Poland Unveils 40-Ton CBWP Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle to Fight Alongside U.S. and European Tanks.

Poland’s Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) and Huta Stalowa Wola (HSW) unveiled a more than 40-ton Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle, known in Polish as CBWP (Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty), at MSPO 2026 in Kielce, designed to operate alongside M1 Abrams and other main battle tanks in high-intensity combat. The CBWP demonstrator combines an engine producing more than 1,000 hp with the ZSSW-30 turret armed with a 30 mm Bushmaster II cannon and Spike-LR anti-tank missiles, while provision for an active protection system is intended to improve survivability against modern anti-armor threats.

Presented on September 8, 2026, the full-size demonstrator appears as U.S. made M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks enter service with the Polish Army alongside the M1A1 Abrams fleet already fielded by Polish armored units. HSW is targeting further prototype development and testing before readiness for serial production in 2029, positioning the CBWP as a future heavy infantry fighting vehicle able to give Abrams-equipped formations a more survivable mechanized infantry component.

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The new Polish CBWP (Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty, or Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle) was unveiled by PGZ and Huta Stalowa Wola at MSPO 2026 in Kielce, Poland. The more-than-40-ton tracked combat vehicle is designed to operate alongside U.S. and European main battle tanks. (Picture source: Army Recognition Group)

The CBWP (Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty, or Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle) is being developed around a survivability requirement that differs fundamentally from that of Poland’s amphibious Borsuk infantry fighting vehicle. Polish reporting places the new vehicle at around 40 tonnes compared with approximately 28 tonnes for Borsuk, with the additional mass intended to support stronger ballistic and mine protection rather than amphibious capability. That tradeoff is central to its intended role: carrying infantry close enough to M1 Abrams and South Korean K2 tanks to clear anti-tank teams, secure defended terrain and remain effective under artillery, drone and missile threats.

An 800 kW powerpack, equivalent to more than 1,000 hp, provides mobility, and the demonstrator reportedly uses an MTU engine coupled to an American transmission. The power reserve matters because a heavy infantry fighting vehicle must keep pace with the tanks it supports despite carrying far more armor than lighter vehicles. For the Polish Army, this means the CBWP is being designed not simply as a protected troop carrier, but as a combat vehicle expected to maneuver inside the same high-threat battlespace as its Abrams-equipped armored formations.

Firepower is centered on the Polish ZSSW-30 unmanned turret already selected for the Borsuk and used on Rosomak wheeled armored vehicles. The turret carries a 30 mm Mk44/S Bushmaster II automatic cannon, a coaxial machine gun, and Spike-LR anti-tank guided missiles, giving the CBWP the ability to engage infantry, light and medium armored vehicles, and heavier targets at extended range. The Bushmaster family also provides a clear point of reference for a U.S. defense audience familiar with American infantry fighting vehicle armament, while the Spike missile adds long-range anti-armor capability suited to dispersed and heavily contested battlefields.

Polish media have also reported that the CBWP design could accommodate alternative weapons, including a 40 mm cannon, while a future fire-support configuration with a 105 mm gun has been discussed as technically possible. This suggests PGZ and HSW are developing the vehicle with enough growth margin to support heavier weapons and future mission variants rather than locking the design into a single combat configuration.

Survivability remains the defining feature of the CBWP concept. The vehicle is intended to combine enhanced ballistic and mine protection with smoke grenade launchers, nuclear, biological, and chemical protection, blast-attenuating seating, and provisions for an active protection system capable of intercepting incoming anti-tank weapons. These features directly reflect Ukraine war lessons, where tracked combat vehicles face overlapping threats from artillery fragments, anti-tank guided missiles, mines, loitering munitions, and first-person-view drones.

The Ukraine war has highlighted a persistent survivability gap between heavily protected main battle tanks and lighter infantry fighting vehicles supporting them. If infantry carriers cannot remain close to tanks under the same intensity of fire, dismounted troops may be forced to deploy too early or from greater distances, reducing the effectiveness of combined-arms operations. Poland’s heavy infantry fighting vehicle is intended to narrow that gap by giving mechanized infantry more protection and power than Borsuk while retaining enough mobility and firepower to remain integrated with armored units.

The distinction between CBWP and Borsuk is therefore doctrinal as much as technical. Borsuk remains suited to formations that value amphibious mobility, lower weight and easier strategic movement, while the heavier CBWP is intended for units where protection takes priority over swimming capability. Poland could consequently field two complementary tracked infantry fighting vehicles optimized for different missions rather than forcing a single design to satisfy conflicting operational requirements.

For a U.S. audience, the M2A4 Bradley provides a useful benchmark rather than a direct equivalent. The upgraded Bradley weighs roughly 36 tonnes and carries a three-person crew plus seven infantry soldiers, with a 25 mm M242 automatic cannon and TOW anti-tank missiles. The Polish CBWP is heavier at around 40 tonnes, uses a larger 30 mm Bushmaster II cannon, and combines that weapon with Spike-LR missiles and more than 1,000 hp of engine power.

The Bradley comparison is relevant because it shows how Poland is approaching the same fundamental balance between protection, firepower, and mobility from a different starting point. The Bradley accumulated additional armor and survivability upgrades over decades of service and combat experience, while the CBWP is being designed from the outset with a higher protection and power margin. The two infantry fighting vehicles were developed under different requirements and should not be treated as direct counterparts, but both illustrate the challenge of keeping mechanized infantry survivable enough to operate with main battle tanks.

That challenge matters for the Polish Army because M1 Abrams tanks are becoming a central element of its heavy armored force. Warsaw is fielding U.S.-made M1A1 Abrams and M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks while also expanding its South Korean-made K2 Black Panther fleet, creating a requirement for infantry that can maneuver and survive in the same threat environment. A lighter amphibious infantry fighting vehicle remains valuable, but it does not necessarily provide the protection margin required for every armored brigade mission.

The CBWP therefore fits into a broader restructuring of Poland’s land forces. Rather than replacing Borsuk, the heavy infantry fighting vehicle could equip formations expected to fight directly with Abrams and K2 tanks, while Borsuk serves units where amphibious mobility and lower combat weight remain essential. This two-tier approach would give the Polish Army greater flexibility across different terrain and mission profiles while improving the survivability of infantry assigned to its heaviest armored formations.

Industrial commonality is another important part of the program. By using the ZSSW-30 turret and other systems already associated with Polish armored vehicle projects, PGZ and HSW can reduce development risk and simplify training, maintenance, and logistics across the future fleet. Shared subsystems with Borsuk could also help Poland sustain both vehicles domestically while preserving different levels of protection and mobility for different operational requirements.

The vehicle shown at MSPO remains a technology demonstrator rather than a finalized production-standard infantry fighting vehicle. Further work is expected to include prototype construction, powerpack integration, field testing, reliability trials and full-scale ballistic and mine-resistance testing. The final armor package, active protection system and detailed equipment configuration will depend on further development and Polish Army requirements.

HSW is targeting readiness for serial production in 2029, but that date should be understood as an industrial objective rather than a confirmed service-entry date. The program's pace will depend on test results, the final procurement framework, and whether Poland decides to fund the CBWP as a major complement to Borsuk within its expanding armored forces.

If PGZ and HSW can translate the MSPO demonstrator into a mature production vehicle, Poland could enter the next decade with a clearer division between lighter amphibious mechanized forces and heavily protected infantry units built to fight alongside M1 Abrams and K2 tanks. The CBWP’s significance lies not simply in its 40-ton weight, 1,000-plus horsepower engine, Bushmaster cannon or Spike missiles, but in Poland’s effort to apply Ukraine war lessons to a central problem of modern armored warfare: ensuring that the infantry supporting main battle tanks can survive, maneuver, and fight in the same threat environment.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.