Ukrainian FPV drones hit two Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters in midair strikes over Belgorod.

On October 17, 2026, Ukraine's 115th Separate Mechanized Brigade announced that its Prybultsi air defense unit engaged a second Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter using a modified FPV interceptor drone over Russia's Belgorod region. This midair engagement follows a similar strike against an Mi-28NM on October 14, demonstrating an evolving tactical deployment of low-cost unmanned aerial systems against Russian attack helicopters operating within border airspace. The operations reflect Ukrainian efforts to counter Russian stand-off aviation strikes by adapting long-range VB140 Blyskavka interceptors to penetrate regions affected by active electronic warfare systems.

The two attacks show how Ukraine is increasingly using its relatively inexpensive FPV drones to threaten Russian attack helicopters that were previously able to freely fire guided missiles against Ukrainian forces from inside Russian territory. (Picture source: ZSU_115OMBr)

On October 16, 2026, Ukraine's 115th Separate Mechanized Brigade announced that its soldiers had attacked a second Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter with an interceptor drone in midair over Russia's Belgorod region, following a similar attack against an Mi-28NM on October 14. Both operations were carried out by the brigade's Prybultsi air defense unit, using modified FPV interceptor drones, originally intended to destroy Russian reconnaissance drones, to pursue these Russian helicopters. The first attack occurred near Yasnozorenskoye, 9 km from the front line, while the second was located 4 km farther north, approximately 16 km from Ukrainian positions. The brigade claimed that the helicopters had been shot down, although the recordings end before the impacts and do not establish their loss or the fate of their crews.

The October 14 engagement involved an interceptor approaching the Mi-28NM from above and behind, toward the helicopter's upper-right rear quarter, without establishing whether the aircraft crashed or returned to service. Earlier Russian imagery showed damage near an Mi-28's emergency escape ladder beneath the pilot's cockpit, inconsistent with the interceptor's apparent approach toward the upper fuselage. The October 17 engagement likewise lacks confirmation of permanent aircraft loss. These incidents followed a Mi-28N interception attempt by Ukraine's 427th Rarog Unmanned Systems Brigade in Belgorod on July 15, 2026, and a FPV strike against an Mi-28's tail rotor in Kursk on August 7, 2024.

Related topic: Ukraine's fiber-optic drone shoots down Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter in flight for the first time

Developed in the Soviet Union during the late 1970s as a dedicated two-seat attack helicopter, the Mi-28 first flew on November 10, 1982, while the Mi-28N Night Hunter entered Russian service in October 2009. Its most modernized variant, the Mi-28NM, first flew on October 12, 2016, introducing the H025/N025 mast-mounted radar, digital weapons controls, improved targeting equipment, and two VK-2500P turboshaft engines with electronic management. Russia contracted 98 Mi-28NMs on June 27, 2019, for deliveries scheduled between 2020 and 2027, without confirmation that this schedule has been fulfilled. The related Mi-28NE export configuration has a maximum takeoff weight of 12,100 kg, a maximum speed of 300 to 315 km/h, a cruising speed of 275 to 285 km/h, and a normal range of 420 to 425 km. Its service ceiling reaches 5,600 to 5,650 m, while additional fuel extends ferry range to 1,000-1,015 km.

Considered as one of the most heavily armed and heavily armored attack helicopters in the world, the Mi-28NM Havoc carries a chin-mounted NPPU-28 turret with a 30 × 165 mm 2A42 cannon carrying approximately 250 rounds, with an effective range of 2.5 km, alongside four underwing hardpoints accommodating anti-tank guided missiles, unguided rockets, and other external stores, with configurations carrying up to 16 Ataka missiles or smaller quantities of modernized Khrizantema-M/VM anti-tank missiles which could reach up to 10 km. For longer-distance attacks, the helicopter employs the LMUR missile, also designated Izdeliye 305 or Kh-39, which carries a 25 kg warhead and uses inertial navigation, a two-way data link, and terminal electro-optical guidance, allowing a commonly cited operational range of 14.5 km.

Unlike the Vikhr's continuous laser-beam guidance, the LMUR allows the helicopter to maneuver after launch while the operator retains the ability to receive seeker imagery and provide corrections. The helicopter also carries S-8 80 mm rockets in 20-round B8V-20 pods and S-13 122 mm rockets in five-round B-13 pods, while the Mi-28NE export configuration accommodates up to 2,100 kg of external weapons. However, even a missile launched from 14.5 km does not establish that the helicopter, valued at $18 to 20 million, is 14.5 km away from Ukrainian interceptor operators, particularly when those teams are positioned along the border or have been warned in advance of Russian helicopter movements by neighboring units, which was the case during the October operations.

This is operationally important, as the helicopter was originally protected against missiles, cannon fire, and battlefield damage rather than small FPV drones deliberately pursuing it in flight. Therefore, on June 18, 2026, a Russian Mi-28NM appeared with additional antenna housings on both sides of the nose, above the stub-wing defensive equipment fairings, and along the tail boom while conducting an LMUR missile strike. The arrangement could improve the MI-28NM's electronic warfare capabilities across several directions, including against drone-control transmissions, video downlinks, and satellite-navigation signals. The helicopter's existing missile-approach warning, infrared countermeasures, chaff and flare dispensers, protected fuel tanks, and cockpit armor were also conceived to address threats different from a small FPV interceptor.

Russian helicopter crews consequently face a related problem when conducting counter-UAV missions, particularly against larger Ukrainian strike drones that target Russian military facilities or infrastructure. On September 9, 2026, Russian Mi-28N/NM and Ka-52 helicopters were employed against Ukrainian FP-1 and MICH-2000 drones, including the Mi-28's 30 mm 2A42 cannon. The Mi-28 combines an OPS-28M electro-optical targeting system with the N025 radar, which reportedly detects certain small aerial targets at distances up to 5 km. At a hypothetical relative closing speed of 150 km/h, the 2.5 km between the detection and engagement ranges would be covered in 60 seconds, but the actual engagement interval could be shorter because the radar does not guarantee immediate acquisition of a small drone against terrain clutter.

The Mi-28 can also employ short-range air-to-air missiles such as the 9M342 Igla-S, although infrared seeker acquisition against small electric-powered FPV drones also presents a problem. On February 5, 2026, Rostec subsequently introduced a programmable 30 × 165 mm airburst cartridge for the 2A42 cannon to improve its engagement capabilities through timed fragmentation, but operational integration remains unconfirmed. The Ukrainian interceptions also follow four years of changes in Russian helicopter employment, beginning with low-altitude penetration and direct battlefield support in February 2022. Approximately 34 helicopters participated in the Hostomel assault, and six were reportedly lost, equivalent to 17.6% of the force; by November 2022, at least 23 Ka-52s, six Mi-28s, and eight Mi-24/Mi-35s had already been visually confirmed lost.

During Ukraine's June 2023 counteroffensive, Russian Ka-52 crews increasingly operated behind Zaporizhzhia's minefields, engaging armored vehicles with Vikhr missiles from 8 to 10 km, but its laser-beam guidance required the helicopter to maintain suitable target-tracking geometry during flight. The subsequent employment of LMUR missiles on Mi-28NMs reduced this constraint by allowing crews to maneuver after launch, while retaining operator-assisted guidance through the missile's data link. Ukrainian attacks against Russian aviation also expanded beyond conventional air defense weapons.

This includes an August 2024 FPV engagement against an Mi-28 in Kursk, a December 2024 missile engagement launched from a Magura V5 unmanned surface vessel, and reported drone strikes against Mi-8 and Ka-52 helicopters in November 2025 and March 2026. By October 2026, the Prybultsi unit was using modified VB140 Blyskavka interceptors manufactured by Vinnytski Bdzhоly, which possess a maximum range of 50 km and an operating altitude of 4,500 m. A member of the unit identified by the callsign Hektor explained that the engagements depended on warning from neighboring Ukrainian formations, preparation by interceptor crews, and modifications to the VB140 to operate in areas affected by Russian electronic warfare. During its summer campaign, the same unit also claimed the destruction of one Orion, approximately 20 Orlan, and ten Merlin drones, indicating that Ukrainian units now use this experience to contest some Russian helicopter operating areas beyond the front line.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.