Russia’s jet-powered Shahed-238 drones introduce new challenges to Ukraine’s air defenses.

As reported by RBC Ukraine on July 31, 2025, Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yurii Ihnat stated that Russia has used at least 8 jet-powered Shahed drones in recent large-scale attacks against Ukraine. The drone in question, the Geran-3, is derived from Iran’s Shahed-238, a turbojet-powered loitering munition first presented publicly in November 2023. Ukrainian authorities reported the use of these drones during the July 30–31 attacks, notably in Kyiv and northern regions.
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The Shahed-238, on which the Geran-3 is based, is a long-range turbojet loitering munition with speeds up to 600 kilometers per hour and a maximum flight ceiling of 9,000 meters, placing them well outside the reach of small arms or standard anti-drone weapons. (Picture source: Iranian MoD)

Ihnat stated that the Geran-3 appears on radar with flight parameters similar to cruise missiles, due to its speed exceeding 500 kilometers per hour. These characteristics present difficulties for most of Ukraine’s current defense systems. According to Ukraine’s Air Force Command, the strike on July 30 included 78 Shahed drones, of which 51 were neutralized by a combination of electronic warfare, interceptor drones, mobile fire teams, and anti-air missiles. At least eight of the drones were jet-powered, marking one of the first documented uses of this variant in a coordinated multi-region assault. The overall strike also involved decoy UAVs and eight Iskander-K cruise missiles, resulting in 13 deaths and over 130 injuries.

The Geran-3's design is based on the Iranian Shahed-238, equipped with a Tolou-10 or Tolou-13 turbojet engine. These engines are widely considered unlicensed Iranian derivatives of the Czech PBS TJ100 and TJ150 turbojets. The Geran-3 is estimated to reach speeds of 600 kilometers per hour and altitudes of up to 9,000 meters. The drone’s endurance is approximately two hours, and its takeoff weight is about 380 kilograms, heavier than the earlier 250-kilogram Geran-2 (Shahed-136). The airframe measures roughly 3.5 meters in length with a 3-meter wingspan. Depending on the configuration, the warhead weight ranges from 50 to 300 kilograms, and some models have been observed with thermobaric charges. The radar cross-section is estimated at around 0.05 square meters, and the high-pitched sound emitted by the jet engine differs from the propeller hum of earlier variants, complicating acoustic detection systems like Ukraine’s Sky Fortress. The Geran-3's performance profile places it between traditional drones and cruise missiles in terms of flight behavior and operational use.

Ukrainian authorities confirmed the recovery of Geran-3 debris bearing serial number U-36 in June 2025. Ukrainian military intelligence and OSINT sources suggest that production of these drones is occurring in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. Early production began with Iranian-supplied kits, transitioning over time to increased localization. Components found in downed drones include GNSS antennas, RF transceivers, and microcontrollers of Western civilian origin, including from Canada, Switzerland, and the United States, likely acquired via unauthorized intermediaries due to international sanctions. Structural modifications to the Geran-3 include reinforced fuselages, redesigned air intakes, and increased control surface actuators from four to eight, which may enhance stability and maneuverability. In Iranian demonstrations, these drones completed simulated strike missions and returned via parachute recovery. However, in Russian service they have been used as one-way attack munitions. Iran previously offered to supply Russia with up to 100 jet-powered Shahed-238 drones per month, according to leaked 2023 documents reviewed by Russian engineers evaluating them alongside other UAVs under the Alabuga project.

Several Geran-3 configurations are reportedly in use. The baseline version uses satellite and inertial guidance via GPS and GLONASS. Another model incorporates an infrared imaging seeker for passive terminal guidance. A third variant may use passive radar homing to target air defense radar emissions, and a fourth may include an electro-optical sensor for reconnaissance or visual guidance. All known models are launched either from truck-mounted rails or with the assistance of solid-fuel boosters (JATO). Although there have been suggestions in Russian sources about air-launched variants, no evidence supports operational deployment as of mid-2025. The drones’ combination of speed, altitude, and radar cross-section presents a difficult challenge for Ukraine’s mobile fire groups, which rely on vehicle-mounted machine guns and infrared-guided MANPADS. The Geran-3’s thermal signature, however, makes it susceptible to heat-seeking missiles such as Stingers, Pioruns, and Strela systems, as noted by aviation expert Valerii Romanenko. Romanenko also stated that systems like the German Gepard are capable of engaging targets with higher speeds than the Geran-3.

Ukraine’s response has included the development and fielding of high-speed FPV interceptor drones capable of engaging targets in the air. President Volodymyr Zelensky called for the production of 1,000 such drones per day, though First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov noted limitations in effectiveness against jet-powered Shaheds. Fedorov emphasized the need to respond rapidly to Russia’s daily tactical adaptations. He warned that Russia has begun integrating systems designed to evade current Ukrainian interceptors and stressed the importance of early technical responses before the threat becomes widespread. Ukrainian military observers, including Alexander Kovalenko, suggested that Russia’s use of Geran-3s may have been intended to test the performance of Ukraine’s interceptor drones. Romanenko also stated that Western-supplied fighters armed with Sidewinder and MICA infrared missiles could engage Geran-3s effectively. He added that at speeds of 450 kilometers per hour, these drones fall within the engagement envelope of Ukrainian aircraft using cannons or short-range missiles, and that their speed makes them potentially easier to intercept for fighter aircraft than the slower Shahed-136.

Despite these available countermeasures, the cost imbalance between offensive and defensive systems remains significant. A single AIM-120 AMRAAM missile used by NASAMS systems costs between $500,000 and $1 million, while a Patriot PAC-3 interceptor costs approximately $4 million. In contrast, the production cost of a Shahed-136 is estimated at $20,000 to $50,000. The cost of a jet-powered Shahed-238, based on Iranian and Russian sources, may reach $1.4 million per unit. Russian engineers have noted that the increased production complexity due to stronger airframes, more precise guidance mechanisms, and the need for higher-tolerance manufacturing limits scalability. Furthermore, even though Russia has announced plans to expand production from 2,000 to 5,000 Shahed-136-type drones per month, the inclusion of jet propulsion and additional guidance components reduces overall production speed. These production difficulties, compounded by sanctions and parts shortages, may prevent Russia from fielding the Geran-3 in large volumes. However, their integration in layered drone strikes alongside Geran-2s and cruise missiles serves to strain Ukrainian missile inventories and reduce the number of high-end interceptors available for ballistic threats.

Reports from Ukrainian Air Force Command and Telegram monitoring channels confirm sightings of jet-powered drones on July 30 and 31. In total, Ukraine reported that 27 drones impacted at seven locations, and falling debris from downed drones was recorded in two additional locations. Ukrainian analysts continue to evaluate wreckage and flight data to determine the Geran-3's evolving role. Independent sources suggest that Geran-3 sightings in April, May, and June were also linked to mass drone attacks, including one on May 17–18 when Russia launched 273 drones in a single night. While the percentage of successful drone strikes increased from 5% in Q1 2025 to 15% in Q2, it is not yet clear if Geran-3s were responsible for this rise. Some Ukrainian bloggers and defense media, including Militarnyi, noted that the Geran-3’s performance may outpace many current interceptors but is offset by thermal vulnerabilities.

Meanwhile, Russian media have described the drone as more akin to a cruise missile than a UAV due to its profile and capabilities. The Geran-3’s deployment reflects a Russian strategy to expand its loitering munitions inventory with platforms that can operate at longer ranges, higher altitudes, and faster speeds, with some suggesting they may eventually be adapted for SEAD roles or limited UAV interception missions. No confirmed air-to-air engagements have been reported as of July 2025, though Iranian technical documents mentioned such concepts. Russian production is ongoing, with localized assembly supported by Iranian designs, Chinese electronics, and imported components, potentially reshaping Ukraine’s air defense investment priorities.