U.S. Continues Its Transition Away From A-10 Attack Aircraft and Dedicated Close Air Support.

The U.S. Air Force has completed the 66th Weapons Squadron’s final A-10C Thunderbolt II training flight at Nellis Air Force Base, ending the aircraft’s dedicated course within the U.S. Air Force Weapons School. The move further reduces the service’s ability to generate advanced A-10 tactical expertise as it draws down a fleet scheduled to remain in service only through 2030.

The milestone follows the closure of the A-10 pilot training pipeline at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base and marks another step in the gradual dismantling of the aircraft’s training infrastructure. Existing instructors can still sustain some qualification and continuation training, but the end of the Weapons School course will progressively narrow the pool of personnel trained to develop and teach the platform’s highest-level tactics during its remaining years of service.

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An A-10C Thunderbolt II pilot prepares for a close air support training mission at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on March 18, 2026, as the U.S. Air Force continues its transition away from the aircraft.  (Picture source: US DoD)

As we have highlighted several times in Army Recognition Group, tensions surrounding the A-10's phase-out remain very much alive. While the aircraft's operational relevance has once again been demonstrated during the war with Iran, notably in counter-UAS operations, strikes against Iranian small craft in the Persian Gulf, and its traditional close air support (CAS) role, some question the rationale behind this decision, arguing that the A-10 currently has no direct replacement within the U.S. Air Force. The F-35A, which the Air Force intends to absorb part of the A-10's mission set, is not considered by some members of Congress to be a suitable CAS aircraft. Congress has long supported keeping the Warthog in service despite opposition from the US Air Force.

What can be concluded from this debate? There are arguments on both sides. The issue largely reflects the U.S. Air Force's focus on a potential conflict with China, while members of Congress who support retaining the Warthog seek to preserve capabilities that could prove essential in an asymmetric conflict such as the one with Iran.

The A-10 was developed from the lessons of the Vietnam War. It was designed around low-speed maneuverability for CAS, high survivability under enemy fire, and the ability to operate from minimally prepared airfields. Its performance during the wars in Iraq demonstrated the relevance of this approach. The F-35A, by contrast, was designed as a multirole stealth fighter capable of performing both strike and air superiority missions. During Operation Epic Fury in 2026, the F-35A demonstrated its ability to operate in heavily defended airspace and penetrate sophisticated enemy defenses.

Another major difference is the role of data. The F-35 is designed around extensive sensor integration and information sharing, allowing it to receive and distribute data across the battlespace. The A-10 was not originally designed around this type of networked warfare. Future software and hardware upgrades are expected to further expand the F-35's information-sharing capabilities. The A-10 can carry up to 16 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs, while the F-35A can carry eight internally when operating in a stealth configuration. The A-10's 30 mm GAU-8/A cannon carries up to 1,174 rounds of ammunition. The F-35A's 25 mm gun system carries 181 rounds and does not provide the same anti-armor capability as the GAU-8/A.

The F-35A, however, was designed as a multirole combat aircraft. It can switch between strike, air superiority, and other missions in a way the A-10 cannot. In its stealth configuration, it has demonstrated its ability to penetrate A2/AD (Anti-Access / Area Denial) environments and conduct SEAD/DEAD missions. The F-35A can also defend itself against enemy fighters and conduct air-to-air combat, giving it a level of versatility that the A-10 does not possess.

According to a 2024 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report, using an identical accounting basis, the F-35A costs approximately 60% more per flight hour than the A-10C. The broader question of F-35 sustainment costs is more complex, and reducing operating and maintenance costs remains one of the U.S. Air Force's major priorities. For some missions, particularly counter-UAS operations involving low-cost targets and weapons, using an F-35A may not be economically justified. In such cases, the A-10 could remain relevant, as its use during Operation Epic Fury has demonstrated.

On the other hand, the US Air Force estimated that retiring the entire A-10 fleet would free approximately $423 million annually in operating and maintenance funding. These resources could then be redirected toward other priorities. The US Air Force also argues that the A-10 fleet is aging and cannot continue to perform its missions indefinitely without costly modernization. Maintaining a small fleet of very old aircraft also creates increasing structural, logistical and maintenance costs.

In this scenario, one could argue that the U.S. Air Force's logic becomes clearer when considering the lessons of the war in Ukraine. In an environment where dense air defenses prevent ground-attack aircraft from safely approaching the front line, the A-10 could see its utility reduced, potentially being pushed toward the use of stand-off weapons, much like the Su-25 has increasingly been employed in Ukraine. This could be particularly relevant in a potential conflict with China, where U.S. aircraft would likely face sophisticated and layered air-defense networks. By contrast, the F-35A was designed to operate in highly contested airspace. Its speed, internal weapons bays and stealth characteristics allow it to operate inside or around sophisticated A2/AD defenses and exploit gaps in the enemy's air-defense network.

Its emerging counter-drone capabilities may nevertheless not be enough to justify using such an expensive aircraft against low-cost targets. Other platforms, such as the Air Tractor L3Harris OA-1K Skyraider II, or lower-cost unmanned systems available in larger numbers, could potentially perform some of these missions more economically. Conversely, in asymmetric conflicts or more permissive conventional warfare, the A-10 can provide ground forces with precise and substantial firepower at a relatively moderate cost. The F-35A, by comparison, requires greater deployment infrastructure and has significantly higher operating costs, both in terms of its weapons and its hourly cost of operation.

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