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Ukraine confirms first combat use of Iskander-1000 ballistic missile by Russia in Kyiv attack.
Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence confirmed that Russian forces executed the first operational combat launch of the upgraded 9M723-2 ballistic missile, known under the development code Iskander-1000, during a strike on Kyiv. Part of the updated Bora-M complex, the weapon integrates an enlarged solid-propellant motor to expand maximum strike range from 390 km to 550 km while retaining the core 9M723-1 airframe, guidance, and warhead architecture. This extended stand-off distance reduces flight time to target to several minutes and expands launcher positioning flexibility to force air defense systems to cover nearly double the target envelope.
The 9M723-2 ballistic missile introduces a 41 percent range increase over its predecessor to reach 550 kilometers via an upgraded propulsion section and enlarged launcher configuration. Despite foreign dependency across 64.3 percent of its primary electronic components, the initial 2025 procurement was priced at RUB 221 million per unit as Russia scales broader Iskander series output toward 60 to 70 missiles monthly.
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The upgraded 9M723-2 ballistic missile, commonly referred to as Iskander-1000, offers a range increase of 41% compared to the Iskander-M, enabling Russia's mobile launchers to move 160 km farther away from Ukrainian drones. (Picture source: X/MilitaryRussia.Ru)
On August 27, 2026, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence confirmed that Russia had used the 9M723-2 ballistic missile, also known as Iskander-1000, against Kyiv during a combined strike in summer 2026, establishing the first confirmed combat employment of the new member of the Iskander family. The 9M723-2 is said to be related to the Bora-M missile system and reaches 550 km, compared with 390 km for the Iskander-M's 9M723-1 missile, an increase of 160 km or 41%. The missile achieves that increase primarily through a larger and more powerful solid-propellant motor, which also required enlargement of the associated launcher, while the remainder of the missile remains substantially common with the 9M723-1. Russia has therefore increased range without replacing the complete guidance, warhead, control, production and support architecture of the Iskander-M.
An initial order covered only 18 9M723-2 missiles for production in 2025, valued at RUB 221 million per missile, or RUB 3.978 billion for the batch, equivalent to roughly $45 million at the stated $2.5 million unit value. That initial quantity was small compared with Russian 9M723 procurement as a whole, but the missile entered combat at a time when estimated Iskander-M ballistic missile output had risen to 60-70 missiles per month, giving Russia an existing production base from which the longer-range configuration could be expanded. The current 9M723-1 missile measures 7.2 m in length, has a 920 mm body diameter, and a launch mass of 3.8 tonnes, while carrying a 450 kg warhead that can be configured as cluster, high-explosive fragmentation, high-explosive, or penetrating.
The 9M723-2 is therefore more accurately characterized as a range-extension package built around an established missile than as an entirely new ballistic weapon. The first visible indication of the extended-range configuration appeared in May 2024 in material marking the 78th anniversary of the Kapustin Yar test range, while the production of the first identified 18 Iskander-1000 missiles was planned for 2025 and combat use followed in summer 2026. That sequence places no more than about 27 months between the May 2024 appearance and the confirmed operational use of this secretive missile, and only about one year between planned initial production and battlefield employment. The 550 km operational range is 1.41 times that of the 9M723-1's 390 km and gives an Iskander launcher positioned at the same location an additional 160 km of depth against Ukrainian targets behind the front.
The Iskander-1000 program nevertheless extends beyond the currently demonstrated 550 km configuration. Its projected objective reaches as far as 1,000 km, which would be 2.56 times the 390 km range of the 9M723-1 and 1.82 times the range of the operational 9M723-2. Estimates for such a 1,000 km configuration envisage increasing the solid-propellant charge by 10-15%, changing the motor and control system, and potentially reducing warhead mass toward 300 to 350 kg to improve the fuel-to-payload ratio. The propulsion and flight profile explain why a 160 km increase has effects beyond a simple change in map radius. The standard 9M723 is a single-stage solid-fuel quasi-ballistic missile about 7.3 m long and 0.92 m in diameter, with a maximum speed near 2.1 km/s, equivalent to 7,560 km/h.
Unlike a conventional ballistic missile following a fixed high apogee trajectory, the Iskander uses a depressed quasi-ballistic flight path and remains maneuverable, forcing an air defense radar and interceptor to update the predicted collision point as the missile alters its trajectory. The missile combines aerodynamic control with gas-dynamic control and can generate maneuver loads in the 25-30 g range in configurations associated with the extended-range program. At 30 g, instantaneous acceleration reaches roughly 294 m/s², a level sufficient to shift the future intercept point rapidly during the few seconds available to an air defense fire control system, although an actual trajectory takes longer because the missile does not maintain maximum velocity continuously. Even so, flight time to Kyiv from relevant launch areas is reduced to only several minutes.
Increasing stand-off by 160 km means a Russian launcher can remain farther from Ukrainian reconnaissance UAVs, long-range drones, and missiles while maintaining time-to-target characteristics measured in minutes rather than tens of minutes. This is the operational trade: the defender must search a larger rear area for the launcher while receiving little additional warning once the missile is fired. The missile’s guidance and countermeasure package creates a second problem for Patriot interception. The 9M723 can combine autonomous inertial guidance with satellite correction and terminal correction, including optical methods depending on the version. The flight-information processing unit connected to the laser gyroscope contains 43 identified electronic components, but only five are manufactured in Russia.
The other 38 represent 88.4% of the unit’s identified component count and include microprocessors, FPGAs, memory devices, digital-to-analog converters and analog-to-digital converters from foreign manufacturers. This dependence is concentrated in the electronics that calculate navigation, process sensor data and generate flight-control commands, rather than in secondary mechanical assemblies. The Iskander can also use a modernized 9B899 penetration module during the terminal phase, releasing decoys, dipole reflectors and other radar countermeasures that produce additional returns and force the defensive radar to distinguish the missile body from false targets within a very short engagement window. The resulting engagement problem consists of several factors acting simultaneously: a missile moving at speeds measured in kilometers per second, a non-fixed trajectory, terminal maneuvering, radar countermeasures, and only minutes between detection and impact.
The Patriot and SAMP/T are among the few Western systems designed to counter such threats, but every additional ballistic target consumes radar attention, interceptor inventory, and engagement channels, particularly when ballistic missiles arrive within a larger strike that also includes cruise missiles and kamikaze drones. The 9M723-2/Iskander-1000 also retains the warhead flexibility of the existing Iskander family rather than exchanging payload versatility for range. The baseline 9M723-1 carries a 450 kg warhead, while a broader standard 9M723 figure reaches roughly 480 kg. The available configurations include high-explosive fragmentation, high-explosive, penetrating, and cluster payloads. A penetrating warhead can concentrate its effect against reinforced structures, hardened command facilities or protected storage sites, while a unitary high-explosive or fragmentation warhead is better suited to buildings, communications infrastructure, logistics installations and other point targets.
Cluster configurations are intended for targets distributed over a larger footprint, such as parked aircraft, air defense equipment, vehicle concentrations or ammunition areas. The extended-range development creates a direct propulsion-payload trade-off. Retaining a warhead near 450 to 480 kg at 550 km is operationally different from reaching 1,000 km while reducing warhead mass toward 300 to 350 kg. A reduction from 450 kg to 350 kg would remove 100 kg, or 22.2%, of payload mass; a reduction to 300 kg would remove 150 kg, or one third. Road mobility multiplies the effect of the additional missile range. The Iskander family is built around transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) rather than fixed firing positions, allowing a unit to move, stop, prepare two missiles, fire them, and leave the launch area. This architecture has its roots in a development program that began in the late Soviet period and continued through the 1990s, with the Iskander-M configuration entering Russian service in the mid-2000s.
The standard launcher uses the MZKT-7930 8×8 chassis and carries two missiles, giving each TEL two ready rounds before reloading. A launcher measuring roughly 13.07 m long and 3.07 m wide and weighing 40 to 43.2 tonnes can reach 70 km/h on roads, 40 km/h on unpaved roads, and 20 km/h cross-country, with road endurance close to 1,000 km. From movement, launch preparation requires about 16 minutes; from the highest readiness state, the process can be reduced to roughly four minutes, and the two missiles can be fired at separate targets with about one minute between launches. The difference between 390 km and 550 km becomes particularly clear in area terms: π × 390² gives 477,836 km², while π × 550² gives 950,332 km². The theoretical area within maximum missile range therefore increases by 472,496 km², or 98.9%, even though linear range rises by only 41%.
Real coverage is further constrained by national borders, terrain, road access and target geography, but Ukraine must nevertheless search a substantially deeper belt for launchers that can relocate by road over distances approaching twice the missile’s own 550 km strike range. Russian procurement volumes will determine whether the new Iskander-1000 missile remains a limited weapon or becomes a regular element of its long-range strike packages. The Machine-Building Design Bureau received an order listed as 1,202 missiles of various 9M723 modifications for 2024-2025, with 589 scheduled in 2024 and 643 in 2025. Those annual quantities actually total 1,232 missiles, leaving a 30-round discrepancy with the stated 1,202 total.
The subtype quantities reproduce the same 1,232 figure: 771 9M723-1F2 fragmentation-high-explosive missiles, 217 9M723-1F3 missiles, 185 9M723-1K5 cluster-warhead missiles and 59 9M723-1F1 missiles. The 18-round 9M723-2 order therefore equaled 1.46% of the 1,232 missiles represented by those subtype quantities. At RUB 221 million per 9M723-2, 18 rounds cost RUB 3.978 billion; 50 rounds at the same unit value would cost RUB 11.05 billion, 100 would cost RUB 22.1 billion, and 500 would cost RUB 110.5 billion. Estimated production by spring 2026 had reached 60 to 70 Iskander-M ballistic missiles per month, plus about 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles. At 65 missiles per month, Russia would manufacture the numerical equivalent of the initial 18-round batch every 8.3 days.
The principal uncertainty is therefore no longer whether the 9M723-2 can be manufactured and used operationally, but how much of a high-volume production system Russia chooses to allocate to the longer-range configuration. The industrial structure of that production line is unusually important because the 9M723-2 preserves extensive commonality with the missile already being manufactured at scale. At least 35 enterprises are associated with the Iskander production, while 140 identified components provide a measurable picture of the supply chain. Only about one quarter, equivalent to roughly 35 components, are manufactured in Russia.
Sixty-three components originate from U.S. manufacturers, accounting for 45.0% of all 140 identified components; eight are Swiss, and eight Belarusian, each 5.7%; four are German and four Taiwanese, each 2.9%; and three are Chinese, or 2.1%. Those explicitly identified foreign categories total 90 components, or 64.3% of the entire set, while the guidance processing unit alone contains 38 foreign components out of 43. The industrial advantage of the 9M723-2 is therefore commonality: Russia does not need a separate supply chain for a completely different missile if the guidance electronics, warhead family, control equipment, and much of the airframe remain shared with the 9M723-1.
Only the propulsion section and launcher geometry required the principal changes identified for the 550 km variant. Russia has simultaneously increased its ballistic missile inventory through the North Korean supply of KN-23, KN-24, and KN-30 missiles. This creates a layered Russian ballistic inventory in which more accurate Iskander-K, Iskander-M, and Iskander-1000 missiles can be reserved for compact or hardened aimpoints while North Korean weapons can be allocated to larger targets where a 50-100 m miss distance is less consequential.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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