Spanish EM&E Reveals ODIN 6x6 Counter-Drone Vehicle with Radar Jamming and 30 mm Gun.

Spanish company EM&E Group unveiled the ODIN 6×6 counter-drone system at Eurosatory 2026 in Paris on 16 June, placing a full detect-to-defeat air defense chain on a protected FEROX 6×6 armored vehicle. The system matters because it gives deployed forces a mobile shield against small drones, reducing reliance on fixed sites or dismounted teams.

ODIN 6×6 combines radar, radio-frequency detection, electro-optics, command-and-control, jamming, interceptor drones, laser-guided micro-missiles and a 30 mm remote weapon station in one platform. This layered design is built for fast-moving drone threats seen in Ukraine, the Middle East and border-security missions, where crews must detect, identify and defeat targets within seconds.

Related topic: FN Herstal Unveils FN MAG Tactical Long Rail Machine Gun for Thermal and Night Vision Optics.

EM&E Group’s ODIN 6×6 counter-UAS system integrates radar, RF detection, electro-optics, jamming, interceptor drones, laser-guided micro-missiles and a 30 mm remote weapon station on a FEROX 6×6 armored vehicle for mobile protection against drone threats (Picture source: EM&E).

The ODIN 6×6 configuration is part of a broader family of counter-unmanned aerial systems developed by EM&E Group around a modular architecture. The company identifies three main variants: ODIN-I for tactical use on military vehicles or deployable configurations, ODIN-L for rapid-response short-range protection, and ODIN-S for fixed-site surveillance and protection. The 6×6 version presented at Eurosatory extends this architecture to an armored vehicle, with the objective of integrating detection, identification, tracking, and neutralization functions into a single mobile system. This is relevant for units that cannot rely only on static protection around bases, airfields, or command posts and need counter-drone coverage during movement, halts, resupply activity, or temporary deployment.

The sensor package is designed around several complementary detection methods rather than a single surveillance channel. Four three-dimensional radars provide local air surveillance and track generation, including altitude data, which is necessary for following low-flying drones operating close to terrain, buildings, or vegetation. Radio-frequency sensors can detect emissions from control links or data transmission when the drone is not fully autonomous. Electro-optical systems then provide the operator with visual identification through day and thermal imagery, supported by laser rangefinding when connected to the weapon station. This layered approach is important because small drones have limited radar cross-section, can fly at low speed, and may appear in cluttered environments where birds, friendly drones, and non-hostile aerial objects can complicate classification.

The command-and-control suite is the central element of the system. It receives information from radars, RF sensors, and electro-optical devices, correlates the tracks, and presents the crew with a consolidated air picture. EM&E Group states that artificial intelligence is used to support automatic threat classification. In operational terms, this should be understood as an aid to reduce operator workload rather than a replacement for human engagement decisions. In a realistic tactical environment, the crew must still take into account rules of engagement, friendly drone activity, civilian airspace constraints, and the risk of collateral damage before selecting an effector. The value of the C2 layer is that it shortens the time between first detection and engagement, which is one of the decisive factors in countering small unmanned aircraft.

ODIN 6×6 combines soft-kill and hard-kill responses. The soft-kill function relies on electronic countermeasures designed to interfere with radio-frequency control links and satellite navigation signals. This can be effective against drones dependent on remote control or GPS-based navigation, but its effect may be reduced against pre-programmed routes, hardened datalinks, frequency-agile systems, or drones using autonomous terminal guidance. For this reason, the system also includes kinetic effectors. The two interceptor drones provide a direct physical option against hostile unmanned aircraft, using optical guidance to close with the target. Laser-guided micro-missiles add another precision engagement layer, particularly useful when the target is beyond the preferred gun engagement geometry or when a more controlled kinetic response is required.

The most visible armament element is the GUARDIAN 2.0 PRO remote weapon station fitted with a 30 mm M230LF cannon. This is a significant choice for counter-drone missions because 30 mm ammunition offers greater projectile mass and terminal effect than 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine-gun fire. Against small aerial targets, the issue is not only destructive power but also the probability of a hit during a short engagement window. A drone may present a very small target profile, change speed or altitude, and approach from a direction that gives the operator only seconds to respond. The remote weapon station therefore depends on stabilization, target tracking, ballistic calculation, and the quality of the electro-optical sighting system as much as on the cannon itself.

The M230LF is an externally powered 30 mm cannon derived from the M230 family and commonly associated with lighter 30 mm weapon installations than systems using larger 30×173 mm ammunition. Its relevance for a vehicle-mounted counter-drone system is the balance between firepower, recoil management and integration weight. A 30 mm gun allows the vehicle to engage small drones, loitering munitions and light ground threats while maintaining the crew under armor. It also gives the system a secondary self-defense role against unarmored vehicles, exposed firing positions or dismounted threats, although the primary mission remains counter-UAS defense. For a tactical unit, this means ODIN 6×6 is not simply a jammer on wheels but an armed local air-defense asset with limited ground-defense utility.

EM&E Group’s wider remote weapon portfolio provides additional context. The GUARDIAN 2.0 family can be configured with weapons including the M2 heavy machine gun, M240, MG3, MG4, MK-19 automatic grenade launcher, M230 cannon and M134D minigun. The company also markets the SENTINEL 30 remote weapon station with the Mk44S Bushmaster 30 mm cannon, 30×173 mm ammunition, a 200-round ammunition capacity and compatibility with programmable air-burst munitions. These details are relevant because counter-drone defeat increasingly depends on ammunition effects as much as sensor detection. Air-burst or fragmentation ammunition can increase the chance of damaging small aerial targets without requiring a direct hit, although the press release on ODIN 6×6 does not state whether such ammunition is part of the displayed configuration.

Mounted on the FEROX 6×6 armored vehicle, the system is intended to operate closer to maneuver units than a fixed counter-UAS installation. A mobile counter-drone vehicle can protect convoys, artillery positions, logistic nodes, command vehicles and temporary assembly areas. Relocation is possible as the defended unit moves, which is increasingly important in environments where drones are used for artillery spotting, route reconnaissance, direct attack and target confirmation. A single vehicle can contribute to a layered defense when networked with other sensors, electronic warfare teams, short-range air-defense weapons and passive protection measures.

The operational question for ODIN 6×6 is therefore to determine if the complete sensor-effector chain can function under battlefield conditions. Performance will depend on radar detection against very small drones, RF detection when the target is silent or autonomous, electro-optical identification in poor weather or smoke, jammer effectiveness against resistant links, ammunition availability for the 30 mm cannon, and crew training under compressed engagement timelines. Its value for armed forces would be highest in missions where drones are persistent, but threats vary in type, range, and behavior, requiring the crew to move between jamming, interception, guided micro-missile engagement, and cannon fire without relying on separate vehicles for each function.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News