailable because of training, medical status, headquarters assignments, or instructor duties. Annual flying hours have similar effects: 150 hours per Saudi F-35 would require 7,200 flying hours annually, while 200 hours would require 9,600, increasing wear on engine life, tires, brakes, consumables, maintenance labor, and spare components by one-third. Israel, by contrast, possesses national F-35 test and integration capacity, so two F-35As sharing the same basic design does not provide an identical operational capability. The Saudi request explicitly includes classified and unclassified software, electronic warfare database support, secure communications and cryptographic equipment, but it does not specify the exact schedule for receiving future upgrades.

The F-35's effectiveness changes with those elements because the fighter uses software and mission data to correlate sensor information, characterize emitters, identify threats, and support weapons employment. Israel has already integrated Israeli-made systems and altered weapons configurations, while Saudi Arabia has not been granted an equivalent national integration pathway in the September 17 package. Technology security is particularly relevant because the F-35 and its support infrastructure contain sensitive software, cryptographic material, electronic warfare data, and low-observable maintenance information. U.S. concerns regarding Chinese access to Saudi military installations, telecommunications infrastructure, and personnel therefore have potential consequences.

Washington could require segregation of communications networks, controlled access to mission-planning areas, restrictions on foreign personnel entering F-35 facilities, and additional procedures for cryptographic and software handling. The earlier failed UAE F-35 process demonstrated that approval of an acquisition at the political level does not automatically settle these technology-protection conditions. Israel is also expanding the supporting tanker force required to exploit those fighters, with the purchase of six KC-46 Gideons, while simultaneously extending the F-35I range and pursuing additional deep-penetration weapons, autonomous strike capabilities, UAV swarms, space systems and future Arrow interceptors.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, would integrate the F-35 alongside its F-15SA, F-15S and Typhoon fleets rather than replacing them. The most informative benchmark will be the potential Saudi initial operational capability in the early 2030s. If first delivery occurs roughly five years after a final agreement, Saudi Arabia could begin receiving aircraft near the same period in which Israel is absorbing F-15IAs, whose contracted deliveries start in 2031 at four to six per year, while its third F-35 squadron begins receiving three to five aircraft annually from 2028. Technology-security requirements could also affect Saudi base access, communications networks, cryptographic handling, and mission-data facilities, while the QME requirement may also strengthen the Israeli Air Force for when the Saudi squadrons become operational.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.