Poland Backs A2 Harpun Catamaran Naval Drone for Baltic Surveillance and One Way Strike Missions.

Presented on 9 September at MSPO 2026 in Kielce, the A2 Harpun from ALA.COM reflects how the Polish defense industry is seeking to turn recent lessons from unmanned naval warfare into exportable capabilities for allied forces. MSPO, the International Defence Industry Exhibition held from 8 to 11 September, brings together governments, military staffs and defense companies.

ALA.COM displayed the A2 Harpun catamaran USV for maritime surveillance, infrastructure protection and one-way strike missions. The system positions a Polish-developed unmanned naval platform within NATO and U.S. efforts to expand autonomous maritime capabilities in the Baltic Sea. The A2 Harpun is the catamaran variant of ALA.COM’s Harpun family and is intended to translate recent operational lessons from unmanned naval warfare into capabilities for allied forces. Its presentation at MSPO places the platform within a defense environment where governments, military staffs and industry are examining wider integration of autonomous systems for maritime security and contested operations.

For more developments from Poland, see our MSPO 2026 coverage.

A2 Harpun catamaran unmanned surface vessel was presented by Polish company ALA.COM at MSPO 2026 in Kielce for maritime surveillance, infrastructure protection, and one-way strike missions. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

Harpun is ALA.COM’s family of unmanned surface vehicles, structured around the A1 Flagship, A2 Catamaran, and A3 Swarm variants. At Kielce, the A2 Harpun corresponds to the twin-hull catamaran version, with fuel distributed between both hulls. ALA.COM states a hull length of 4.9 meters, a range of 700 km, and a speed of about 55 km/h, or 30 knots. Propulsion is provided by a 70 to 80 hp engine, while payload capacity can reach 500 kg.

The A2 Harpun is designed around two mission profiles. In the reconnaissance configuration, it carries an observation mast and an EO/IR turret listed as standard equipment. In a second configuration, the same platform can be prepared for a coordinated one-way strike. ALA.COM states that this adaptation can be set by the operator rather than requiring modification at a shipyard. Publicly available data does not specify the maximum sea state, the exact type of data link or the degree of autonomy, which limits how the stated range can be interpreted in operational terms.

This issue becomes more relevant when the platform is viewed within the company’s wider system architecture. ALA.COM is also developing ALA Command, a C2 layer intended to combine UAVs, USVs, UGVs and existing systems into a common operational picture using NATO APP-6 symbology. The company lists RF, LTE, mesh and SATCOM links together with AES-256 encryption. There is no public indication that all of these functions are fitted to the A2 shown at MSPO, but the architecture points to an effort to connect maritime platforms to a multidomain command network.

The Ukrainian experience gives this concept an immediate operational reference. Since 2022, Ukraine has employed naval drones in the Black Sea for reconnaissance and attacks against Russian vessels, before expanding their use into broader mission sets. On 31 December 2024, Ukrainian military intelligence reported that a Magura V5 armed with R-73 missiles shot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter off Crimea. The comparison with the A2 Harpun, is not technical, as no direct lineage has been claimed, but operational. A compact USV can produce effects beyond its size when integrated into an ISR chain, employed in numbers and adapted in response to enemy countermeasures.

The United States is pursuing two complementary approaches. In Europe, U.S. Sixth Fleet’s Task Force 66 integrates robotic and autonomous systems with allied forces and explicitly draws lessons from what it describes as the Ukrainian “Black Sea Battle Lab.” During BALTOPS 25, it employed USVs for maritime domain awareness and contested logistics. In the U.S. Fifth Fleet area, Task Force 59 has tested the Saildrone Explorer since 2021. About 7 meters long, wind-powered and equipped with solar-powered sensors, one platform operated continuously for more than 30 days in the Gulf of Aqaba, illustrating the use of unmanned systems for persistent presence and data collection.

The A2 Harpun sits between these two approaches. Its 30-knot speed and strike configuration are oriented toward more dynamic missions than a Saildrone, while its EO/IR turret supports surveillance roles. Used as an ISR picket, it could extend observation around a port or offshore energy infrastructure without exposing a crew. Employed in groups, several units could create multiple approach vectors and impose an additional burden on opposing defenses. Against a protected warship, however, the A2 would remain vulnerable to small arms, electronic warfare, and dedicated counter-USV systems. Its effectiveness would therefore depend on coordination, intelligence support and the ability to complicate or saturate defensive responses.

The NATO context reinforces this assessment. Task Force X-Baltic, established to support Baltic Sentry, tested more than 70 aerial, surface and subsurface drones in 2025 for persistent ISR missions and the protection of critical infrastructure. In February 2026, eight Allies, including Poland, agreed to accelerate the acquisition of multidomain maritime capabilities. For European security, the A2 Harpun therefore appears at the intersection of Ukrainian combat experience, U.S. integration methods and NATO requirements for persistent coverage on the eastern flank. Its military value will depend less on the stated range alone than on interoperability, communications resilience and integration into allied command networks. Platforms in this category could contribute to distributed maritime presence and the protection of cables, ports and energy infrastructure in the Baltic region.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.